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A d e k e y e  A d e b A J o
Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, South Africa
it was fortuitous that, after five years, i was able to take time out from my 
position as the executive director of the Centre for Conflict resolution 
(CCr), in Cape town, South Africa, in 2008/9 to spend a five-month 
sabbatical in the wonderful surroundings of the Centre of African Studies 
(CAS) at Cambridge university in england. in pursuit of its pan-
African vision, the overall theme of CCr’s Africa program in 2008–12 was 
“Peacebuilding in Africa,” with a book planned specifically to assess the 
continent’s peacebuilding challenges. under the dynamic supervision of 
devon Curtis, CAS was itself preparing a book project on the same topic. 
this volume is the result of the fruitful marriage of both projects between 
an African institution and a european institution, involving scholars 
from Africa, europe, and north America, as well as an indian-Australian 
scholar. Several of the authors have practical experience of peacebuilding 
in Africa. thematic debates involving issues of mediation, governance, 
the security sector, disarmament, and demobilization are combined here 
with assessments of African and global institutions, bolstered by rich case 
studies spanning the great lakes region, Southern Africa, West Africa, 
and the Horn of Africa. this is truly a unique volume, which we hope 
scholars, civil society activists, and practitioners around the world work-
ing on peacebuilding issues in Africa will find useful.
 A seminar at the university of Cambridge in march 2009 helped 
shape the conceptual and empirical contents of this project. five months 
later, CCr organized and largely funded a policy seminar in gaborone, 
in cooperation with the universities of botswana and Cambridge, at-
tended by about forty scholars and practitioners. my colleagues at the 
Centre for Conflict resolution deserve particular praise for the flawless 
organization of this logistically challenging meeting. Commissioned pa-
pers were presented at the seminar over three days, and authors received 
feedback to revise their chapters in a rigorous editing process. A few 
more chapters were commissioned based on gaps identified at the ga-
borone seminar. We thank all the authors for cooperating so efficiently 
with this arduous process. i particularly acknowledge the contributions 
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of devon Curtis, who did the most to shape and edit the book (includ-
ing spending a few weeks in Cape town in 2010 completing this proj-
ect). i also thank the director of CAS, megan vaughan, for supporting 
this collaboration. devon Curtis’s co-editor and former CCr colleague, 
gwinyayi dzinesa, also deserves recognition for his contributions. i take 
this opportunity to pay tribute to glenn Cowley, former publisher of the 
university of kwaZulu-natal Press, with whom CCr published seven 
important books on Africa’s post–Cold War international relations. At 
the gaborone seminar in August 2009, he skillfully chaired a session on 
how to turn the papers into a coherent edited volume. glenn unfortu-
nately died in may 2011, and his great warmth, experience, and insights 
will be sorely missed.
 CCr, one of the very few centers of excellence on the un’s role in 
Africa, has established its expertise in this important area, organizing 
important policy seminars since 2004 on critical peacebuilding chal-
lenges in Southern, West, eastern, and Central Africa that involved key 
actors from the African union (Au), Africa’s regional organizations, 
civil society, the un, and external donor representatives. the center has 
also published three books on un peacebuilding issues, as well as three 
other volumes covering issues of transitional justice in Africa, Africa’s 
human rights architecture, and the African union and its institutions.
 Peacebuilding was popularized in the 1992 publication, An Agenda 
for Peace, by the first African united nations secretary-general, egypt’s 
boutros boutros-ghali. Africa has since become the world’s most im-
portant peacebuilding laboratory, making this book particularly timely 
in assessing two decades of post–Cold War peacebuilding experiences 
on the continent. the concept of peacebuilding is often associated with 
the “second generation” of post–Cold War un missions in countries 
such as namibia, Angola, mozambique, and Somalia, where efforts were 
made to adopt a holistic approach to peace. more recent cases, also cov-
ered in this book, have involved the democratic republic of the Congo 
(drC), burundi, rwanda, Sierra leone, liberia, nigeria’s niger delta, 
and Sudan. not only are diplomatic and military tools employed in 
building peace; today’s peacebuilders also focus on the political, social, 
and economic causes of conflicts, as well as the need to promote socio-
economic justice.
 the peacebuilding office established by the un in liberia in 1997 
was the first ever such office. others were subsequently established in 
Sierra leone, Central African republic (CAr), guinea-bissau, Angola, 
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and burundi. there are also un peacebuilding offices for west Africa, 
central Africa, and the great lakes region. both the un High-level 
Panel report of 2004 and the 2005 report In Larger Freedom, by the sec-
ond African un secretary-general, ghana’s kofi Annan, called for the 
establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuild-
ing Support office within the un secretariat. both were approved by 
the un general Assembly in december 2005 and established in 2006. 
the Peacebuilding Commission aims to improve un postconflict plan-
ning, focusing particularly on establishing viable institutions, ensuring 
financing in the period between the end of hostilities and the convening 
of donor conferences, and improving the coordination of un bodies 
and other key regional and global actors. this commission is mandated 
to interact both with the un Security Council and its economic and 
Social Council (eCoSoC), and involves the participation of interna-
tional financial institutions such as the World bank and the African 
development bank (Af db).
 the un Peacebuilding Commission is composed of thirty-one mem-
bers from the Security Council, eCoSoC, and the most significant 
contributors of financial support and peacekeeping troops to the un. 
the first chair of the commission in 2006 was Angola’s respected per-
manent representative to the un, ismael gaspar martins, and the first 
two countries to be reviewed were burundi and Sierra leone. the 
commission has also been involved in guinea-bissau, Central African 
republic, and liberia, and Africa remains its main theater of work. A 
multiyear standing fund was established with voluntary contributions. 
However, based on un experiences in rwanda, Sierra leone, liberia, 
and Central African republic, many Africans feel that this commis-
sion may represent yet another effort at political alchemy that does not 
do enough to mobilize the resources required for effective postconflict 
reconstruction efforts in Africa. the first six years of the commission’s 
existence have proved disappointing and have so far failed to match the 
great expectations at its birth that it would promote improved peace-
building in Africa and improve un coordination in the field.
 Africa, however, remains the continent most in need of effective 
peacebuilding to ensure that countries emerging from conflict do not 
relapse into war because of a lack of strong institutions and adequate 
resources to ensure that fighters bid a final farewell to arms. African re-
gional bodies are also seeking a role in peacebuilding efforts on the con-
tinent, though they often lack the resources. A proper division of labor 
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must therefore be established between African security and financial 
institutions, external donors, the un, and the World bank—another 
important topic tackled in this book.
 last but certainly not least, i wish to thank the main funders of CCr’s 
Africa program—the governments of denmark, the netherlands, and 
Sweden—who provided the support for holding the botswana seminar 
in 2009, commissioning chapters, and disseminating this book, as well 
as the report and policy brief from the project. We hope that this unique 
study will contribute to efforts to shape a more effective peacebuilding 
architecture on the continent in pursuit of Pax Africana.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The Contested Politics of  
Peacebuilding in Africa
d e v o n  C u r t i S
t h e  A f r i C A n  u n i o n  ( A u )  d e C l A r e d  2 0 1 0  t o  b e  t h e  “A f r i C A n  y e A r 
of Peace and Security,” with the campaign slogan urging people to 
“make Peace Happen.” At a meeting in tripoli in August 2009, Afri-
can leaders committed themselves to dealing with conflict and violence, 
saying: “We as leaders simply cannot bequeath the burden of conflict 
to the next generation of Africans.”1 the chairperson of the African 
union Commission, Jean Ping, said that “of the many challenges facing 
the Au and Africa, the quest for peace and security is the most press-
ing” and reaffirmed the Au’s commitment to peacebuilding efforts, in 
partnership with the international community.2
 indeed, Africa has been the site of a large number of international 
and continental projects to promote peace. in 2011, Africa hosted seven 
of the sixteen united nations (un) peacekeeping missions in the world. 
the first five countries on the agenda of the united nations Peacebuild-
ing Commission, established in december 2005, are all African: Sierra 
leone, burundi, the Central African republic (CAr), guinea-bissau, 
and liberia. the first four cases before the international Criminal 
Court (iCC) are also all African: uganda, the democratic republic of 
the Congo (drC), Sudan, and the CAr.3
 the Au’s 2010 declaration therefore appears to be backed by a range 
of institutions, mechanisms, and programs to help build peace on the 
continent. furthermore, the increased attention to peacebuilding in 
2
devon Curtis
Africa has occurred alongside an overall decrease in violent conflict on 
the continent. the 2007 Human Security brief published by the Human 
Security Centre shows that between 1999 and 2006, the number of 
state-based and non-state-based armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa 
declined significantly.4 the number of battle deaths also declined, with 
the fatality toll dropping by two-thirds in sub-Saharan Africa between 
2002 and 2006.5 the 2006 Human Security brief said that the greatest 
decline in armed conflict was in sub-Saharan Africa, with the result that 
it was no longer the world’s most conflict-affected region.6 both briefs 
suggested that this decline was related to the major increase in interna-
tional efforts to end wars and prevent them from restarting, including 
peacebuilding missions.7
 this volume is a critical reflection on peacebuilding efforts in Africa. 
in light of new global and African institutions, initiatives, and activities 
set up in support of peacebuilding efforts, the time is ripe for a reassess-
ment of peacebuilding concepts, practices, and implications in Africa. 
the contributors to the volume interrogate whether the optimism re-
flected in policy reports is merited, and question how and why certain 
peacebuilding ideas and initiatives are adopted over other ones in Africa.
 the volume grows out of a collaborative project between the Centre 
of African Studies at the university of Cambridge in the united king-
dom, and the Centre for Conflict resolution (CCr), based in Cape 
town, South Africa, involving Africa-based as well as Western-based 
scholars with diverse perspectives on peacebuilding in Africa. the vol-
ume represents a small selection of the work presented by scholars from 
a weekly Cambridge seminar series in 2008–9, at the march 2009 Cam-
bridge workshop “rethinking Peacebuilding in Africa,” and at a large 
international conference of scholars and peacebuilding practitioners 
organized by CCr in gaborone, botswana, in August 2009, in col-
laboration with the university of botswana and the Cambridge Centre 
of African Studies. Although not all of this work is included here, the 
contributions of all participants have helped inform the ideas and argu-
ments in this volume.
 taken together, the contributions in this volume show that there is 
no consensus about the role, aims, and effects of continental and inter-
national peacebuilding programs and initiatives in Africa. the contrib-
utors highlight that although the local, regional, and global spaces for 
peace in Africa have been altered through discourses and practices of 
peacebuilding, these practices play out differently in different locales. 
3
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Peacebuilding ideas and initiatives are at various times reinforced, 
questioned, subverted, or reappropriated and redesigned by different 
African actors. thus, the trajectories of peacebuilding programs and 
initiatives tend to be messy and multifaceted. Procedures and practices 
established in one venue or by one institution are subjected to a thor-
ough reworking as they play out in another venue, such as Somalia, 
Sierra leone, or the drC.
 the volume includes contributions from policy scholars and schol-
ars involved in on-the-ground case studies. the contributors adopt a 
variety of approaches, but they share a conviction that peacebuilding 
in Africa is not a script that is authored solely in Western capitals 
and in the corridors of the un. rather, the writers in this volume 
focus on the interaction between local and global ideas and prac-
tices in the reconstitution of authority and livelihoods after conflict, 
showcasing the tensions that occur within and between the multi-
tude of actors involved in the peacebuilding industry, as well as their 
intended beneficiaries.
 Highlighting the diverse expressions and contexts of peacebuilding 
helps us understand the intended and unintended consequences and 
limitations of peacebuilding programs in Africa. Contrary to the insu-
lar character of much of the peacebuilding discourse and some of the 
peacebuilding scholarship, the authors in this volume show how peace-
building cannot be positioned above politics and history.
 this introductory chapter briefly traces the evolution of peacebuild-
ing ideas and practices, as well as the growing body of scholarship that 
has accompanied the rise of the peacebuilding industry. it pays par-
ticular attention to the dominant ways of thinking about peacebuilding, 
including what is often called “liberal peacebuilding,” and the range of 
critiques that have emerged in the scholarly literature. the chapter then 
goes on to show why existing frameworks for understanding peace-
building are largely insufficient. rather than interpreting peacebuilding 
as a fixed set of procedures and practices leading to some universally 
defined end called “peace,” the introduction and the chapters that follow 
suggest that peacebuilding may be best thought of as a set of multiple 
ideas, relationships, and experiences that are embedded within hierar-
chies of power and knowledge. Hierarchies exist within and between 
peacebuilding institutions, within knowledge about peacebuilding, and 
within funding for peacebuilding, but the chapters show that these 
hierarchies are not fixed or immutable.
4
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the Concept of Peacebuilding and its trajectory in Africa
the idea and the practices of peacebuilding are not new. Conflict is a 
generative force that alters social norms and institutions in Africa as 
elsewhere. the experience of conflict typically brings issues of political 
authority, security, society, and economy to the fore, albeit in different 
ways in different places. Questions of how to reestablish political au-
thority and security after violence, what to do about ex-combatants, 
how to renegotiate and manage the changed social relations, mistrust, 
and destruction that accompanies violence, and what to do about 
changed patterns of production or livelihoods as a result of conflict have 
been addressed in a myriad of different ways in different African locales 
over time. for instance, under the oyo empire in nigeria, the victori-
ous oyo granted substantial political autonomy to the vassal colonies 
following wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as long as 
the colonies reaffirmed their loyalty to oyo. Agents from oyo resided 
in the colonies to monitor local politics.8 in western Côte d’ivoire, mike 
mcgovern describes the historic highly structured social relations be-
tween “strangers” and “hosts” that emerged partly as a response to pre-
colonial labor requirements in areas of low population density. yet if the 
autochthone “hosts” were conquered by “strangers,” the autochthones 
often adapted and assimilated and the relationships were recalibrated. 
thus, the host-stranger relationship was “an elastic social idiom that 
facilitated the process of making do and getting on with life, even in 
the face of endemic violence and insecurity.”9 in the early nineteenth 
century, Shaka, the Zulu chief and state-builder, consolidated a number 
of military innovations. by the mid-1820s, he had a large standing army 
of over 40,000 people. Shaka did not allow members of military regi-
ments to marry until after they finished their military service, often in 
their late thirties for men and late twenties for women. After marriage, 
men and women left the regiments and set up their homesteads, so the 
issue of a transition from a fighter to a “civilian” was resolved through 
the social institution of marriage.10 thus, examples of “peacebuilding” 
strategies in Africa are as old (and as diverse) as conflict. drawing on 
derry yakubu’s research, tim murithi argues that conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding mechanisms in precolonial Africa had a “significant 
degree of success in maintaining order and ensuring the peaceful coexis-
tence of groups.”11 murithi describes various institutions in their his-
toric and contemporary incarnations, such as the jir mediation forum of 
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the tiv in nigeria and the Mato Oput reconciliation mechanism among 
the Acholi in northern uganda, to highlight that peacebuilding is not a 
new preoccupation in Africa.
 international actors also have a long history of attempting to shape 
war-affected communities and politics. Colonial rulers developed a wide 
variety of coercive and noncoercive strategies to deal with the effects of 
war. And external actors continued to influence politics in postcolonial 
Africa, with the wide-ranging un operation in the Congo from 1960 
to 1964 often described as the precursor to the peacebuilding operations 
of the 1990s.12 yet as a distinctive area of international policy interven-
tions, peacebuilding rose to prominence at the end of the Cold War at 
the time of the un operation in namibia in 1989–90. the end of the 
Cold War led to a renewed emphasis on the possibilities of international 
engagement in support of peacebuilding. An Agenda for Peace, published 
in 1992 by the then un secretary-general, boutros boutros-ghali, pro-
vided a coherent conceptualization of peacebuilding for a post–Cold 
War era. this important report defined peacebuilding as the medium- 
to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities through 
identifying and supporting “structures which will tend to strengthen 
and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”13 essentially, 
An Agenda for Peace saw peacebuilding as a worthy and distinct area of 
international attention, and conceived of it as the promotion of activi-
ties and structures that reduce the likelihood of violent conflict.
 At the time of the publication of An Agenda for Peace, the number of 
un peacekeeping operations was rapidly expanding, and many of these 
operations took place in Africa. Peacebuilding came to be an important 
component of these missions. yet since the Agenda for Peace was pub-
lished in 1992, three changes with respect to peacebuilding are notable: 
an expansion of peacebuilding activities, a proliferation of institutions 
tasked with peacebuilding, and an increase in peacebuilding scholarship.
 first, the number and kinds of activities that are considered under 
the rubric of peacebuilding programs have grown, and peacebuilding has 
become more intrusive. Whereas the Agenda for Peace emphasized state 
sovereignty, later reports, such as the 2004 united nations High-level 
Panel report A More Secure World, focused on the rights of the individual 
as well as state sovereignty.14 Peacebuilding therefore expanded to include 
not only the cessation of hostilities and the rebuilding of infrastructure, 
but also the protection of human rights, the reconstitution of individual 
identities and the reforging of individual and community relationships.
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 this expansion in activities reflected a willingness to conceptualize 
peace not only as negative peace (the absence of direct physical violence), 
but also as positive peace (the absence of structural violence). According 
to proponents of positive peace, focusing only on negative peace is in-
sufficient, as it ignores the multiple ways that people suffer.15 A narrow 
focus on negative peace meant that great efforts and resources went into 
helping to reach cease-fires between belligerent groups, and to guarantee 
these agreements through peacekeeping missions, but other forms of 
insecurity, inequalities, and vulnerabilities were left unaddressed. for 
instance, negative peace does not address the unequal status of women 
or domestic sexual violence.16 in 2000, the united nations brahimi re-
port on Peacekeeping reform explained that peacebuilding consisted of 
activities to “provide the tools for building on those foundations some-
thing that is more than just the absence of war.”17 Some authors have 
claimed that peacebuilding entails moving from a condition of negative 
peace to one of positive peace.18 the areas of concern to peacebuild-
ers have therefore broadened to include issues and activities that were 
formerly considered to be outside its scope.
 the concept of human security further expanded the types of peace-
building measures on the agenda of international institutions. Although 
positive peace is not the same as human security, the two ideas are closely 
connected. Human security focuses on the security of the individual 
rather than the security of the state. the concept was first elaborated 
by the united nations development Programme (undP) in 1994 
and has since been widely accepted at the united nations.19 nonethe-
less, there are large disagreements over the scope of the concept. the 
undP uses definitions that are closer to notions of positive peace, and 
says that human security includes “safety from such chronic threats as 
hunger, disease and repression,”20 whereas the Human Security Centre 
uses a definition that focuses on “violent threats to individuals.”21 the 
un Secretary-general’s High-level Panel on threats, Challenges, and 
Change in 2004 identified poverty, infectious disease, and environmen-
tal degradation as major threats to security, along with armed conflict, 
terrorism, organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction.22 Along-
side the rise in human security, peacebuilding has therefore deepened 
to target not only the state and its institutions, but also individuals and 
their local communities. Social transformation has become an object 
of peacebuilding concern and intervention, including initiatives to im-
prove individual psychosocial well-being.
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 these expanded activities and initiatives to address and prevent violent 
armed conflict could occur at different phases of conflict cycles. Previ-
ously, peacebuilding was usually conceptualized as part of a linear pro-
gression, starting with humanitarian relief and conflict management, then 
settlement, then peacebuilding and reconstruction, then development. 
increasingly however, it was acknowledged that transitions from conflict 
rarely follow such a linear path. Activities to strengthen “peace” can take 
place before, during, or after conflict. likewise, “peace” and “war” may 
exist simultaneously in different parts of the same country. for instance, 
in Sudan the conflict in darfur escalated even after the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement formally ended the conflict between the north and the 
South in 2005 (see Srinivasan, this volume). uganda is typically viewed as 
a “peaceful” country since the national resistance Army won the war and 
brought President yoweri museveni to power in 1986. However, this ob-
scures the ongoing conflict involving the lord’s resistance Army in the 
northern part of uganda and across its borders (see omach, this volume).
 thus, in the two decades since An Agenda for Peace, the concept 
of peacebuilding has broadened, deepened and been applied to differ-
ent points in the conflict cycle. A second important change since the 
publication of An Agenda for Peace is the proliferation of institutions, 
units, and programs tasked with peacebuilding in Africa. these include 
institutions at the global level, the continental, regional, and national 
levels, as well as local programs led by community and nongovern-
mental organizations (ngos). Several international agencies created 
special units to deal with postconflict reconstruction in the middle to 
late 1990s. for instance, in 1997, the organisation for economic Co-
operation and development (oeCd) created the Conflict Prevention 
and Post-Conflict reconstruction network to help better coordinate 
aid agencies’ peacebuilding activities. that same year, the World bank 
adopted a framework for World bank involvement in postconflict re-
construction, and established the Post-Conflict fund to make fast loans 
and grants to conflict-affected countries (see Harrison, this volume).23 
in 2001, the undP created the bureau for Crisis Prevention and re-
covery to “provide a bridge between the humanitarian agencies that 
handle immediate needs and the long-term development phase follow-
ing recovery.” in 2005, the united nations Peacebuilding Commission 
was established, with the aim of bringing together relevant actors and 
proposing integrated strategies for postconflict peacebuilding in specific 
countries (see olonisakin and ikpe, this volume).24
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 the Au and subregional organizations in Africa have also developed 
peacebuilding units, programs, and initiatives at an accelerated pace. 
earlier, the organization of African unity (oAu) created the mecha-
nism for Conflict Prevention, management, and resolution in 1993, and 
the economic Community of West African States (eCoWAS) estab-
lished the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, resolution, and Peace-
keeping in 1999. more recently, the Au Peace and Security Council was 
established in 2004 and the Au Panel of the Wise was established in 
2007. the new Partnership for Africa’s development (nePAd) and 
the Au separately developed postconflict reconstruction frameworks in 
June 2005 and July 2006 respectively (see khadiagala, this volume).25 
in 2008, eCoWAS adopted a Conflict Prevention framework, to 
strengthen efforts to “prevent violent conflicts within and between States, 
and to support peace-building in post-conflict environments.”26 the 
Southern African development Community (SAdC) Council of non-
governmental organisations has a program for governance, Peace and 
Security in accordance with its organizational strategy for 2009–13. in 
2002, the intergovernmental Authority on development (igAd) es-
tablished the Conflict early Warning and response mechanism, with 
a particular focus on pastoral and related conflicts. these new conti-
nental and regional structures and programs underline a commitment 
to peacebuilding, alongside their increasing involvement in peace op-
erations. to date for instance, the African union and African regional 
organizations have mounted peacekeeping operations in countries such 
as burundi, Comoros, Côte d’ivoire, guinea-bissau, liberia, Sierra 
leone, Somalia, and Sudan. these new institutions and programs in 
Africa have grown along with calls for “local ownership” in peacebuild-
ing programming.
 the third notable development since the publication of An Agenda 
for Peace is the expansion of peacebuilding scholarship, which has ac-
companied the broadening and deepening of peacebuilding activities, 
as well as the proliferation of peacebuilding institutions. A growing 
but disparate body of academic work has attempted to make sense of 
peacebuilding efforts and their consequences.27 A number of special-
ized scholarly journals focusing on peace and conflict themes have 
been established since the early 1990s, such as International Peacekeep-
ing (1994), Global Governance (1995), The International Journal of Peace 
Studies (1996), Civil Wars (1998), African Journal on Conflict Resolution 
(1999), Conflict, Security and Development (2001), Peace, Conflict and 
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Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal (2002), Journal of Peacebuilding 
and Development (2002), and Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 
(2007).28 Some of this scholarship concentrates on African peace and 
conflict issues. indeed, many African universities now offer course pro-
grams in peace and conflict studies.29 think tanks and policy institutes 
have followed suit, offering peace research and peace training, often 
with a vast array of recommendations on how to improve international 
and continental peacebuilding practice. And yet, as explained below, 
much of this scholarship fails to fully capture the multifaceted nature 
of peace and the contested local and global politics of peacebuilding. it 
treats peace as an uncontroversial, ahistoric “end,” and peacebuilding as 
the means to get there.
Peacebuilding frameworks and debates
there are at least three main frameworks for understanding peacebuild-
ing that are prevalent in the literature. Although there are important 
areas of overlap between these positions, they rest on different con-
ceptions of power and politics in Africa. each of these views contains 
important normative assumptions about the nature of peace and about 
the identity and motivations of peacebuilders. they lead to different 
conclusions about the role of the state in peacebuilding, the type of 
economic policies best suited to recovery, the appropriate ways to en-
courage societal reconciliation, and how best to ensure security.
Liberal Peacebuilding
the dominant framework for understanding peacebuilding is a liberal 
framework. A significant amount of peacebuilding scholarship posi-
tions itself either within this liberal tradition or against it. According 
to this view, peacebuilding is understood to be part of a global project 
of liberal governance, promoted by international and regional institu-
tions and other actors. Certainly, the goal and promise of a liberal 
peace is found within the pages of many donor documents and insti-
tutional reports. An Agenda for Peace described political and economic 
liberalization as key elements in the transformation of war-torn soci-
eties. Paragraph 9 sees new opportunities for peace now that “many 
States are seeking more open forms of economic policy”; paragraph 56 
talks of social and economic development; and paragraph 59 recom-
mends the strengthening of new democratic institutions, the rule of 
law, and good governance.30
10
devon Curtis
 the perceived success of (liberal) war-to-peace transitions in namibia 
and mozambique reinforced these ideas. indeed, the idea of a “liberal peace,” 
with its roots in european enlightenment thinking of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, has guided much of the peacebuilding programming 
at the un and elsewhere. multiparty electoral democracy and a market 
economy are seen as inherently peaceful and desirable, and it is thought 
that all “good things” go together. Peacebuilding therefore consists of ac-
tivities and initiatives to help bring about and facilitate this desired liberal 
end. more recently, the 2005 un report In Larger Freedom, produced under 
the leadership of the then un secretary-general, kofi Annan, echoed this 
view: “Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not 
enjoy development without security, and will not enjoy either without re-
spect for human rights.”31 the chairperson of the Au commission, Jean 
Ping, said that “Africa’s attention to peacebuilding reflects the continent’s 
recognition that peace is the foundation of prosperity.”32
 liberal peacebuilding is thus both a normative agenda, as well as 
a framework for understanding the diverse activities and initiatives to 
promote peace on the continent. even with the expansion of peace-
building activities and the move toward conceptions of positive peace 
and human security, the privileged focus on liberal peacebuilding has 
largely remained intact within the dominant global peacebuilding com-
munity. liberal peacebuilding is assumed to have universal relevance, 
therefore techniques and lessons can be learned from different parts of 
the world. A standardized approach that includes multiparty elections 
and institution-building, constitutional and legal reform, and economic 
pro-market reform can be applied in such diverse settings as mozam-
bique, el Salvador, Cambodia, Sierra leone, and timor-leste, with 
only limited adaptations to suit the “local” context.
 the problem, as some scholarship has pointed out, is that the experi-
ences of many countries emerging from conflict do not correspond to 
these liberal predictions. Already by the end of the 1990s, the achieve-
ments of liberal peacebuilding in Africa and elsewhere were being 
questioned. even countries that are often judged as peacebuilding 
successes, such as namibia and mozambique, have experienced high 
rates of inequality and persistent insecurity among some communities. 
furthermore, these qualified “successes” were overshadowed by horren-
dous failures such as Angola in 1992, rwanda in 1993–94, Sierra leone 
in 1999, Sudan in 2005, and Côte d’ivoire in 2010.
 for advocates of liberal peacebuilding, these failures do not repre-
sent the limits of liberal peace, but rather, the flawed implementation 
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of liberal ideas. for them, peacebuilding failures had more to do with 
improper sequencing or a lack of coordination or insufficient commit-
ment by outsiders, not problems with the liberal idea itself. for instance, 
in a widely cited argument, roland Paris notes that rapid political and 
economic liberalization in postconflict countries can trigger a renewal 
of conflict instead of a reinforcement of structures of peace.33 Paris does 
not criticize economic and political liberalization per se; he simply ar-
gues that it cannot be done too quickly in the immediate aftermath of 
violent conflict. rapid political liberalization can exacerbate tensions, 
since elites may use violence to gain electoral support, and rapid eco-
nomic liberalization can generate tensions through increased unem-
ployment and economic uncertainties. instead, Paris argues in favor 
of “institutionalization before liberalization,” meaning building state 
institutional capacity first, in order to enable liberal values and practices 
to take hold over time.
 this argument and others like it do not fundamentally question the 
content of liberal postconflict peacebuilding but suggest ways that the 
international peacebuilding community may improve practices to get 
to their desired outcomes. unsurprisingly, many policy practitioners 
through lessons-learned units and evaluations divisions have adopted 
similar conclusions about peacebuilding failures. the un High-level 
Panel on threats, Challenges and Change, for instance, made a case 
for greater policy coherence and donor coordination and more careful 
attention to sequencing.34
 this approach therefore assumes that peacebuilding is a liberal script 
authored primarily by outsiders, perhaps with the assistance and input of 
enlightened locals. Advocates believe that this can lead to optimal peace-
ful results if the program is properly implemented. All actors in conflict-
affected countries are identified vis-à-vis their position on liberal peace, 
and those who violently disagree with liberal peace are labeled “spoil-
ers” who must be socialized or marginalized.35 the liberal peacebuilding 
scholarship tends to be prescriptive, offering advice on how to better deal 
with these “spoilers.” Peace, development, and governance go hand in 
hand and reinforce one another in this liberal framework.
Peacebuilding as Stabilization
A second position on peacebuilding shares the liberal concern with 
order, but rather than focusing its attention on order within states, it 
sees peacebuilding as being primarily concerned with maintaining the 
international status quo. the view has become increasingly important 
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since the 9/11 attack on the united States (uS), and the subsequent 
global “war on terror.” Although this view acknowledges the multitude 
of activities conducted under the peacebuilding umbrella, the rationale 
for these activities is to maintain global security and stability.
 the recent conflation of antiterrorism measures with peacebuilding is 
an indication that this way of thinking about peacebuilding may be gain-
ing currency.36 the language of peacebuilding is indicative. in the united 
kingdom, the Post Conflict reconstruction unit was renamed the Stabili-
sation unit in late 2007, jointly owned by the department for international 
development, the foreign and Commonwealth office, and the ministry 
of defence. Within the uS department of State, the office of the Co-
ordinator for reconstruction and Stabilization was created in 2004–5 to 
“promote the security of the united States through improved coordina-
tion, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization 
assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from 
conflict or civil strife.”37 the un peace operation in the drC changed its 
mission and its name from monuC (united nations organization mis-
sion in the democratic republic of the Congo) to monuSCo (united 
nations organization Stabilization mission in the democratic republic 
of the Congo) in 2010. A central part of monuSCo’s mandate is to 
assist the Congolese government in strengthening its military capacity, 
and to support the Congolese government in consolidating state author-
ity (lemarchand, this volume). With China’s increasing involvement in 
Africa, including China’s participation in un peace operations, one can 
expect that peacebuilding as stabilization will continue to rise in impor-
tance, given China’s preoccupation with order and state authority rather 
than “good governance,” democratization, or civil society.38
 According to this view, the emphasis for peacebuilders is the creation 
of stable, secure states with well-policed borders. Although it shares 
many of the same preoccupations of the peacebuilding as liberal gov-
ernance view, the stabilization view holds less faith in the possibilities 
of transformation and socialization. for example, if part of the problem 
in Africa is perceived as Africans’ stubborn attachment to parochial 
identities, peacebuilding as stabilization controls the expression of those 
identities, without seeking to transform them. low-intensity conflict 
and localized violence or repression may be acceptable (or perhaps in-
evitable) under this view, so long as it does not affect international order 
and stability. Paradoxically then, increased militarization comes to be 
seen as peacebuilding.
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 As with the liberal peacebuilding literature, some of the stabilization 
scholarship is normatively driven and prescriptive, offering guidelines 
and suggestions to policymakers on how to stabilize first (and some-
times liberalize later, depending on whether internal conditions are 
“conducive”).39 other scholars are much more critical of these types of 
peacebuilding practices, seeing peacebuilding as reminiscent of previous 
forms of external domination in Africa, or as disguised imperialism.40 
for them, peacebuilding is a cover for the political and economic inter-
ests of the West, mirroring the role of imperial power in the construc-
tion and order of colonial states.41 this view asks “whose peace” is served 
by peacebuilding programs and activities. in contrast to advocates of 
peacebuilding as liberal governance who believe in the shared benefits 
of liberalism, a peacebuilding as stabilization framework implicitly 
acknowledges that the benefits of peacebuilding may be unequal and 
selective. Although much of the peacebuilding as liberal governance 
literature focuses on African elites and their identities and interests as 
being the main objects to reshape through peacebuilding, the stabiliza-
tion literature takes account of the interests of external peacebuilders 
themselves. it shows that global powers and institutions are not dis-
interested actors or neutral vessels (see Harrison, olonisakin and ikpe, 
and nouwen, this volume), and that their peacebuilding programs are 
not divorced from other political interests (see lemarchand, ero, and 
Clapham, this volume).
Peacebuilding as Social Justice
like the previous two views, peacebuilding as social justice is both a 
normative position and a descriptive framework for understanding 
peacebuilding activities. this position tends to be put forward by people 
who believe that the previous two views place undue focus on maintain-
ing order. they see peacebuilding as stabilization and/or liberal gover-
nance as part of a strategy to maintain the global status quo, with its 
inequalities and selective privileges intact. in the case of liberal peace-
building, these intentions may be obscured by the universalist language 
of human security, peacebuilding, the “responsibility to protect,” and 
development, whereas in the case of peacebuilding as stabilization the 
intentions to impose order is clear. for both however, the aim is to sub-
vert radical challenges to the global and national distribution of power 
and resources and to stabilize the international system. Hegemony and 
domination are maintained through discursive and material means.42 
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Although stabilization relies more heavily on coercion and on building 
the coercive apparatus of the state, and liberal governance relies more 
extensively on building institutions and markets, both share a preoccupa-
tion with stability.
 in contrast, some authors believe that peacebuilding can and should 
be based on social justice, rather than liberal governance or stabilization. 
Structural violence is the problem to be addressed through peacebuilding, 
and peacebuilding therefore involves programs to encourage inclusive ac-
cess to resources and institutions, to empower marginalized groups, to 
end discrimination against women and other disadvantaged groups, and 
to redistribute income and land ownership.43 in other words, peacebuild-
ing becomes focused on reaching the condition of “positive peace.”
 Peacebuilding as social justice addresses international inequalities 
as well as inequalities within countries. According to this view, peace-
building cannot be divorced from a discussion of global capitalism and 
the distribution of the world’s resources. liberal peacebuilding tends to 
focus on how to restructure economies internally so that countries can 
attract foreign investment and be better integrated into the global econ-
omy, but the networked economies in the drC, Sierra leone, nigeria, 
Angola, and Sudan show that both violent conflict and violent peace 
are compatible with markets that are well integrated internationally, 
albeit unevenly. An emphasis on social justice involves raising questions 
about international economic inequality. Seeing uneven global capitalist 
structures as the indisputable and inevitable context for peacebuilding 
severely limits possibilities.
 in calling for a redistribution of resources both within countries 
and internationally, peacebuilding as social justice echoes earlier claims 
made by dependency theorists such as Samir Amin.44 but, as mahmood 
mamdani points out, it also involves the deracialization of power, the 
redressing of systemic group disadvantage, and the formation of an in-
clusive redefined political community.45
 Within this perspective, however, there are disagreements about 
the agents of peacebuilding. Although some African governments 
and African institutions may seek to draw attention to international 
inequalities, it is debatable whether governments and regional institu-
tions are effective vehicles for the promotion of social justice. Some 
authors highlight the developmental potential of African-level institu-
tions (landsberg, this volume), but a key question is whether African-
level institutions reflect kinds of knowledge similar to Western-based 
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ones, or whether they capture different kinds of experiences in their 
research and programming. the early experiences of the Au, nePAd, 
and the African development bank (Afdb) suggest that these in-
stitutions adopt peacebuilding logics that are similar to those of their 
international counterparts (khadiagala, this volume), relying on liberal 
governance packages. the African union policy framework provides an 
overall strategy from which individual country programs can develop 
their own context-specific plans, but it is unclear that this represents an 
alternative peacebuilding template. devolving responsibility to African 
governments will not necessarily achieve social justice or satisfy the 
transformative aspirations of other local groups. elites tend to revert to 
strategies that reproduce their positions of power, and there is nothing 
to indicate that there is more of a consensus on issues of social justice 
among inhabitants within Africa countries.
the local and global Practices of Peacebuilding
the three frameworks for understanding peacebuilding are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive, and indeed institutions such as the united 
nations and the African union use the language of all three. it is pos-
sible for the same actor or agency to hold a normative commitment 
toward social justice, but to encourage stabilization and/or liberal gov-
ernance. indeed, despite their stated common goals, different agencies 
prioritize different activities. notwithstanding the common use of the 
term peacebuilding, different institutions show important variation. in 
a survey of twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies ac-
tive in peacebuilding, barnett et al. show that there are great divisions 
among these bodies regarding the specific approaches to achieve peace, 
often depending on prevailing organizational mandates and interests.46
 much of the peacebuilding scholarship, however, presumes to know 
what constitutes peace and sees peacebuilding as a series of activities, 
initiatives, and policies to help reach predetermined goals, whether 
those goals are defined as liberal governance, stabilization, and/or social 
justice. the scholarship tends to be prescriptive, based on the author’s 
knowledge of peace.47 even the concepts of social justice and positive 
peace tend to be defined from the perspective of powerful societies.48 
thus, whether it is understood as liberal governance, stabilization, or 
social justice, peacebuilding programming is often driven by external 
ideas and by the disciplining power of external norms rather than by 
the meanings and values from within African countries and locales. 
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Academic research is not separate from these systems of power. Perhaps 
scholars are so concerned with their research being policy-relevant that 
they tend to focus on operational and technical aspects of peacebuild-
ing.49 in other words, perhaps peacebuilding practitioners search for 
knowledge that reinforces their own practices and experiences.50
 is it possible to reject these frameworks for peacebuilding, and rely 
instead on African ideas and alternatives? Claude Ake observed that 
the problem is not so much that development has failed in Africa as 
that it has never really been tried in the first place.51 Ake’s complaint 
was that development practices were based on earlier european experi-
ences and ignored the specificities of African experiences, and one could 
argue that African peacebuilding faces a similar constraint. isaac Albert 
describes several African conceptions of peace and argues that whereas 
Western conceptions of peace place heavy emphasis on prosperity and 
order, African conceptions are based on morality and order.52 the un-
derpinnings of peace in Africa, according to Albert, can be located in 
the commitment to cultural values, beliefs, and norms as well as in soci-
etal role expectations.53
 other authors have discussed the possibility of uncovering peace-
building alternatives in local societies.54 mark Hoffman points out that 
the emphasis on individual rights, accountability, and transplantation of 
Western institutions may not sit easily with cultures that emphasize com-
munity and family over the individual.55 oliver richmond argues that 
the pursuit of liberal peace “may be socially atomizing, hegemonic and 
lead to the valorization of predatory state elites who gain easy access to 
an international economic and political cartography.”56 instead, rich-
mond proposes “localized everyday peaces,” or unscripted conversations 
between local actors.57 Alternative practices of peace may be found within 
the informal economy (see oyefusi, this volume), within religious groups 
(see Clapham, this volume), within community groups (see Hutchful, 
and omach, this volume), with representatives of ethnic communities 
and others who may fall outside the parameters of the liberal peace.
 this literature on “local peace” has usefully uncovered a range of 
different ideas about peace and peacebuilding. nonetheless, it is im-
possible to separate the “local” from the “international” in Africa, even 
if one intends to privilege local understandings of peace. it is notori-
ously difficult to discern who is the “local.” Sometimes, local is used 
to mean the national country in which a peacebuilding intervention 
takes place. yet a national actor from the capital city may be an outsider 
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when entering into another local community.58 furthermore, although 
power relations are present, the local, regional, and global are mutually 
constitutive. Politics in Africa is not simply the product of hegemonic 
external forces, and it is not a failed or incomplete example of something 
else. this denies Africans of their agency and connections with the rest 
of the world.59 Jean-françois bayart argues that through a strategy of 
extraversion, African states were not passive recipients of structural 
adjustment.60 Similarly, African states have adjusted and shaped inter-
national peacebuilding strategies. John Heathershaw shows that when 
peacebuilding takes the form of a rational design or technique to do 
something to an “other” in order to elicit behavioral change, local actors 
may subvert its techniques and reappropriate resources to further their 
own authority.61
 the ideas and resources of international and regional actors are 
therefore contingent (see olonisakin and ikpe, nouwen, and khadia-
gala, this volume), and are shaped, adapted, subverted, and reappropri-
ated by different local elites (see Srinivasan, lemarchand, ero, oyefusi, 
dzinesa, and Clapham this volume). yet these actors are intimately 
connected, and an authentic “local” does not exist separately from the 
regional and transnational networks within which it resides.62
the volume
Peacebuilding is therefore not a script authored by outsiders, nor is it 
a script solely authored by Africans. instead, peacebuilding is a set of 
ideas and practices, mediated by the interaction between local com-
munities and international, national, and regional actors. the contest 
over peacebuilding is not only a contest for funds but also a contest over 
meanings and interpretation.
 in different ways, the chapters in this volume explore the multiple, 
shifting, and interacting meanings, discourses, and agendas underlying 
peacebuilding efforts in Africa. the authors do not share a common 
understanding of the ultimate objective of peacebuilding, and indeed 
they disagree on whether finding such an objective is productive or pos-
sible. they use different approaches and methods, but they all analyze 
the tensions and debates between various peacebuilding ideas and pro-
grams. they agree that peacebuilding is a site of political and social 
contestation and interaction, which raises questions about power and 
hierarchy. given the trade-offs, shifting identities, and multiple mean-
ings of peace and peacebuilding, the chapters in this volume ask which 
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ideas take hold and to what effect. because hierarchies in the produc-
tion of knowledge may mean that certain voices have been privileged in 
peacebuilding debates and discussions, the authors paid close attention 
to a range of voices. the authors themselves come from diverse geo-
graphic, disciplinary, and intellectual backgrounds and traditions.
 thus, the volume cannot resolve peacebuilding tensions, but it 
highlights what happens when various peacebuilding logics come into 
contact with realities on the ground. the contributors analyze key areas 
typically associated with peacebuilding (political authority, security, 
economy, society) and the institutions involved in peacebuilding, to il-
lustrate the contested politics of peacebuilding, and to describe how 
peacebuilding is reinterpreted and reshaped by Africans.
 for instance, the very logic of a negotiated peace agreement can be 
different for outside actors and for local political competitors (see keen, 
and Srinivasan, this volume). Peace agreements themselves are replete 
with tensions. outside actors may view a peace agreement as a binding 
commitment between different belligerents that sets out a common vi-
sion for a postconflict future, whereas the parties themselves may see it 
in instrumental and contextual terms. this has happened, for instance, 
in the drC and Sudan, where political elites continually adjusted their 
strategies to a changed context (see lemarchand and Srinivasan, this 
volume). elites that were included or excluded in the peace agreements 
maintained the use or the threat of violence as a parallel tool in what 
Alex de Waal calls the political marketplace, where social affinities and 
patronage networks take precedence over state institutions.63 Peace 
agreements may institutionalize violence by giving a share of gover-
nance to former military or rebel leaders who have committed human 
rights abuses or who maintain links to regional and global war econo-
mies (see keen, this volume). yet excluding these groups, if they retain 
the capacity for violence, may be equally dangerous. throughout the 
peacebuilding process, state elites and former rebels may seek interna-
tional recognition in order to bolster their own agendas. international 
actors make intrusive interventions, and local actors engage in their own 
transnational practices in order to gain political, material, and discursive 
support from outside parties and networks.64
 unlike some of the other literature on peacebuilding, the volume 
raises doubts about whether the question of political authority can 
be resolved through the sequencing of peacebuilding activities. Some 
of the authors of this volume do point to problems in peacebuilding 
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sequencing and coordination (see omach, ero, and dzinesa), but 
argue that better coordination and sequencing alone cannot resolve 
the tensions and contradictions of peacebuilding in Africa. A focus on 
sequencing ignores the fact that there may be strong political reasons 
for a lack of coordination, and competing visions and ideas of what 
peacebuilding is meant to achieve.
 Statebuilding is another practice fraught with contradictions and 
trade-offs. by the early 2000s, most multilateral peacebuilding insti-
tutions had agreed that durable peace depended on the construction 
or strengthening of state institutions. As khadiagala, landsberg, and 
olonisakin and ikpe show in this volume, this meant that for many 
institutions, statebuilding came to be seen as an important aspect of 
peacebuilding.65 Peacebuilding therefore involves setting priorities and 
establishing legitimate institutional hierarchies at the level of the state. 
the goal is to ensure a regime that is accountable to international norms, 
that is legitimate, and that has earned its sovereignty.66 yet as dominik 
Zaum points out in this volume, there are contradictions between verti-
cal legitimacy and horizontal legitimacy in the statebuilding project that 
may not be possible to reconcile. Zaum shows that identifying relevant 
societal groups to empower may require a very large external peacebuild-
ing footprint, raising other accountability issues. Similarly, Comfort ero 
describes in this volume how in liberia people who wanted change were 
allied with international actors against a status quo coalition. ero high-
lights a tension between the transformative aspirations underlying the 
statebuilding enterprise and the idea of local ownership.
 Christopher Clapham suggests that international actors have taken 
for granted that the international system is composed of states, and 
therefore have no conception of how peace can exist without one. And 
yet Clapham shows the futility of a peacebuilding through statebuilding 
approach in Somalia. He argues that the engagement of external actors 
in Somalia has intensified conflict rather than moderating it, in part 
because attempts to build peace have assumed the existence of a state in 
Somalia or the possibility of creating one. externally driven attempts to 
negotiate peace led to further factionalism in Somalia, as Somali lead-
ers sought to present themselves as independent operators in order to 
gain external recognition and a seat at the table. Clapham shows that 
one of the keys to Somaliland’s peacebuilding success was its insula-
tion from external engagements, whereas the focus on statebuilding in 
Somalia led to the marginalization of local mediators and elders. more 
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generally, a focus on the state and on the formal institutions of politics 
may overlook the local dimensions of authority and conflict (see le-
marchand, this volume).67 furthermore, if institutionalized statehood is 
the assumed goal, local voices that do not use or aspire to that language 
are disempowered.68
 like the reconstitution of political authority after conflict, the re-
establishment of security is not uncontroversial. Peacebuilding occurs 
when security is, at best, unevenly distributed, but there is no consensus 
that peacebuilding strategies and programs succeed in reducing inse-
curity for all. eboe Hutchful shows how security lies in the eyes of the 
beholder. the question of whether one’s security increases or decreases 
as a result of peacebuilding programs and initiatives depends on one’s 
position vis-à-vis the conflict (see keen, this volume). Security gover-
nance that emphasizes ownership as well as formal and informal mea-
sures to enhance security may be helpful (see Hutchful, this volume), 
but the ability to shape the interpretations of peace and conflict is also 
often a very powerful tool in the struggle.
 disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (ddr) programs 
are indicative of some of the contradictions of peacebuilding. gwin-
yayi A. dzinesa shows how ddr programs in namibia, Angola, and 
mozambique were supposed to contribute to creating sustainable, se-
cure, peaceful transitions. but these programs were affected by a number 
of different factors, including the synchrony between global, regional, 
and local actors, and the political context. in Angola in the 1990s for 
instance, ddr foundered owing in part to the collusion between dif-
ferent actors who sought to undermine the potential of ddr. Paul 
omach in this volume points to a disconnect between international 
ddr programs and local realities, even when local actors do not seek 
to undermine ddr. for instance, omach says that the way in which 
ddr programs define “ex-combatants” does not always reflect the flex-
ible and variable roles played by people involved in conflict.
 Peacebuilding strategies to revitalize the economy are also the site of 
tensions and contradictions, and privilege some interests over others. in-
ternational peacebuilding programs tend to focus on the formal economic 
sector, whereas many livelihoods in Africa are based on informal economic 
activities and exchange. Women in particular may be disadvantaged when 
peacebuilding programs fail to acknowledge informal economies.
 As discussed previously, reinvigorating the market has been a core 
component of peacebuilding in Africa. in the 1980s and 1990s, key 
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institutions, including the bretton Woods institutions—the interna-
tional monetary fund (imf) and World bank—blamed the failure 
of African development on bloated bureaucracies and corrupt leaders. 
rather than looking historically at why such leaders emerged and locat-
ing the failure of development in the international system, the prescrip-
tions given by the bretton Woods institutions were rooted in efforts to 
create more effective markets and to downsize the state, arguably limit-
ing the capacity of these “corrupt” leaders to do damage. the resulting 
structural adjustment programs often included drastic cuts in public 
services, liberalization, privatization, and the elimination of subsidies 
(see Harrison, this volume).69
 market approaches to peacebuilding have since been widely criti-
cized for their detrimental consequences on security and well-being, 
but they are often still promoted in African contexts, albeit sometimes 
with a longer-term time frame and different sequencing.70 these ef-
forts, however, often have unintended consequences. in Sierra leone, 
for instance, privatization resulted in the transfer of state assets to a 
small oligarchy, reinforcing interests that were opposed to political 
transformation (see ero, this volume).71
 during hostilities and afterward, the political economy of an area is 
reshaped, with some beneficiaries and some losers. in conflict, there are 
profits to be made for the large number of individuals and companies 
connected to the arms trade as well as for natural resource traders who 
benefit from weak laws and regulations. As rené lemarchand outlines 
in this volume, conflict in the great lakes region of Africa is sustained 
through trading and multiple webs of economic networks and interests 
involving state and nonstate actors. Aderoju oyefusi in this volume ex-
plains how peacebuilding has been stunted in nigeria’s niger delta, due 
to the continued economic incentives in that region. thus the effects of 
peacebuilding cannot be separated from the global and local political 
economies of war. in some cases, the large amounts of foreign aid that 
accompany peacebuilding has been used by the holders of state power as 
an additional rent that can be used for decidedly nonpeaceful purposes.72
 last, although authors recognize that conflict affects the social fabric 
of societies in terms of population dislocation, mistrust, shifting iden-
tities, and the erosion and creation of new social bonds, there is no 
consensus about whether—or how—peacebuilders should address this. 
omach, for instance, believes that peacebuilding can be a further way 
for powerful states and interests to monitor, intervene, and regulate the 
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peoples of the South.73 vanessa Pupavac has shown that peacebuild-
ing programs focusing on healing psychosocial trauma problematically 
apply models developed in the West to very different local contexts.74 
furthermore, there may be opportunities for progressive social change 
arising out of conflict (Hutchful, this volume). gendered approaches 
to peacebuilding have usefully highlighted the ways in which women 
sometimes continue to be marginalized within peacebuilding programs 
and peacebuilding knowledge, but also how the processes of conflict 
and peace can sometimes bring new opportunities for women.75
 even programs in support of justice or reconciliation may be fragmented, 
contradictory, and contested. for instance, in 2001 the rwandan gov-
ernment instituted the gacaca jurisdictions to hear and judge the cases 
of genocide suspects. Supporters saw this as a homegrown, histori-
cally rooted way of achieving postconflict reconciliation and justice in 
rwanda. Critics saw it as the reinvention of tradition with the aim of 
further extending the power of a repressive rwandan state. in uganda, 
mato oput ceremonies have been discussed as a locally appropriate way 
to address community reconciliation in northern uganda. yet critics say 
that the emphasis on mato oput serves the interests of some foreign aid 
organizations and older male Acholi who want to reinforce their dimin-
ishing power, rather than being something that is universally accepted 
among the Acholi.76
 the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of 
postconflict countries may lead to consequences that do not achieve the 
goals of their advocates.77 tensions between different conceptions of 
rights complicate peacebuilding. like the other peacebuilding elements 
discussed in this volume, rights do not reside “out there,” waiting to be 
discovered. rather, they represent areas of contestation and multiple in-
terpretations. the disagreements over the role of the iCC in uganda and 
Sudan raise important questions about whose interests are served by em-
phasizing certain forms of justice over others (see nouwen, this volume).
Structure of the Volume
the volume is not an exhaustive account of all peacebuilding efforts 
and initiatives in Africa, but the various chapters provide examples of 
how global, regional, and local interests, practices, and ideas interact in 
peacebuilding programming on the continent.
 the volume is divided into three parts. Part 1 deals with peacebuild-
ing themes and debates, exposing the tensions and contradictions in 
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different clusters of peacebuilding activities. each chapter explores the 
myriad of international and local ideas and practices, the challenges 
and trade-offs that have been encountered, and the alternatives that 
have been proposed in specific areas of peacebuilding, including peace 
negotiations, statebuilding, security sector governance, and ddr. the 
chapters show how and why the consequences of peacebuilding initia-
tives have not always been as anticipated in Africa.
 Part 2 addresses the institutional framework for peacebuilding in 
Africa and the ideological underpinnings of key institutions, includ-
ing the African union, nePAd, the African development bank, the 
Pan-African ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service, the 
un Peacebuilding Commission, the World bank, and the international 
Criminal Court. the chapters in this section address the extent to which 
these institutions have been successful in achieving their mandates and 
visions, and the conceptions of peace and peacebuilding on which these 
mandates rest.
 finally, Part 3 examines how the themes and institutions analyzed in 
Parts 1–2 have operated in particular African contexts. these six case-
study chapters allow for detailed analyses of local constraints to, and 
opportunities for, peacebuilding in different African locales, highlight-
ing how peacebuilding procedures and activities are reshaped by differ-
ent actors. Some of the case-study chapters deal with single-country 
cases, and other chapters adopt a regional approach; some case chapters 
deal with a single peacebuilding activity whereas others analyze the 
range of peacebuilding efforts in a specific area. the chapters address 
the conflicting ideas of peace in the negotiations in Sudan; overlapping 
networks of conflict and peace in the great lakes region; statebuilding 
in Sierra leone and liberia; the political economy of peace and conflict 
in the niger delta; ddr in namibia, Angola, and mozambique; and 
the failure of peacebuilding in Somalia. the case studies highlight the 
interplay among the local, regional, continental, and global levels, and 
the ways in which spaces for peace are constantly being rearticulated 
and renegotiated through particular programs in particular spaces.
one Peace or many?
there is no denying that violent conflict has horrific costs in Africa, 
in terms of lives lost, dreams shattered, and livelihoods destroyed. 
the horrors of violence urge us toward an imagined shared alternative 
named “peace,” where hope can be reclaimed and livelihoods restored. 
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When international peacebuilding programs prove insufficient or in-
adequate, we look toward African institutions and African agency. yet 
African agency, like any other agency, contains worthy elements as well 
as lamentable ones, and cannot be separated from the world in which 
it is a part.
 Peacebuilding is a political contest involving questions of authority, 
legitimacy, equality, and knowledge. the chapters in this volume treat 
peace not as something to be discovered or imposed, but as a number 
of different and continually contested practices. the political mean-
ings of peace and peacebuilding are subject to negotiation between 
international, regional, and local actors. masking the subjective nature 
of peace disguises ideology and power and may obscure the various 
ways that peace is understood and experienced in different contexts. 
being cognizant of the wide range of interests and views involved in 
peacebuilding leads to questions about whether peacebuilding should 
continue to be described primarily in nonideological terms as a force 
for good.
 thus a single, all-encompassing definition of peacebuilding is elu-
sive. the chapters in this volume show that different organizations, 
institutions, and actors may have different notions of the foundations 
for peace, leading to tensions in peacebuilding programming and un-
intended consequences on the ground. When international or regional 
peacebuilding projects have failed to achieve their objectives, this is 
usually blamed on poor implementation or lack of commitment, rather 
than on the contradictory logic of peacebuilding itself.
 When competing conceptions of peace are incompatible, there is no 
independent perspective that can adjudicate between them. this is not 
to say, however, that there is no power or hierarchy in peacebuilding. to 
the contrary, the chapters in this volume show that some conceptions of 
peace are privileged in Africa, and some activities are emphasized over 
others. yet all actors with a stake in peacebuilding bring their own ideas, 
norms, and practices to a situation that is highly political and that may 
alter the local landscape in unexpected ways. likewise, the local context 
may be refracted back to regional and international institutions. Some-
times this may provide an opportunity for learning and change, but in 
other instances the consequences may be more problematic. in order for 
scholars, students, and practitioners to propose peacebuilding change, 
they must have an awareness of the forces that constrain, obstruct, or 
give meaning to different peacebuilding practices.
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Peace as an Incentive for War
d Av i d  k e e n
t h i s  C h A P t e r  l o o k s  At  t h e  i n C e n t i v e s  f o r  f u rt h e r  v i o l e n C e 
that may be established by peace agreements. it does not aim for a 
comprehensive discussion but rather seeks to highlight a key element 
of building peace that has been somewhat neglected both at the policy 
level and in academic discussions. this is risk of “incentivizing” further 
violence through the very act of peacemaking.
 the question of how “inclusive” or “exclusive” a peace agreement 
should be is a difficult and critical one. A considerable measure of in-
clusion of the main armed groups—both at the negotiating table and 
in government—would appear to be necessary. Why else would they 
agree to lay down their arms? the case of liberia is instructive here. in 
the four years prior to the 1996 Abuja ii peace agreement, as Adekeye 
Adebajo has shown,1 the economic Community of West African States 
(eCoWAS), through its Cease-fire monitoring group (eComog), 
made a serious attempt to marginalize liberian warlords and support a 
civilian government in monrovia. yet peace agreements in this period 
simply did not stick, as powerful warlords refused to disarm and clung 
to their profitable economic activities. by 1996, subregional mediators 
exhibited a new determination to bring warlords into political power in 
monrovia. distasteful as this “warlords’ peace” was, it had the signifi-
cant advantage that the agreement could actually be implemented; in 
this new climate, both demobilization and elections became possible.2
 the constraints imposed by warring parties may be severe; but going 
too far in the direction of including and appeasing war leaders may 
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damage equity, deepen impunity, and store up trouble for the future. 
there are grave dangers in excluding civil society and politicians not 
linked to armed groups. A key problem is the signal sent out: in particu-
lar, it may sometimes be difficult to discern the exact difference between 
rewarding people for giving up violence and rewarding people for tak-
ing it up.
 Armed groups have proliferated in many conflicts, and there may 
be many political interests who might potentially turn to arms if their 
grievances are not met. to what extent should a peace process embrace 
a proliferation of armed groups? is it possible that a peace process could 
itself encourage such proliferation?
 incentive-based approaches to peacemaking tend to focus on the 
violent (who constitute the immediate problem) while often ignoring 
those who have not (or not yet) been drawn into participation in vio-
lent processes. by contrast, those emphasizing a need for justice and 
an “end to impunity”—including human rights organizations—tend to 
focus on the importance of signals, notably to those who might one day 
contemplate violence. However, the advocates of both positions often 
“talk past” each other.
incentivizing violence: three mechanisms
there are three key incentive problems when it comes to peacemaking. 
the first key danger is that a peace process may exclude major armed 
groups taking part in a war, who will therefore have little incentive to 
abide by the peace. An extreme example was the 1997 khartoum Peace 
Agreement in Sudan, an agreement that actually excluded the main 
rebel organization, the Sudan People’s liberation Army (SPlA), and 
predictably did not bring the war to an end. Also in Sudan, the may 
2006 darfur Peace Agreement was not accepted by two of the three 
rebel factions, and the khartoum government then set about attacking 
and intimidating the nonsignatories, in alliance with the one faction 
(under minni minawi) that had signed the agreement. the exclusion 
of the Arab militias—often referred to as Janjaweed—from the darfur 
peace process has also caused significant risks.
 A second problem is that even when the main armed groups are rep-
resented, the underlying causes of violence are likely to remain unad-
dressed. in particular, where large sections of civil society are excluded, 
this will tend to prolong or even exacerbate the grievances of ordinary 
citizens. What forms of corruption are being institutionalized in a 
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particular peace process? economic initiatives may help cement a peace 
agreement between armed factions, perhaps by providing the right mix 
of incentives and disincentives, but a key danger is that deep fissures in 
the society may simply be “papered over.” in practice, armed actors who 
have been able to use violence to secure control of production, trade, 
and emergency aid in wartime may be able to carve out for themselves 
a degree of control over production, trade, and development and recon-
struction aid after a peace settlement.3 by consolidating exploitation 
and corruption, an exclusive peace agreement may store up problems for 
the future.4 When civilians fall victim to an exclusionary peace agree-
ment that institutionalizes corruption, this may sometimes be an exten-
sion of collaborative warfare that targeted and exploited civilians.5
 the dangers of consolidating corruption and exploitation were illus-
trated in the case of liberia. What looks to some people like realism 
and pragmatism may look to others like appeasement. After the 1995–96 
Abuja ii peace process had brought a number of warlords (most notably 
Charles taylor) into the political settlement, taylor, who was subse-
quently elected president in 1997, proved unwilling to engage in substan-
tial reform of the security services while promoting widespread corrupt 
practices and harassing civil society and the press.6 in Sierra leone, the 
controversial appointment of revolutionary united front (ruf) leader 
foday Sankoh as vice president and head of a new mineral resources 
commission (under the 1999 lomé Peace Agreement) was profoundly 
offensive to many Sierra leoneans: it looked even more distasteful 
when the ruf returned to war in 2000.7 the 2003 peace agreement in 
the democratic republic of the Congo (drC), while in many ways a 
step forward, was also seen by many as a kind of “warlords’ peace” that 
entrenched the exploitation of economic resources by various military 
commanders, often with foreign backing, who were given a degree of 
power within the state apparatus and a degree of political legitimacy.8
 An earlier and revealing example of a political fix that “papered over” 
important societal grievances came at the end of Sudan’s first civil war. 
the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which ended Sudan’s first 
civil war, included important concessions to the southern rebels, such as 
incorporation into the national army, but it did not produce the kind of 
accountable political system that was capable of remedying the extreme 
underdevelopment of the south or the marginalization of significant 
groups within the north. in effect, a military government entered into 
alliance with former rebels at the expense of rival political forces within 
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the north. When President Jaafar nimeiri and his successors courted 
some of the discontented elements in the north (especially the western 
part of northern Sudan) during the 1980s, the south was left without 
protection. in these circumstances, the limited economic rehabilita-
tion in the south after the first civil war served merely to regenerate 
resources, notably cattle, that could be raided by disgruntled northern 
pastoralists allied to the government.
 twenty-three years after the Addis Ababa agreement, Sudan’s 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended Sudan’s second 
civil war, also carried the seeds of major problems in relation to op-
position groups in the north. the agreement excluded the opposition 
national democratic Alliance, and the CPA allocated only 14 percent 
of positions in the national and state executive and legislative branches 
to the northern opposition, compared to 52 percent to the national 
Congress Party and 28 percent to the Sudan People’s liberation move-
ment (SPlm).9 As in 1972, peace meant an alliance with the southern 
rebels but also an exclusion of many elements of northern, and even 
southern, civil society. opponents of the current regime have included 
those muslims who hoped, wrongly as it turned out, that common 
religion could be a basis for common citizenship; with southern seces-
sion, many in the north also fear that they will now have no option but 
to become part of an islamic state.10 key grievances in the north have 
included, first, years of neglect by the government and, second, the loss 
of access to land by both smallholders and pastoralists as a result of the 
expansion of Sudan’s large semimechanized farms.11 leben moro has 
presented the north-south peace in Sudan as a rather exclusive busi-
ness, even in terms of the south. this is manifest, for example, in the 
difficulty that many displaced people have experienced in returning to 
oil-rich areas that the government in khartoum, which came to include 
the SPlm/A, was interested in exploiting.12
 Away from Africa, many similar concerns have attached themselves 
to peace agreements. in Cambodia in the 1990s, the institutionalization 
of corruption in a peace process helped deprive the treasury of revenue, 
and this was subsequently a source of some instability.13 in tajikistan 
following the 1992–97 civil war, a considerable degree of stability has 
been brought about by a peace process that effectively “bought off ” a 
range of warring factions, not least with the benefits of a privatization 
program. However, the entrenchment of corruption and of oligopolistic 
markets has raised concerns about the long-term sustainability of this 
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peace.14 in the former yugoslavia, the 1995 dayton Peace Agreement 
can be seen as rewarding local elites who had already rewarded them-
selves through violent accumulation in wartime.15
 in Afghanistan, as Antonio giustozzi has highlighted, warlords have 
tried to use peace agreements to become “respectable” and to consoli-
date their ill-gotten gains; indeed, this impulse may even help to explain 
why elements of peace became possible.16 Some analysts suggest that 
during negotiations over the composition of an interim government 
starting in november 2001 in bonn, the united States, in concert with 
senior united nations (un) officials, actually strengthened the morale 
of, and support for, Afghan warlords (some of them described as “paper 
tigers”) at a moment when they could have been weakened.17 it appears 
that concerns beyond “human security” were influential, including the 
need to “incentivize” and then reward allies in the northern Alliance 
in the context of the “war on terror” and the uS-led war against the 
taliban. one of the longer-term problems that resulted was that power-
ful warlords were able to withhold a great deal of customs revenue from 
the center, making reconstruction and restoring some kind of central 
authority more difficult. As Ahmed rashid wrote in 2007: “the lack of 
developmental activities in the south [of Afghanistan] has resulted in 
part from [President Hamid] karzai’s failure to purge corrupt or drug-
trafficking officials from powerful positions. this has fuelled disillu-
sionment among Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in southern and 
eastern Afghanistan, many of whom are now offering to fight or at least 
offer sanctuary to the taliban.”18
 A third problem is that peace agreements may actually reward violent 
behavior, sending potentially damaging signals perhaps internationally 
as well as nationally about the utility of violence. these signals may be 
acted upon by a variety of (excluded) groups within a country that is 
undergoing a peace process and perhaps in the wider region too. yet 
being more “inclusive” during a peace process (for example by bringing 
in smaller military factions) does not necessarily solve the problem. in 
fact, it may even make matters worse, since it is possible that this will 
send a signal to an ever-widening group of people that they too need to 
resort to violence if they are to find a stake in the peace.
 in liberia, civilian organizations have often opposed recognition of 
armed faction leaders in peace negotiations, arguing that this rewards 
their violence and boosts their prestige and their ability to attract a fol-
lowing.19 the early 1990s in liberia saw a rapid proliferation of factions, 
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and this seems to have been driven in part by the desire of various mili-
tary leaders to claim a place at the negotiating table through seizing ter-
ritory.20 Adekeye Adebajo has noted:
ulimo [united liberation movement for democracy in 
liberia], the lPC [liberia Peace Council], and the ldf [lofa 
defense force] hoped to obtain a share of political power in 
a future government through the conquest of territory, which 
would then provide them with some leverage during negotiations. 
ulimo’s presence at the Cotonou talks in 1993, after its 
exclusion from yamoussoukro in 1991, was a clear sign to other 
factions that gaining territory was the most viable way of winning 
a place at the negotiating table. new factions had much to lose 
and nothing to gain from the successful implementation of 
Cotonou. it was in their interest that the agreement failed, as 
it had been in ulimo’s interest that yamoussoukro failed in 
1991.21
 it is worth setting this account alongside an analysis of the peace 
process in the drC by denis tull and Andreas mehler. referring to 
the 1999 lusaka Peace Agreement, they note:
While insurgencies may be prone to defections, it is no 
coincidence that as soon as the political terms of lusaka (power-
sharing, transitional government) had been established, the 
defections from the rCd [rally for Congolese democracy] 
and the proliferation of smaller insurgencies started in earnest, 
including the rCd-national and the rCd-ml [rCd–
movement for liberation] which progressively fragmented 
even further into factions led by Wamba, tibasima, nyamwisi 
and lubanga, striving to become rebel leaders in their own 
right. given the underlying logic of power-sharing agreements 
according to which all armed insurgents are to be included in 
negotiations, these personalities understandably expected to be 
treated accordingly by the mediators; indeed, this was the very 
reason the new groups were created.22
 this damaging dynamic has persisted. in a 2009 article, koen vlas-
senroot and timothy raeymaekers highlight important negative effects 
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of the strategy of luring drC warmongers to the negotiating table: 
“the message sent out to Congolese rebel groups is that violence pays. 
A recurrent pattern since the 1999 lusaka ceasefire agreement is that 
every negotiated peace deal in the drC has been followed by the pro-
liferation and fragmentation of armed groups that each want a portion 
of existing power agreements.”23
 in Sudan, as noted, a near-exclusive international focus on khartoum 
and the rebel SPlA, in line with a binary understanding of a north-south 
or even a muslim-Christian divide, has tended to encourage a neglect 
of the interests of those northerners who oppose the government of 
omar al-bashir. Some of these northerners, notably in darfur, turned 
to violence in an attempt to win the international recognition and the 
place at the negotiating table that had been accorded to the SPlA, for 
whom violent resistance seemed at last to have paid dividends.24
 darfur’s rebel Sudan liberation movement (Slm), headed by 
minni minawi, noted in 2003: “the government is negotiating with 
the south because of pressure from the international community and 
military pressure in the south, in the west and in the east.”25 in some 
sense, violence was seen to have “worked.”
 the problem of incentivizing violence through peace subsequently re-
curred within darfur. Clea kahn and elena lucchi, two aid workers who 
were based in darfur with the office for Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (oCHA) and médecins sans frontières (mSf), observed:
for rebel groups or armed insurgents, when humanitarians 
negotiate with them for access to people living in their areas of 
control, this interaction can be used to demonstrate that they 
are legitimate, or “recognised.” in eastern Chad and darfur, this 
has been turned on its head: in both areas, power and legitimacy 
are derived not from fostering positive relationships with the 
humanitarian community, but through demonstrations of brute 
force. the result is a “toyota war,” in which the seizure of vehicles 
by force from humanitarian organisations confers legitimacy. 
in darfur this pattern is particularly clear, as the parties that 
are invited to the negotiating table are generally those with the 
greatest military strength, and asset targeting peaks just prior to 
peace talks. theft increases as rebel groups with ever-decreasing 




 the danger of “incentivizing” violence is present well beyond these 
African examples. in Cambodia, the peace deal with elements of the 
khmer rouge under ieng Sary in the mid-1990s was often seen as send-
ing out potentially damaging signals on the acceptability of violence 
and corruption. for example, Amnesty international complained that 
the deal contributed to a climate of impunity. Also in the mid-1990s, 
the peace process in the former yugoslavia demonstrates some of the 
dangers of incentivizing violence. Consider this measured assessment 
by Alexandros yannis:
the dayton Peace Accords, which in 1995 settled the conflict 
in bosnia-Herzegovina, had a major destabilizing effect on 
kosovo. on the one hand, the dayton Accords left the question 
of kosovo’s political future unresolved, thereby exacerbating the 
simmering frustrations of kosovo Albanians. on the other hand, 
the accords acted as a major disincentive for the continued pursuit 
of peaceful political solutions; the kosovo Albanians could not 
fail to observe that the underlying logic of the peace accords was 
largely the ratification on paper of the ethnoterritorial gains made 
on the ground by the use of force. Consequently, the dayton 
Accords strengthened the political commitment of radical 
Albanians to the use of force. Popular support for the militant 
program of the kosovo liberation Army (klA) increased at the 
expense of the moderate strategy of ibrahim rugova.27
 rugova’s ability to rein in extremists in the Albanian community was 
premised on the belief that kosovo would be included when the conflict 
in bosnia was finally settled. So it was logical that his position would 
be dramatically undermined by the exclusion of kosovo from dayton. 
meanwhile, the message that violence had paid dividends, in particular 
for the bosnian Serbs, appears not to have been lost on either the klA 
or the Serbs in kosovo. Peter russell argues that, even though the dete-
riorating situation in kosovo was fairly well understood internationally, 
there was some justification for excluding the issue of kosovo at dayton, 
since inclusion could have jeopardized the immediate and pressing goal 
of ending the conflict in bosnia, which had until that point been a much 
more destructive conflict than the conflict in kosovo.28 in particular, 
Slobodan milosevic was a pivotal figure at dayton, particularly given his 
influence over the bosnian Serbs, and his willingness to enter into the 
39
Peace as  an incent ive  for  War
agreement might have been compromised by pushing for major conces-
sions on kosovo, especially as championing the Serbs in kosovo had 
formed the platform for milosevic’s original rise to power in the late 
1980s and the issue was still the most reliable way for him to rally Serb 
support. in contrast with russell’s argument, Alex bellamy describes the 
lifting of international sanctions as an “overriding concern” for milosevic, 
and suggests that this presented an opportunity for pushing for conces-
sions on kosovo.29 it is difficult to know for sure just how far milosevic 
could have been pushed. Although sanctions, which were renewed as 
violence in kosovo escalated, did eventually contribute to milosevic’s 
downfall, the many advantages—both political and economic—that the 
milosevic cabal derived from these sanctions30 suggest that removing 
them may not have been an absolute priority for him in 1995.
 in Sierra leone, many local people saw the 1999 lomé Peace Agree-
ment, which brought the ruf inside the government, as an unfortunate 
necessity given the preceding attack on freetown and the grave weak-
ness of international protection. mediators in Sierra leone also used 
educational scholarships as an incentive for peace. but if necessity is the 
mother of concession, what kind of message does this send? An analysis 
of the various coups and renewed rebellions in Sierra leone from the 
1992 coup onward suggests that a variety of groups have tried to use 
violence to force their way inside the existing system of rewards and 
benefits.31 A young man working on the demobilization scheme told me 
in 2001: “if you pay much attention to perpetrators without recognising 
the civilians or helping them like the ex-combatants, you are sending 
another signal. there might be another uprising. . . . Civilians will get up 
and say the people who caused this havoc, they are now living big.”
 in addition to incentivizing rebellion through this kind of “dem-
onstration effect,” peace agreements may dangerously free up military 
resources for new targets and they may encourage those who are accus-
tomed to living off a war economy to look for “fresh pastures.” Albanian 
fears of escalating Serb oppression in kosovo were heightened when 
notorious Serb paramilitary leader Zeljiko “Arkan” raznatovic an-
nounced that he was moving his headquarters to the kosovo capital of 
Pristina. many Albanians believed that warmongers among the Serbs 
would transfer their attention to kosovo once the conflict in bosnia had 
been resolved, a prediction that proved disturbingly accurate.32 Sudan’s 
2002 cease-fire agreement, the precursor to the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, seems to have released some military resources for 
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war-making in darfur, which became the new justification for high 
military spending and maintaining a sense of national emergency.33 
these cases underline the need, at the very least, for outsiders to antici-
pate that peace in one region may encourage war in another.
Ways forward
it is one thing to raise a problem but quite another to suggest a sensible 
solution. in an interesting contribution, tull and mehler, after noting 
that violence may be incentivized by peace agreements, mention “two 
rather bold solutions” to this problem: “first, let conflicts run their course; 
second, always provide support (diplomatically, militarily) to incumbent 
regimes attacked by insurgents.”34 tull and mehler go on to note that 
letting wars run their course—in line with edward luttwak’s injunction 
to “give war a chance”35—is hardly a very humanitarian option, adding, 
first, that it ignores the role of external actors in fueling wars over long 
period and, second, that the victory of a rebel group may not even bring 
a war to an end. these are powerful objections with which one can 
readily agree. As for providing support to incumbents, tull and mehler 
note that this means bolstering authoritarian regimes and stifling any 
political change. Arguing that civil wars happen when they are physi-
cally feasible, and moving away from a focus on motivation, Paul Collier 
has stated: “if the feasibility hypothesis is right it has a powerful impli-
cation: violent conflict cannot be prevented by addressing the problems 
that are likely to motivate it; it can only be prevented by making it more 
difficult. Whether rebellion is easy or difficult basically comes down to 
whether rebels have access to guns and money, and whether the state is 
effective in opposing them.”36
 yet this line of analysis, like the earlier “greed discourse,” seems to 
delegitimize all rebellion and to throw the weight of “reason” behind all 
counterinsurgency.37 A major worry here is that many wars have revealed 
a tendency for abuses to flourish within a counterinsurgency while in-
ternational attention and condemnation are focused on the insurgency:38 
giving “carte blanche” to counterinsurgency will only make this worse.
 Here i highlight three more constructive ways forward. the first, em-
phasized by tull and mehler, is through ensuring some rather demanding 
criteria for inclusion in a peace process. As tull and mehler suggest:
external brokers need to raise the threshold which grants 
insurgents a place at the negotiating table. As such, it is 
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imperative to think beyond violence as the primary measure of 
political inclusion. Armed groups preying on local communities 
and committing serious human rights abuses should be disqualified 
as negotiating partners. by contrast, some rebels provide some 
measure of order or even collective goods such as security, and 
they should therefore receive a political premium in negotiations, 
for they come at least close to carrying out functions that a 
government is supposed to fulfil.39
 there may be some very severe practical constraints, but in many 
ways this makes good sense. it is important to recognize that armed 
groups have many political, economic, and ideological reasons for not 
abusing civilians, as well as many reasons for abusing them.40 As much 
as possible, these relatively benevolent tendencies can be encouraged by 
including some of the better actors: it is not usually necessary or help-
ful to dismiss everyone as a greedy warlord. there are precedents for 
discouraging some of the more abusive behavior, moreover. in liberia, 
nongovernmental organizations (ngos) implemented a joint opera-
tion policy in 1996 after massive looting of relief resources in monrovia. 
ngos made it clear that they were not prepared to put up with re-
peated looting. they limited activities to essential life-saving tasks, and 
they tried to ensure that they were not played off against each other 
by local warlords. Philippa Atkinson and nicholas leader argue that 
cooperation between humanitarian agencies at this time helped put 
civilian protection on the agenda, feeding into a peace process in com-
bination with a range of more diplomatic and legal pressures.41
 However, tull and mehler’s emphasis on disqualifying abusers does 
raise difficult questions. in particular, what is to be done about those 
who have been preying on civilians? there are likely to be many such 
groups. one option is to wage war on them, but this puts civilian lives 
further at risk and raises the question of whether the peace process 
really deserves that name. Waging war may also solidify an abusive 
rebel leadership’s control over reluctant recruits.42 Some degree of 
incorporation of these groups may be necessary, particularly as an ap-
parently “implacable” spoiler may change, in new circumstances, into a 
less violent entity.43
 A second way forward is through the provision of other incentives, 
perhaps alongside a formal peace agreement that can discourage vio-
lence in various ways. one of these might be criminal prosecutions, 
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for example by the international Criminal Court (iCC), though here 
the advantages of reducing impunity have to be weighed against the 
possibility that armed actors will prolong conflict rather than risk 
prosecution in conditions of peace.44 A good disarmament, demobili-
zation, and reintegration (ddr) program can lure soldiers away from 
loyalty to leaders, who often have a particularly strong vested interest 
in continuing conflict and in avoiding the accountability and punish-
ment that peace might bring.45 loss of faith in a greedy leadership can 
be an advantage here, and this was one element that helped facilitate 
the disarmament of rebels in Sierra leone.46 Weak chains of com-
mand in modern wars, as well as creating difficulties in enforcing peace 
agreements, can play a positive role in encouraging belligerents to ne-
gotiate.47 Another way of providing incentives beyond a formal peace 
process is through focusing on the instruments of counterinsurgency. 
improved conditions for government soldiers proved extremely impor-
tant in reining in the decade-long civil war in Sierra leone, where 
the understandable demonization of rebels had long diverted attention 
from the substantial role of government soldiers and other government 
actors in fueling the conflict.
 in the drC, governmental “spoilers” have often been damagingly 
absent from international radar screens.48 the embezzling of soldiers’ 
pay by senior military officials encouraged looting of civilians. Poor or 
nonexistent pay also reportedly encouraged government army soldiers to 
take bribes from the democratic liberation forces of rwanda (fdlr), 
who are linked to the former rwandan génocidaires, encouraging the 
government soldiers to tolerate the presence of fdlr soldiers and even 
to assist the fdlr in taxing and looting civilians.49 in an important 
2006 report, the international Crisis group (iCg) noted:
While donors have supported monuC [united nations 
organization mission in the democratic republic of the 
Congo] at an operational rate of approximately $1 billion 
a year to improve the situation in the east, they have 
balked at the concept of providing basic equipment to the 
integrated brigades, let alone decent living conditions. . . . the 
integration centres at mushaki, nyaleke and luberizi were 
largely unsuitable for human habitation, let alone training, 
forcing some soldiers to live in straw huts amid outbreaks of 
disease such as cholera and tuberculosis.50
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 A third way forward is to treat peace as an ongoing process in which 
a peace agreement or cease-fire is only a beginning. given the right 
internal and external pressures over an extended period, a greater degree 
of inclusion and accountability may become possible over time, even 
where short-term pragmatism has put warlords or faction leaders into 
positions of power at the expense of civil society.51 What is clear is the 
urgency of addressing the concerns of those elements, whether of civil 
society or armed groups that are considered potentially cooperative, 
even once a peace agreement has been reached.
 if a society is to move from a situation of extreme violence and ex-
ploitation to a more peaceful and accountable system, then some kind of 
process of democratization will clearly be necessary and desirable. but 
there are also grave dangers here. Work by edward mansfield and Jack 
Snyder in particular has shown just how difficult it is to ensure compli-
ance from elites for a project of democratization.52 Another worry is the 
possibility that a peace agreement only becomes possible as a result of 
the assumption that it will not be implemented.
 it is striking, however, that the process of democratization has often 
been handled in a crude and precipitous manner, not least in the tragic 
case of rwanda.53 Combining rapid democratization with rapid eco-
nomic liberalization would appear to be particularly dangerous.54 in li-
beria, the resources that Charles taylor was able to acquire in wartime, 
along with the threat of resumed war, helped him to win the presidential 
election in 1997.55 Commenting on bosnia-Herzegovina in a 2004 ar-
ticle, Peter Andreas observed: “leading actors in the covert acquisition 
and distribution of supplies during the war have emerged as a new elite 
with close ties to the government and nationalist political parties.”56
 the case of Sudan after the 2005 peace agreement also suggests that 
rather excessive faith has been placed, not least by international donors, 
in elections as something that will in themselves sort out the conflict in 
that country. in some ways, almost magical powers have been attributed 
to the democratic process. the withdrawal from the 2010 elections by 
Sadiq al-mahdi and of the SPlm’s yasir Arman effectively handed vic-
tory to omar al-bashir, even without the resort to census manipulation 
and vote-rigging.57 Al-bashir was also able to use the very considerable 
patronage of the (increasingly oil-rich) Sudanese state to cement his 
political constituency. meanwhile, khartoum largely escaped criticism 
for its purchase of enhanced weapons systems and its domestic weapons 
production, with much of the weaponry being deployed in or near the 
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oil regions in the north-south border area.58 the decision of southern 
Sudanese to secede has been followed by widespread human rights 
abuses by the Sudanese army in the Abyei area and by the movement 
of large numbers of the seminomadic messiriya Arab population into 
the region, apparently as part of an attempt to stake a claim to this 
contested and oil-rich area.59
A large measure of realism is important in peace negotiations: peace 
is unlikely to be possible without “buying off ” the major armed actors. 
However, the dangers with this process also need highlighting—and 
counteracting. this requires a conscious—and prolonged effort—to 
extend the benefits of peace beyond these armed groups. in particu-
lar, where nonviolent, or even relatively nonviolent, actors feel they are 
receiving a significant “peace dividend,” the incentive to join the ranks 
of armed groups who may have benefited more directly from a peace 
settlement will be reduced. the analysis here also suggests a need to 
accommodate genuine grievances, notably those of civilians, and to re-
ward armed groups whose behavior is at least relatively favorable toward 
civilians. Peace is usually a “dirtier” business than we like to think; but 
if this is taken too far, the perverse incentives for further violence are 
not to be underestimated. if peace is accompanied by a process of 
democratization, the economic context is likely to be crucial and a sus-
tained reconstruction effort can provide a relatively promising environ-
ment, helping to extend benefits beyond the main armed groups.
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The Conundrums of Legitimacy and Local Ownership
d o m i n i k  Z A u m
s i n C e  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  C o l d  w A r ,  s tAt e b u i l d i n g  h A s  i n C r e A s i n g ly 
come to be seen as a central strategy for establishing sustainable peace 
after civil conflicts.1 following the eruption of conflicts in many de-
veloping countries, where already weak state structures often crumbled 
under the double blow of the sudden termination of superpower patron-
age and the pressures of globalization, the need to strengthen the capac-
ity of states to provide basic services such as security to the population, 
and to establish institutions that enjoy relatively broad popular consent, 
became critical. As kofi Annan suggested in 2001, during his tenure 
as secretary-general of the united nations (un), “the natural con-
flicts of society can be resolved through the exercise of state sovereignty 
and, generally, participatory governance.”2 the attacks of September 11, 
2001, further enhanced the focus on so-called weak and failing states as 
sources of insecurity not only for their own populations but also for the 
West, because of the former’s potential association with international 
terrorism and organized crime. this reinforced the association between 
statebuilding and peacebuilding.
 despite the inherent link between the two concepts, and the fact that 
they have often been used interchangeably by donors and analysts alike, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding are conceptually different. boutros 
boutros-ghali’s Agenda for Peace defines peacebuilding as “action to 
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and so-
lidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”3 Statebuilding, in 
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contrast, encompasses efforts to build or strengthen political and ad-
ministrative institutions with the aim of establishing a legitimate local 
political order in the eyes of relevant societal groups.4 Whereas the for-
mer focuses on preventing renewed outbreaks of violence after conflict, 
the latter is concerned with the character of the relationship between 
state and society,5 and the legitimacy of state institutions, a concern that 
has important implications for peacebuilding but also broader implica-
tions for development and governance that are distinct from dealing 
with the consequences of conflict.
 As Charles Call has argued, there are a range of tensions between the 
practices and priorities of peacebuilding and statebuilding.6 one com-
mon peacebuilding practice, for example, is the formation of power-
sharing agreements,7 which are used to engage potential spoilers and 
give them a stake in a successful peace process. Such power-sharing 
agreements have been particularly common in African peacebuild-
ing processes, for example in Côte d’ivoire, the democratic republic 
of the Congo (drC), Sudan, and Zimbabwe.8 However, while such 
arrangements have often been successful in containing spoilers and 
preventing the renewed outbreak of conflict, they have in some cases 
undermined the development of state capacity and the transformation 
of state-society relations. this has occurred in particular where leaders 
of different factions use their access to the state for private gain rather 
than developing effective institutions to provide public goods, or when 
they instrumentalize the political process to block the strengthening 
of state institutions at the expense of parallel institutions they control. 
Although peacebuilding tends to emphasize the impartiality of outsid-
ers to engage all relevant parties in a peace process, statebuilding often 
requires international actors to take sides and to make deeply political 
decisions about access to power and control of resources that are incom-
patible with impartiality. the strengthening of state institutions can 
fuel the resistance of those groups that stand to lose most from a state 
effectively exercising the monopoly of violence, or encourage them to 
use violence to capture the state—a dilemma that has characterized the 
failed attempts at statebuilding in Somalia, as Christopher Clapham 
and ken menkhaus have argued.9
 Although such tensions do not suggest that statebuilding cannot 
make a critical contribution to building sustainable peace, they do un-
derline the need to examine the impact of statebuilding on peace in the 
political, economic, and social contexts of each case. As argued in this 
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chapter, many of these tensions are actually inherent in statebuilding, as 
they reflect different aspects of the complex social construct that is the 
state. Although most international statebuilding efforts have focused 
predominantly on the strengthening of formal political and adminis-
trative institutions (the state’s vertical legitimacy), the state is also an 
institutional arrangement that enshrines power balances in a society10 
(reflecting its horizontal legitimacy), and the requirements for these two 
aspects of statehood can easily conflict in weak, postconflict states.
 two decades of postconflict statebuilding have resulted in practices 
that are too complex to be described as a single approach. Statebuilding 
has involved a wide range of different international actors with dif-
ferent priorities and perspectives on the role of the state,11 and some 
of these actors have arguably learned lessons from their involvement 
and changed their statebuilding practices. At times they have drawn on 
specific local traditions, for example in Afghanistan, where the loya 
Jirga mechanism was used to legitimate the political settlement of the 
2001 bonn conference following the military intervention of the united 
States and its defeat of the taliban. there is also a growing recognition 
that in many developing countries, particularly in Africa, the state has 
never resembled the Weberian model that has informed international 
statebuilding efforts, which raises questions about the effectiveness of 
the existing approaches.12 However, one can argue that over the past 
two decades, the most important statebuilding actors, such as the 
un, the international financial institutions, and Western donors, have 
generally adopted top-down approaches focusing on the creation and 
strengthening of formal-legal state institutions rather than indigenous 
political practices.13 this chapter focuses predominantly on these ac-
tors and their practices. their statebuilding efforts have been driven by 
the objective of creating what roland Paris has called “liberal market 
democracies,” which are characterized by democratic government, the 
rule of law and promotion of human rights, market liberalization, and 
reasonably effective public administration.14
 in this chapter, i argue that the central contribution to peacebuild-
ing made by international statebuilding efforts is the legitimation of 
the state. legitimacy, though, is a complex social phenomenon, and the 
structures, practices, and processes that can generate and sustain the 
legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis its population are shaped by societal-
specific norms. Although the Western donor states and the interna-
tional organizations most deeply involved in statebuilding (such as the 
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un, the World bank, the european union [eu], and the organisation 
for economic Cooperation and development [oeCd]) have arguably 
recognized this, the key mechanism through which they attempt to 
reconcile their own normative commitments and interests with those 
of local actors—the concept of local ownership—can in practice have 
problematic implications for both statebuilding and peacebuilding.
 this chapter presents the case for the centrality of legitimacy and 
the problem of local ownership as a legitimation strategy in three 
steps. first, it explores the concept of legitimacy and why it matters 
for successful postconflict statebuilding. Second, it surveys how inter-
national statebuilding efforts have tried to strengthen the legitimacy of 
postconflict states, and examines some of the legitimacy challenges they 
have faced, in particular the failure of internationally imposed institu-
tions to reflect local norms, and the conflicts between new formal state 
institutions and existing (informal) local structures that developed or 
transformed during conflict to compensate for the absence or predatory 
nature of formal state institutions. i argue that these tensions are inher-
ent in the multifaceted character of the state, which puts competing 
demands on statebuilding efforts. third, the chapter examines in more 
detail the practices of local ownership in statebuilding, one of the key 
strategies for reconciling the normative commitments and strategic ob-
jectives of international statebuilders with the values and needs of local 
communities. i argue that meaningful local ownership that allows for 
substantive local participation in all aspects of statebuilding is likely 
(though counterintuitively) to involve extensive international involve-
ment. Some states, especially those that are suspicious about activities 
that might compromise their sovereignty—a category that includes 
most African states—will find this difficult to accept.
the importance of legitimacy
the importance of legitimacy for a stable political order has long been 
recognized, and has become increasingly prominent in discussions of 
statebuilding among both scholars and practitioners.15 A state is legiti-
mate if its power is justified in terms of normative beliefs shared by both 
those who exercise power and those over whom power is exercised—
beliefs about the ends toward which a state exercises power, but also 
about the way in which power should be exercised, and in which those 
who exercise power should be chosen.16 According to rodney barker, 
“legitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its 
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authority to issue commands, so that these commands are obeyed not 
simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some 
sense to have moral authority because subjects believe they ought to 
obey.”17 thus legitimacy is primarily a social phenomenon and is attrib-
uted on the basis of judgments about the congruence of the state and 
its institutions with the beliefs, values, and expectations that provide a 
justification for its power.
 legitimacy is an important objective of state- and peacebuilding for 
several reasons. first, if the legitimacy of a state is weak in the eyes 
of its population or among particular societal groups, they are more 
likely to refuse to comply with the state’s laws and decisions, and more 
likely to support actors who violently challenge the state. the failure 
of the state to fulfill the expectations of certain social groups because 
of corruption or its inability or unwillingness to provide public goods 
undermines its legitimacy and can lead to rebellions against it. in the 
case of Sierra leone, for example, the corruption of the government, the 
collapse of the education system, and the lack of economic opportuni-
ties for young people fueled support for the revolutionary united front 
(ruf) among a marginalized young population at the beginning of the 
1991 war.18 in Côte d’ivoire, the legitimacy of the state was not only 
undermined by poor governance but also by the consequence of system-
atic discrimination against ivorians of mixed parentage and “foreigners” 
after 1993, whose grievances then fueled an armed rebellion in 2002.19
 Second, legitimate state institutions are more likely to be effective 
in the provision of public services. As michael Carnahan and Clare 
lockhart argue, legitimate states find it easier to collect revenue—a 
fundamental condition for sustaining the capacity of the state to pro-
vide social services and public infrastructure.20 As the ability of the state 
to provide such services helps strengthen its legitimacy, Carnahan and 
lockhart identify a mutually reinforcing relationship between a state’s 
legitimacy and its effectiveness.
 finally, legitimacy is central to the sustainability of state institu-
tions. Weak legitimacy was at the root of many of the “failed states” 
in Africa that descended into conflict at the end of the Cold War 
when their rulers, deprived of financial or military support from the 
united States or Soviet union, could no longer contain resistance to 
their rule through patronage or coercion.21 this development has been 
highlighted most dramatically by the cases of Somalia and the drC. 
Similarly, if the state institutions that are established or strengthened 
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by international efforts are not considered legitimate by society, they 
are unlikely to outlast the international presence that sustains them 
with money (and if necessary, force) for long. to be long-lasting, in-
stitutions need to be embedded in the wider normative structures of a 
society, in order to ensure the local support necessary for their sustain-
ability beyond the international presence.
 the legitimacy of a state can be based on different sources. A state’s 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its population depends on the extent to which its 
core principles reflect the normative beliefs and expectations of this 
particular community. the normative criteria against which local com-
munities judge the legitimacy claims of a state might differ substantially 
from those applied by international statebuilders, and in pluralist and 
divided societies also between different local groups, which in itself can 
become a source of conflict. legitimacy can result in a state’s ability 
to promote shared social goals, such as its effectiveness in providing 
security, economic development, public infrastructure, or social ser-
vices.22 it can be procedural, arising from the way in which the state is 
governed—for example, whether institutions are accountable and rela-
tively transparent, or whether they involve all relevant societal groups 
in their decision making. finally, legitimacy can be structural, meaning 
that the state is legitimate and “becomes a repository of public confi-
dence because it is ‘the right organization for the job.’”23 it is perceived 
as particularly suited to address particular challenges like guaranteeing 
security or delivering economic prosperity. the different sources of 
legitimacy of a particular state depend on contextual factors such as the 
state’s history and sociopolitical structures.
 there is therefore no template for what constitutes a legitimate state, 
and hence no template for building legitimate states. nonetheless, most 
statebuilding efforts by international organizations and Western donors 
have been driven by liberal understandings of state legitimacy.
Statebuilding and legitimacy
international statebuilding efforts have aimed at building the legiti-
macy of postconflict states in a range of different ways, but three aspects 
of statebuilding in particular have been directed toward this end. first, 
attempts to strengthen the capacity of state institutions to provide pub-
lic services, and in particular to establish the monopoly of legitimate 
violence across the state, have aimed at improving the performance of 
the state to enable it to deliver on its responsibilities under the social 
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contract. Second, the focus on the rule of law, which has become one 
of the key priorities of postconflict statebuilding, and the related inter-
national efforts to address postconflict corruption, have been directed 
at making the state effective but also more accountable to its citizens, 
thus strengthening both the output and the procedural legitimacy of the 
state. third, statebuilding operations have prioritized the legitimation 
of the new institutional framework through democratic elections. these 
legitimation efforts reflect a fundamentally liberal conception of the 
state, where political authority is based on popular consent, and on an 
implicit social contract, central to which is the provision of security and 
public services to society. this understanding of the content of state-
hood is epitomized by the emerging yet still contested norm that states 
have a “responsibility to protect” (r2P) their citizens, expressed most 
clearly by the international Commission on intervention and State 
Sovereignty (iCiSS) in its report on the r2P concept.24
 international statebuilding efforts have thus mostly addressed what 
kalevi Holsti has called the vertical dimension of legitimacy.25 vertical 
legitimacy establishes the conditions for the right to rule26—the social 
contract between society and the state. it outlines the responsibilities 
the state takes on in return for its power, and defines the ends toward 
which it can legitimately use that power. this emphasis on capacity 
(such as the ability of the state to provide public services) and account-
ability (for example through democratic institutions) focuses attention 
on the character of this social contract, on the state’s ability to deliver 
its part of the bargain, and on society’s ability to democratically control 
this stronger state.
 this can be contrasted with the horizontal dimension of legiti-
macy, which emphasizes “the attitudes and practices of individuals and 
groups within the state toward each other and ultimately to the state 
that encompasses them.”27 it is thus concerned with the ways in which 
different groups within society relate to each other, and how these re-
lationships are mediated through the state. international statebuilding 
efforts have tried to enhance the horizontal legitimacy of the state in 
different ways. they have used power-sharing institutions to encourage 
the participation of a wider range of different groups, and to co-opt 
potential spoilers into state institutions, as in the transitional govern-
ments in burundi, Côte d’ivoire, the drC, and liberia. they have 
promoted the integration of rebels into the armed forces or state-run 
militias, in order to extend the reach of the state into social groups and 
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territories it previously did not control. this form of legitimacy involves 
a complex web of social relations, and horizontal legitimacy claims need 
to address different audiences with distinct interests. these claims need 
to be recognized not only by various societal groups but also by the 
distinct elites leading these groups, who during the conflict might have 
provided a degree of protection and governance when state institutions 
were either absent or predatory, and who as a result might make claims 
on legitimacy that compete with those of the state. However, these ef-
forts to enhance the inclusiveness of a political settlement and of new 
state institutions have been mostly limited to elites and have neglected 
civil society and its transformed relationship to the state following con-
flict.28 this might be informed by the high priority that statebuilding 
operations have accorded to stability, as renewed conflict would not 
only set back any humanitarian and statebuilding gains achieved but 
also undermine the legitimacy of the international presence.
 the practices used to extend the horizontal legitimacy of the state 
can conflict with the requirements for greater vertical legitimacy. Co-
opting different elites into power-sharing institutions, for example, at 
times involves the tacit acceptance of corruption as the price to pay for 
their participation in the state structures, thus undermining the capacity 
of the state to deliver public services in a transparent and effective man-
ner and thus undermining its legitimacy.29 efforts to enhance horizon-
tal legitimacy thus tend to create a different kind of state—not a strong, 
centralized state exercising a monopoly of violence, but a weak state 
where political authority and control over state resources is parceled out 
among different parties. Such a fragmented state is undoubtedly less 
able to promote economic development and establish a monopoly of 
legitimate violence.
 However, the attachment to a state with strong capacity and vertical 
legitimacy is premised on the assumption that in all countries a society’s 
political life is most effectively organized by formal institutions and that 
such institutions universally enjoy structural legitimacy. it suggests an 
understanding of international order where political authority around 
the world rests on a substantive shared (liberal) normative framework 
that legitimizes the institutions of both international and domestic 
order. Whereas in the aftermath of World War ii the formal principle of 
organizing international society—sovereign statehood—was universal-
ized through the decolonization process, statebuilding in the aftermath 
of the Cold War has promoted the universalization of the substantive 
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elements of the Western conception of liberal statehood, promoting a 
particular model of organizing political authority domestically. from 
this perspective, such statebuilding efforts are seen as necessary for the 
completion of a liberal order.
 Without succumbing to moral relativism, such a strong normative 
consensus remains elusive, challenging the viability of statebuilding 
efforts that focus solely on the construction of Weberian states. Post-
conflict countries are characterized by alternative conceptions of author-
ity and by informal power structures that, having emerged in the context 
of conflict, interact with formal state structures in complex ways.30 With 
regard to African countries, Alex de Waal argues that the prevalence of 
patrimonial sociocultural rules in many African states suggests that politi-
cal life should better be understood as a “patrimonial marketplace” where 
a stable political order is the consequence of the most inclusive “buy-in” of 
relevant elites,31 rather than the capacity of formal state structures. When 
the state is not seen as a neutral arbiter and provider of public goods, 
interventions geared to strengthen its institutional capacity are perceived 
as partial and as influencing power balances in favor of those groups who 
control state institutions, thus “upsetting” the marketplace and making 
less likely a reasonably stable order that minimizes violence. one of the 
consequences of the top-down character of liberal statebuilding is there-
fore that some groups may feel marginalized in the developing political 
order, and use violence to oppose it in order to maintain their previous 
social and political positions and privileges.32
reconciling the tensions in Statebuilding:  
the Promise of local ownership
to reconcile the top-down character of postconflict statebuilding with 
local needs and conditions, and to resolve some of the tensions between 
vertical and horizontal legitimation efforts, many commentators have 
emphasized the importance of local ownership, arguing that, in the 
words of Jarat Chopra, local ownership constitutes “a minimum stan-
dard and a moral imperative.”33 the perceived lack of local ownership 
has been central to most criticisms of “liberal statebuilding” and its 
emphasis on the Weberian state and the institutionalization of Western 
liberal norms, highlighting the limited local involvement in deciding on 
the character of the new political and social institutions.34
 Calls for more local ownership have also come from leading statebuild-
ing practitioners, who have attributed the poor record of postconflict 
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statebuilding, in terms of both development and return to conflict, to a 
lack of local ownership, which they argue would make statebuilding ef-
forts both more effective and sustainable.35 these arguments are based 
on three core claims. first, institutions need to reflect relevant social 
norms to be able to command compliance and to be sustainable. if not, 
they will be brittle and weak, and unlikely to play a meaningful role 
in the absence of constant outside support. local involvement in the 
design and establishment of institutions is thus said to help with their 
sustainability and effectiveness.
 Second, and related, local ownership allows international statebuilding 
efforts to draw on local “practical” knowledge, or metis in the words of 
James Scott, to complement the abstract, technical knowledge (techne) of 
outsiders.36 this makes it more likely that the envisaged political order 
will reflect the sociocultural rules of a society and provide a better match 
between the scope of the envisaged state institutions and the available 
local resources. As Sarah Cliffe and nick manning argue, postconflict 
environments are no terra nullis onto which statebuilders can project 
their institutional visions, and local knowledge can help identify both 
institutions and practices that are well adapted to local conditions and 
resources, and structures that are obstacles to reform.37
 third, local ownership is thought to help in the building and main-
tenance of local capacity. As Ashraf ghani and Clare lockhart argue, 
one of the consequences of the structure of the international aid 
complex is the development of parallel bureaucracies in postconflict 
countries to implement statebuilding projects.38 rather than building 
capacity, such parallel structures contribute to the “sucking out” of local 
capacity, in the memorable words of michael ignatieff,39 depriving the 
state both of financial resources, which are instead channeled through 
the parallel bureaucracy, and of its most qualified public servants, who 
instead work for international actors able to pay substantially larger 
salaries. Although some donors, most notably britain’s department 
for international development (dfid),40 have recognized this and 
have increasingly channeled their aid through the budget and state 
institutions, many major donors continue to direct most of their aid at 
projects implemented by nonstate actors, replicating the institutions 
they want to strengthen.
 the un also identifies local ownership as central to the success of 
its peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts. As stated in the secretary-
general’s report on peacebuilding:
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international support in such complex and rapidly evolving 
situations is therefore a fundamentally political and often 
high-risk undertaking. efforts that bolster the power of 
unrepresentative leaders, or empower one group at the expense 
of another, can exacerbate the causes of conflict or create new 
sources of tension. international actors need to be mindful of 
these considerations. local and traditional authorities as well as 
civil society actors, including marginalized groups, have a critical 
role to play in bringing multiple voices to the table for early 
priority-setting and to broaden the sense of ownership around 
a common vision for the country’s future. the full participation 
of women in these processes is essential, both as victims of the 
conflict and as important drivers of recovery and development.41
 local ownership is thus seen as transformative of key statebuilding 
relationships, not only of the relationship between local and interna-
tional actors, but, equally important, of the relationship between com-
munities and local elites, empowering otherwise marginalized groups, 
giving them voice in the reconstruction process, and involving them in 
its implementation. As a consequence, local ownership is vested with 
expectations of emancipation and empowerment—expectations that 
the concept is inherently unable to fulfill.
 invocations of local ownership of statebuilding processes raise two 
important questions. first, how is local ownership operationalized in 
postconflict statebuilding operations? one of the main pathways for 
local ownership has involved compact mechanisms, such as the un’s 
integrated peacebuilding strategies and strategic peacebuilding frame-
works, or the World bank’s poverty reduction strategy papers, that are 
based on joint planning and locally led monitoring of program imple-
mentation. the aim of these strategies, in the words of yukio takasu, 
former chair of the un Peacebuilding Commission, is the establish-
ment of “mutual accountability” of local and international actors.42 Al-
though these mechanisms might involve local actors in decision making 
and implementation of statebuilding policies, they fall short of estab-
lishing meaningful mutual accountability. ultimately, the international 
part of the bargain—the financial and institutional support offered by 
international actors in the context of these frameworks—is not enforce-
able. Whereas donors can decide to withhold aid if they think that local 
partners are not fulfilling their responsibilities under such a compact, no 
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such sanctioning mechanism is available to local actors, short of evicting 
donors from the country. So although there might be accountability, it 
is neither mutual nor local.
 the second question that the concept raises concerns who should 
exercise ownership. Which local actors should be involved in the de-
sign and implementation of statebuilding policies? Postconflict so-
cieties are normally very heterogeneous, encompassing groups with 
diverging interests and capacities to participate in statebuilding. the 
groups relate to each other, to the state, and to international actors in 
a wide range of different ways. if substate groups are given ownership 
of the allocation and distribution of aid, the process bypasses the cen-
tral state and arguably weakens it further. does local ownership mean 
“government ownership,” or the extensive involvement of civil society? 
Should it be limited to formal institutions, or also involve traditional 
or customary institutions?
 in practice, the way in which local ownership has been operational-
ized in statebuilding operations has often entrenched wartime power 
structures and inequalities. key statebuilding policies that aim at in-
creasing local ownership can contribute to empowering particular elites 
over others rather than contribute to substantive local ownership. ef-
forts at consultation and co-option into state structures, in particular 
in the context of transitional institutions that form part of a peace 
settlement and incorporate the major conflict parties, tend to focus 
on traditional authorities or wartime leaders who are seen as speak-
ing for particular communities. Substantial development aid in the 
aftermath of conflicts has tended to empower governing elites at the 
center, who can use aid to sustain support from key constituencies, and 
traditional elites locally, who act as gatekeepers controlling the local 
access to aid.43 in the absence of functioning state institutions, recon-
struction aid is channeled through parallel donor networks and directly 
to local communities. often, traditional authorities become involved 
in the administration and disbursement of this aid, and can use it for 
patronage, and to enhance their authority vis-à-vis the local population, 
often exacerbating existing inequalities and marginalizing and alienat-
ing other societal groups.44 in Sierra leone, for example, humanitarian 
and development aid was channeled through the Paramount Chiefs, 
whose rule was reinstated with help of donors despite the grievances 
with regard to the role the chieftaincy played in causing the civil war. As 
monica das gupta and her collaborators highlight, local communities 
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are often characterized by substantial inequalities and power imbal-
ances, which complicate collective decision making for the common 
good and can lead to the capture of aid and development programs by 
local elites who monopolize their benefits.45 these policies selectively 
endow particular elites with outside recognition and legitimacy, as well 
as access to resources.
 for local ownership to have the emancipatory effect identified in the 
previously cited un secretary-general’s report on peacebuilding, and 
envisaged by authors such as Chopra, it must go beyond “government 
ownership” and the co-option of self-appointed local elites. instead it 
must involve the participation of a wide and inclusive range of societal 
groups. this, however, requires not only identification of relevant groups 
but also establishment of new mechanisms for consultation and partici-
pation, beyond existing state institutions and customary local author-
ity structures, which need to be linked to the existing structures of the 
state and the international presence. in Sierra leone, the international 
community pressed hard for decentralization and the establishment of 
local governance structures to that end, but although these structures 
have been established at the district and local levels, their competences 
overlap with the traditional authority of the Paramount Chiefs, with 
whom they compete in regard to both function and control over re-
sources. As béatrice Pouligny has argued, many attempts of donors and 
international organizations to involve “civil society” have ignored the 
great diversity of local civil society actors and the fact that “some sectors 
of society are just as discredited as the state,”46 and have underestimated 
the importance of the “state-society relationship” for “rebuilding a state 
apparatus and re-creating a new society out of the ashes of conflict.”47
 enabling such emancipatory ownership requires that international ac-
tors not only make fundamentally political judgments about existing local 
structures and the character of political and social relationships in post-
conflict countries but also that they intervene deeply in the internal affairs 
of postconflict societies. it requires of international statebuilders a role 
that is fundamentally at odds with general understandings of local owner-
ship that focus on self-determination and the “light footprint” of such 
interventions that should result from the greater role of local actors in the 
statebuilding process. local ownership thus fails to resolve the inherent 
tensions of postconflict statebuilding, and arguably even adds to them. 
the intrusive involvement necessary to obtain emancipatory ownership 
is unlikely to find much support among governments who are concerned 
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about shoring up their own position in a postwar order, and who are sup-
ported in their resistance by a restrictive interpretation of sovereignty and 
nonintervention shared by most developing countries. indeed, local elites 
have used references to local ownership to argue for a more limited and 
less intrusive role for international statebuilding actors,48 both to acceler-
ate the transition toward local rule and to strengthen their own power 
domestically. thus in burundi in 2006, the newly elected government 
called for less foreign interference in its affairs and asked the un to close 
its peacekeeping operation in the country (onub) and limit its involve-
ment to economic development activities. At the same time, it tried to 
strengthen its position through patronage and by clamping down on the 
press.49 the choices by international actors that emancipatory ownership 
requires are likely to challenge the legitimacy of the statebuilding efforts 
and of the ownership arrangements.50
legitimacy contributes to the sustainability and effectiveness of the 
state. i have argued in this chapter that central to contemporary state-
building practices is the legitimation of new state institutions, both 
vertically (by enhancing the capacity and accountability of institutions) 
and horizontally (through their inclusiveness). from such a perspective, 
it becomes clear that many of the apparent tensions between peacebuilding 
and statebuilding are actually inherent in contemporary statebuilding 
practices. they are particularly pronounced in countries where the state 
has traditionally been shallow, has coexisted and competed with alter-
native substate authority structures, and has played only a limited role 
in organizing social relations. many postconflict countries in Africa fall 
into this category.
 i have further argued that a greater emphasis on local ownership, 
which has become so central to the rhetoric of the un, major donors, 
and recipient countries that it constitutes part of the new orthodoxy of 
statebuilding, fails to resolve these tensions. instead, the actual donor 
practices associated with pursuing local ownership have often focused 
on government ownership, strengthened and entrenched wartime elites, 
and done little to change state-society relations in ways that create the 
conditions for sustainable peace and development.
 underlying these tensions are inherently political and moral ques-
tions about self-determination, the substantive content of sovereignty, 
and the nature of the state. these are questions that cannot be resolved 
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by tinkering with the processes of state- and peacebuilding, by increas-
ing the available resources, or by enhancing coordination among inter-
national actors. this, however, has been the focus of recent institutional 
innovations in postconflict statebuilding, for example through the un 
Peacebuilding Commission or the “Whole of government” approaches 
by different donors.51 the presence of such inherent contradictions does 
not mean that statebuilding should be abandoned as a part of peace-
building strategies. instead, greater awareness of such tensions and 
contradictions, and of the specific character in particular peacebuilding 
contexts, can help actors to better understand the impact of particu-
lar statebuilding policies on the political and economic structures and 
relationships that shape the possibilities for peace and development 
in postconflict countries, and can inform the prioritizing of particular 
statebuilding objectives and activities.
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T h R e e
Security Sector Governance and Peacebuilding
e b o e  H u t C H f u l
s e C u r i t y  s e C t o r  g o v e r n A n C e  ( s s g )  i s  A C C e P t e d  A s  A  C r i t i C A l 
element in state- and peacebuilding.1 this focus is justified, not least, by 
the intimate link between breakdowns of SSg and the genesis of con-
flict. repression and abuses by security institutions have often laid the 
foundation or provided the trigger for broad-based, even catastrophic, 
conflict. there have, however, been few postconflict contexts in Africa 
where building institutions of security governance, as opposed to stabi-
lizing and normalizing the security situation, has been a priority. South 
Africa, and to a much more limited extent Sierra leone, are excep-
tions. engagement with justice reform and rule of law issues, essential 
underpinnings of democratic SSg, has also been weak in postconflict 
contexts. nevertheless, conflict can have, and has had, transformational 
effects on SSg, offering incentives to take reform of security practices 
and governance more seriously. Conflict produces a proliferation of struc-
tures of force that render effective security governance imperative, but 
challenging, in a context of widespread institutional weakness. Security 
sector governance will need to be recast in a more inclusive direction if 
it is to capture the diversity of institutions, such as private, nonformal, 
and community-based, involved in delivery of security and justice on 
the ground.
 the chapter provides an analysis of three case studies of security sec-
tor reform in the context of postconflict reconstruction—liberia, Sierra 
leone, and South Africa—and asks why SSg has been a lower priority 
in liberia and Sierra leone compared to South Africa. various factors 
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may explain this apparent paradox, the central argument being that 
ownership was present in the case of South Africa, but largely absent in 
the other two. ownership becomes important in light of the complex 
and sometimes competing objectives that characterize contemporary 
peacebuilding under international auspices.
SSg in the African Context
reconstructing SSg in the aftermath of conflict can be a particularly 
daunting task, but it is nevertheless important to locate the issue in 
broader context. there has been prioritization of building “effective” 
security and state systems rather than accountable security and state 
systems founded on due process and rule of law—in other words, 
security sector reform (SSr) rather than security sector governance. 
Security governance in Africa as a whole has remained largely resistant 
to democratization. military coups continue to be part of the political 
dynamic in a number of countries, such as mauritania, madagascar, 
guinea, and guinea-bissau. there are also more insidious forms of 
“securitization” that transcend even the most “democratic” regimes in 
Africa, mainly related to weak rule of law environments. in sum, even 
where “coups” are not obviously on the agenda, security services have re-
mained the mainstay of “softer,” civilianized autocracies masquerading 
under the guise of electoral democracy. the Au dream of a community 
of democratic states with accountable and democratically governed se-
curity forces remains, at best, some way in the future.2
dynamics and Challenges of force in Postconflict Contexts
Conflict and postconflict situations give rise to particularly complex land-
scapes of force, arising from the need to prosecute multilayered, cross-
cutting conflicts. these encompass international forces; governmental 
military, paramilitary, and other security elements; warlords, rebel 
forces, and various militia with equally variable loyalties; community, 
traditional, and local security organs; and private (commercial) security. 
“Asymmetric” or “composite” forces are a recognized feature of counter-
insurgency and civil wars,3 with both states and nonstate actors driven 
by various and incongruent calculations and motivations.4 Although 
not necessarily generating or controlling private security companies, 
states both strong and weak have sought to tap into private commercial 
as well as noncommercial circuits of violence for their own interests.5 
due to this multitiered and often intertwined landscape of force, it is 
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necessary to reframe security governance in countries emerging from 
conflict. SSg should be recast in a more inclusive direction, to capture 
the diversity of institutions—formal, private, nonformal, and community-
based—involved in the actual delivery of security and justice on the 
ground. the “security sector” itself will have to be defined more broadly. 
given that “security” is a critical variable that has to be in place for 
postconflict reconstruction to proceed, effective security governance is 
all the more imperative.
 the concept of “inclusive security governance” involves full participa-
tion by all four dimensions of the “civil”—executive (policy), legislative 
(oversight), judicial (rule of law), and civil society and media (oversight 
and critical input).6 it incorporates local, communal, and customary or-
gans of security and justice, and ensures adequate representation along 
the lines of gender, race, and ethnicity. it also bases security on justice 
and rule of law (rights or rule-based security) in both the formal and 
the informal or nonformal (customary) spheres, and thus connects SSr 
with justice reform.
Potential transformational impact of Conflict
there are two hopeful signs for societies grappling with legacies of con-
flict. first, conflict has had transformational effects on the management 
of security, most notably the emergence of regional conflict prevention 
and management structures and corresponding notions of collective se-
curity. this reflects the realization that security problems cannot be ade-
quately addressed within national borders, although these developments 
have not been unambiguously positive. regional economic communi-
ties (reCs) such as eCoWAS, the Southern African development 
Community (SAdC), the economic Community of Central African 
States (eCCAS), and the intergovernmental Authority on develop-
ment (igAd) have been increasingly diverted away from their original 
focus on economic integration and development, toward grappling with 
pressing issues of security. given their lopsided capabilities, regional 
organizations have become more attuned to managing conflict instead 
of addressing broader and longer-term peacebuilding needs. regional 
security complexes potentially pose their own accountability issues, and 
the emergence of “collective security” regimes has not necessarily trans-
formed the way individual states deal with security issues or produced 
greater harmonization of national security systems. regional states 
therefore remain a mishmash of idiosyncratic security arrangements.
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 Second, postconflict situations may provide strong motivation to 
overhaul the way security is produced, managed, and governed.7 Hence, 
one of the paradoxes of postconflict SSr is that it can potentially result 
in countries leapfrogging other transitional political systems as well as 
more stable countries in security sector development and overall quality 
of security governance. it is not entirely surprising then, that among 
the countries with “best practice” security sector legal frameworks are 
countries such as South Africa, and to a lesser extent Sierra leone, that 
recently emerged from conflict.
rebuilding SSg in the Context of Peacebuilding
the reconstruction of the security services and the manner in which 
they are managed and governed are central to any peacebuilding strat-
egy.8 indeed, issues of security and security governance have been at 
the core of the peace negotiations and subsequent peace agreements 
in Africa. in some contexts, such as South Africa and the democratic 
republic of the Congo (drC), the provisions of peace agreements 
with regard to security governance have been further elaborated and 
entrenched in a new constitution. in others, for example liberia and 
Sierra leone, the old constitution has been retained but security sector 
policy and legislation have been overhauled. SSr and SSg exercises 
would appear to be logically related, and indeed a recent publication 
on security governance in West Africa has suggested, correctly, that 
“if democratic governance of the security sector defines the goal, then 
SSr represents the primary tool toward this objective.”9 Professional 
and operationally effective security forces are an essential foundation for 
improved security governance and improved delivery, but there are few 
security services in Africa that qualify.
 nonetheless, security sector governance has not frequently been 
a priority in approaches to peacebuilding, and security sector reform 
overall has had a poor track record in building institutions of account-
ability and oversight. this may not be manifest from the rhetoric, but 
it is nevertheless amply obvious from actual programming.10 there are 
many reasons for this lack of focus on SSg,11 on the part of both the 
donor community and national governments, including:
•  References to civil oversight and good governance 
dimensions of security sector reform are relatively scarce 
in un mission mandates, as is funding for the necessary 
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capacity building.12 in addition, un field officers often 
have scant appreciation of the principles of democratic 
governance of security,13 and in any case the limited 
duration of the typical un mission virtually precludes 
engagement with longer-term institutional reforms.
•   National governments may not regard SSG as a priority.
•  Legislatures and civil society, which constitute the usual 
sources of pressure for reforms in security governance, may 
have little effective voice or capacity to ensure that such 
reforms are actually delivered.
Capacity building for security oversight, limited as it is, has been largely 
left to independent national and international nongovernmental orga-
nizations (ngos)14 and in some cases, to quasi-official organizations, 
such as the national democratic institute (ndi), which has a long 
record of legislative engagement.
 building the capacity of security management organs has not been 
a consistent peacebuilding priority either. Civilian capacity to manage 
security issues is limited, and many civilian security ministries, particu-
larly those of defense and interior, function as administrative adjuncts of 
the services rather than as instruments of political and policy direction. 
Similarly, strategic-level institutions such as national security councils 
may be more focused on operational issues and less on the development 
and implementation of a strategic framework. Since these functions, 
properly performed, also feed into and drive the work of parliament, 
their absence means that oversight is correspondingly compromised. 
With the exception of South Africa and to a lesser extent Sierra leone, 
efforts to build the capacity of security management organs have been 
relatively scarce and selective.
the Peacebuilding “gap”:  
SSr, rule of law, and transitional Justice
Another peacebuilding problem is the weak connection between secu-
rity reforms and justice reforms. SSr assumes a context of rule of law. it 
is only when security agents are fully subject to the laws of the land, and 
only when all citizens have unimpeded access to due process and equal 
protection of the law, that security will be delivered accountably, equi-
tably, and with due respect for human rights. SSr and the development 
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of the rule of law should ideally occur in tandem, since systems of ad-
ministration of justice are likely to be casualties of war. Weak rule of 
law contexts have largely been responsible for progression from a “war 
economy” to “criminal enterprise” in the aftermath of conflict.
 yet a consistent feature of peacebuilding is the low priority and lack 
of detailed attention often given to justice reform and rule of law is-
sues. indeed, as Call and colleagues have sought to demonstrate, justice 
reform has been particularly flawed in postconflict contexts.15 there are 
several reasons for this:
•  Formal rule of law traditions are weak or nonexistent in 
many transitional societies.
•  Administration of justice is not seen as a priority by 
political authorities, in part because of the perception that a 
powerful judiciary constrains the power of government.
•  Transformation of dysfunctional justice mechanisms is 
difficult and complex.
 A similar chasm exists between SSr and transitional justice. Societ-
ies emerging from conflict face significant and interlocking imperatives 
of security sector reform and transitional justice. many activities that 
occur under the rubric of “transitional justice” have profound direct or 
indirect impacts on SSr. these include the role of truth and reconcilia-
tion commissions in exposing abusive security institutions or personnel, 
curbing impunity, and building consensus for institutional reform and 
transformation, as well as underscoring the need for a culture of trans-
parency, scrutiny, and oversight. At the same time, SSr serves the pur-
poses of transitional justice by minimizing the possibility that human 
rights abuses by security institutions will occur in the future. However, 
transitional justice and SSr have tended to operate as separate streams 
of activity largely isolated from each other, with the exception of limited 
activities such as vetting of security forces by such organizations as the 
international Center for transitional Justice (iCtJ).
reaching beyond the State: nonstate Providers of Security
the current approach of the international donor community to SSr 
reflects Westphalian assumptions: (a) the state is the sole or preeminent 
provider of security, and (b) it possesses sufficient control (or monopoly) 
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over the means of coercion, in addition to the requisite legitimacy and 
other resources. this “Westphalian” perspective fails to recognize the 
state’s complicated relationship with private organs of violence. this is 
manifested in two polar instances of the privatization of force: private 
military and security organizations, on the one hand, and community-
based security and justice institutions, on the other. the delivery of 
security and justice in fragile and postconflict states is thus multilay-
ered, involving multiple and overlapping (even competing) structures 
and agents, including “traditional” and “customary” institutions such as 
village chiefs, councils of elders, women’s associations, age groups, and 
secret societies. there is some evidence that, where the state is weak, 
traditional, customary, or informal institutions may be responsible for 
up to 80 percent of service delivery at the local level. indeed, a recent 
survey in the drC found that only 11 percent of the population felt 
protected by the police. Community organs such as the bashingantahe 
in burundi, the gacaca courts in rwanda, and the xeer and sharia courts 
in Somalia may play important roles. their resilience may provide a 
modicum of social order and security.16 indeed, they sometimes enjoy 
a legitimacy that is not always extended to the formal justice sector, 
which may be viewed as alien, inaccessible, and corrupt. Whereas the 
(imported) state may be fractured and in crisis, these local organs may 
sometimes function with relative coherence and vitality.17 the single-
minded focus on state organs of security in postconflict reconstruction 
thus ignores the realities on the ground in many postconflict countries.
reframing the Paradigm:  
Prioritizing local and Community organs
on the basis of this analysis, a different peacebuilding paradigm is be-
ginning to emerge. if the focus of pro-poor security and justice delivery 
is local customary and nonformal structures rather than the state, then 
it is at this level that reconstruction must begin. the key to expanding 
access to security and justice in fragile states is not so much in trying to 
create or re-create the imagined edifices of the Westphalian state, in-
cluding rebuilding courthouses that no one would use, but focusing on 
community-level institutions that meet the test of the “four As”: acces-
sibility, accountability, appropriateness, and affordability. the approach 
would build from the ground up rather than the other way around, 
while still ensuring that the formal system itself is able to handle ap-
peals as well as the range of responsibilities associated with a modern 
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justice system. this would call for dialogue or negotiation to bridge the 
cleavage between customary institutions and nonstate networks, on the 
one hand, and the state sphere, on the other.18
 top-down, statist, and donor-driven approaches tend to mean that 
communities are relegated to the role of spectators and consumers 
of SSr, with little influence over the way reform is shaped or imple-
mented. this is changing to some extent with the wider role that civil 
society organizations are playing in the process, whether through their 
own initiative or through limited donor support. However, civil society 
does not necessarily mean wider community involvement. the current 
emphasis on “local needs policing,” “community policing,” or “police de 
proximité” suggests some community involvement, but these practices 
do not guarantee adequate levels of local ownership and governance. At 
the same time, given the diversity of community and customary institu-
tions in character and scale, careful mapping is required to determine 
appropriate mechanisms of inclusive governance.19 this is not straight-
forward, as the processes and outcomes are bound to be contested.
Addressing the gender gap
Security is a highly gendered activity. given the prevalence of sexual 
and gender-based violence in postconflict contexts, such as the drC, 
liberia, Sierra leone, burundi, South Africa, and Angola, special at-
tention needs to be paid to the “gender gap” in reforming security de-
livery and governance at the level of local communities and at the state 
level. Although there are national variations, women on the whole have 
been underrepresented in the security services, as well as in security 
governance and management bodies and positions.20 for instance, there 
was not more than a single female member in most of the nine parlia-
mentary security committees surveyed in the eCoWAS area.21 the 
dramatic exception was the defense committee in liberia’s House of 
representatives, which was chaired by a woman. Although the gender 
balance appeared to improve at the level of parliamentary staff, men 
still dominated in terms of both numbers and seniority. there is some 
evidence, nevertheless, that conflict has sometimes improved the formal 
standing of women in legislatures generally and on parliamentary secu-
rity committees in particular, for instance in South Africa and rwanda.
 Another manifestation of the gendered nature of (in)security is the 
failure of authorities and security agencies to take sexual and gender-
based violence and other threats against women and people of different 
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sexual orientation more seriously. “engendering security” must go be-
yond elevating the presence and visibility of “women” in security institu-
tions, toward eliminating the deeply cultural and ideological notion that 
some are qualified by their gender to be “protectors” and to enjoy the 
power and social preeminence associated with that role, while others are 
cast as congenitally “helpless” and in need of “protection,” or as “booty” 
available for the taking by valorous warriors.22
the Case Studies:  
three Approaches to SSg in the Aftermath of Conflict
experiences with security sector reform and governance in the aftermath 
of conflict have been far from unilinear, and lessons drawn from any 
particular case are not necessarily applicable elsewhere. As with peace-
building generally, such experiences are highly contextual and path-
dependent. this point can be demonstrated from the cases of security 
reforms and peacebuilding in liberia, Sierra leone, and South Africa. 
each of these three countries has undergone (and is still undergoing) 
various degrees of security and justice reforms. only the South African 
SSr process prioritized issues of SSg across the board. this difference 
can be traced to the issue of ownership, although “ownership” itself will 
have to be understood as a contested process involving complex local 
and national political dynamics, changing over time.
 in sum, “ownership” refers to the ability to set and drive the agenda 
for security and justice reform. national ownership entails at least three 
related properties: (1) the commitment of national authorities and ac-
tors to a national vision of reform; (2) the technical and institutional 
capacity to manage a complex change process, or to manage those local 
and external actors entrusted with implementing or supporting such a 
change process, consistent with the national vision; and (3) the ability to 
mobilize indigenous resources to drive and sustain the reform process, 
complementing resources from bilateral and multilateral partners.
 these elements existed in large measure in South Africa but not in 
Sierra leone or liberia. the peace agreements that launched security 
and justice reforms in the three countries already foreshadowed issues 
of “ownership.” in both liberia and Sierra leone, peace negotiations 
involved a lead facilitating role for external regional and interna-
tional parties. the resulting peace agreements assumed a prominent, 
even dominant, role for external actors in national reconstruction and 
peacebuilding. Control over SSr was initially ceded to bilateral and 
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international partners. in the case of liberia, clauses in the 2003 Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) specifically requested the uS to 
take a lead in restructuring the Armed forces of liberia (Afl). in the 
case of Sierra leone, although the peace agreement itself did not cede 
as much control to foreigners, the tendency to identify national salva-
tion with intervention by foreigners coincided with the uk taking a 
lead. As discussed below, these lead bilateral partners in turn placed 
their stamp on SSr in divergent ways, with important consequences for 
national ownership.
 in South Africa, by contrast, the peace negotiations occurred entirely 
and directly between indigenous forces and political groups, with the rep-
resentatives of the African national Congress (AnC) and the apartheid 
government as principals, but also involving a wide range of social move-
ments and civil society organizations such as the united democratic front 
(udf) and the churches. A un observer mission would be subsequently 
dispatched to monitor the resulting peace agreement. Additionally, the 
South African national Peace Accord (nPA), in contrast to both the 
lomé and Accra Accords, which were seen as finished documents, was 
designed as a prolegomena to the “real” national dialogue, opening the 
door to further, more localized and intensive negotiations and compro-
mises between a wider range of local parties and actors.
 the particular context at the end of the conflict is key to understand-
ing security sector trajectories. both Sierra leone and liberia, already 
two of the poorest societies in the world, emerged from devastating 
civil wars with widespread destruction of national institutions and in-
frastructure, with no clear victor or politically dominant force, and rela-
tively weak civil societies. the postconflict governments that emerged 
had not themselves been direct parties to the war, but were confronted 
with the fact that formal security institutions had been destroyed or 
deeply discredited by war. the immediate policy objective was to pro-
mote security institutions that would meet minimal security needs of 
the population while protecting the fragile governments that emerged 
from the peace process. in both cases, reform was further undermined 
by the failure of the elected regimes that emerged from the peace pro-
cess (taylor in liberia, kabbah in Sierra leone) to take SSr seriously, 
a factor that contributed to their downfall, as well as to the return to 
war.23 “Civil control,” “democratic security governance,” and “oversight 
and accountability” were either notably missing or very much secondary 
priorities, to be pursued later.24
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 even so, important differences emerged in the two West African 
countries, in large part attributable to the different styles of their main 
international partners, the united kingdom in Sierra leone and the 
united States in liberia. in Sierra leone, the united nations mis-
sion in Sierra leone (unAmSil) and the international military As-
sistance training team (imAtt) was combined with a robust bilateral 
lead by the uk government. After the unprecedented military action to 
dislodge the revolutionary united front (ruf) and its Armed forces 
revolutionary Council (AfrC) allies, the uk government stressed 
long-term partnership with the government of Sierra leone, and com-
prehensive and ambitious governance and institutional reforms of secu-
rity and justice based on evolving strategic policy frameworks. However, 
severely limited local capacity resulted in a tendency to draw on overly 
complex british models, such as in the design of the defense ministry, 
as well as the external management of many of these programs. this 
undermined local ownership. Also, notwithstanding references to “com-
prehensive and integrated SSr,” initial reforms in Sierra leone were 
selective and piecemeal, focusing on developing the national security 
office, technically a secretariat of the national security council but in 
reality functioning more as the nerve center for managing security and 
intelligence, the defense ministry, and the national armed forces and, 
to a lesser extent, the police.25 much more modest (and less coherent) 
attention was directed to the justice sector.
 nevertheless, there appeared to be a definite learning process, on the 
part of both the government of Sierra leone and the uk agencies. over 
time, the growing emphasis on local ownership and consultation, for 
example through the Security Sector review of 2005, and attention to 
institution building and developing local capacity for strategic planning, 
led to a gradual rebalancing of this uneven partnership, with the Sierra 
leonean government and local officials becoming more assertive.26 the 
creation of the office of national Security was the focal point for stra-
tegic planning and coordination of SSr. this was dramatically different 
from the situation in liberia, where no priority was given to reforming 
the multitude of overlapping national security and intelligence organs 
inherited from the previous regime, and where central security manage-
ment and coordination organs took time to emerge.27 in Sierra leone, 
regular and candid program reviews, principally through the uk’s de-
partment for international development (dfid) “output to purpose” 
reviews, helped provide transparency and periodic corrections. Sierra 
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leone has also been a pioneer in Africa in integrating SSr as one of the 
core elements of its poverty reduction strategy, although this may not be 
enough to generate dynamism for social and economic transformation.
 Strikingly in Sierra leone, though, although policy documents and 
pronouncements emphasized organs of accountability and parliamen-
tary oversight, few resources were committed specifically to developing 
the capacity for oversight, especially in defense and internal and presi-
dential affairs, as a component of SSr. the parliamentary oversight 
committees (respectively Presidential Affairs and defence, and internal 
Affairs and local government) suffered, like others in the Sierra leone 
parliament, from a long list of constraints.28 very modest training has 
been rendered by two ngos, Conciliation resources and the Center 
for development and Security Analysis.
 in liberia, the approach adopted by the uS was markedly different. 
it focused narrowly on military reform and the rebuilding of the Afl, 
with limited support to police reform. the united nations mission in 
liberia (unmil) took on the responsibility of rebuilding the liberian 
national Police and the justice sector, though with markedly limited re-
sources, as the original un mandate had failed to provide the necessary 
resources. this focus left a large proportion of the amorphous security 
sector, such as the fire service, border security, and the many intelligence 
organs inherited from the regimes of Charles taylor and his predeces-
sors, out of the reform process, including those institutions specifically 
identified for reform in the CPA. the initial actions of the uS diverged 
from the provisions of the CPA in two ways. the first was the decision, 
without consultation with the principals, to abolish and dismantle the 
Afl and rebuild it from the ground up, rather than “restructuring” it as 
provided in the accord.29 the second was the privatization of the con-
tract through dyncorp international and Pacific Architects and engi-
neers, rather than relying on two sovereign partners, the governments of 
the united States and liberia, envisaged by the CPA. this arrangement 
had considerable implications for transparency and accountability, since 
dyncorp insisted that its contractual obligations were not with the gov-
ernment of liberia but with the uS State department. to compound 
the confusion, dyncorp widely adopted the term “SSr” to refer to its 
Afl recruitment and reform activities, contributing to a widespread 
misconception of the nature and scope of SSr. on the positive side, 
rebuilding the Afl from the ground up, including an exceptionally 
rigorous vetting process, created public legitimacy for the new force.30
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 An associated problem in liberia was the initial lack of needs as-
sessment or strategy framework on which to base decisions about the 
emerging security architecture. the initial targets in the rebuilding of 
the Afl, with a projected force of 2,000, were based on fiscal and cost 
considerations by the uS embassy with little public consultation. A 
broad strategic assessment was not conducted until early 2006, when it 
was undertaken by the rAnd Corporation, a foreign agency contracted 
by the uS government, allegedly without the knowledge and participa-
tion of much of the liberian security sector. the rAnd Corporation’s 
report directly questioned the logic that underlay the “SSr” initiatives, 
including the basis for deciding force levels in both the military and 
police, concluding that these were completely inadequate for the na-
tional security needs of liberia. it also pointed out the lack of coherence 
and synergy between military and police reform planning objectives, 
the absence of a national security architecture to give coherence to the 
reforms, and the relatively narrow scope of “SSr,” in particular the fail-
ure to address the issue of the large number of security organs inherited 
from the former regime.31
 external actors in liberia were not inclined to public consultation. 
A culture of consultation did not exist within the government of li-
beria either, especially in relation to decisions on national security. At 
a workshop in monrovia in november 2005, the governance reform 
Commission (later “governance Commission”) announced the launch 
of national consultations as the basis for the national security strategy, 
but externals complained that it would interfere with their timelines. 
thus “external support . . . led to a decision-making process” that was 
“heavily top-down and, during the initial years, lacked consultation 
with local people”32 and, under the lead of the uS, gave rise to “over-
whelming concern about lack of ownership of the SSr process in the 
country.”33 it was not until January 2008 that a draft national security 
policy framework was developed by the governance Commission.
 Scenarios unfolded quite differently in South Africa. that country 
emerged from its liberation war with three striking characteristics: the 
relatively unscathed and sophisticated structures of the apartheid state 
and economy; a popular liberation movement (the AnC) with a demo-
cratic mandate, around which a new state and new social relations could 
be conceived; and a vocal civil society and grassroots protest movement, 
constituting an independent democratic voice, committed as much to 
supporting the AnC as extracting accountability from the party, and 
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regarding itself fully as a partner—not a bystander or political satrap—
in the process of transformation. the immediate reality, however, was 
that the AnC had inherited a formidable war machine and security 
establishment that had been deployed against it over several decades 
of savage repression, and which remained intact, even in the face of the 
political defeat of apartheid. there was full awareness within the AnC 
and among its allies that subordinating the apartheid war machine to 
political control, particularly in the context of the early fears of a mili-
tary coup by the right wing, was vital to the democratic transition and to 
its own political survival. this altered the political dynamics: “transfor-
mation,” not “rebuilding,” was the battle-cry. thus the AnC had both 
the undoubted political imperative and, as it turned out, the political 
will to pursue transformation. the immediate and essential instrument 
for this was “civil” or “democratic control” of the defense and security 
establishments, along with an overhaul of the justice system. in the con-
text of African SSr, this was a unique departure. And importantly, the 
South African nPA anticipated that this act of “transformation” would 
be executed by internal and not external agents.
The Roles of Civil Society Organizations and Parliament
Civil society and the legislature play essential roles in creating participa-
tion and broad-based ownership, and avoiding top-down SSr processes 
captured by the government and external actors. the political space for 
playing these roles differed in the three contexts.
 in liberia, government and external actors were less supportive of 
civil society engagement and parliamentary oversight. Civil society or-
ganizations and rebel groups played a commanding role in the Accra 
negotiations and hence in the drafting of the CPA, but their influence 
receded once the agreement was in place. the un took over police 
reform, and the uS government took over military reform. Although a 
civil society “SSr Working group” was created, its influence in shap-
ing SSr was marginal, in part due to a lack of effective organization 
and also because external agencies did not encourage local involvement. 
Similarly, the legislature was initially marginalized. the paradox is that 
the liberian constitution grants extensive powers to Congress and its 
three defense and security committees, reflected in Article 34 of the 
1986 constitution and the standing rules of both the House and Sen-
ate. However, the legislature had historically been dominated by the 
presidency and ruling party, and there was tight executive control of 
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all matters relating to security. Although the various acts establishing 
the security agencies provided that all appointments by the president 
were subject to the approval and consent of the liberian Senate, this 
provision was never seriously applied. to aggravate the situation, many 
parliamentarians were inexperienced, with low levels of education, and 
there was a high turnover among the members of the parliament.34 the 
body was largely denied access to information relating to the military 
and police reform programs. there was no formal capacity building for 
the legislature as a component of the SSr programming. training for 
the three defense and security committees was undertaken informally 
by a consortium of nonprofits consisting of the African Security Sector 
network (ASSn), the Conflict Security and development group at 
kings College, and the geneva Centre for the democratic Control of 
Armed forces, which collaborated with the governance Commission 
and the Civil Society SSr Working group to develop a national secu-
rity strategy framework and a limited review of the security sector.35
 nevertheless, the liberian Congress has become increasingly asser-
tive over time.36 it rejected the draft defense Act, successfully demand-
ing that the government redraft it. it has summoned security personnel 
as well as the ministers of defence, and Justice, and the national Secu-
rity Advisor for hearings on security and defense matters. this growing 
empowerment of the legislature reflects not only the salutary effects 
of the seminars conducted by the ASSn and partners, but also a weak 
presidency and the fact that, for the first time, the president’s party did 
not command a majority in Congress.37
 in Sierra leone, though civil society organizations were active in peace 
campaigns, their role in both the Abidjan and lomé negotiations was 
less direct than in liberia. nevertheless, under uk leadership, a large 
role was conceived for civil society participation in reconstruction and 
in the creation of structures of democratic accountability following the 
lomé Peace Agreement. in contrast to liberia, the formal SSr policy 
and strategy framework in Sierra leone assigned roles to civil society 
organizations. in particular, the 2005 Security Sector review and the 
mantra that accompanied it—“security is everyone’s business”—af-
forded an opportunity for the participation of civil society. the new 
security paradigm sought to build civil society organizations into the se-
curity architecture, by recognizing their contribution to border security, 
intelligence, early warning, and conflict management and reconcilia-
tion. it granted civil society organizations limited representation on the 
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district and provisional security committees, as well as on local policing 
partnership boards, and representation in the justice sector through a 
civil society coordinating group.
 nevertheless, one study argues that, for several reasons, “relations 
between the security sector and civil society are still limited” in Sierra 
leone.38 Sierra leone emerged from the civil war with a legacy of bit-
terness and division between civil society, particularly women and youth, 
on the one hand, and the security sector, on the other, leading to initial 
reluctance to engage SSr. deep suspicions inherited from the civil war, 
including negative national self-perception and self-confidence, also in-
hibited community action. furthermore, strong uk bilateral leadership, 
high-profile involvement of the un and imAtt, and the large number 
of international ngos in the country, initially eroded possibilities for 
national ownership.
 in South Africa, in contrast to both Sierra leone and liberia, secu-
rity sector transformation was driven to an unprecedented degree by a 
popular coalition of civil society and community organizations, labor and 
church groups, ngos, and elected representatives. the framework for 
political activism was the deliberate development of a substantial policy 
and legal framework for defense, public safety and security, and intel-
ligence. the early hallmarks were a 1996 defense white paper and a 1998 
defense review. the processes that led to the evolution of the defense 
white paper and defense review were highly participatory and consulta-
tive, drawing heavily on the work of civilian defense and other experts.39 
nevertheless, parliamentary defense and safety and security committees 
and the Joint Standing defence Committee retained a central role. un-
like in liberia and Sierra leone, the South African parliament engaged 
the reform process, carving out a muscular role for itself in developing 
a robust legal and policy framework for the security sector, monitoring 
the process and the institutions to ensure accountability, collaborating 
closely with defense officials, outside experts, and social movements, 
and relaying unmistakable messages about how seriously it intended to 
take its oversight role. the intervention of the South African parlia-
ment fundamentally reshaped the emergent debate in the defense arena, 
departing from the usual narrow “SSr” to the broader “SSg.”40 this 
meant deepening the concept beyond civilian control, usually meaning 
decision making by civilian government officials, to one of democratic 
control, in which a wide range of social actors could participate. At the 
same time, the transparency and performance of parliament itself was 
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closely monitored, with extensive dissemination of debates, discussions, 
and proposed legislation on public media, and monitoring by civil soci-
ety groups, including the parliamentary monitoring group.
 the key to the process was the political leadership of the African 
national Congress, which included many powerful members of parlia-
ment of both genders. the AnC brought undoubted political capital 
and legitimacy. As an armed liberation organization, the party under-
stood the dialectics of force. ideologically too, the movement had a tra-
dition of civilian political control of its military wing. finally, there was 
a unique combination of “elite pacting” and popular mobilization, in 
which the AnC itself was a member of a complex alliance that included 
the Communist Party of South Africa, civil society organizations, labor 
unions, and churches. yet the AnC as a party lacked intellectual and 
other resources required for security sector transformation. Arguably, in 
this curious paradox of hegemony and political weakness, the political 
leadership of the AnC governed rather than drove the security sector 
process. the multicentered and fractious alliance resulted in a broad-
based ownership that made it impossible for the AnC to unilaterally 
impose its will or dictate the direction of events.
The Issue of Ownership
these three cases thus highlight key differences in terms of “owner-
ship” in security sector reform processes. the conventional view is that 
ownership is essential to the success of SSr (as one publication pithily 
put it, “no ownership, no commitment”).41 yet “ownership”—the abil-
ity to envisage, design, fund, manage, and oversee the implementation 
of a complex and multidimensional security reform process—is not a 
yardstick easily met by states and societies emerging from conflict. At 
the minimum, ownership implies the ability to make strategic decisions 
and deliver a clear set of priorities, and to ensure that these are respected 
by all partners, external and internal. However, even this minimalist 
definition may not settle the issue. As we have seen, ownership will 
remain mortgaged as long as countries are unable or unwilling to com-
mit meaningful resources of their own to the process. external actors 
exercise an eventual veto through what they will or will not fund; hence, 
it is not unusual for crucial elements in independently crafted national 
“strategic plans” to wilt on the vine while less favored projects attract 
funding. What may be presented as “national priorities” have often been 
shaped by foreknowledge of what the donors would or would not fund.
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 it is not surprising then that SSr has been dominated by two con-
trasting narratives. on the one hand, there is the perception that SSr is 
donor-driven and, on the other, that reforming governments are unable 
to articulate a clear vision or set of priorities.42 both of these positions 
undoubtedly contain an element of truth. external support may be re-
quired to help build capacity in conflict-affected countries to enable 
these countries to exercise ownership. unfortunately, this is contradicted 
by prevailing donor practices, such as an emphasis on quick results and 
outputs rather than outcomes, on piecemeal project funding rather than 
program funding, and on short-term rather than longer-term funding 
horizons, that undercut any possibility of meaningful ownership. given 
the asymmetric relations that characterize SSr, “ownership” as a very 
concept will remain ambiguous and elusive.
 ownership is contested in a second and much more local sense. At 
home as much as in the global arena, “security” resides very much in the 
eyes of the beholder. our individual and collective notions of security 
tend to be influenced by geography, social location, gender, ethnicity, 
and class. the question of whose ownership remains pertinent. it is 
thus essential that “national ownership” not be reduced to “government 
ownership.” references to “national authorities” in the prevailing dis-
course on ownership are worrisome signs that this is commonly the 
case. Second, it is important that what is defined as security or security 
policy be the result of an inclusive national discussion that allows the 
concept and its ownership to be broadly shared. indeed, wherever such 
a national debate/consultation has been undertaken, more democratic 
understandings of security have emerged that depart from previous 
militarized notions shaped by securocrats and the political class.43 
transparent and accountable security governance is an essential coun-
terpart to, and reflection of, notions of democratic security, but this 
requires ownership as a precondition.
 Here too, though, ownership should not be reduced to a snapshot in 
time. ownership by its very nature will remain contested and dynamic. 
the political space to debate security may begin to shrink; new security 
“threats,” new forces and new actors may emerge that erode or force a 
rethink of the earlier consensus, and concerns about accountability and 
governance may yield to more muscular notions of crime control.44
 “ownership” was important to the respective outcomes in security 
sector reform in liberia, Sierra leone, and South Africa precisely be-
cause the multilayered discourse on global security merges a number 
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of international and local security concerns, and it is not always clear 
whose interests are actually being served. in this discourse, “failing,” or 
“fragile” states are seen not only as dangerous to their own citizens but 
also as a threat to international order (as defined by its most power-
ful states), fostering terrorism, international criminal rings, human and 
drug trafficking, piracy, money laundering, and a litany of other evils. 
it is for this reason that the european defense and Security Policy and 
the uS national Security Strategy point to Africa and other “fragile” 
states in the south as “security threats” and mandate muscular interven-
tion mechanisms. the wholesale rush into “SSr” that we are witnessing 
today is not entirely altruistic.
 thus in the conflicting agendas that tend to characterize peacebuild-
ing by the international community, “ownership” becomes crucial in 
determining not only who has voice but also who benefits from the 
complex calculations around peacebuilding and SSr. Such “ownership” 
meant, for instance, that indigenous forces in South Africa, not interna-
tional actors, determined the objectives and modalities of peacebuilding. 
the protracted and sensitive negotiations that characterized the South 
African process would have been inconceivable if the international 
community, with its short attention span and multiple agendas, had 
been in command. the analytical intelligence and deep local knowledge 
brought to bear on the technical negotiations in the various committees 
and working groups were also important. the commitment to “owner-
ship” did not come cheap, however. it meant hard policy and legal work, 
dedicated institution building, and substantial national resources.
national ownership, despite its benefits, is not a panacea, let alone a 
guarantee of inclusiveness. Security sector governance, much more than 
reform, explicitly requires the incorporation of the entire security sector, 
formal and informal, state and nonstate, modern and customary, into 
the scope of governance and regulation. it also requires full participa-
tion in the process by all the constitutionally mandated organs—the 
executive (policy), legislative (oversight), judicial (rule of law), and civil 
society and media (oversight and critical input). in the African context, 
it must build on traditional and customary practices for delivering and 
regulating security and justice; a robust connection between security on 
the one hand and justice and rule of law on the other; and “representiv-
ity” on the basis of gender, race, and ethnicity.
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 this is, of course, a highly idealized picture, particularly in countries 
emerging from conflict. the reality is that, for the foreseeable future, the 
provision of security is likely to remain segmented and take the form of 
hybrid security regimes, or what eric Scheye calls “pragmatic realism.”45 
this need not be a problem, as long as systems are increasingly infused 
with common norms, procedures, and human rights protections. Post-
conflict peacebuilding provides an opportunity as well as an incentive 
to move toward greater synthesis and reconciliation. nevertheless, one 
cannot avoid a note of skepticism. the problem with this “different 
strokes for different folks” approach is that nonstate systems may pro-
vide improved access to security and justice at the local level without 
providing the ability to curb the excesses of state institutions at the 
national level. further, dependence on customary forums for justice is 
often a mark of vulnerability (and even exclusion), rather than empow-
erment. As one analysis of Sierra leone’s justice sector reforms argues, 
“rural people are marginalized from and fearful of the structures of 
government and the formal legal system.”46
 A second concern relates to possible reversals. for instance, South 
Africa’s efforts to create an inclusive and democratic system of secu-
rity governance may be in jeopardy. As the African national Congress 
has moved to consolidate governmental power, more orthodox security 
dynamics have gradually begun to assert themselves, particularly in the 
aftermath of a defense procurement scandal, suspected involvement 
of the national Prosecution Authority (“Scorpions”), and the intelli-
gence establishment in the intraparty intrigues within the AnC (the 
renaming of the “ministry of intelligence Services” as the “ministry of 
State Security” has a chilling familiarity about it), and the increasingly 
strident “war on crime” rhetoric. Security sector reform is increasingly 
viewed through the prism of these wider contestations. Similarly, there 
is a diminished prominence of parliament and civil society. Although 
this may be explained in part by the routinization of governmental func-
tions and the shift from legislation to implementation, and by the more 
technocratic style of government under thabo mbeki,47 it arguably also 
points to possible shifts in the postapartheid political trajectory.
 Another concern relates to “inclusivity.” As the AnC has tried to 
fall in line with the dominant neoclassical global economic paradigm, 
while promoting black capitalist economic empowerment, it has been 
less successful in addressing mass poverty and deprivation, conflicts over 
land, violent crime, sexual abuse, vigilantism, “instant justice,” witchcraft 
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trials, and xenophobia that have tended to characterize the townships, 
squatter camps, and rural areas of South Africa. Hence, South African 
citizens, depending on who and where they are, are exposed to two very 
different worlds of “security” and “justice.”
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of ex-combatants and others associated with armed groups is widely 
accepted as an integral part of peacebuilding. international policy on 
ddr is influenced by the neoliberal discourse on the nexus of security and 
development. this discourse perceives poverty, underdevelopment, and 
poor governance to be at the root of violent crime and conflict. According 
to this view, conflict undermines development and deepens poverty, which 
in turn creates conditions for further conflict. this view justifies a range 
of programs to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict, including ddr 
programs. yet these programs, including ddr, can also be seen as tools to 
exert control over the global South and maintain global order.1
 the desire to prevent conflicts and create stable conditions for sus-
tainable development has led to the increased involvement of actors 
such as the united nations (un), the World bank, international de-
velopment agencies, donor states, and nongovernmental organizations 
(ngos) in supporting ddr programs. Support has been given to an 
array of national and local actors, including signatories of peace agree-
ments, national governments, provincial and local authorities, commu-
nities where the ex-combatants are reintegrated, and the combatants 
and others associated with armed forces. the contexts of such programs 
have varied. for instance, ddr has been implemented during peace 
support operations as part of peace settlements to end civil wars. it has 
been carried out as part of peacebuilding processes where wars ended in 
88
PAul omACh
decisive military victory by one of the parties. ddr has also occurred 
in countries deemed to be at “peace,” as part of military downsizing, 
normally as part of macroeconomic and institutional reforms supported 
by the international monetary fund (imf) and World bank. the ob-
jective of many of these programs is to reduce military expenditure and 
redirect resources to social sectors and poverty eradication programs.
 Although the question of what to do about former combatants after 
the end of war is a question asked throughout history, more formal ddr 
programs have increased in number and in scope, and they have evolved 
over time. in 2004–5, un agencies, departments, funds, and programs 
drafted a series of integrated ddr standards (iddrS)—a set of poli-
cies, guidelines, and procedures for the planning, implementation, and 
monitoring of ddr programs in peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping 
contexts. the iddrS guidelines and their rather technocratic “to do” 
lists are adaptable to specific conflicts and country contexts to ensure 
that ddr processes are flexible.2 outcomes have varied, and determin-
ing the success of ddr programs has not been easy, given the com-
plexity of conflict contexts and the conflicting objectives of the actors 
involved. often, however, there is a disconnect between the approaches 
of the various international and national actors who use ddr programs 
for purposes that are at times out of touch with local realities and in-
compatible with peacebuilding. this makes it vital to analyze the ap-
proaches of various actors engaged in ddr, and to understand formal 
and informal processes of dealing with ex-combatants, including those 
that are rooted in traditional practices.
 this chapter examines the discourse and practice of ddr programs 
in sub-Saharan Africa. it highlights the complex interplay of conflict 
contexts, ddr objectives, and the diverse approaches of various ac-
tors to ddr processes, despite the un’s seemingly universal integrated 
standards. the chapter begins by examining the different elements of 
ddr, and why ddr is considered vital for peacebuilding. it next ana-
lyzes the various actors engaged in ddr, their different approaches, 
and the coordination of their activities, and then examines the unintended 
consequences and shortcomings of ddr programs, including difficul-
ties in defining the term ex-combatant. the chapter argues that local 
contexts matter for ddr programs, but they are often overlooked. the 
different interests and understandings that guide ddr processes are 
subject to reworking in different local contexts and this may lead to 
unintended consequences for peacebuilding.
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ddr Programs and Peacebuilding
As the name indicates, there are three main components of ddr.3 dis-
armament is “the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small 
arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants 
and often also of the civilian population” and also includes “the devel-
opment of responsible arms management programs.”4 disarmament is 
considered essential for reducing the number of weapons in society and 
restoring the monopoly of the means of violence to the state. the large 
number of weapons that remain after conflict is considered to be a threat 
to stability during the transition from war to peace and regional security.
 there are many approaches to disarmament. it can be coercive, con-
sensual and voluntary, or induced. Coercive disarmament is normally 
carried out after military victory by one of the parties, such as in uganda 
in 1986, rwanda in 1994, and Angola in 2003.5 members of the de-
feated force are forced to surrender their weapons. However, there is 
a risk that the defeated army may hide some of its weapons. Where 
disarmament is carried out as part of a peace settlement, the process 
is normally voluntary, such as in mozambique in the 1990s. there is 
reliance on the goodwill and mutual confidence of the parties and on 
their commitment to the larger peace process. if the parties are not sure 
that the peace process will hold, the temptation to conceal some of their 
weapons will be strong. for example, it was widely observed that after 
the 1990 bicesse agreement between the movement for the liberation 
of Angola (mPlA) government and national union for the total lib-
eration of Angola (unitA) rebels, unitA surrendered only obsolete 
weapons due to lack of faith in the agreement.6
 inducements may be offered to combatants to surrender their arms. 
this may take the form of gun “buybacks” through offers of cash or 
vouchers that can later be exchanged for cash.7 this mechanism was 
used during ddr programs in liberia in 2003 and Côte d’ivoire in 
2004. in liberia, eligibility for benefits was determined by the willing-
ness to hand over weapons. this was later expanded to include those 
who could produce at least 150 rounds of ammunition.8 Alternatively, 
“weapons for development” programs, through which weapons are col-
lected in exchange for development goods or services, are sometimes 
used.9 Such programs were initiated in mali in mid-1997 following a 
peace settlement between the government and rebel forces. Collected 
weapons were exchanged for development goods and services such as 
schools, roads, and wells.10
90
PAul omACh
 the cash inducement approach to disarmament has generated de-
bate and controversy. Critics argue that the approach carries the risk 
of creating other security problems. if there are porous borders, weak 
controls, interlinked conflicts in neighboring countries, or endemic gun 
cultures, cash incentives may foment the illegal arms trade.11 in liberia, 
for instance, there was a large gap between the number of combatants 
who disarmed and the number of weapons collected, estimated at about 
one gun per four fighters, as weapons found their way to conflict zones 
in neighboring Côte d’ivoire.12
 the demobilization of ex-combatants entails reducing the size of 
armed forces, and in some cases dissolving opposition forces and inte-
grating them into regular armed forces.13 the process typically involves 
a survey of combatants; an assessment of their needs; medical exami-
nations; assembly, counseling, and orientating; and discharging and 
transporting former combatants and their dependents to their former 
communities of origin or to their preferred destinations.14 the demo-
bilized become ex-combatants and may receive some form of assistance 
to facilitate transition to civilian life. this reinsertion assistance consti-
tutes a “transitional safety net” to cover basic needs of ex-combatants 
and their families and may take the form of cash or kind, including 
clothing, food, shelter construction materials, and health services.15
 reintegration is a long-term process that takes place on multiple 
social, political, and economic levels.16 reintegration programs some-
times address the psychological impact of conflict on ex-combatants. in 
some cases, ex-combatants are traumatized by the brutal experiences of 
conflict and may experience depression, drug and alcohol abuse, violent 
behavior, or even suicide. in this regard, particular attention toward 
children affected by conflict is often seen as vital.17 reintegration in-
volves the acceptance of former combatants and their families by the 
host community, as well as their engagement in productive livelihoods 
as civilians.18 more recently, there have been efforts to ensure that sup-
port for ex-combatants does not create a feeling of unfair reward among 
other members of the community, which might generate discontent 
and undermine the peacebuilding process. According to kees kingma, 
rural people in Zimbabwe resented the demobilization and resettle-
ment assistance given to ex-combatants and their dependents.19 group 
and community-based programs that benefit entire communities have 
sometimes been seen as more suitable, as they promote social reintegra-
tion and reconciliation.20
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 Since the late 1980s, ddr programs have become an integral com-
ponent of international peacebuilding.21 they have been regularly 
promoted by multilateral donors in the transition from war to peace, 
since they are seen to constitute a central element in security and de-
velopment–oriented interventions.22 international policy discourse on 
ddr views the often large number of former combatants who have no 
clear source of livelihood, alongside the widespread availability of weap-
ons, as potential threats to stability in societies emerging from conflict. 
the “idleness” of ex-combatants is considered to be a source of violent 
crimes and insecurity. As robert muggah has observed, “the ‘post-
conflict’ period is not as safe and secure as generally believed. Armed 
violence, particularly committed by ex-soldiers and informal militia, 
can reach epidemic proportions in the shadows of a ceasefire.”23 ddr 
of ex-combatants is thus viewed as essential in establishing favorable 
conditions for sustainable peace, recovery, and development.24
 Sometimes ddr is viewed as a bridge between security and devel-
opment. then un Secretary-general boutros boutros-ghali, in his 
1994 report An Agenda for Development, acknowledged the links be-
tween stability, recovery, and long-term development. He argued that 
development “cannot proceed in societies where military concerns are 
at or near the centre of life.”25 emphasis on the reciprocal link be-
tween peace and development can also be seen in the development aid 
and foreign policies of international development agencies, Western 
donor states, and ngos. these actors support ddr programs to ad-
dress security problems associated with surplus soldiers and militias 
in societies emerging from conflicts, reduce expenditures on defense, 
to reduce fiscal deficits, and rechannel resources to social sector and 
poverty eradication programs.
 in Africa, pressure on governments to implement neoliberal re-
forms or structural adjustment programs (SAPs), in exchange for 
foreign aid, created opportunities for the implementation of ddr 
programs. ddr was seen by many bilateral and multilateral donors 
such as the World bank as an instrument to help rebuild the economic 
foundations for growth and development. A number of countries car-
ried out ddr programs in the context of peacekeeping operations 
to end civil wars and to create conditions for sustainable security and 
development where conflicts had already ended. for instance, ddr 
programs were implemented in namibia beginning in mid-1989, 
Angola between 1991 and 1992, mozambique between 1992 and 1994, 
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uganda from 1992 to 1995, ethiopia in 1992, eritrea beginning in 1993, 
South Africa after the April 1994 elections, and Zimbabwe after the 
1979 lancaster House Agreement.26
Actors and Approaches
different global, regional, and local actors are involved in ddr in Af-
rica. most multilateral agencies and donors consider ddr as part of 
their overall framework for liberal reform, although different actors em-
phasize different ddr components. for instance, the World bank has 
limited itself to demobilization and reintegration; it has not ventured 
into disarmament because its mandate prohibits it from engagement 
with militaries. the World bank’s multi-Country demobilization and 
reintegration Programme (mdrP), and the multi-donor trust fund, 
are illustrative. the mdrP was implemented from 2002 to 2009 to 
support the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants in 
the great lakes and Central Africa region. At its height, it targeted 
approximately 300,000 ex-combatants in seven countries: Angola, bu-
rundi, the Central African republic, the democratic republic of the 
Congo (drC), the republic of the Congo, rwanda, and uganda.27 
the mdrP and multi-donor trust fund were designed such that 
contributions of the various donors, un agencies, and ngos would 
be based on their “respective comparative advantages,” thus differing 
from country to country. the World bank’s contribution to the mdrP 
amounted to 30 percent of overall cost, but it funded only national 
programs.28 Similarly, the united States Agency for international de-
velopment (uSAid), which has supported ddr in Angola, ethiopia, 
mozambique, and uganda, among other countries, has also confined 
itself to demobilization and reintegration, since uSAid is prohibited 
from providing support to foreign militaries.29
 multilateral agencies and donors often collaborate with the African 
union (Au) and subregional organizations in implementing ddr pro-
grams. for instance, the African union mission in burundi (Amib), 
deployed in April 2003, was mandated to support disarmament and 
demobilization and advise on reintegration. Although it achieved little, 
Amib was a “holding operation” for the deployment of the united na-
tions operation in burundi (onub) in June 2004.30 national govern-
ments and local ngos also facilitate and support some components of 
ddr programs. for instance, in liberia, following the peace agreement 
of August 18, 2004, the government established a national commission, 
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comprising representatives of the warring parties, the economic Com-
munity of West African States (eCoWAS), and the African union, 
among others, to oversee the ddr process in the country.31
 local actors such as civil society–based organizations, including 
ngos, cultural, traditional, and religious organizations, also facilitate 
ddr programs. in northern uganda, even without a formal govern-
ment initiative, the gulu Support the Children—a local ngo, ker 
kal kwaro—the Acholi Cultural institution, Acholi religious leaders 
Peace initiative and Caritas office in gulu Archdiocese, among others 
have engaged in ad hoc reintegration processes since the 1990s. the 
initiatives of these organizations were given formal recognition in the 
Amnesty Act (2001) and the government Peace recovery and devel-
opment Plan, which was launched in october 2007 and implemented 
in July 2008.32
 the global, regional, and local actors engaged in ddr programs 
have different goals and mandates, varying from the minimalist goal 
of improving security to a maximalist one of creating opportunities 
for development. determining success is difficult, because of the lack 
of agreed-on measures. there is no agreement on whether to take a 
short-term view of success and focus on immediate outcomes or a long-
term view that focuses on the ability of programs to provide sustainable 
peace and liberal development. Some actors, notably those engaged in 
humanitarian activities such as emergency assistance, take a minimalist 
and pragmatic view of ddr. the united nations, for instance, tends 
to view ddr as serving a symbolic and confidence-building purpose.33 
Success is measured by the collection of weapons and the control and 
pacification of ex-combatants, so that the peace process is not disrupted. 
other actors, like the World bank and development agencies, lean to-
ward a maximalist understanding of ddr as a means to create condi-
tions for social peace and liberal development.34
 However, although reference is often made to the goals of creating 
sustainable peace and development, resources devoted to ddr pro-
grams and immediate objectives tend to reflect short-term goals. A 
long-term perspective would mean that success is difficult to attain. the 
actual costs of ddr are also often very high. for instance, the cost of the 
mdrP was estimated at uS$500 million. the strategy was designed on 
the premise that no single donor could address the complexity of ddr 
issues in the region. As kingma has observed, “Savings as a result of 
demobilization are slow in coming and often not as expected.”35
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 Coordination between different actors and multiple aspects of ddr 
programs is problematic because no single clear institutional mecha-
nism exists. Coordination varies, and depends on “capacity and interests 
of institutions on the ground.”36 if ddr occurs within the context of a 
peacekeeping mission, typically the un will coordinate. However, co-
ordination and cooperation of the various agencies within the un has 
not been easy. in mozambique, for instance, the reintegration segment 
of ddr that was implemented under the un peacekeeping mission in 
that country from 1992 to 1994 (unomoZ) was overseen by the united 
nations office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (oCHA). it 
was not integrated with disarmament and demobilization, which were 
overseen by unomoZ and co-coordinated by the Special representa-
tive of the Secretary-general (SrSg). oCHA reported directly to the 
un’s department of Humanitarian Affairs in new york.37 it is on the 
basis of these types of experiences that the un developed the iddrS 
guidelines to ensure better coordination and integration of ddr. the 
iddrS guidelines stress that “the goal should be complete integration 
at the planning level and in the methods of the various entities.”38
 the implementation of ddr has varied. Some programs are planned 
and systematically implemented, while others are haphazard and spon-
taneous. in uganda, for instance, the demobilization of former national 
resistance Army (nrA) soldiers was well planned and systematically 
implemented according to a World bank design.39 the process entailed 
a baseline survey on the socioeconomic profile of the nrA, a study 
of opportunity structures for employment that led to a settling-in kit 
and long-term reintegration design, and the design for implementa-
tion structure. the uganda veterans Assistance board was established 
through an act of parliament to implement the program. Soldiers 
identified for discharge were provided with discharge certificates, given 
pre-discharge orientation and “transitional safety net” packages, and 
transported to the districts of destination. However, in mozambique and 
namibia, the ddr programs were less systematic and not integrated.40 
in mozambique, disarmament was not clearly specified in the peace 
agreement, but was implicit and tied to demobilization. the process was 
also marred by poor implementation, which contributed to the prolif-
eration of weapons.41 in namibia, the program was “patchwork” rather 
than well planned,42 and the mandate of the un transitional Assistance 
group was limited to disarmament and demobilization. reintegration 
was hastily designed and implemented later by namibia’s independence 
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government and failed to effectively integrate ex-combatants into sus-
tainable civilian livelihoods. the government subsequently implemented 
reintegration measures after protests by disaffected ex-combatants who 
had failed to integrate socially and economically into society.
 there also tends to be a lack of integration between formal and infor-
mal ddr processes. the un’s iddrS guidelines emphasize national 
institutions and processes, but this does not include informal processes, 
which are not even integrated with national ddr processes. many peo-
ple who take part in fighting do not go through formal ddr processes. 
they are not registered and are not entitled to benefits. many fighters 
self-demobilize and do not disarm. Armies and guerrilla groups may 
gradually disintegrate due to low morale or the collapse of command 
structures, resulting in a large number of unregistered ex-combatants.43 
there are also many former combatants who go through traditional 
demobilization processes involving rituals embedded in cultural norms. 
local communities may regard such rituals as a precondition or a sym-
bol of acceptance into the community. even ex-combatants who have 
gone through formal processes may also undergo these rituals. An ex-
ample is the ritual of stepping on eggs and jumping over branches of 
olwedo shrubs among the Acholi of northern uganda.44 As kingma 
has observed, in uganda and mozambique, ex-combatants underwent 
cleansing rituals in order to be accepted into their communities.45 Such 
rituals may promote reconciliation and psychological reintegration ac-
cording to local norms. formal ddr processes tend to ignore or mar-
ginalize these important locally grounded initiatives.
 Past experiences suggest that successful ddr requires good plan-
ning, effective logistics and management, and substantial resources.46 
in uganda, where demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants 
cost uS$42.3 million, donors contributed over 90 percent of the funds.47 
in liberia, the ddr process was marred by inadequate preparations. 
Some of the 15,000 peacekeepers of the united nations mission in li-
beria (unmil) were not yet deployed when the ddr program started, 
and only one of the three cantonment camps was ready. there was also 
a lack of timely and adequate funding, which contributed to rioting and 
the suspension of the program to allow for reorganization.48 A decen-
tralized implementation mechanism for ddr is helpful, since ddr 
takes place in various parts of a country.
 in 1996 the World bank and other donors introduced a standard 
template for the demobilization and reintegration of military personnel 
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in Africa, and outlined key factors for successful outcomes.49 the bank 
observed that “political will” is a “fundamental precondition” on which 
a ddr program needs to be built. later, the un’s iddrS guidelines 
similarly stated that “a genuine commitment of the parties to the pro-
cess is vital to the success of ddr.”50 the experience of several ddr 
programs in Africa indicates that the goals of former belligerents may 
be different from the desires of donors and other international and re-
gional actors. Parties are not always committed to peace. their commit-
ment may depend on the existence of security guarantees and political 
opportunities. Without a political solution and a secure environment, 
the chances of success are limited, as the example of Angola illustrates.51 
Where there is stronger commitment, as was the case in namibia, there 
is a greater likelihood of success.52
 more recently, based on the realization that many ddr interven-
tions “have failed due to their narrow focus and short-term approach,”53 
the un’s iddrS guidelines have emphasized the integration of se-
curity, wider recovery, and development programs. According to the 
guidelines, peacebuilding should be perceived as complementary to 
ddr, which should be entrenched in the peace agreement and in the 
overall national postconflict recovery and reconstruction and develop-
ment strategy.54 the guidelines and principles also recognize that con-
text matters—each conflict is unique, and it is not possible to create a 
blueprint or model that fits all situations.
 the iddrS framework addresses some of the shortcomings of past 
ddr processes, such as the lack of integration of various components, 
especially between disarmament and demobilization on the one hand and 
reintegration on the other, and the lack of linkage with broader peacebuild-
ing efforts. yet the iddrS framework assumes that such integration is 
possible and that outcomes will be favorable, which may not necessarily 
be the case. the iddrS guidelines reflect a faith in the guiding frame-
work of ddr—the nexus between security and development.
How and Why the local Context matters
recent ideas about ddr, as expressed in the un’s integrated stan-
dards, acknowledge that context is critical. ddr should “be adapted to 
the unique needs of particular country (and region).”55 Although there 
are similarities in the experiences of different countries, models are not 
necessarily transferable, and there is no universal format for sequencing. 
traditional approaches that see ddr as a linear process or “natural 
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continuum,” implying that there is a gradual progression from where 
“disarmament terminates, demobilization begins” to where “demobili-
zation ends, reintegration commences,” do not often apply to the much 
more complex realities of transitions from war to peace.56
 it does not always make sense to distinguish between the three 
phases of ddr and to carry out the program in sequence. rather, 
activities should be viewed as interdependent and interconnected. de-
spite the importance attached to disarmament, it does not necessarily 
have to precede demobilization and reintegration processes or other 
peacebuilding activities. As mats berdal argued, there is no automatic 
or inherent relationship between disarmament and establishment of 
security.57 Put differently, disarmament does not necessarily ensure 
a total collection of arms, since its importance may be symbolic.58 
there are circumstances during which it may be necessary to post-
pone the disarmament phase and embark on the reintegration process, 
especially when combatants are unsure of their security. Parties may 
hand in fewer arms, or obsolete arms, as was the case during the un’s 
peacekeeping mission in mozambique, where “both frelimo and re-
namo ordered that weapons be hidden.”59
 likewise, pursuing demobilization and reintegration simultaneously 
may be appropriate in conflicts where there are large numbers of parties 
and groups. in other situations, it may be necessary to find a political 
agreement first. Without a peace agreement, fighters have no guarantee 
that they will not be persecuted, and they will be reluctant to disarm and 
demobilize. furthermore, former rebels who surrender their arms may be 
targeted by their former comrades.60 generally, without a well-planned 
recovery process, the viability of ddr will be questionable. As mark 
knight and Alpaslan ozerdem have observed, “there is a symbiotic 
relationship” between peacebuilding and the ddr process. Successful 
peacebuilding is as important for successful disarmament, demobiliza-
tion, and reintegration process as ddr is for peacebuilding.61
 Aside from requiring variation in sequencing, contextual factors me-
diate the success and failure of ddr efforts in a number of other ways. 
these include local sociocultural factors, the nature of the state, the 
nature of the conflict, including the interpretation of the term combat-
ant, and the economic context.
 local sociocultural factors may play a role in the outcomes of ddr 
programs. for instance, local attitudes toward the ownership of arms 
and toward disarmament may determine whether ex-combatants will be 
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willing to give up their weapons. in weakly institutionalized states that 
lack capacity to provide security or protect rights, people may consider 
weapons as valuable tools for personal security and may view them as 
male “status symbols.” in a socioeconomic environment where competi-
tion for resources is stiff and opportunities for development and means 
of livelihood are lacking, weapons are also used for securing economic 
interests. the symbolic association of weapons with masculinity may 
have political effects. Specifically, in relation to ddr programs, there 
may be barriers to effective disarmament through the ways in which 
masculine identities and roles have become conjoined with weapons 
possession.62 in societies where the culture of gun ownership is well 
entrenched, emphasis should be put on “decommissioning” or ensuring 
that there are no abuses of guns, rather than on disarmament, which 
may be impossible to enforce. failure to acknowledge sociocultural atti-
tudes toward guns has contributed to the failure of various national dis-
armament programs in the pastoral areas of northeastern uganda and 
northern kenya, and played a role in the failure of ddr in Somalia.63
 identities created during times of conflict also have implications for 
disarmament. Conflict reinforces narrow and violent notions of mas-
culinity where weapons are used as symbols and tools to contest other 
notions of masculinity. this is reflected in violence and civilian abuse. 
Chris dolan’s analysis of the conflict in northern uganda, where abuse 
and humiliation of civilians by soldiers, militias, and rebels was frequent, 
is illustrative.64 this has effects in postconflict societies. thus, a gendered 
analysis that addresses the construction of masculinities and reinforces 
alternative notions of masculinities based on a culture of nonviolence may 
be important for successful disarmament and sustainable peace.65
 there are other reasons why local contexts are so important in 
understanding the limits to ddr for peacebuilding. there may be a 
disconnect between the donors’ ddr goals and national realities. As 
mentioned, the conceptualization of ddr programs is often guided 
by donors’ strategic goals of liberal reform, stability, and development. 
yet many African states lack a domestic political and social consensus 
over these goals. the military is often central in many African states, 
and many governments face challenges to their legitimacy and viability. 
regimes may therefore rely on the suppression of opponents, the use 
of force, and political co-optation to remain in power. leaders may 
prioritize the drive for military security,66 sometimes at the expense 
of economic development, even though official rhetoric may stress 
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development to its donor audience. massive expansion of armies and 
internal security and their “operational” costs are central to the actual 
costs of maintaining security.
 in these contested and factionalized states, political, economic, or 
administrative reform can be severely destabilizing. this makes ddr 
a sensitive and delicate process because of its relationship with power 
and security. Parties may agree to carry out ddr because of domestic 
political considerations or short-term political goals, yet these may be 
at odds with donor objectives and longer-term visions. for instance, 
during the early 1990s, the World bank and other donors supported 
the demobilization and reintegration program in uganda, in the con-
text of reducing expenditure on defense and security and shifting re-
sources to social services. the ugandan government, however, used the 
program to achieve its short-term political objectives. it embarked on 
fresh recruitment, recalled some ex-combatants, and increased defense 
expenditures.67 Similarly in ethiopia, the transitional government, after 
achieving military victory over forces of the derg in 1991, used its ddr 
program to control and restrict the movement of defeated derg soldiers 
by confining them to transit centers before rapidly demobilizing them.68
 Another problem is determining who is a combatant and therefore eli-
gible for assistance. in interstate conflicts, combatants are individuals who 
are members of national armed forces that have an identifiable organiza-
tion and a clear chain of command. they carry arms openly and conduct 
operations in accordance with the laws of war.69 in intrastate conflicts, 
combatants are individuals who have taken part in fighting on behalf of 
the parties. determining what exactly amounts to “taking part in fight-
ing” and who qualifies for ex-combatant status is problematic, as was the 
case in liberia, where almost “everybody fought.”70 this is because con-
temporary intrastate conflicts involve many civilians who carry arms and 
are somehow involved in fighting when the need arises or on part-time 
basis. Women and girls are especially unlikely to qualify as combatants 
if a restrictive definition of combatant is used. Some women may fight 
for brief periods and return to their communities. Women and girls also 
participate in conflict in different ways, including caring for the injured. 
in Zimbabwe and namibia, female combatants and supporters of armed 
groups were generally excluded from formal ddr processes.71 the un’s 
iddrS guidelines emphasize the need to assess the roles of women and 
girls in conflict and to design gender-sensitive ddr programs in confor-
mity with un Security Council resolution 1325.72
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 Soldiers and civilians in many African conflicts are therefore not 
necessarily fundamentally distinct and distinguishable. given the na-
ture of most African societies and economies, a soldier is very likely 
to engage in other activities, just like a professor or civil servant may 
be a part-time trader or farmer. Political and bureaucratic co-optation 
ensures the integration of the military into civilian life. As John Harbe-
son observed, civilians and military officers do not deal with each other 
at arm’s length.73 for example, in uganda, where demobilization and 
reintegration exercises were conducted in the 1990s, the nrA soldiers 
were already an integral part of civilian society, not confined to living 
in army barracks. they were engaged in local politics, business, farm-
ing, and other activities alongside their civilian counterparts. likewise, 
rebel armies are often made up of both full-time and part-time soldiers. 
Some rebel soldiers double as cultivators and traders.
 viewing civilians and soldiers as distinct can lead to the perception 
that ex-combatants are idle, potentially subversive, and dangerous. ex-
combatants may be associated with crime and the spread of disease, 
especially Hiv/AidS. As lalli metsola and Henning melber’s analysis 
of the ex-combatants of namibia’s South West Africa People’s organi-
zation (SWAPo) indicates, these individuals are perceived not as active 
agents, but as subjects in need of corrective action and reintegration 
assistance.74 As Alex vines argues, this view is contentious. He cites a 
study by the refugee Studies Programme showing that in maputo, the 
capital of mozambique, there is little evidence to link former soldiers 
with armed crime.75
 there is also a common misconception among donors that when 
ex-combatants are provided with skills and training, this will facilitate 
their reintegration into civilian society. this assumption overlooks the 
nature of the economy in many African societies that are emerging from 
conflict. many states that suffer from intrastate conflicts have weak eco-
nomic and political institutions with limited employment opportuni-
ties. there is therefore a risk of training people for jobs that do not 
exist. in mozambique, for instance, expectations that agriculture would 
facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants in the Zambezian region 
went unrealized, due to the collapse of agriculture, land shortage, and 
unavailability of goods in the rural areas. there were few employment 
opportunities for ex-combatants, let alone civilians.76
 thus the overall economic context for ddr should not be over-
looked. most postconflict reintegration efforts are undertaken without 
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donor support, and ex-combatants and communities carry the heaviest 
burden of reintegration.77 if there are multiple opportunities for sustain-
able livelihoods, ex-combatants are easily reintegrated in the economy. 
in uganda, which is often cited as a successful story of demobilization 
and reintegration, ex-combatants received only token assistance from 
donors. reintegration of ex-combatants was facilitated by the steady 
recovery of the economy, and support from family and community.
 the regional context is also significant as many African armed conflicts 
are highly interconnected at the local, national, regional, and global levels. 
this creates a wave of security interdependence or formations where arms 
and combatants move across porous state boundaries with ease. most ddr 
initiatives focus on national programs and are funded through bilateral 
cooperation, yet “regional conflict formations” mean that the conflicts, and 
therefore peacebuilding, are linked. for instance, the great lakes regional 
conflict formation, encompassing conflicts in burundi, the Central African 
republic, the drC, rwanda, Sudan, and uganda, is a notable example.78 
Against this backdrop, the implementation of the previously mentioned 
Country demobilization and reintegration Programme was important. 
Similarly, the conflicts in liberia, Côte d’ivoire, and Sierra leone are in-
terlocked, with arms and combatants moving from one conflict zone to the 
next. nonetheless, the ddr process in Sierra leone lacked a subregional 
approach, even though it occurred at a time of widespread insecurity in 
the mano river countries. Some combatants moved from Sierra leone to 
conflict zones in liberia and Côte d’ivoire, influencing those conflicts.79 
ddr design and implementation need to take into account and address 
regional dimensions of conflict, since the success of ddr in one country 
may be dependent on peacebuilding in another part of the region.
the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is 
multidimensional, varied, and complex, involving a number of inter-
related and interdependent processes. ddr tends to include global, 
regional, and local actors engaged in humanitarian, security, and devel-
opment activities. the actors have different goals and mandates that are 
not always compatible. Success is difficult to determine, since different 
actors will have different yardsticks.
 Along with other ddr donor initiatives, the un’s guidelines for 
an integrated approach to the planning, design, and implementation of 
ddr tend to be embedded in a wider, liberal project that links security 
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with development. the experience of many African countries with 
ddr suggests that these approaches may not always be appropriate. 
for instance, donor-driven ddr programs often sideline important 
informal and traditional practices. yet many people have confidence in 
informal processes rooted in particular cultural norms that resonate with 
the community. it is important to understand these informal processes 
because significant numbers of combatants are informally demobilized 
and reintegrated, and because sometimes combatants go through both 
formal and informal processes.
 it is also important to understand the context of conflict, which affects 
the possibilities and limits of ddr in Africa. How a conflict ended, as 
well as the prevailing security situation, will shape the outcomes of any 
ddr program. A program that is implemented after military victory 
will be different from a program that is agreed upon during a negotiated 
settlement to conflict. furthermore, donor-driven ddr programs may 
inaccurately interpret the motives of the parties involved in ddr. in 
the context of a fractured state and an insecure elite, willingness to sign 
a ddr agreement may not be an expression of a credible commitment 
to peace. last, ddr programs often rest on the distinction between 
combatants and noncombatants. this is problematic in many African 
conflicts, where these categories are often largely artificial. instead, 
programs that emphasize community livelihoods are needed, as well 
as a better understanding of the global, regional, and local economic 
relationships that often contributed to conflict in the first place.
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The Role of the African Union, New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development, and 
African Development Bank in Postconflict 
Reconstruction and Peacebuilding
g i l b e r t  m .  k H A d i A g A l A
t h e  s e A r C h  f o r  e f f e C t i v e  P e A C e b u i l d i n g  s t r At e g i e s  i n  A f r i C A 
since the 1990s is animated by the need to find durable mechanisms 
that contribute to sustainable peace and development.1 despite these 
efforts, debates abound about how to rebuild states, the operational 
limitations of peacebuilding, and the consequences of external engage-
ment in postconflict reconstruction.2 the African union (Au), the 
new Partnership for Africa’s development (nePAd), and the African 
development bank (Afdb), alongside multilateral institutions, have 
been at the center of intervention attempts to promote peacebuilding 
in complex political, social, and economic environments. in addition 
to dealing with differences among postconflict countries, African ac-
tors, just like international actors, have faced problems of sequencing 
humanitarian and development goals against the backdrop of limited 
internal and external resources.
 this chapter seeks to understand the roles of the Au, nePAd, and 
the Afdb in postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Africa. 
the discussion is structured around three fundamental questions. first, 
how have the Au, nePAd, and the Afdb conceptualized the no-
tions of postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding? Second, what 
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strategies have these institutions adopted to deal with the challenges 
of peacebuilding in Africa? third, are ideas and approaches to peace-
building in Africa different from global ones? Answers to these ques-
tions are instructive in gleaning insights into the involvement of these 
institutions in postconflict African countries and the consequences of 
this involvement. the chapter contends that postconflict reconstruc-
tion and peacebuilding roles are novel to continental institutions that 
are struggling with issues of weak resource and institutional capacity 
and multiple mandates. despite these weaknesses, however, continental 
initiatives remain critical in the mobilization of action and resources to 
complement international postconflict and peacebuilding efforts.
Postconflict Assistance and Peacebuilding in Africa
there have been significant debates about whether peacebuilding and 
postconflict reconstruction are complementary objectives. Aid agencies 
involved in humanitarian work, such as oxfam, international Alert, and 
doctors Without borders, initially resisted efforts to integrate peace-
building into postconflict assistance because of what they perceived as 
the dangers of injecting political objectives into their strictly “neutral” 
and apolitical sectoral work in postconflict contexts.3 viewing their 
work in strictly technical terms, these aid agencies resisted the integra-
tion of overt political goals into their reconstruction and development 
projects because it seemed to violate one of the cardinal rules of foreign 
assistance.4 this skepticism has gradually given way to the recognition 
of the complementary nature of these objectives. this recognition stems 
from wide acknowledgment that the provision of security is an essen-
tial condition of peacebuilding and, furthermore, that the rebuilding 
of public institutions is a key to sustainable peace.5 Hence, successful 
political and governance transition must form the core part of any post-
conflict peacebuilding mission.
 over the past decade, the experiences of many African countries, 
such as Angola, burundi, the democratic republic of the Congo 
(drC), guinea, liberia, rwanda, and Sierra leone, have affirmed that 
sustainable peacebuilding occurs within a broad context of political and 
economic reforms. Proponents of peacebuilding throughout the 1990s 
documented the failures of conventional approaches and challenged 
the assumption that aid in postconflict settings could be separate from 
politics.6 in recent years, the thinking has gravitated toward the idea 
that postconflict contexts are distinct from conventional development 
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settings and thus require separate strategies that integrate peacebuild-
ing into postconflict assistance.7 for instance, a number of donors, in 
particular the Canadian international development Agency (CidA) 
and the World bank, have developed peace and conflict impact assess-
ments (PCiAs) in the planning and execution of “traditional” develop-
ment projects, underscoring the increasing donor interest in funding 
peacebuilding undertakings. the PCiA is a means of systematically 
evaluating the positive and negative impacts of development projects 
on peace and conflict in conflict countries.8 Attempts to integrate peace 
and conflict concerns into development planning are particularly in-
structive in Africa, where civil wars have decimated economies, polities, 
and livelihoods, and where reconstruction involves the resuscitation of 
institutions of order and prosperity. these are the ideas about peace-
building that undergird the Au, nePAd, and the Afdb.
the role of the Au and nePAd
As the primary institution responsible for peace, security, and develop-
ment on the continent, the African union has prioritized the establish-
ment of a peace and security management system that comprises several 
elements: the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the 
Continental early Warning System, the African Standby force, the 
military Staff Committee, and the Peace fund.9 nePAd is a program 
of the Au that focuses on the socioeconomic causes of conflict such 
as poverty, underdevelopment, and poor governance. While the Au’s 
Constitutive Act articulates the centrality of the Au in the peace and 
security arena, nePAd supports postconflict reconstruction and the 
mobilization of resources for the Au Peace fund.10 given their nov-
elty, both institutions confront questions of the effective harmonization 
of their roles. As part of harmonization attempts, nePAd’s Heads of 
State and government implementation Committee adopted a peace 
and security agenda in february 2003 that consists of eight priorities:
1.  developing mechanisms, institutions, and instruments for 
achieving peace and security in Africa.
2.  improving the capacity for, and coordination of, early action 
for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, including 
development of operational capabilities for peace support.
3.  improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic 
analysis and support.
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4.  Prioritizing strategic security issues such as disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (ddrr) 
efforts in postconflict situations and coordination of African 
efforts to prevent and combat terrorism.
5.  ensuring efficient and consolidated action for preventing, 
combating, and eradicating the illicit proliferation, circulation, 
and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
6.  improving the security sector and the capacity for good 
governance as related to peace and security.
7.  generating minimum standards for application in the 
exploitation and management of Africa’s resources (including 
nonrenewable resources) in areas affected by conflict.
8.  Assisting in resource mobilization for the Au Peace fund and 
for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing, and 
resolving conflicts on the continent.11
this collaborative framework is intended to contribute to peace and 
security by focusing on strategic planning of peacebuilding operations, 
including determining and defining priority interventions, identifying 
appropriate networks of partners, and consolidating the work of the 
various internal and external actors involved in postconflict reconstruc-
tion processes.12
 the other important institution that the Au and nePAd have devel-
oped to address the peace, security, humanitarian, development, and po-
litical dimensions of postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding is an 
African postconflict reconstruction policy framework. developed in 2005 
through a consultative process facilitated by the nePAd secretariat, this 
framework harmonizes the activities and programs of the Au, nePAd, 
the regional economic communities (reCs), member states, civil society, 
and the private sector in Africa. As part of this initiative, the Au and 
nePAd seek to develop a centralized funding mechanism to assist coor-
dination of postconflict reconstruction. the framework also identifies the 
role of reCs and international donors in postconflict reconstruction.
 the 2005 postconflict reconstruction framework recognizes that a 
country’s transition from conflict to peace should be informed by its 
own particular circumstances, reflected in the programming features of 
peacebuilding interventions: composition, prioritization, timing, and 
sequencing.13 toward this end, the framework has identified five key 
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areas of postconflict reconstruction: security; political transition, gov-
ernance, and participation; socioeconomic development, human rights, 
justice, and reconciliation; and coordination management and resource 
mobilization.14 in addition to these key areas, the Au and nePAd 
stress the importance of building the capacity of postconflict states 
to enable them to gradually own the reconstruction process. Accord-
ing to the framework, “externally driven post-conflict reconstruction 
processes that lack sufficient local ownership and participation are un-
sustainable.”15 despite this intent, the Au and nePAd have yet to 
successfully resolve the tension between externally driven strategies and 
priorities, and local ownership.
 the Au strategy seeks to facilitate coherence in the assessment, 
planning, coordination, and monitoring of postconflict reconstruction 
systems by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual base 
for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional, and multi-
dimensional actors that affect postconflict reconstruction. the main 
building blocks of the framework are as follows:
•  Country-level strategic framework: to coordinate the various 
constituent elements of the postconflict reconstruction 
system around a common country strategy.
•  Monitoring and evaluation system: to monitor progress in 
implementation of peacebuilding activities as well as setbacks 
and challenges encountered, enabling the various actors, 
sectors, and programs to adjust their plans accordingly.
•  “Special needs” strategic and programmatic component: Certain 
groups or categories of internal actors require responses 
that cater to their specific needs. these groups include 
women, children, youth, the disabled, the elderly, female 
ex-combatants, child soldiers, internally displaced persons 
(idPs), refugees, single-parent households, victims of 
sexual violence, and Hiv–positive individuals.
•  Strategic coherence and coordination model: to ensure that 
the peace, security, and development dimensions of crisis 
interventions are directed toward a common objective.
•  Aid harmonization: to coordinate the external actors involved 
in postconflict reconstruction. this includes monitoring 
reporting and evaluation systems in recipient countries, as 
112
gilbert m.  khAdiAgAlA
well as streamlining the interfaces between internal and 
external actors to limit their impact on host bureaucracies.
•  Synchronized delivery and assistance absorption: to harmonize 
the delivery of postconflict aid by external actors with 
the absorption capacity of internal actors, primarily by 
incorporating assistance delivery into postconflict programs 
and aligning it with the needs of internal actors.16
 before the establishment of the 2005 policy framework, nePAd’s 
role in postconflict peacebuilding was to “support efforts at developing 
early warning systems [and] support post-conflict reconstruction and 
development . . . including the rehabilitation of national infrastruc-
ture, the population, as well as refugees and internally displaced per-
sons.”17 these responsibilities remain a central part of the continental 
peacebuilding strategy, though it has evolved since 2005. in its 2004–7 
strategic plan, nePAd further elaborated on its goals with respect to 
peace and security: supporting the Au and the regional economic com-
munities (reCs), supporting national focal points, coordinating and 
harmonizing the efforts of external actors, addressing the security needs 
in postconflict countries, supporting efforts toward justice and recon-
ciliation, furthering the economic and social well-being of the citizens of 
postconflict countries, and working toward good governance and equal-
izing citizen participation.18 equally significant, nePAd processes such 
as the African Peer review mechanism (APrm) also embrace some of 
the fundamental areas of postconflict reconstruction: good governance, 
political transition, human rights, justice, and participation. the APrm 
enables postconflict countries to assess their own development processes 
and receive objective recommendations for improvement.19
 there are different views on the utility of a sequenced approach to 
the continuum of relief, rehabilitation, and development. not only are 
conflict dynamics nonlinear, but effective sequencing can be difficult, 
particularly given the multiplicity of programs and actors converging 
in these efforts. According to the Au/nePAd framework, postcon-
flict reconstruction starts when hostilities end, typically in the form of 
a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. in the same breath, however, 
the plan ambitiously states that peacebuilding involves actors under-
taking a range of “interrelated” programs spanning security, political, 
socioeconomic, and reconciliation dimensions, and that peacebuilding 
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“collectively and cumulatively addresses both the causes and conse-
quences of the conflict” and establishes the long-term foundations 
for social justice and sustainable peace and development. experience 
from most postconflict contexts, such as burundi, the drC, and Sierra 
leone, reveals that various peacebuilding activities may not necessarily 
complement each other, as coordination and policy coherence becomes 
an arduous undertaking in these settings.20
 Although its ultimate aim is to address the root causes of conflict 
and to lay the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace, in 
the short term the Au/nePAd framework is designed to assist in sta-
bilizing the peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict. the 
challenge here is that the processes involved in addressing the root 
causes of conflict are longer-term and more complex, involving difficult 
reforms in the governance and social realms.21 According to the Au/
nePAd postconflict framework, interventions are undertaken through 
three broad phases: the emergency phase, the transition phase, and the 
development phase. the framework notes, however, that these phases 
should not be understood as being absolute, fixed, or time-bound, or as 
having clear boundaries. other donors and development actors, such as 
the World bank, the united kingdom’s department for international 
development (dfid), and the Canadian international development 
Agency, based on their experiences in postconflict states in Africa, have 
acknowledged that it is more effective to identify a limited number of 
strategic objectives, grounded in solid analysis (including conflict assess-
ments, political economy analysis, drivers-of-change studies, and ca-
pacity mapping) of the sources of fragility and the potential for change. 
in this regard, priority areas can be selected by mapping the goals of the 
intervention and then identifying the critical path for achieving them in 
the security, economy, and social spheres.22
 like most of the broad African security agenda, the initiatives en-
compassed under the Au/nePAd postconflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding agenda are still in their formative stages. thus far, nei-
ther the Au nor nePAd have engaged in any substantive activities 
toward peacebuilding. Part of this problem stems from the enormous 
resource constraints these organizations are facing. thus, although the 
framework was articulated in 2005, it was not until 2008 that the Au 
and nePAd made a formal request to donors for uS$50 million over 
a three-year period for postconflict reconstruction and development.23 
of this amount, none was to be sourced from Africa, but the Au and 
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nePAd anticipated exploring new and innovative means of harness-
ing resources from other sources, including the private sector, southern 
partners, and the African diaspora. Although the uS$50 million did 
not include the cost for other sectoral priorities, such as the continental 
peace and security architecture (including the early warning system), 
the African Standby force, management of natural resources, and 
combating the spread of small arms and light weapons, it is difficult to 
envisage how the ambitious agenda of postconflict reconstruction could 
be realistically accomplished on such meager resources. in the context 
of the radical reduction of the Au’s overall budget (estimated to be a 
50 percent cut in the Au’s operational budget) following the uprisings 
in north Africa in early 2011, it is unlikely that the Au will find new 
resources to finance peacebuilding efforts in the foreseeable future.
 even with a future generous injection of donor resources, the Au and 
nePAd would face constraints and would need to focus on a few priori-
ties. realistically, external actors, including the Au and nePAd, cannot 
do everything in postconflict countries, particularly given the scale of 
problems facing most of these countries. establishing priorities is also 
a question of developing exit strategies that quickly wean postconflict 
countries from donor funds that focus primarily on humanitarian, relief, 
and postconflict capacity building toward standard development fund-
ing and financing.24 the transition from postconflict reconstruction to 
economic development is a key puzzle that has received limited attention 
under the Au/nePAd framework; however, it may take center stage 
as resources decline. understandably, postconflict countries face unique 
problems in restoring political order and economic prosperity, but the 
disproportionate roles of external actors in reconstruction often comes at 
the expense of national ownership. Countries such as Angola, eritrea, li-
beria, and mozambique made significant strides in shedding the stigma 
of a postconflict label through strong leadership and programs that 
privileged broad national ownership, domestic mobilization of resources, 
and creative bargaining with donors to establish priorities and plans that 
mitigated the creation of new economic and political dependencies.
the role of the Afdb
in recent years, the African development bank has been involved in the 
planning and implementation of postconflict, peacebuilding, and recon-
struction initiatives on the continent. Although its role in peacebuilding 
is limited compared to that of the World bank, dfid, and the united 
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States Agency for international development (uSAid), the Afdb has 
increased the geographic reach of its operations, the size of its financial 
contributions, and the diversity of its programmatic support. in line 
with nePAd’s postconflict reconstruction policy framework and its 
emphasis on strengthening the peacebuilding capacity of the regional 
economic communities, the Afdb has tried to craft and implement 
regional strategies to prevent conflict and promote development. As it 
has emerged as a significant player in postconflict reconstruction, the 
Afdb has focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of post-
conflict states such as burundi, Comoros, the drC, guinea-bissau, 
liberia, and Sierra leone.25 most of these resources have been allocated 
to training of personnel involved in public sector management, budget-
ing, decentralization, and anticorruption.
 in 2001 the Afdb established a set of policy guidelines for postcon-
flict assistance that emphasized providing advice, financing, and advo-
cacy to postconflict countries, as well as building their capacity. Accord-
ing to the Afdb, fragile states (including postcrisis and transitional 
countries) have their own special requirements. they need to be assisted 
in moving toward stable political and economic development and to 
reengage with the international community. in 2007–9 the Afdb ap-
proved two documents relating to fragile and postconflict states: the 
“bank group Strategy for enhanced engagement in fragile States” 
and the “operational guidelines of the fragile States facility.” the 
new strategy differentiates the bank group’s support to postconflict 
and transitional countries from the support provided to other categories 
of fragile states along similar lines established by other international 
financial institutions.26
 in order to be classified as a fragile state by the Afdb, a country 
needs to satisfy any one of three conditions: it must have a compos-
ite Afdb and World bank Country Policy and institutional Assess-
ment (CPiA) score of 3.2 or less;27 it must have low income and no 
CPiA score; or it must have hosted united nations (un) or regional 
peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or mediation operations on its territory 
during the preceding three years. Consequently, fragile and postconflict 
states are generally characterized by exceptionally weak institutional 
capacity, poor governance, political instability, and frequent conflict. 
furthermore, these states are unlikely to have met the un’s millen-
nium development goals, usually in the face of huge and unaddressed 
socioeconomic needs.28
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 over the past decade the Afdb has changed its policies regarding 
postconflict and fragile states. Prior to 2001, the Afdb embarked on a 
purely standardized lending program aimed at supporting macroeco-
nomic reform, improving service delivery, building institutional capacity, 
and providing arrears and debt relief.29 this program, however, was too 
broad, forcing the Afdb to establish a number of specialized facilities 
to assist member states. the Afdb’s current approach involves a facil-
ity for fragile states, which also incorporates a facility for postconflict 
countries. the objective of the facility for fragile states is to provide a 
broader and integrated framework through which the Afdb can assist 
eligible states more effectively, in order to help them consolidate peace, 
stabilize their economies, and lay the foundation for sustainable poverty 
reduction and long-term economic growth.30 to achieve this end, the 
facility has three windows of grant support for financing the recovery 
process in fragile states:
•  Supplemental support window: these funds (uS$272 
million in 2008) are aimed at supporting governance, 
capacity building, and rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
infrastructure in fragile states.31
•  Arrears clearance window: these funds (uS$120 million in 
2008) are essentially used as a onetime support mechanism 
for the clearance of arrears of eligible fragile states. the 
objectives of this window are linked to those of the facility 
for postconflict countries; however, its implementation is 
different.32
•  Targeted support window: these funds (uS$27 million 
in 2008) support capacity building and development of 
management knowledge in fragile states.33
 both the facility for fragile states and the facility for postconflict 
countries provide an array of financing options that enable eligible can-
didates to clear their arrears. the Afdb’s arrears clearance program is 
closely linked with those of the World bank and international monetary 
fund (imf), as the facility for postconflict countries has helped candi-
dates qualify for debt relief under the Highly indebted Poor Country 
(HiPC) initiative and more recently under the multilateral debt relief 
initiative.34 burundi was the first such beneficiary, gaining access to the 
HiPC initiative in September 2005 at an estimated cost of uS$826 
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million. Access to this fund, which has supported resettlement of idPs, 
development of infrastructure, and improvement of health care and 
education, has been important to maintaining stability in burundi.35 
other countries that have benefited from this facility include the Co-
moros, the drC, and liberia. Additional advantages of Afdb financ-
ing and loan provision for postconflict countries include jump-starting 
public spending programs that improve services to the population and 
provide jobs; helping countries return to a formal economy and build 
tax revenues; and improving domestic economic conditions to reverse 
capital flight. in Sierra leone, the Afdb’s frontal engagement in post-
conflict financing for the bumbuna hydroelectric power project induced 
other donors to follow suit.36
 there is no doubt that the African development bank has made 
significant provisions for supporting postconflict countries and ad-
dressing the specific needs of fragile states, particularly by emphasiz-
ing interventions in “priority areas”: capacity building, employment 
creation, support for arrears clearance, and support for vulnerable 
groups—women, children, the elderly, and the disabled. like its de-
velopment counterparts such as the World bank, however, the Afdb 
has been criticized for many shortfalls and limitations. first, some 
observers have noted that the Afdb tends to shy away from adopting 
a political “lens” to its postconflict interventions by not sufficiently 
considering the political and economic power dynamics in postcon-
flict settings and their adverse consequences.37 instead, the Afdb’s 
approach is primarily technical, focusing on economic variables and 
scores such as the CPiA. there are concerns that this may actually 
exacerbate income disparities, exclusion, and inequity, problems that 
drive instability.
 Second, aid funds and donor-sponsored policy reforms can inad-
vertently strengthen elite dominance and patronage, fuel resentment 
among certain groups, increase exclusion, and increase the risk that such 
excluded groups may resort to violence to address their grievances. in 
most postconflict settings, systems of exclusion based on gender, caste, 
and ethnicity may be obstacles to sustainable reconstruction.38
 third, the Afdb’s allocation system prioritizes performance over 
the needs of postconflict countries. likened to the World bank’s CPiA, 
the Afdb’s allocation system effectively penalizes poor-performing 
fragile states that have chronically weak policies, institutions, and gov-
ernance. in this respect, the Afdb largely mirrors the World bank in 
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its approaches to postconflict reconstruction rather than evolving new 
ones that reflect African specificities. furthermore, there is insufficient 
clarity on the meaning of local ownership, particularly in countries that 
have weak state institutions. ownership may be rhetorical in contexts of 
insufficient domestic resources and inadequate capacity. rather than ac-
knowledging the tensions and dilemmas around ownership, the Afdb 
may be overlooking them in its programs. moreover, operations in re-
ceiving countries are not always transparent. there have been reports of 
weak control of corruption and that the Afdb’s facility for fragile states 
in some instances may be supporting undemocratic regimes.39
 fourth, although coordination has improved, the Afdb still needs 
to develop better mechanisms for coordinating with other donors and 
initiatives that stem from continental institutions and international ac-
tors. Coordination is critical because, unlike the Au and nePAd, the 
Afdb has more expertise and experience in financing and implementa-
tion of development projects. in future peacebuilding initiatives, it may 
be prudent for external actors to funnel financial support to the Afdb 
to enable it to operate as the implementation and financial manage-
ment arm of the Au and nePAd. Such an arrangement would serve to 
enhance coordination between external donors and African institutions 
in peacebuilding.
African continental institutions have embraced postconflict and peace-
building roles because of the importance they have attached to resolving 
conflicts, enhancing security, and laying firm foundations for sustainable 
development. As Africa’s civil wars have ended, the Au, nePAd, and 
the Afdb have elaborated various approaches and strategies to help 
with peacebuilding. these roles have also evolved as part of Africa’s 
wider search for problem-solving mechanisms that draw from local ini-
tiatives and resources. in identifying the key strategies adopted by these 
institutions, this chapter has shown that although the broad articula-
tion of strategies has often not translated into effective mobilization 
of resources or action, it has been important for African continental 
institutions to be involved in these efforts. the experience shows that 
thus far the Au, nePAd, and the Afdb have expended modest re-
sources in postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, depending 
for the most part on subventions from international actors. yet since 
postconflict reconstruction roles are time-bound, future planning and 
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strategies should accord more priority to helping countries to transition 
expeditiously from postconflict to development. moreover, if African 
countries make significant steps to recover from civil conflicts, the need 
for additional resources for postconflict reconstruction and peacebuild-
ing enterprises will no longer be as critical in the larger calculus of 
African continental priorities.
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The Case of the Pan-African Ministers Conference  
for Public and Civil Service
C H r i S  l A n d S b e r g
t h e  A f r i C A n  C h A l l e n g e  i s  e s s e n t i A l l y  A  C h A l l e n g e  o f 
development, and the African crisis is primarily a crisis of the state. 
Africans therefore have to respond simultaneously to a two-pronged 
problematic, brought about by decades of internal misrule and exter-
nally driven wars and exploitation: governance and development. As 
such, the state has to be set at the very center of African politics and 
development. African states have since the end of the Cold War and 
apartheid searched for their own post–Cold War, postapartheid inter-
state paradigm to address the consequences of decades of African bad 
governance and superpower rivalries and proxy battles at the continent’s 
expense. Since 2002 with the formal establishment of the African union 
(Au), the continent’s most credible and legitimate interstate body, Af-
rican states have pursued an “African Agenda” that spells out four areas 
of dynamic cooperation, or “calabashes”: peace and security; stability, 
or governance; socioeconomic development; and international coop-
eration. many continental and subcontinental actors and forums have 
emerged to embrace and champion this continental African Agenda. 
the Pan-African ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service, 
established in 1994, is one such African interstate actor that has pro-
vided indigenous intellectual support and acted almost as a lobby group 
in support of a governance approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
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it is one that many scholars and observers know very little about, yet one 
that can tell us a great deal about Africa’s security-politico-development 
agenda and the peacebuilding challenges faced by the continent at the 
operational level.
 this chapter deals with the little-known Pan-African ministers 
Conference, which provides a forum for ministers who face weak gov-
ernance infrastructures and massive public service delivery challenges, 
and helps them look outward to select global and continental postcon-
flict tools and frameworks. it is an example of the continentalization of 
policy in Africa and demonstrates how government departments, other 
than the usual ministries of foreign affairs and defense, have staked a 
claim in foreign policy and security matters. the conference also poten-
tially addresses two other problems. first, it can use postconflict recon-
struction frameworks to address how political power is used and abused 
in continental affairs, and thus places the state and governance at the 
center of continental development. Second, it can address imbalances 
in the continent’s relations with outside powers, notably those from 
the West. typically, powerful industrialized states usurp the powers of 
African governments, to the point where these states lose much of their 
policy sovereignty. thus, the Pan-African ministers Conference can 
potentially reassert the role of national governments, and by extension 
the state, in the peacebuilding process.
 Postconflict reconstruction and development (PCrd) are stated as 
key objectives of both the Au and the Pan-African ministers Confer-
ence, but there are disagreements over what this means and which kinds 
of activities should be supported. Peacebuilding initiatives have typi-
cally taken, as their starting point, global institutions and their efforts to 
build peace in needy countries—an outsider-in approach. Scant atten-
tion is given to African or regional initiatives and efforts to ensure that 
external efforts dovetail with homegrown initiatives—an insider-out 
approach. but unless African efforts at statebuilding and development 
are made fundamental parts of the continent’s postconflict peacebuild-
ing efforts, little will come of these initiatives.
 Since its first gathering in 1994 in tangier, morocco, the Pan-
African ministers Conference has prioritized postconflict reconstruc-
tion as a means of dealing with the question of the distribution of 
power, resources, and services. in that year, a regional conference on 
public administration was held in Windhoek in namibia, with the aim 
of modernizing postconflict public services. the Pan-African ministers 
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Conference was influenced by relevant resolutions of the united na-
tions (un) general Assembly and by former un Secretary-general 
boutros-ghali’s 1992 report An Agenda for Peace. the ministers used 
these documents as a guide and subscribed to the idea that postconflict 
countries needed to embrace democratic governance and the notion of 
developmental states. Politics and development could not be separated.
 this chapter specifically probes how the Pan-African ministers 
Conference sought to engage postconflict reconstruction and de-
velopment challenges on the continent, through an emphasis on 
statebuilding, governance, and public service delivery. in doing so, 
the chapter makes the case for developmental institutionalism and 
highlights the interesting ways in which national and continental 
peacebuilding and reconstruction initiatives are shaped by global 
ideas and approaches, but also how those ideas are interrogated and 
adapted to African conditions.
toward developmental institutionalism?
developmental institutionalism is derived from two separate concepts, 
developmentalism and institutionalism. institutionalism emphasizes 
institutions as enduring and stable sets of arrangements that regulate 
individual and group behavior on the basis of established rules and 
procedures. Andrew Heywood argues that political institutions have a 
formal and often legal character, and imply explicit and often usually 
enforceable rules and decision-making procedures.1 developmental 
institutionalism refers to institutions that are meritocratic in character 
and are able to prioritize development by being goal oriented, and 
able to get key stakeholders to pull in the same developmental direc-
tion in society. the concept of developmentalism has been defined by 
guy mhone to mean an active approach by the state in a country’s 
economy, which refers to the government having “a directive, promo-
tive and facilitative role” in a country’s economy.2 A developmental 
state leads the market by directing market initiatives toward devel-
opment and creating competitive advantage and fostering economic 
development. this is in stark contrast to the neoliberal view, which 
sees the state “not (as) an agent of growth, only an umpire, frequently 
an obstacle, and ideally not a major participant in development.”3 As 
the rest of this chapter will show, the Pan-African ministers Confer-
ence offers an alternative approach to African peacebuilding that is 
anchored on developmental institutionalism.
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the Pan-African ministers Conference: A background
With the formal cessation of the Cold War by 1990, and the end of 
apartheid in South Africa in 1994, African ministers of public service 
and administration came together to establish the Pan-African minis-
ters Conference for Public and Civil Service. the end of apartheid and 
white-minority oppression marked the continent’s achievement of its 
objective of political emancipation. Africa’s focus shifted to issues of 
socioeconomic emancipation.
 many African state actors emerged to play key roles in helping to 
shape the postapartheid governance and development architecture.4 
the Pan-African ministers Conference is one such actor. it seized the 
opportunity to engage Africa’s renewed pan-Africanism by committing 
to develop policies to enhance public and civil services and administra-
tion roles in political and socioeconomic development in Africa through 
its establishment as a common forum in 1994. Since its inception, the 
ministerial conference has demonstrated a commitment to move toward 
establishing standards and codes of practice for public administration in 
Africa. the ministers recognized that the continent is desperately in 
need of meritocratic civil services, and that the establishment of basic 
frameworks for public administration is central to the overall effective-
ness of the state in realizing sustainable development.5
 the ministers convened their first conference in tangier, morocco, 
June 20–21, 1994. While the goal was to have all African countries join 
this new club, states joined on a gradual basis. About 17 to 20 states 
participated on a regular basis, a far cry from the ambitious target of 
having all of the then 52 members of the Au participate directly.6 the 
second Pan-African ministers Conference, organized with the support 
of the un’s department of economic and Social Affairs, was held in 
rabat, morocco, december 13–15, 1998. morocco, although not part of 
the African union, continues to play a leading role, and it is because of 
this that the Au and the Pan-African ministers Conference keep their 
relationship at an “informal” level.
 the 1998 conference was a landmark event for Africa’s public admin-
istration, as it seized the policymaking and agenda-setting initiative by 
laying the foundation for establishing a continental charter for the pub-
lic service. in keeping with the recommendations of the conference, a 
ministerial working group, supported by a secretariat, was established to 
draft the charter. the Africa Public Service Charter (APSC) described 
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below was adopted at the third conference, held in Windhoek, namibia, 
february 5–6, 2001. the fourth conference took place may 6–7, 2003, in 
Stellenbosch, South Africa, where the ministers pledged to hold future 
conferences under the banner of the African union Commission. this 
demonstrated their commitment to operating under the aegis of the 
continental body. Continental legitimacy was important to the Pan-
African ministers Conference, and the forum has met at least once a 
year since 2005 under the AuC.
 the new Partnership for Africa’s development (nePAd), a mod-
ernizationist blueprint that has been in operation since october 2001, 
mandated that its secretariat support the Pan-African ministers Con-
ference.7 nePAd’s secretariat welcomed the fact that the ministers had 
set out to help meet the development mandates outlined by African 
leaders by linking the conference’s work to the broader continental 
development agenda, showing again how this pan-African ministerial 
forum was engaging key continental initiatives. but very early on, it 
became clear that, even on nePAd’s score, there were serious chal-
lenges of implementation and operationalization. the experience of the 
ministers conference highlighted that although continental actors were 
good at crafting and developing policies, they often lacked the will to 
implement policies.
 the Pan-African ministers Conference also agreed to engage Af-
rica’s five key regional economic communities (reCs) on political 
governance and public administration questions because they form the 
building blocks of continental integration. these include the Southern 
African development Community (SAdC), the economic Commu-
nity of West African States (eCoWAS), the economic Community of 
Central African States (eCCAS), the intergovernmental Authority on 
development (igAd), and the Arab maghreb union (Amu).8 one 
of the aims of the Pan-African ministers Conference is to focus on 
strengthening these reCs through decentralization and the prioriti-
zation of provinces, municipalities, and local governments. enhancing 
the planning capacities of these entities is a key issue. this is a novel, 
innovative policy idea. How to translate these ideas into action and to 
ensure that individual African governments implement them has been 
the Achilles heel of continental policy. one area neglected by the min-





the ministerial forum has identified the Africa Public Service Charter 
as a key priority.9 the charter signifies Africa’s political will and com-
mitment to good governance, ethics, and accountability, and commits 
ministers to help ensure transparency when making administrative deci-
sions. the charter underlines common values while preserving diversity, 
and through sharing different experiences it could evolve into a power-
ful catalyst for reforming the public service of African countries. the 
Pan-African ministers Conference also highlighted the importance of 
coordinating actions to combat corruption. this includes establishing a 
common definition of corruption, assessing its magnitude and costs, and 
developing an African position on how to fight it.10 As early as 2006, 
then nigerian President olusegun obasanjo revealed that corruption 
was costing African countries an estimated 25 percent of their combined 
national income per annum.11 but the costs of corruption are not only 
financial; they are also developmental, as scarce resources earmarked for 
development went astray. the Pan-African ministers Conference has 
noted that the devastating impact of corruption on development, gov-
ernance, and service delivery processes should not be underestimated.12
 the Pan-African ministers Conference builds on numerous histori-
cal exchange initiatives across the continent to enhance governance and 
public administration effectiveness.13 the initiatives were supported by 
organizations such as the African training and research Centre in Ad-
ministration and development, the development Policy management 
forum, and the African Association for Public Administration and 
management (AAPAm). these led to learning-exchange opportuni-
ties (conferences, seminars), training initiatives, and the development 
of research projects and publications.
 the All-Africa Public Sector innovation Awards constitute another 
priority area for the ministerial conference. mauritius served as the lead 
government for this initiative and established a working committee 
made up of representatives of nePAd and the chairperson’s office to 
oversee its implementation, which comprises four stages: design, mar-
keting, adjudication, and an awards ceremony.14 the innovation award 
was introduced both to reward original work and encourage innovative 
approaches in the areas of governance and public service, but many Af-
rican states have not taken up this opportunity to promote new and best 
practices in their own ranks.
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 the ministerial forum also initiated Africa Public Service day, which 
highlights the major goals and objectives of the ongoing processes of 
civil service reform and emphasizes ideas of good governance, effective 
service delivery to citizens, particularly the most vulnerable and rural 
poor, and the dissemination of information on public service.15 the 
African Public Service day aims to attract attention to the enhancement 
of public services that adequately respond to citizens’ expectations; this 
of course comes against the backdrop of assertions that governments 
and civil servants are often too far removed from the people they claim 
to serve. this state-society gap is one that has long bedeviled many 
African peacebuilding and democratization processes.
Cooperation with international Actors
dialogue with donor agencies is another priority. A key objective is to 
foster greater cooperation between the continent and external powers 
on the basis of partnership, not paternalistic neocolonial links, while 
expecting external actors to respect African ownership and policy 
sovereignty. over the past decade, most of Africa’s development (or 
donor) partners, such as the united nations development Programme 
(undP) and the european union (eu), have supported the emerg-
ing continental architecture around peace and security, governance and 
stability, development, and cooperation. the Pan-African ministers 
Conference has made the case for the continent’s development part-
ners to coordinate their efforts more effectively among themselves, as 
well as with African partners. they insisted on synergy among donors 
and on efforts to dovetail with, and reinforce, African initiatives. the 
conference also expected donor partners to strategize more coherently 
for both short-term rehabilitation and long-term institutional develop-
ment within the public sector. for instance, most national parliaments 
have enacted or are in the process of enacting legislation that specifically 
deals with corruption, transition, and development.
 Although Africans have insisted on policy sovereignty and owner-
ship, there has been a natural threat of dependency on donors and ex-
ternal partners exploiting the weaknesses of Africa’s policy networks. 
Aid dependence can potentially undermine the quality of governance 
and public sector institutions, as well as development trajectories, by 
weakening accountability, encouraging rent-seeking and corruption, fo-
menting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning scarce talent from 
the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies 
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and institutions. it is thus important for donors to develop less costly 
and less intrusive ways of disseminating state-of-the-art knowledge on 
public sector reform and development agendas in countries emerging 
from conflict. ultimately, Africans should guard ownership of their 
initiatives jealously, and foreign actors have to be seen to be supporting 
and bolstering continental initiatives.
Peacebuilding, governance, development,  
and the Pan-African ministers Conference
the African union’s postconflict reconstruction and development strategy 
encompasses six indicative elements: security; humanitarian and emer-
gency assistance; political governance and transition; socioeconomic 
reconstruction and development; human rights, justice, and reconcili-
ation; and women and gender.16 the pan-African ministers welcomed 
the Au’s emphasis on “political governance and transition” as a key 
dimension of its postconflict reconstruction and development strategy, 
as they believe in the centrality of the state in constructing peace on the 
continent. the ministers thus promote the merits of a developmental 
institutional approach.
 typical postconflict reconstruction and development efforts consist 
of three main objectives: facilitating the transition from war to peace, 
supporting economic and social development and reconstruction, and 
consolidating political development through effective governance.17 
the pan-African ministers see consolidating development through 
governance as their particular focus. in most conflict situations, gover-
nance capacities are severely hampered by the loss of skills and experi-
ence associated with violence and displacement. the decision-making 
capacities of governments are compounded by postconflict political 
dynamics such as “sunset” arrangements, balance-of-power alliances 
and coalitions, and compromises.18 to consolidate peace, a framework 
for effective and legitimate governance and the rule of law needs to 
be put in place, and constitutional order needs to be restored.19 many 
postconflict governments struggle to set up new administrations that 
are functional and effective.
 governance, peacebuilding, and development form a symbiotic rela-
tionship. As a 2008 report by the un’s economic and Social Council 
(eCoSoC) noted, “it is now understood that the institutional and 
human capacities, governance and development are interdependent and 
in a relationship of reciprocal cause and effect.” the eCoSoC report 
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further posited that “in times of radical transformation and crises, new 
and renewed forms of governance and public administration capaci-
ties are needed to achieve sustainable, people-centred, pro-poor gover-
nance and development.”20 by placing governance at the center of their 
agenda, the Pan-African ministers Conference contributes directly to 
peacebuilding. the challenge is whether African states will respond se-
riously to yet another interstate initiative and inculcate these ideas into 
their national programs.
 there are, however, different definitions of governance. in 1995 the 
Commission on global governance defined governance as
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public 
and private, manage their common affairs. it is a continuing 
process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. it includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, 
as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either 
have agreed to or perceived to be in their interests.21
 the un development Programme (undP) has defined governance 
as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to 
manage a country’s affairs at all levels”22 the World bank identified 
three distinct aspects of governance: “(1) the form of political regime; 
(2) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development; and (3) the 
capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies 
and discharge functions.”23 the organisation for economic Coop-
eration and development (oeCd) defined governance as denoting 
“the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in 
relation to the management of its resources for social and economic 
development.”24 A 2008 united nations report on governance states 
“governance and public administration capacities are essential for 
sustainable human development, in political, economic, social and 
environmental contexts.”25
 despite some difference in emphasis, all the preceding definitions 
hint at the importance of power and resources. focusing on power and 
resources emphasizes issues of inclusion and exclusion, and the privi-
leged and marginalized: those who hold and are included in power and 
control resources, and those who are excluded from power and deprived 
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of resources and are thus unable to shape formal power dynamics and 
even informal power relations.26
 Peacebuilding as governance involves creating or re-creating structures 
and capacities in countries that have been reshaped by violent conflict 
and by the reconfiguration of political, social, and economic institutions. 
the Pan-African ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service 
looks outward to global and continental instruments of peacebuilding 
in pragmatic and functional ways, to legitimize their activities to a wider 
audience. At the very least, they wish to see mutual reinforcement be-
tween their own perspectives and standards, on the one hand, and more 
conventional international perspectives on peacebuilding, on the other. 
the Au regards its PCrd strategy as a “flexible template that can be 
adapted to and assist regions and countries.”27 the Pan-African minis-
ters Conference has viewed this as a window of opportunity to flesh out 
the governance and public service dimensions of PCrd.
 the Au’s PCrd strategy framework argues that “successful PCrd 
is dependent on good political governance” and that “political gover-
nance involves the devolution and exercise of power from the national 
to the local level.”28 it encompasses the notion of democratic governance 
as called for in the Au’s Constitutive Act of 2000. the Pan-African 
ministers Conference has promoted a number of African initiatives 
and instruments over the past decade that recognize the importance 
of democratic governance. these instruments include the 2000 lomé 
Summit of the organization of African unity (oAu), which adopted 
the Constitutive Act of the Au; the inaugural Au Summit of 2002 in 
durban, South Africa; the launch of nePAd in october 2001; the 
adoption of the African Peer review mechanism (APrm) in 2003; 
and the declaration on Political, economic, and Corporate gover-
nance of 2002. other African governance instruments include the 2001 
Au/nePAd foundation document on Conditions of Sustainable 
development in Africa; the 2002 kananaskis group of eight (g8) in-
dustrialized Countries–Africa Action Plan on Capacity building and 
Conflict resolution;29 the coming into force in 2004 of the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples rights; the 2005 Com-
mission for Africa report; and the 2007 Potsdam g8 Action Plan for 
good financial governance in Africa. All these instruments promote 
the idea that democratic governance is associated with better appro-
priation and management of power. nonetheless, many members of the 
conference, and African governments, remain tardy when it comes to 
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operationalizing and implementing these instruments. furthermore, 
while many pan-African ministers agree that improved investment 
and growth, government effectiveness and efficient bureaucracy, better 
economic performance, adult literacy, and the rule of law are associated 
with one another, a great many of them continue to undermine, or even 
violate such provisions.
 the Pan-Africa ministers Conference spoke directly to the ques-
tion of power and the abuse of power, and aligned itself with the ideas 
of nePAd, which highlighted the need to fight against “the abuse of 
human and peoples’ rights resulting from policies of marginalization, 
identity-based discrimination, and perceptions of injustice.”30 yet, since 
2008, there has been a real ambivalence and reluctance by the successors 
of nePAd’s architects to embrace and take ownership of nePAd as 
the continent’s development program. today, nePAd is in limbo, and 
fast losing its status as a continental plan.
 given its emphasis on governance and the public service, it is not 
surprising that a key policy strategy of the Pan-African ministers 
Conference is the “building of capable states,” which the South Africa 
based nePAd secretariat has been mandated to execute through its 
governance initiative. this particular initiative stresses three priorities.31 
first, it aims at assisting African governments in developing a capacity 
for self-reliance, particularly with regard to putting in place institutional 
and policy measures for mobilizing resources for development domes-
tically. Second, it aims to build capacity within national governments 
for long-term strategic planning and continental integration. third, it 
helps national governments develop institutional and policy measures 
for domesticating African democratic governance instruments. the 
point again is that the Pan-African ministers Conference has made its 
contribution to articulating and designing sound policies; the problem 
has been in the realm of policy implementation. Another problem is 
that not all governments took the ministers conference seriously, and 
it was up to South Africa, nigeria, kenya, Algeria, and a few others to 
take the lead.
 likewise, while the Pan-African ministers Conference has in recent 
years promoted the notion of the developmental state, there are problems 
putting this vision into practice. As explained previously, a developmen-
tal state assumes that some government intervention in the economy is 
desirable, and the regulatory and judiciary bodies, public enterprise, and 
other public administration institutions should be effective, efficient, 
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fair, responsive, accessible, and accountable. the ministerial forum 
has encouraged the idea that decentralization of power and resources 
to local government is one way for governments to get closer to their 
citizens, increasing the scope of African citizens to influence priorities 
and service interventions. However, successful decentralization requires 
political commitment and leadership, adequate financial resources, and 
technical and managerial capacity for planning, budgeting, implemen-
tation, and monitoring in local governance.32 these are still lacking in 
many African countries where local government elections do not always 
take place.
 in 2006 the African union called for the establishment of a think 
tank to provide advice on governance issues, since ideas about gover-
nance issues on the continent were dominated by bretton Woods insti-
tutions, un agencies, the African development bank (Af db), and a 
host of think tanks based in the north. Such a think tank would serve 
as a policy initiator and clearinghouse for the Pan-African ministers 
Conference, and help the ministers develop ideas and plans in the areas 
of public administration and governance that were specific and relevant 
to the African context. the interesting point to note is that the peace-
building approach advanced by African institutions emphasizes the role 
and capacity of the state, whereas some international institutions such 
as the international monetary fund (imf) and the World bank either 
ignore or marginalize the state, or advance the idea of the minimal-
ist state. the activist African state is thus pitted against the idea of a 
retreating state.
 the statebuilding strategy developed by the Pan-African ministers 
Conference is aimed at improving capacity for public service delivery. 
this strategy includes building state capacity, systems to deliver ser-
vices, and anticorruption measures.33 it embraced the ideas of the 2008 
eCoSoC report, which noted that “organisationally, capacity develop-
ment ensures the establishment of effective networks, teams and func-
tional communities.”34 the individual dimension is also discussed, as the 
eCoSoC report suggests that “at the individual public servant level, 
capacity-building and development rely on effective leadership, career 
development and professional human resource management, respon-
siveness to community organisations and individual citizens, and active 
professional associations and functional communities of practice.”35 
What is significant about the eCoSoC report is that it emphasizes 
both micro- and macro-organizational aspects of statebuilding.
133
Peacebui lding as  governance: the Pan-Afr ican ministers  Conference
 the Pan-African ministers Conference has recognized that one of 
the major weaknesses in many African states is that different government 
departments are poorly integrated with one another, making planning 
and implementation difficult. this contributes to problems with the 
monitoring and evaluation of outcomes of policies. government-wide 
monitoring and evaluation systems are crucial for service delivery, yet 
these remain some of the most neglected elements in policy and gover-
nance processes. What is needed are greater levels of co-ordination and 
integration of policy initiatives.
 furthermore, one of the most serious challenges faced by many Af-
rican states is the nonexistence, or poor operationalization, of national 
planning frameworks for the delivery of public services. in effect, service 
delivery requires all spheres in government, including national, provin-
cial, and local, to act in unison and coordinate their work. Without a 
national framework, planning often remains unintegrated and improp-
erly aligned with national strategic goals. Policy does not typically filter 
down to all echelons of government, and breakdowns in communica-
tions and service delivery tend to occur. thus the Pan-African ministers 
Conference has emphasized capacity building for service delivery in its 
efforts to create viable public administration institutions. Weak admin-
istrative capacities and deficits in human skills bedevil many African 
civil services, which continue to make the idea of developmental states 
in the continent mere pipe dreams, particularly for countries emerging 
from conflict.
 State-society relations are typically weak in many African states, 
yet these states claim that their priority is to put citizens at the center 
of public service planning and operations. As many parts of the world 
move away from the old dispensation through which governments 
provided services “for” people and toward a new model of working “in 
partnership” with people, many African states face an uphill struggle. 
the Pan-African ministers Conference has recognized that African 
governments face enormous challenges of transforming service delivery 
mechanisms to meet the needs of citizens. in order to address these 
challenges, there is need for a participatory strategy in which citizens 
have a stake and claim in governance and delivery models. organized 
civil society must also engage with governments and the state. unlike 
the majority of Africa’s poor citizens, organized civil society has the 
resources to influence the state, and it too should become better con-
nected with the poor so as to allow them the opportunity to have voice 
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and influence. Citizens are empowered through access to information 
and services. Human and resource capacity constraints among African 
states often stretch the time lag between agenda setting, decision mak-
ing, resource mobilization, and implementation. According to the Au, 
capacity-building strategies thus have to address these challenges at 
local, national, regional, and continental levels.36
 therefore, both the macro-organization of African states, including 
the systems of intergovernmental relations and public participation in 
policy formulation, as well as the micro-organization of African states, 
are on the agenda of the pan-African ministers. the challenge is to en-
sure that African states take these ideas seriously and move to implement 
and operationalize these ideas. micro-organizational questions typically 
receive less attention, but they are vital spokes in the statebuilding hub. 
these include various structures and systems to enhance the delivery 
of services, including information communication technology, finance 
management, human resources, and electronic governance.37 electronic 
governance is not only about technology; it is about using information 
technology to make government services more accessible to citizens by 
increasing their effectiveness. the gains of electronic governance could 
include reduced cost of services, improved quality of delivery, increased 
capacity of government, and increased transparency and accountability.
Putting ideas into Practice
the previous sections of the chapter have outlined the ideas, the frame-
work documents, and plans set out by the pan-African ministers. in 
many ways, the pan-African ministers have been more successful in 
devising collaborative policymaking and harmonizing their rhetoric 
with those of other continental-level institutions than they have been in 
implementing their plans. At times, however, the pan-African ministers 
have tried to apply their ideas. for instance, recognizing that burundi 
was experiencing a turbulent peacebuilding process, the ministers em-
phasized a peacebuilding approach that aimed to reduce the concen-
tration of power in the centralized structures of state authority.38 the 
key peacebuilding priorities continued to be those related to security, 
governance, and human rights.
 external actors were encouraged to collaborate closely with the 
national authorities, the united nations integrated office in burundi 
(binub), the undP, and other partners in implementing the un’s ac-
tion plan for the country. the pan-African ministers urged the various 
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partners to rebuild governance and civil service administration and to 
restore confidence in government at the national, provincial, and local 
levels by building an effective balance of power and ensuring broad 
democratic representation. national and external actors were further-
more urged to support the promotion of a culture of accountability and 
transparency, including implementation of targeted anticorruption pro-
grams. nevertheless, despite the efforts by the Pan-African ministers 
Conference, burundi remains fragile, public service provision is uneven, 
and violence could return, thus reversing the gains made since 2004.
 in the democratic republic of the Congo (drC), meanwhile, the 
peacebuilding process was slowed by the failure of transitional institu-
tions to elaborate fundamental laws and to promote the reunification of 
the country through the appointment of provincial governors and vice 
governors. this affected the restoration of state authority throughout the 
country, including restructuring and integration of armies and security 
services.39 transforming and building the drC’s public services remain 
key priorities of the government in this unstable country. the pan-African 
ministers supported the government’s agenda to reform the public ser-
vice, which falls under the auspices of the drC’s ministry of Public 
Services with the support of South Africa’s ministry of Public Service 
and Administration. the technical Committee of Public Administra-
tion reform was established within the drC ministry to take overall 
responsibility for the coordination and integration of the public service 
reform process, which focused on developing a transitional strategy for 
human resources and institutional capacity building, including in the 
area of public administration. Just like with burundi, however, progress 
in the drC is slow and incremental at best.40 Alongside the consolida-
tion of peace, the government will have to show progress in the area of 
development and improving the quality of the lives of the citizenry. thus, 
improvements in public service delivery are essential, but this can be done 
only alongside the consolidation of other peacebuilding initiatives. State-
building and development should thus be pursued simultaneously, but the 
difficulties in the drC highlight the obstacles in translating the policy 
objectives of the pan-African ministers into actual reform and services 
that benefit people in countries emerging from conflict.
Peacebuilding in Africa requires statebuilding, which in turn requires 
developmentalism. We have thus posited the idea of developmental 
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institutionalism, building strong, meritocratic institutions, which can 
help mobilize society around a clear and common development agenda, 
and through which the goals of growth, education, and health care can 
be pursued. developmental institutionalism involves the strengthening 
of institutional capacities to make and execute effective policies. Africa 
has experienced a long battle to secure its policy sovereignty and to 
pursue policy agendas that suit and advance the continent’s political and 
development interests.
 the Pan-African ministers Conference for Public and Civil Service 
is an example of a homegrown, continental initiative to tackle key chal-
lenges, and to devise solutions based on African needs and interests 
rather than serving the priorities of external foreign policy agendas. the 
forum has played an important role in thinking through the priorities 
in postconflict reconstruction and development in Africa, and has made 
a valuable contribution by advancing the idea of peacebuilding as gov-
ernance and statebuilding. the Pan-African ministers Conference is a 
novel example of how actors not traditionally associated with foreign 
policy and defense and security matters can become actively involved in 
this debate. to be sure, there have often been disagreements among the 
ministers on the best approaches to peacebuilding, with some stressing, 
for example, technical capacity building and training, some stressing 
anticorruption, and others emphasizing the macro-organization and re-
organization of the state. even more seriously, many conference mem-
bers have violated the letter and the spirit of agreements entered into, 
and show little regard for pacta sunt servanda; they do not always honor 
commitments made by themselves, and in the name of their states. de-
spite ministers remaining determined to work together, because they 
face similar challenges despite different national contexts, many of their 
governments do not take seriously the cross-border and continental 
work they have helped to articulate.
 As the Pan-African ministers Conference has engaged in its postconflict 
peacebuilding work, it has aligned its mandate for effective and sustainable 
governance and service delivery within the Au’s continental development 
and integration agenda. it is important that the ministers conference now 
raise its voice and impress on continental leaders, and those within leader-
ship positions in the Au commission and other regional structures, to take 
seriously their agreements and implement the policies.
 So, while the role of the Pan-African ministers Conference offers an 
interesting alternative to dominant liberal peacebuilding models that 
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marginalize the state, it also brings into sharp relief the gap between 
policy and implementation on the continent. the manner in which 
external powers and donor agencies intervene on the continent in the 
name of promoting peacebuilding speaks to the question of power. 
given the hierarchy in power relationships between African and exter-
nal actors, foreigners typically dictate policy terms and priorities, and 
Africans are left as mere implementation agents of external priorities. 
the need for international cooperation should be strongly emphasized, 
but it is important for Africans who work in the areas of governance 
and administration to take ownership of postconflict reconstruction and 
development initiatives and to identify priorities for success. African 
ownership does not mean that international actors are exonerated from 
their responsibilities toward the continent. external actors indeed have 
a vital role to play. What ownership does is to place the important ques-
tion of African policy sovereignty squarely on the agenda.
 the Pan-African ministers Conference addresses the question of pol-
icy sovereignty in areas of key importance: the delivery of public services 
and the structure of the civil service. the ministers have recognized that 
there is much to learn from their colleagues in different African countries. 
As the work of the conference proceeds, ministers must continue to insist 
on the adoption of a regional approach that links Africa’s governments, 
the regional economic communities, continental bodies, and civil society 
actors. the future debate over continental integration is likely to revolve 
around a devolutionary, confederalist model, through which the reCs 
would come to play a pivotal role. the Pan-African ministers Confer-
ence should engage these actors in a decisive manner.
 Continental institutions should insist that international agencies 
align their efforts with national, regional, and continental strategies, 
such as the Au and nePAd’s postconflict reconstruction and develop-
ment plans, not the other way around. they should further implore that 
external powers and their agencies cease to undermine African efforts 
at governance, peace, security, and cooperation. ownership should rest 
with Africans; it is unlikely to be offered to them on a silver platter. 
if Africans and their international partners remain faithful to respect-
ing legitimate and credible African initiatives, including state-focused 
peacebuilding initiatives, then homegrown African models, driven by 
African agents, may prove to be more successful in ensuring sustainable 
peace. these African initiatives can take a myriad of forms, including 
the functional approaches discussed in this chapter for public service 
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delivery. it is inconceivable in the medium to long run that international 
actors and their foreign agendas will disappear from the African political 
terrain. but it is incumbent on Africans to organize themselves more 
strategically and take greater ownership to ensure that international gov-
ernments and agents engage the continent on terms that respect African 
interests and priorities rather than that Africans remain mere pawns in 
the chess game of foreign agendas. the current problem is not a lack of 
policies and agendas in Africa; it is rather the implementation and op-
erationalization of such policies and ideas. A developmental institution-
alist approach suggests that African states and civil society actors will 
have to increase their efforts in more deliberative and strategic fashion to 
help close the huge policy-implementation gap in Africa so as to ensure 
that peacebuilding and other governance efforts are more fruitful.
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The United Nations  
Peacebuilding Commission
Problems and Prospects
’ f u n m i  o l o n i S A k i n  A n d  e k A  i k P e
t h i s  C h A P t e r  e x A m i n e s  t h e  C r e At i o n  A n d  o P e r At i o n A l i Z At i o n 
of the united nations (un) Peacebuilding Commission (PbC). We 
argue that while this institutional mechanism offers an improvement 
to the global approach to peacebuilding, its impact on and relevance 
to African security realities are marginal. the chapter begins with a 
discussion of the origins, mandate and structure, and substantive work 
of the PbC. this is followed by an examination of the prospects for the 
commission’s success and then an analysis of the main challenges con-
fronting the PbC. the chapter concludes with an assessment of how 
the commission might fare in African contexts that require a transfor-
mation of the conditions that sustain violent conflict.
origins, mandate and Structure, and Substantive Work  
of the Peacebuilding Commission
Applying the un’s tried, tested, and reinvented approaches in peace-
keeping in the 1990s did not keep many armed conflicts at bay in Africa. 
the challenges posed by post–Cold War conflict environments led to 
a significant shift, from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional 
peace operations.1 former peacemaking approaches had focused on 
stopping wars without tackling the underlying causes of the conflict. 
typically, this involved keeping a fragile peace between warring parties 
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while hastily organized elections were showcased as the end to a con-
flict, after which peacekeepers were withdrawn.
 Current ideas about peacebuilding recognize the connections among 
the economic, social, and political spheres as well as the connections 
between different phases of violent conflict. for instance, michael 
doyle and nicholas Sambanis frame peacebuilding as engaging with 
economic, social, and political institutions and realigning attitudes to-
ward the prevention of violent conflict.2 Charles Call and Susan Cook 
also see peacebuilding as encompassing conflict prevention, since they 
consider it to include all efforts to transform potentially violent social 
relations into peaceful ones.3 the un recognizes these different aspects 
of peacebuilding, yet its main peacebuilding focus remains on situations 
where social and political relations have degenerated into violence.
Origins
Conception of the Peacebuilding Commission began in 2003, when 
then–un Secretary-general kofi Annan tasked the High-level Panel 
on threats, Challenges, and Change to recommend necessary reforms 
on the un’s role in maintaining peace and security. Part of the panel’s 
remit was to address the challenges of coordinating peacebuilding ac-
tivities and to support the long-term efforts to consolidate peace in 
postconflict societies. there had been long-standing calls for increased 
coordination in international support for peacebuilding. un peace-
building was largely uncoordinated and took place within different 
branches of the organization, such as the department of Peacekeeping 
operations (dPko) and the department of Political Affairs (dPA), 
as well as the united nations development Programme (undP) and 
other agencies.
 the High-level Panel proposed the establishment of the Peacebuild-
ing Commission, which would draw on the Security Council and the 
economic and Social Council (eCoSoC) within the un system, as 
well as on donors and national governments, to support countries in the 
transition from war to peace.4 in addition, the commission would assist 
countries in preventing state collapse and conflict. thus it was proposed 
that the new body would focus on conflict prevention and postconflict 
reconstruction. the High-level Panel called for regional organizations 
and international financial institutions (ifis), notably the World bank 
and the international monetary fund (imf), as well as the twenty 
largest economies globally, to support the work of the Peacebuilding 
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Commission. it also proposed the creation of the Peacebuilding Sup-
port office (PbSo), to act as a secretariat for the commission.
 the un secretary-general supported the proposal for establishment 
of the Peacebuilding Commission in his 2005 report In Larger Free-
dom. However, in this incarnation, the commission was to engage with 
peacebuilding processes only in a postconflict context.5 this recom-
mendation was endorsed later the same year at the un World Summit, 
where governments called for the establishment of the Peacebuilding 
Commission by the end of the year.6
 At the time of the Peacebuilding Commission’s creation in 2006, 
the un was supporting a substantial number of postconflict peace pro-
cesses following the signature of peace agreements. these included the 
Sudan peace process, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
liberation movement/Army in January 2005, as well as the liberian 
peace process, following the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between the liberian factions in August 2003.7
 Another factor that influenced the creation of the PbC was the fact 
that the un’s reputation as the defender of global security had suf-
fered substantially following the unilateral uS military intervention in 
iraq in 2003.8 this led to questions about the credibility of the un as 
a global institution that could respond to the interests of the broader 
global citizenry as opposed to those of the most powerful states.9 the 
peacebuilding initiative can be seen in part as an attempt by the un to 
restore its credibility and to reinforce the principle of universality that 
informed its work, by reasserting its primary role in consolidating peace 
and ensuring global security.
Mandate and Structure
the Peacebuilding Commission was mandated to bring together the 
relevant actors and resources in the early recovery period after conflicts, 
as well as to offer advice on comprehensive strategies to support peace-
building processes.10 the PbC was to focus attention on development 
and institution-building efforts in order to support postconflict recov-
ery and avoid relapse into violence. in addition, the commission was 
expected to support the coordination of all relevant “stakeholders” in 
peacebuilding processes, both within and outside the un system.
 the PbC is made up of a thirty-one-member organizational commit-
tee appointed on the basis of two-year renewable terms. this committee 
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consists of seven members of the Security Council (the five permanent 
and two nonpermanent members); seven members of the un’s eco-
nomic and Social Council, selected on the basis of regional groupings 
and experience with postconflict recovery; seven members elected by 
the un general Assembly; five of the largest donor countries, based 
on assessed contributions to the un’s regular budget and voluntary 
contributions to un funds, programs, and agencies; and five of the 
largest peacekeeping countries, based on number of troops and civil-
ian personnel contributed.11 representatives from the ifis, the imf, 
and the World bank are required to be present at all meetings of the 
organizational committee. this committee determines the agenda of 
the Peacebuilding Commission, and particular cases are assigned to 
country-specific configurations.
Substantive Work
the first four countries on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda 
were African countries: burundi, Sierra leone, guinea-bissau, and the 
Central African republic.12 liberia and guinea have since been added 
to its agenda, in September 2010 and february 2011, respectively. the 
proverbial meat of the commission’s work is found in its country-specific 
meetings.13 in the country-specific meetings that support peacebuilding 
efforts, participants are the government representatives from the country 
in question, representatives from neighboring states, and the relevant 
regional organization.14 these meetings also include representatives 
from ifis and of un officials in the field, as well as representatives 
from the particular donors and troop-contributing countries involved 
in the specific country. All actors in the various peacebuilding processes 
are brought together in formal and informal discussions.
 the Working group on lessons learned is a forum for generating 
learning from previous and current peacebuilding experiences.15 Here a 
variety of experiences of postconflict engagements, at international and 
national levels, are addressed, with the view toward distilling lessons 
to guide ongoing processes. the Peacebuilding Support office, acting 
as the Peacebuilding Commission’s secretariat, obtains and analyzes 
relevant information on peacebuilding strategies and supports imple-
mentation of recommendations reached by the commission.16
 in addition, the Peacebuilding fund, managed by the assistant 
secretary-general for peacebuilding support, with the support of the 
PbSo, is funded on the basis of voluntary contributions administered 
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by the undP’s multi-donor trust fund.17 As of february 2010, the 
Peacebuilding fund’s total portfolio stood at just over uS$334 million, 
including pledges, commitments, and interest earned, with a total of 
just over uS$196 million allocated to 115 approved projects.18 As of 
march 2011 the portfolio stood at uS$365 million.19 the Peacebuilding 
fund provides financial support both to countries on the PbC’s agenda 
and to countries that are not (following eligibility approval from the 
un secretary-general).20 funds are allocated through the immediate 
response facility and the Peacebuilding recovery facility, to be used 
in response to imminent threats to ongoing peace processes, to support 
initiatives that contribute to peace agreements and political dialogue, to 
reinforce national capacity in order to promote coexistence and peaceful 
conflict resolution, to stimulate economic recovery in order to generate 
peace dividends, and to restore essential administrative services.
Prospects for Success
the Peacebuilding Commission is an improvement on previous global 
peacebuilding efforts. despite some important limitations, there is added 
value in its remit and approach.
Ensuring a Balance between Security and Development
the PbC is set up to institutionally straddle the security and devel-
opment divide. it is intended to bridge the operational gap between 
the security focus of peacekeeping, and the activities of development 
actors, including the ifis, in supporting the rebuilding of war-torn 
economies.21 this is evident in the Peacebuilding fund’s priority area 
of stimulating economic recovery in order to support progress toward 
tangible peace dividends.
 An integrated security-development approach to peacebuilding is 
one of the PbC’s strengths. for instance, to further the peacebuilding 
process in Sierra leone, the commission supported a negotiations pro-
cess for the inclusion of an energy provision as a priority in its strategic 
framework. this was justified on the basis of the impact of the energy 
provision on economic activity and the potential for negative economic 
fallout to undermine security gains in Sierra leone.22
Undertaking a Contextual Approach to Peacebuilding
Another asset of the PbC is its case-study method of work. the com-
mission is premised on the belief that dedication of time and resources 
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to addressing peacebuilding processes in a single country case is impor-
tant. unlike in many other global institutions, the processes in the PbC 
are driven by context particularities.
 for instance, in burundi the commission has prioritized good gover-
nance, the rule of law, security sector reform, and community recovery, 
whereas in Sierra leone it has prioritized youth empowerment and 
employment, democracy and good governance, and judicial and secu-
rity sector reform. in guinea-bissau the commission has prioritized 
support for electoral processes, economic recovery, infrastructure reha-
bilitation, security sector reform, rule of law consolidation, addressing 
drug trafficking, and public administration reform, while in Central 
African republic it has prioritized security sector reform, disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration, support for governance and rule of 
law processes, and development support.23 in burundi in particular, the 
PbC has been praised for its flexibility. it modified and extended a proj-
ect that was supposed to focus on refurbishing courthouses, and instead 
worked to improve access to justice for the poor, as this was what the 
context required.24
Coordinating Peacebuilding Activities and Actors
the Peacebuilding Commission’s role as a coordinating body, bringing 
together actors and resources to consolidate gains in postconflict recon-
struction, has made it welcome in most countries. in burundi, the com-
mission has been commended for facilitating strong engagement with 
civil society as well as between civil society and the government, arguably 
after a troubled start.25 Although this is a positive outcome, there is also a 
risk that the PbC will simply become an additional and largely irrelevant 
layer of bureaucracy, with only limited gains in increasing coordination. 
this point is reinforced by the 2010 review of the un peacebuilding ar-
chitecture, which suggests that there is a risk that the PbC will settle 
“into the limited role that has developed so far.”26 the efficacy of its co-
ordinating role may be challenged by the location of the PbC at the un 
secretariat in new york. indeed it has been noted that less interactive 
processes such as video-linked meetings have not proven popular with 
some developing countries.27 Some critics have therefore rightly argued 
that the commission’s horizon “must be raised far beyond its new york 
base.”28 this is underlined by the 2010 review of the un’s peacebuilding 
architecture, which includes a recommendation for establishing field-
based liaison committees for country-specific configurations.29
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 there is nonetheless some optimism that the PbC might improve 
the efficiency and coordination of various peacebuilding efforts. Jehan-
gir khan, former deputy director of the un’s department of Political 
Affairs, argued that although the dPA had historically played the role 
of coordinator in peacebuilding activities, it was not set up to be op-
erational. As such, the PbC could fill a much needed gap by enabling 
coordination on peacebuilding activities across the un system.30 the 
PbC’s role as a coordinating body has provided a valuable umbrella for 
the activities being undertaken to support postconflict recovery and re-
construction, notably in driving deliberation on the inclusion of energy 
issues in the peacebuilding strategy in Sierra leone and in negotiating a 
delicate impasse on continued funding from the imf in Sierra leone.31 
the commission’s coordinating capacity was tested in burundi, when 
the government called for the exit of the un executive representative 
of the Secretary-general (erSg) in december 2009.32 the commis-
sion responded to these tensions by affirming its continued commit-
ment to peacebuilding efforts in burundi with the national authorities 
and the new un representative.
Engaging Regional Actors
the Peacebuilding Commission provides an institutional site to engage 
with regional organizations. Specifically, the PbC mandates the mem-
bership of regional organizations and the relevant neighboring countries 
in country-specific meetings. it is still too soon to assess the added value 
or impact of the contribution of regional organizations to the work of 
the commission. this might become easier to gauge once many regional 
actors, for example the economic Community of West African States 
(eCoWAS), have become regular participants in the PbC. nonethe-
less, in the 2010 review of the un peacebuilding architecture the point 
is well made that regional organizations may be best placed to intervene 
efficiently in highly sensitive situations.33
Challenges and limitations
notwithstanding its prospects for success, the PbC confronts a number 
of challenges that threaten to undermine its effectiveness and relevance 
in Africa. fragile conflict-affected situations on the continent call for 
a much more fundamental shift in global and local conditions than the 
PbC can offer in the face of deep-seated conditions that perpetuate 
misery and insecurity for many ordinary people in Africa.
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Conceptual Problems
the fundamental challenge to the work of the PbC has been its failure 
to define what peacebuilding should mean for transformation. the ex-
clusion of preconflict peacebuilding work from the mandate and focus 
of the PbC is an important limitation, which has led to questions about 
its credibility and relevance to Africa’s conflict environment. it is likely 
that future conflict in Africa will be primarily low-intensity and intra-
state. Such conflict is unlikely to pose major threats to international 
peace and security but will remain a challenge for efforts to promote 
sustainable national development and human security on the continent.
 due to the nature of the threats faced by many Africans, peacebuilding 
should include preconflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention. yet the 
PbC has excluded these activities from its focus because of resistance 
from some countries in the global South.34 this exclusion, which was 
the result of political negotiations among global elites, does not reflect 
the interests of the broader African populace. even the 2010 review of 
the peacebuilding architecture questions the static approach to addressing 
realities on the ground through its statement that “the organization must 
adjust to the realities: the united nations must continually reappraise its 
own structures and prioritize its approach to ensure they match needs on 
the ground.”35 the point is also made that the PbC needs to consider a 
preventive role in order to holistically engage with peacebuilding pro-
cesses because “realities on the ground are not compartmentalized.”36
 Another challenge is that the PbC is broadly embedded in a notion 
of peacebuilding that aims at “transforming war economies to liberal 
market democracies,” a notion of postconflict reconstruction and recov-
ery to which most international actors broadly subscribe.37 the PbC 
is fundamentally committed to this agenda,38 as confirmed by its insis-
tence on a strong role for ifis that reflect this particular liberal ideal. 
As such, this “ideal” is pursued in many postconflict societies that are 
not effectively equipped to present homegrown visions based on their 
specific situational realities.
Limited Relevance to Africa’s Strategic Environment
the particular scope of the PbC is driven by a faulty assessment of se-
curity threats in Africa. the focus on cases where conflict has escalated 
into large-scale fighting bears little relevance to the current and poten-
tial armed situations in Africa. When one takes the evolving security 
situation on the continent into account, two trends become apparent.
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 first, the large-scale regional armed conflicts of the past two de-
cades in Africa have gradually mutated and, with some notable ex-
ceptions, have been mostly contained within national spaces. this is 
due in no small measure to the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts 
of African regional organizations and the united nations. there has 
been a de-escalation of the crises in the mano river basin (exempli-
fied by the Parrots beak problem in 1999), and of the large-scale armed 
conflicts in liberia, Sierra leone, and Côte d’ivoire. As a result, there 
are fewer active wars in Africa that have the potential to inflict dire 
consequences on the region. interestingly, what has emerged is not 
peace and stability throughout Africa’s regions, but rather a situation 
of “no war, no peace” in which security and development remain vola-
tile and unpredictable.
 Second and related, the real challenge is low-intensity conflicts. 
these may not pose a threat to regional or international peace and 
security, but they pose great dangers to the population and harm the 
possibility of sustainable livelihoods for many people. examples of such 
low-intensity conflicts are found in nigeria’s niger delta,39 northern 
ghana, northern mali, northern niger, Casamance in Senegal, and 
northern uganda. they reflect the widespread structural instability in 
Africa, which predates many of the civil wars of the past two decades.
 the reduction in large-scale armed conflict has created the space to 
address the structural underpinnings of armed conflict while respond-
ing to the challenge of low-intensity conflict. the eCoWAS region, 
for example, has begun to change its approach, through its articulation 
of a conflict prevention framework and its development of a subse-
quent implementation plan that is intended to actualize the objectives 
of the prevention framework, which aims at structural change rather 
than simply a reduction in armed conflict.40 likewise, the PbC must 
adapt itself to the needs of the continent. the African security environ-
ment is dynamic and will continue to mutate, albeit with (sub)regional 
variations for the foreseeable future. As such, conflict management and 
peacebuilding frameworks, not least the efforts of the PbC, must retain 
the flexibility to respond to “moving targets.” Africa requires an effective 
transformation of its current structural environment into one having the 
stability and security to ensure sustainable and equitable development.
 Arguably therefore, due to the way the PbC currently conceptualizes 
peacebuilding, its efforts are unlikely to be relevant to the low-intensity 
conflicts expected to play a central role in Africa’s future.
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Institutional Challenges
during the consultations surrounding the establishment of the PbC, 
some countries in the global South resisted the inclusion of conflict 
prevention or preventive diplomacy.41 these countries feared that more 
powerful countries might use peacebuilding as a pretext for military 
interventions. All the country cases on the agenda of the commis-
sion are African cases, and the 2010 review of the un peacebuilding 
architecture raises questions about the exclusive African focus on the 
PbC’s agenda.42 for some, the predominance of African countries on 
the agenda can lend credence to the view that there are important hi-
erarchies and inequalities in the global system that result in countries 
from different regions being treated differently.
 furthermore, the creation of the PbC reflected institutional impera-
tives at the un, and the perceived lack of an institutional process at the 
un to engage countries in postconflict transitions.43 it is therefore not 
surprising that the commission focuses on facilitating the un’s ongoing 
engagement with peacebuilding processes vis-à-vis other actors.
 the composition of the PbC also reflects its institutional context, 
as the commission is dominated by the permanent members of the 
Security Council, the principal donors to the un system, and the larg-
est peacekeeping contributors, which make up almost half the central 
structure of the PbC, its organizational committee. this is especially 
pertinent given that many of these committee members are rich and 
relatively peaceful countries of the global north. despite the two-
year renewable terms, the country categories guarantee the continued 
membership of a small group of the most powerful northern countries 
within the PbC’s organizational committee. this pattern is to some 
extent redressed by the requirement that at least seven countries with 
postconflict reconstruction experience have membership in the organi-
zational committee. this latter provision is almost the only guarantee 
for standing core participation from African countries, except nigeria 
due to its role as a major troop contributor.
 As of June 2010, African countries constituted 23 percent of the 
membership of the PbC’s organizational committee; included were 
Angola, burundi, egypt, ghana, guinea-bissau, nigeria, and tanza-
nia.44 yet all the countries being considered for inclusion on the PbC’s 
agenda are African. Although these are early days in the life of the 
PbC, this comparatively low ratio speaks to the challenges to Africa’s 
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participation in the activities of the commission, particularly as Africa 
seems to be its principal constituency.
 these factors reinforce the notion of a “global apartheid” within the 
un system, which can be described as a pattern of political power and 
socioeconomic inequalities, primarily between the rich countries of the 
global north and the poor countries of the global South, especially those 
in Africa, within the structure and workings of the un.45 furthermore, 
some of the core partners of the PbC, such as the ifis, are mandated to 
be present at all organizational and country-specific meetings, despite 
not being a core part of the un system. this is especially pertinent 
when considering that the other key developmental body that is a core 
member of the PbC is the un’s economic and Social Council, which 
has substantially less authority within the discourses and practices of 
global development. eCoSoC’s limited impact is the result of its lim-
ited powers as delineated in the un Charter, tensions between the de-
veloped and developing world within the body, as well as its continued 
subordination to the World bank and the imf.46 However, eCoSoC 
has wider global membership than the World bank and imf, which 
have weighted voting systems and leadership structures that dispropor-
tionately represent the richer and more developed global north.47
 these imbalances contribute to the Peacebuilding Commission’s 
acceptance and prioritization of the ifis’ approaches, despite the long-
standing critiques of these approaches. the extent of this prioritization 
in the work of the PbC was illustrated in the initial meeting about 
Sierra leone’s placement on the PbC’s agenda in July 2006. in atten-
dance were the PbC, the united nations integrated office in Sierra 
leone (unioSil), the World bank, and the imf.48 Curiously, the 
PbC is not under eCoSoC, but under the thumb of the un Se-
curity Council (alongside the un general Assembly), “where power 
lies.”49 the 2010 review of the un peacebuilding architecture argues 
that the PbC’s linkages with all three bodies are less than optimal, albeit 
with much emphasis on the relationship with the Security Council.50 
Without wholesale changes to the policies and the initiatives of the 
ifis, their strong involvement with the Peacebuilding Commission will 
likely give preeminence to a market-driven development approach with 
scant regard for local contexts.51
 the PbC may be compelled to adopt the approaches of the ifis 
owing to the power of the latter within global development structures. 
the commission does not have the authority to require ifis to modify 
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their strategies even if they risk undermining peacebuilding efforts.52 
there are also other practical concerns. in the cases of Sierra leone and 
burundi, the commission pushed for the synchronization of mandates, 
roles, and responsibilities, but the ifis and others have been unwilling 
to negotiate their autonomous and independent approaches.53
 the ifis, like the PbC itself, pursue peacebuilding only in the post-
conflict stage. this is evident in the World bank’s activities in conflict 
countries, which the bank labels as “pre-transition” countries, on the 
basis of aid support under the Country Policy and institutional Assess-
ments (CPiA) system. broadly within this system is a “one size fits all” 
approach, as all countries are judged, within the same framework, on 
performance of policies and institutions regardless of need.54 in addition, 
evaluations of country performance by the World bank are based on its 
neoliberal ideological leanings, according to which the state is to have a 
minimal role and good performance is judged to present itself in the form 
of liberalized trade, “manageable” (read, low) levels of public expenditure, 
low ratios of debt to gross domestic product, avoidance of crowding out 
private investment, and prioritization of foreign debt servicing.55 this in-
sistence and reliance on the neoliberal agenda, especially in undermining 
public investment and expenditure when the latter are crucially required 
in the context of challenging conflict, effectively sidelines countries that 
have suffered breakdowns in their policy and institutional apparatus.56
Nonstate Actors
the Peacebuilding Commission’s work in the country-specific process 
privileges the role of national actors. there have been criticisms of the 
PbC’s engagement with civil society in burundi and Sierra leone, includ-
ing the claim that state authorities selected the civil society actors that 
participated in proceedings.57 in Sierra leone, there was criticism of the 
“hand-picking” of certain organizations by the government that were not 
deemed best placed to put forward a grassroots position.58 in addition, civil 
society groups claim that there is a lack of any clear system of their engage-
ment in the monitoring of the PbC’s activities.59 in burundi, despite the 
earlier-mentioned progress, capacity is a serious challenge, and civil society 
engagement with the PbC is declining because of the immense burden of 
the process as well as inadequate financial support to civil society groups.60
 the role of civil society actors is yet to be clearly defined in the work 
of the Peacebuilding Commission, although general Assembly resolu-
tion 60/180 notes that the commission is to consult with civil society, 
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nongovernmental organizations, including women’s organizations, and 
private sector actors as appropriate.61 Although there are provisional 
guidelines for the engagement of civil society groups, their actual in-
volvement remains very much at the discretion of the PbC and thus 
relies on the acceptance of commission members.62 So far, the process 
for engaging civil society appears to be hampered by the vagueness of 
the guidelines, which raises questions about the notion of “local owner-
ship” of the peacebuilding processes pursued by the commission.
 this issue should not be taken lightly, given that there are often ten-
sions between state and nonstate actors, especially civil society actors in 
many African contexts. in addition, the Peacebuilding Commission has 
to balance these tensions against the objective of strengthening public 
institutions as part of the peacebuilding process. these are dilemmas 
that may not be so easy to reconcile; nonetheless, the coordinating role 
of the PbC implies that it should help facilitate the representation of 
nonstate actors and their constituencies.
Other Contentious Issues
Another contentious issue is the question of which countries should be 
on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. Countries are required 
to “put themselves forward” for the commission’s support. Arguably, the 
PbC’s initial approach was to support countries that were not experienc-
ing the worst postconflict conditions, as the initial cases of Sierra leone 
and burundi seemed to show. However, the breakdown in stability in 
guinea-bissau in 2009, with multiple assassinations of the political and 
military leadership, tested the commission’s commitment to the full spec-
trum of conflict conditions.63 the PbC subsequently included guinea-
bissau on its agenda, though, thus signaling its openness to a broader 
range of selection criteria for including countries on its agenda.
 the work of the PbC as a resource mobilizer for peacebuilding activi-
ties has also been controversial. financial commitments remain voluntary 
and as such the initial commitment to the Peacebuilding fund was set 
at uS$250 million.64 However this has now been exceeded, with a total 
portfolio, including deposits, of just over uS$334 million. A substantial 
proportion of these funds (approximately 80 percent of allocations) are 
earmarked for countries under consideration for inclusion on the PbC’s 
agenda, with allocations to the first four countries (burundi, Sierra leone, 
guinea-bissau, and the Central African republic) totaling uS$106 mil-
lion.65 However, this is a limited fund, especially when compared to the 
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costs of uS intervention in iraq and Afghanistan, where uS$944 billion 
was spent in financial year 2009, with uS$51.8 billion disbursed for recon-
struction, embassy operation and construction, and aid programs.66 given 
the precarious nature of the PbC’s finances, it is difficult for the commis-
sion to be perceived as a body that can procure predictable financing for 
the early postconflict phases.
 the governments of Sierra leone and burundi have also raised some 
concerns. in Sierra leone, local actors have highlighted the need for the 
PbC to take a longer-term and more strategic approach to peacebuild-
ing on the political as well as the financial front, especially regarding 
structural issues such as youth employment priorities. there was a trou-
bling perception that the short-term focus was being driven by electoral 
politics.67 there was a lack of firm political process and dialogue for 
addressing governance and peacebuilding issues in the country, to ac-
company the allocation and disbursement of financial support from the 
Peacebuilding fund. there was also some confusion over the Peace-
building fund’s support to peacebuilding priorities vis-à-vis broader 
development initiatives, including Sierra leone’s Poverty reduction 
Strategy Paper (PrSP) process.
 With respect to burundi, the PbC was said to have had “little impact 
on burundian political trends. . . . it has been a ‘sideshow.’ ” As in Sierra 
leone, the PbC stands accused of focusing on financial drive while 
paying scant attention to the underlying political process, although this 
also suited the government of the day.68 the pressure from new york 
drove the prioritization of the commission’s focus in burundi, with the 
goal of proving its relevance to the international community. in par-
ticular, the Peacebuilding fund has been criticized as having a more 
development-driven agenda, to the exclusion of core peacebuilding is-
sues, and of largely succumbing to the burundian PrSP process, which 
is fundamentally a World bank–driven initiative. Additionally, the list 
of projects undertaken by the PbC is influenced by donor interests, 
with projects added to or removed from the list simply on this basis 
alone. the quick disbursement priorities of the Peacebuilding fund 
are not rooted in contextual realities, and artificial deadlines are set by 
committees thousands of miles away. the dominance of the opinions 
of elites within the agenda of the PbC has emerged as a key feature in 
burundi, and there have been complaints about the overwhelming focus 
on government actors and political elites in its activities.
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it is still too early to assess the performance of the united nations 
Peacebuilding Commission with any degree of precision, but this chap-
ter has raised questions about a number of issues that are likely to limit 
its effectiveness in African contexts. these limitations are related to the 
structure of the un system, which is in part replicated in the PbC, 
where rich, powerful states still have a disproportionate influence. Af-
rican elites and government representatives are often complicit in the 
consolidation of Western interests, which has led to the acceptance of 
neoliberal policy directions, with dire consequences for the global poor.
 the failure to incorporate conflict prevention in the mandate of the 
PbC runs contrary to the expansive notion of peacebuilding and to 
realities and requirements in many parts of Africa. this limited man-
date reflects concerns of member states regarding the possible violation 
of their sovereignty. this arguably reflects deeper structural challenges 
within a system whose less powerful members are unable to rely on the 
un as a fair arbitrator in the face of its more powerful members.
 greater devolution to country teams, rather than the current format 
of the Peacebuilding Commission playing the overarching role and the 
country teams simply reporting back via video conferences or “flying 
visits,” would also be an improvement. As the commission increases the 
number of countries considered for inclusion on its agenda, there will be 
increasing pressure to adopt a more formulaic approach to each case. it 
will be important to avoid any tendency to apply non-context-specific 
practices to different countries.
 the sustainability of the case-by-case approach will need to be nur-
tured especially in light of the commission’s inclination to “suggest” 
priority areas as a starting point in any peacebuilding strategy, thus 
giving the impression of a modeled approach.69 the proposed priority 
areas—basic safety and security, support for political processes, provi-
sion of basic services, support for core government functions, and sup-
port for economic activities—are laudable objectives of peacebuilding 
processes, but framing them as standardized starting points risks the 
appearance of a “one size fits all” approach. furthermore, there is the 
likelihood that a prescriptive understanding of these objectives will be-
come entrenched, a prescriptive understanding that does not draw from 
the particular contexts, but rather borrows from dominant normative 
frameworks that are developed superficially.
 the Peacebuilding Commission could benefit from the permanent 
presence of representatives of regional organizations, since many of 
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these regional actors, such as eCoWAS, play substantial roles in peace-
building. to be relevant in the long run to Africa’s conflict and security 
challenges, the PbC might need to align itself to these regional and 
subregional structures and processes. the 2010 review of un peace-
building architecture reinforces this point by noting the vast experience 
of these institutions and recommending that “the Commission tap into 
this wealth of experience, in Africa and on other continents.”70
 the challenges posed by low-intensity conflicts, for which the PbC 
currently has no strategy, are among Africa’s most important regional 
security concerns. in its present form, the Peacebuilding Commission 
will be at best marginally relevant to Africa, and at worst irrelevant, if it 
fails to overcome the limits that prevent it from contributing to a more 
transformative peacebuilding agenda.
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Financing Peace?
The World Bank, Reconstruction, and Liberal Peacebuilding
g r A H A m  H A r r i S o n
t h e  w o r l d  b A n k  A n d  t h e  i n t e r n At i o n A l  m o n e tA ry  f u n d  ( i m f ) 
have not been key players in peacebuilding. Quite explicitly, the bank 
has defined peacebuilding and emergency relief as outside of its remit.1 
rather, it has remained dedicated to its core function—larger-scale so-
cial and physical infrastructure lending and policy-based lending. nev-
ertheless, Africa’s share of postconflict funds from the bank has risen 
dramatically since the mid-1990s and the continent, as many chapters 
in this book recognize, has been the site of many of the world’s civil 
conflicts in the post–Cold War period. thus, although the bank has 
put its greatest lump sums into postconflict states such as kosovo and 
iraq, it has also increasingly involved itself in some African countries 
including uganda, Sierra leone, eritrea, and mozambique.
 the World bank’s and imf’s engagement in peacebuilding reveals 
many of the problems that characterize the relations between these 
international financial institutions (ifis) and African countries. Peace-
building has largely been an inevitable point of reference rather than a 
core operational theme for the ifis. on a continent that has been so 
besieged by civil war, it has proven necessary for all external agencies 
to reconcile themselves to the challenges of engagement in “complex 
emergencies”2 and the political economy of peace and reconstruction. 
for the World bank in particular, peacebuilding has served as a rubric 
under which a series of reconstruction activities have been assembled 
with a view to the expedited and enhanced disbursal of (often soft) 
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loans and grants. but this aspect of bank activity is accompanied by 
another dynamic: the ongoing general orientation of macroeconomic 
policy-based lending as currently encapsulated in the Poverty reduc-
tion Strategy Paper (PrSP) process and supported by the bank. this 
chapter outlines the modalities of ifi involvement and explores the 
interactions between lending in postconflict situations and the political 
economy of neoliberal policy-based lending.
 the World bank and imf have become central to African gover-
nance and development. throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
these sibling creditor organizations were the dominant external agen-
cies in Africa, lending substantial amounts of money to governments 
and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) with a focus on discrete 
projects, targeted sectoral initiatives, and also general budgetary sup-
port. in fact, the ifis have always been involved throughout transitions 
from war to peace; it was simply that this transition was not named and 
packaged as such before the united nations (un) took up the specific 
challenges of “peacebuilding” beginning in 1994. A good example of this 
is mozambique from 1992 onward following the signing of a general 
peace agreement after a protracted war. in this case, the imf and World 
bank had been very much involved in mozambique’s governance since 
1986, and remained so throughout the transition to a multiparty post-
conflict political system. Although aspects of bank lending were labeled 
as “reconstruction” (road building, for example), there was also a sense 
that the ifis were pursuing an agenda that did not need to be signifi-
cantly modified to tailor it to either the specific demands of war or the 
challenges of peacebuilding.3 this was especially the case with the imf, 
which drew substantial public opprobrium in mozambique for its strict 
adherence to neoliberal conditionalities, even in the immediate post-
conflict period.4 more generally, the imf has remained—characteristi-
cally—indifferent to the specific circumstances that country context or 
states of war or peace present. for the imf and to a large extent the 
World bank as well, the solutions are universal: they set the answers to 
any developmental questions.5 As such, the imf has not developed a 
strong specific voice on peacebuilding.6
the ifis and Conflict: A very Short History
the World bank established its Post Conflict unit (PCu) in 1995. but 
before this, the bank and imf had been heavily involved in African 
countries that were either enduring war or implementing transitions to 
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peace, such as Sudan (1978) and uganda (1981). throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s, the ifis cleaved narrowly to a neoliberal policy agenda 
that was realized through structural adjustment programs (SAPs). these 
programs, which went by various names in different countries, set fun-
damental economic dictates that reined in money supply, removed price 
controls and other forms of regulation, privatized state-owned enterprises, 
and opened up national economies to international trade and investment. 
the 1980s saw this agenda spread to practically all countries on the conti-
nent: by the end of the decade, thirty-six African states had implemented 
243 adjustment agreements with the World bank and imf.7
 And, of course, this universalization meant that SAPs became one of 
the tools that some countries used to manage war and transitions toward 
peace. it is worth reflecting a little longer on mozambique, because of 
the importance of ifi involvement in the country and the extremely 
challenging circumstances of moving toward peace.8
 mozambique embarked on structural adjustment, known as the 
economic rehabilitation Programme (Pre), beginning in 1986.9 the 
program contained within it conditionalities concerned with price liber-
alization and devaluation. this was seen, in the words of one researcher, 
as “bringing the war to the cities.”10 this is a telling phrase: it likens 
structural adjustment to the social disruption and hardship caused by 
war. And it was certainly the case that, during the war in mozambique, 
the majority of the urban population experienced structural adjustment 
as additional social hardship and uncertainty—a result of the removal 
of price controls and retrenchment in particular.11 the social damage 
done by the Pre was implicitly acknowledged by the World bank in its 
second program, the economic and Social rehabilitation Programme 
(PreS), which included “safety net” expenditure items that would ease 
the transition from a statist to a market-based political economy.12 of 
course, underpinning both programs was the belief that economic liber-
alization would generate economic growth. in the context of a singeing 
war that had already destroyed so much of mozambique’s physical and 
social infrastructure, this belief seemed to many to be both fantastical 
and inappropriate.
 So, to what extent did the transition to peace make a difference to 
the ifis’ involvement in mozambique? one can make a rough distinc-
tion between two phases: the transition toward multiparty democracy 
and the multiparty period itself. from 1992 to 1994, mozambique un-
derwent a remarkable transition from war to peace. the mozambican 
161
the Wor ld bank, reconstruct ion, and libera l  Peacebui lding
national resistance (renamo), a former guerrilla organization, became 
a political party, and the un invested very heavily in the demobilization 
of troops and the organization of elections.13 international donors and 
ngos eagerly arrived or increased their presence in order to contribute 
to the transition’s social and economic components. the World bank, 
along with the imf, was at the heart of the reconstruction drive. it in-
vested heavily in infrastructure such as roads, water supply, health, and 
education. Concurrently, the bank maintained its macroeconomic focus 
on liberalization. its strategy was to lend money to smooth a transition 
toward a liberal political economy, and this required maintaining its 
faith toward neoliberal basics throughout. “normalcy” was defined as 
good adherence to neoliberal policies and a resumption of growth.
 the 1994 elections saw the ruling party, the liberation front of 
mozambique (frelimo), maintain incumbency. frelimo had been con-
certedly implementing aspects of the SAP agenda since the late 1980s 
and was now enjoying democratic legitimacy, civic peace, and close rela-
tions with the ifis. As a result, frelimo received strong support from 
the World bank,14 and the country’s gross national income grew by a 
striking 11 percent in 1997 and maintained strong growth into the 2000s. 
it was the Heavily indebted Poor Country (HiPC) scheme and the 
subsequent Poverty reduction Strategy Paper process15 that cemented 
frelimo’s support from the ifis. the “normalization” constructed 
through these credit mechanisms was at the heart of the World bank’s 
contribution to peacebuilding in mozambique.
 mozambique’s experience is revealing; we can draw out salient as-
pects of the ifis’ involvement in transitions from war (with due recog-
nition of nationally specific contexts). in essence:
•  Structural adjustment continues throughout war and peace.
•  The IFIs have generally seen their role during transitions 
to peace as lending for special and transitional social and 
infrastructural programs.
•  The expectation is that there will be a transition to stability 
and normalcy, defined in neoliberal terms and underpinned 
by economic growth.
these key features could also be found in the ifis’ involvement in An-
gola, liberia, Sierra leone, and rwanda during the 1990s, and these 
features persist in current peacebuilding endeavors. Clearly, in the cases 
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of the 1990s, the trajectories of the conflicts and the ifis’ expectations 
did not match. SAPs were abandoned; conflict continued during and 
after elections; relations between states and the ifis shifted drastically; 
and there was no straightforward stability and growth response. indeed, 
in these more problematic cases, it might also be argued that the ifis’ 
involvement actually contributed to the instability and militarism that 
prolonged conflict or undermined moments of peace.
 for instance, the government that prosecuted the 1994 genocide in 
rwanda had maintained close relations with the World bank up until 
1994. the bank, among many other donors, considered rwanda to be 
a kind of success story, a success based in the strength of the govern-
ment. indeed, “the World bank seemed to be the one with the stron-
gest love affair with rwanda.”16 the bank’s focus on working with an 
effective development partner meant that the increasingly violent and 
racist politics of the state were largely ignored.17 in Sierra leone, the 
World bank and imf led an attempt to liberalize the economy and roll 
back the state during civil war, as they did in mozambique. Here, as 
david keen details, state rollback exacerbated aspects of the civil war 
by making general social hardship more extreme and by supporting the 
national Provisional ruling Council government, which was violating 
Sierra leoneans’ human rights on a large scale. reminiscent of the kind 
of language that the bank used in rwanda in the early 1990s, the bank 
stated that “the government of Sierra leone is carrying out a compre-
hensive program of economic growth aimed at achieving sustainable 
growth and reducing poverty.”18
 As an examination of other case studies would reveal, one can discern 
a paradoxical presence of the bank and imf in countries prone to or 
engaged in civil conflict. the bank tends to depoliticize its relations 
with governments, looking only at issues of program implementation 
even when other radical and violent political practices might be present. 
but partly in contrast, the SAPs that are advocated by the bank and 
imf tend to undermine the ability of states to ensure forms of formal 
and informal social provision that tie together some sense of political 
order.19 in this situation, states become vulnerable to radical instability 
of a kind that Chris Allen called “terminal spoils,”20 or that William 
reno identified as a violent kind of “shadow politics.”21
 thus the bank in its involvement in conflict situations has relied on 
core structural adjustment policies to guide its lending, regardless of the 
particular situation in a particular country. it has lent money to promote 
163
the Wor ld bank, reconstruct ion, and libera l  Peacebui lding
reconstruction, and this has been the main distinguishing feature of its 
lending to states recovering from civil conflict. but it is also the case 
that the “deep politics” of the bank—its cleaving to a neoliberal agenda 
and its shyness about addressing state politics outside the modalities 
of implementation—have left it with an awkward relationship to con-
flict. this is critical to peacebuilding, since the policies promoted by 
the bank may at times aggravate tensions. furthermore, peace is not 
achieved through the signing of a cease-fire agreement and a political 
transition alone. rather, low-level violence commonly remains; much 
of the social structures that in one way or another fueled conflict also 
often remain in place; and there is always the possibility that civil war, 
however defined, might break out again. We can see this clearly from 
Angola in the mid-1990s to Côte d’ivoire in the early 2000s. the ifis’ 
(re)actions throughout the messy shifts between war and relative peace 
are extremely relevant.
the World bank and Peacebuilding
Since the late 1990s the World bank has demonstrated a willingness to 
engage with a range of development agendas that have emerged from 
other institutions, and this is the case with the peacebuilding agenda that 
has largely emerged from the un. As ever, the bank is careful to define 
its mandate: it has always been nervous about stepping into a “political” 
role when it officially declares itself as a nonpolitical organization. it 
is this “apolitical” premise that has led the bank to define a division of 
labor between the un system and the un’s remit to manage political 
transitions in various ways, and the “economic” demands of reconstruc-
tion. the bank identifies for itself the following tasks: demobilization 
and reintegration, reconstruction, governance, and development.22
 these tasks each need some unpacking. Demobilization refers to the 
need to fund the cantonment, disarming, auditing, and release of for-
mer soldiers after hostilities have formally ended. Reintegration follows 
from demobilization and comprises schemes to assist ex-combatants 
in ensuring livelihoods without the gun, most often involving a “pack-
age” of tools and seeds to recommence farming.23 it also involves pack-
ages to manage the return of internally displaced people and returning 
refugees.24 Reconstruction encapsulates the bank’s lending to repair and 
modernize destroyed infrastructure: sabotaged roads and rails, dilapi-
dated electricity and water systems in besieged towns, and the like. it 
also might involve funding de-mining operations.
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 governance and development are broader aims rather than project-
related objectives. the premise here is that good governance and devel-
opment will ensure the broader processes of a social transition toward a 
peaceful state of affairs. Governance encapsulates a well-known agenda 
of transparency, participation, partnership, and accountability. the 
order of specific reform objectives is rearranged to address transitions to 
peace: security, rule of law, tax administration, and state capacity as the 
“Weberian” starting points from which the more normatively explicit 
“good governance” might be constructed. in regard to the latter, the 
bank’s reports frequently make linkages between the “economic” factors 
behind conflict and their resolution through better forms of partici-
pation, social inclusion, and economic growth. this is where develop-
ment comes in: transitions of peace must be underpinned by economic 
growth that is seen—to use a stylized phrase—as the solvent of social 
tensions. of course, the substantial assumption behind this notion is 
that liberalized economic management and growth will generate so-
cially beneficial outcomes, rather than intensified or new inequalities 
and social tensions. this is known in the critical literature as the “liberal 
peace” argument.25
 the liberal peace model is central to recent bank thinking on post-
conflict assistance, so it requires more analysis. the premise of the liberal 
peace approach is that economic and political liberalization are comple-
mentary to peacebuilding efforts. this is precisely where the bank can 
claim to be contributing to peacebuilding: “assistance must focus on 
recreating the conditions that will allow the private sector and institu-
tions of civil society to resume commercial and productive activities.”26 
Whatever context-specific peacebuilding measures might be required 
and implemented by other agencies, such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions and demobilization and reintegration, the movement away 
from these specific tasks to a “sustainable” peace is to be found within 
liberal governance and the free market.27 this association is based on a 
belief that liberalization produces positive-sum and stabilizing effects 
on societies, a belief that pervades the bank’s development ideology.28 
but it is also the case that the bank thinks through its worldview in the 
context of postconflict recovery in more particular ways.
 At the heart of the bank’s lending in postconflict states is multi-
sectoral lending, which largely connotes nonproject lending to rebuild 
states, capacity building and technical assistance in particular. much 
of this lending appears to be the familiar governance reform that one 
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might find in (relatively peaceful) tanzania as much as in (relatively 
conflict-laden) uganda over the past two decades.29 but aspects of 
governance reform in postconflict states carry with them certain as-
sumptions about liberal reform and peacebuilding.
 the leitmotif of the bank’s multisectoral lending is normalization, 
which means directly (re)establishing relations with external agencies 
by clearing arrears, establishing working relations with the ifis, and 
engaging on the processes embedded in HiPC, PrSP, and a range of 
other sectoral programs that address issues such as Hiv/AidS, agri-
culture, and so forth. the framework for normalization is commonly 
a postconflict needs assessment, which feeds into the creation of an 
interim PrSP.30 but normalization also serves as a useful way to stylize 
more specific aspects of bank lending in postconflict situations.
 for instance, the bank lends in order to support the rule of law in 
many countries. this requires a rehabilitation of police and military 
forces, a revived judiciary, a stronger legal protection of contracts, the 
establishment of property rights, and the rehabilitation of basic fiscal 
institutions.31 the bulk of the bank’s State and Peacebuilding fund 
(SPf), in its first objective, speaks to this agenda.32 ostensibly, this 
agenda seems perfectly sensible: it evokes ideas of social order and 
transparency, and the old and venerable liberal idea that property own-
ership promotes social stability.
 but capitalism in Africa has rarely followed the liberal ideal. indeed, 
aspects of capitalist development have generated conflict throughout 
Africa’s colonial and postcolonial history.33 Property rights are con-
tested, or asserted through violence, in many places, and therefore any 
reassertion of rights might involve exclusion. the alienation of land and 
resources has been a driver of civil conflicts throughout the continent.34 
Whatever one’s convictions about the nature of capitalism in Africa, it 
is reasonable to say that the bank and other donors fail to, or cannot, 
recognize that the construction of regimes of property rights is neces-
sarily political and contentious. in this sense, liberal reconstruction runs 
a risk of generating social sources of conflict. institutions like the World 
bank do not have the wherewithal to address this fact.
institutions, Practices, and Programs
We have seen that ifi involvement in conflict and postconflict states has 
undergone a series of changes and that the ifis have played a role in 
contexts of both war and peace in many countries. A salient feature of this 
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involvement, throughout all of the turbulence and uncertainty of either 
failed or successful transitions, is structural adjustment and its progenies. 
As well, the World bank has worked hard to develop a more detailed ap-
proach to peacebuilding, one that is less exclusively based on adjustment, 
and it is here that we find the liberal peace doctrine. the key argument is 
that the World bank has developed a heuristic framework within which 
to engage in peacebuilding, in which neoliberal coordinates are married 
to the aspirations of liberal governance, are duly supported, and cautiously 
realized. So, how has the World bank put its ideas into practice?
 the bank’s establishment of its Post Conflict unit in 1995 marked 
the inception of a dedicated unit to monitor conflicts, strategize early 
interventions, and liaise with other external donors and creditors. 
throughout the 1990s, the bank was concerned with maintaining its 
institutional identity vis-à-vis other agencies. the PCu functioned to 
coordinate donors’ peacebuilding efforts, not to set a distinct World 
bank agenda. the PCu was renamed the Conflict Prevention and re-
construction unit (CPru) in 2001 as part of a moderate upgrading that 
involved a larger dedication of money.35 the low income Countries 
under Stress (liCuS) unit was created in 2004 with a remit that over-
lapped that of the CPru. both were effectively trust funds for discrete 
“exceptional” projects in states that were deemed to be suffering from, 
recovering from, or likely to fall back into conflict. As trust funds, the 
CPru and liCuS disbursed money as grants. though their activities 
were not well defined, the CPru and liCuS were underpinned by an 
aim to move countries toward a “normalized” reconstruction process 
that would require mainstream international development Association 
(idA) and international bank for reconstruction and development 
(ibrd) funding, closely followed by the broader frameworks of the 
HiPC scheme and PrSP process.
 in 2008, the bank’s State and Peacebuilding fund (SPf) was inaugu-
rated with its own funding base (uS$100 million for the period 2009–11 
from the bank, with additional funding from bilaterals) and its own 
strategic objectives. the SPf integrated the CPru and liCuS, and 
signaled an increasing concertedness in the bank’s efforts to assist states 
in transitions out of conflict. the SPf aims to provide grants toward 
projects that promote state institutional stability and social reconstruc-
tion. the SPf has granted money for the same key areas already outlined, 
but reformulated to focus on improving governance and institutions, 
and reconstruction.36
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 the most salient aspect of the SPf is its integration of statebuilding 
and peacebuilding. these are seen as complementary and mutually 
reinforcing. the logic of the SPf is that effective neoliberal reform must 
be premised on a certain state infrastructure; this moves the bank into a 
certain kind of statebuilding, which cuts a contrast with the adjustment-
related obsession with state rollback. States need to be strengthened in 
order to provide transparent governance, rule of law, social investment, 
and development of infrastructure. Peacebuilding is seen as the creation 
of a “peaceful, stable and sustainable” society.37 Although this fits well 
with the liberal peace approach, the increasingly prominent suturing of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding is problematic. Whereas building states 
is concrete, building peace is abstract; peacebuilding does not signify a 
specific agency to build. What the SPf sets out is a readiness to work 
with ngos and other donors to promote labor-intensive reconstruc-
tion projects, “safety net” funds, ngo reconciliation projects, and so 
on.38 these projects might improve the lives of the target groups who 
benefit from projects, but it would be a stretch to define this as peace-
building. An example of this targeted intervention would be the fund-
ing of public works programs for the demobilized.
 the focus on statebuilding is complex.39 Historically, strong states have 
ensured social peace through violence as well as through law and good 
governance. in the African context, where states have colonial origins and 
have been complicit in widespread violence against their citizenries, as is 
the case during civil wars, the assumption that building states will con-
tribute to sustainable peace needs to be treated with caution. States are 
not simply institutions. they are also embodiments of modes of authority: 
they articulate ideologies, shore up ruling classes, and develop practices of 
governing that will at best involve aspects of liberal politics but will per-
haps rely on more factionalized forms of authority and order. And states 
are historically embedded: rebuilding is not practiced on a tabula rasa.40
 the SPf’s remit shows no awareness of the difficult relationships 
between state strength and social peace. in fact, it rarely shows any 
awareness that protracted civil conflict has a profound effect on a coun-
try. one could cut all references to conflict out of SPf documentation 
and identify a fairly orthodox and generic World bank program of neo-
liberalism and good governance. As with other “emergency” areas, the 
bank has its solutions and largely sets these solutions to the problem at 
hand. the SPf seems likely to be a special fund to prepare postconflict 
states for the orthodoxies of the PrSP process.
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 in sum, the bank has constructed a series of institutional innovations 
to put postconflict recovery more clearly at the heart of its operational 
strategy. but this does not indicate a significant policy innovation that 
tailors itself to the specific conditions of the transition from war to 
peace. instead, we can identify that the World bank has pursued three 
tasks. first, the bank provides quick-release grants and technical as-
sistance with a view to normalizing countries’ relations with external 
agencies, most directly the ifis. Second, the bank provides grants for 
projects that are important for postconflict recovery, but these projects 
are also often of the kind that one might find in a nonconflict coun-
try that is borrowing from the bank and the imf. thus the bank’s 
approach to postconflict engagement consists of expedited disbursal 
through dedicated trust funds, with a view to normalization within a 
very short period of time, after which the bank’s orthodoxies of gover-
nance, growth, and poverty reduction might take hold. third, the bank 
supports statebuilding through capacity building and lending to build 
up key institutions of governance in ways that efface the political issues 
that accompany these processes.
Africa appears to be enjoying a relatively peaceful moment, certainly 
compared to the period from the end of the Cold War to the mid-1990s. 
but many countries that have achieved formalized peace remain be-
sieged by insecurities: low-intensity conflict, banditry, extreme poverty 
that makes “normalization” difficult to entertain, and political parties or 
organizations that remain only partially incorporated into liberal politi-
cal practices. What does this mean for the World bank and interna-
tional monetary fund?
 Perhaps the bank should remove itself from conflict-prone states. if 
the basic public goods of peace and order are not in place, the bank’s 
policy-based lending will not work. this view represents a risk-averse 
point of view that allows the bank to reduce its lending liabilities. it also 
reflects a debate about governance and aid effectiveness that took place 
in the mid-1990s, in which it was argued that lending should be concen-
trated in states that have demonstrated the “political will” to implement 
reforms. there are two problems with this argument. first, ethically, 
it means accepting that some of the world’s most impoverished, bru-
talized, and desperate populations will be cut off from international 
concern. Second, it cuts off any discussions about effective intervention 
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and acceptable risk, each of which might be achieved even within the 
bank’s own neoliberal terms of reference. for instance, in mozambique, 
the bank’s social lending and support for the state, while hardly un-
problematic, did play a part in the securing of peace and in the process 
of reconstruction, a process that, though limited, has been sufficiently 
effective to make a resumption of large-scale war extremely unlikely.
 the realization that emerges from a study of mozambique, as well as 
other relative successful peacebuilding cases, is that movement away from 
war and toward peace is both complex and largely nationally based.41 
large amounts of external assistance can be marginal or even damaging 
if segments of a state or society are antagonistic toward peacebuilding. 
this has been the case with Sierra leone recently.42 Perhaps, then, the 
World bank, and many other external agencies, should be more modest 
about the scope of their ambitions. A stronger sense of fallibility might 
enable more flexible forms of lending, which by itself can never ensure 
a successful transition to peace. Whether the World bank’s institutional 
culture might allow such a shift in mind-set is another question.
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The International Criminal Court
A Peacebuilder in Africa?
S A r A H  n o u W e n
lasting peace requires justice—this was the decision taken in 
rome by 120 States.
luis moreno-ocampo, prosecutor of the international 
Criminal Court, “building a future on Peace and Justice”
d o e s  A  C h A P t e r  o n  t h e  i n t e r n At i o n A l  C r i m i n A l  C o u rt  ( i C C ) 
belong in a book on peacebuilding in Africa? the iCC is definitely 
relevant to Africa. Since the beginning of its operations in 2003, the 
world’s first permanent international criminal court has opened seven 
investigations, each of them on the African continent. With european 
states as the court’s most fervent supporters and with its investigations 
in uganda, the democratic republic of the Congo (drC), Sudan, the 
Central African republic, kenya, libya, and ivory Coast, the iCC is 
sometimes dubbed the “european Court for African Affairs.”
 but what is the relation between the iCC and peacebuilding? is an 
international court that was established to investigate, prosecute, and try 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide a “peacebuilder”?1 
How do peace and justice relate? more fundamentally, what is peace? 
is it the absence of war and violence (“negative peace”) or the absence of 
causes of violence (“positive peace”)?2 What is justice? is it the enforce-
ment of the rule of law (“legal justice”), the elimination of structural and 
systematic injustices such as political and economic discrimination and 
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inequalities of distribution (“distributive justice”), or the addressing of the 
direct consequences inflicted on individuals (“rectificatory justice”)? if the 
latter, should the focus be on the restoration of the position of the victim 
and of the affected relationships (“restorative justice”) or on inflicting a 
penalty on the perpetrator (“punitive justice”)?3
 the complexity of these questions notwithstanding, the interna-
tional criminal justice movement, a loose coalition of mainly West-
ern nongovernmental organizations (ngos), other Western-funded 
ngos, and officials working in or on international criminal tribunals, 
has straightforward answers. the opening statement on the website of 
the Coalition for the international Criminal Court immediately reveals 
its conception of justice—“together for Justice: Civil society . . . advo-
cating for a fair, effective and independent iCC.”4 Justice in this context 
refers to iCC-style justice, which is individual rather than communal, 
criminal rather than distributive, and punitive rather than restorative. 
victim participation and reparations remain subsidiary to the iCC’s 
main focus on the criminal accountability of perpetrators. With respect 
to peace, the international criminal justice movement seems to focus on 
positive peace, arguing that impunity ultimately begets more violence. 
Without hard empirical evidence for the correlation, let alone a causal 
relationship, between iCC-style criminal justice and peace, the interna-
tional criminal justice movement contends that “lasting peace requires 
justice,” irrespective of the actual outcomes of the Court’s actions. “no 
peace without justice” became one of the most dominant ideologies of 
the 1990s, and remains so today.
 this chapter challenges the “no peace without justice” ideology on 
the basis of the iCC’s experiences in uganda and Sudan. the situation 
in northern uganda was referred to the Court by the ugandan govern-
ment itself, while the situation in darfur (Sudan) was referred to the 
Court by the Security Council.5 the difference in how the Court be-
came involved in these two cases allows for an analysis of the different 
interests involved. the chapter begins with a brief exploration of how 
criminal justice could contribute to peace. it then discusses the rome 
Statute’s vision of justice and peace, and subsequently, turns to how the 
Court became involved in uganda and Sudan. With illustrations from 
these case studies, the chapter next presents four ways the Court’s ju-
dicial work can influence peacebuilding efforts: as an instrument of ob-
taining peace by military means, as a facilitator or an obstacle to peace 
talks, as a substitute for peace efforts, and as a catalyst for discussions on 
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questions of accountability in peace talks. finally, the chapter identifies 
key obstacles to the iCC’s functioning as an instrument for peace.6
Criminal Justice and Peace
the argument that iCC-style justice contributes to peace is based 
on similar sets of assumptions regarding national criminal justice and 
peace, yet extends this to the international level. Criminal proceedings 
against alleged perpetrators of conflict-related crimes may, for instance, 
have the following results:
•  Provide justice to victims and prevent vigilante justice
•  Establish or reestablish the rule of law
•  Deter future crimes, by showing that those who have 
violated the law do not get away with impunity
•  Delegitimize those who committed crimes and diminish 
their potential to act as spoilers, by “incapacitating” them 
through trial and sentences
•  Provide a bulwark against revisionism and the ensuing 
tensions
•  Avoid demonization of social groups and facilitate 
reconciliation, by showing that individuals, not entire 
groups, bear criminal guilt
•  Provide a symbolic break with a violent past, by exposing 
and condemning past crimes.7
in comparison to domestic courts, an international court may have a 
stronger deterrent effect internationally and may promote the rule of 
international law. yet the cultural and geographical distance of an inter-
national court to the society in which the crimes were committed dilutes 
the potentially beneficial effects of such proceedings on the establish-
ment or reestablishment of the rule of law in the country concerned.
Peace and Justice in the iCC’s rome Statute
the rome Statute of the iCC establishes and governs a criminal jus-
tice mechanism. it creates a permanent international criminal court, 
stipulates how the Court shall conduct its proceedings and outlines 
how states shall cooperate with the Court. the only explicit references 
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to peace are in a preambular recital that recognizes that “grave crimes 
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,”8 and where 
the Statute criminalizes attacks against missions mandated to keep the 
“peace.”9 Some provisions implicitly link peace and justice. for instance, 
the Statute allows the united nations (un) Security Council to refer a 
situation to the iCC Prosecutor as well as to defer iCC proceedings for 
a renewable period of twelve months.10 in both instances, the Council 
must take its decision in a resolution adopted under Chapter vii of the 
un Charter, a decision which aims “to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”11 the Statute thus recognizes that both a referral of 
a situation to the Prosecutor and a deferral of iCC proceedings can be 
in the interest of peace.
 the Statute’s silences are equally revealing. Some delegations at the 
rome Conference argued that the Statute should address the relevance of 
national amnesties for iCC proceedings.12 the Statute, however, makes 
no mention of this, and national amnesties, which are a matter of domes-
tic law, do not bind the iCC. others have suggested that the iCC could 
and should play a role in rebuilding domestic justice systems,13 through 
which the Court could contribute to the rule of law and in that way to 
peace. However, again, the Statute provides no legal basis for doing so.
 As it is, the Statute provides only limited and narrow avenues for 
halting iCC proceedings if they appear to obstruct the achievement of 
(negative) peace. first, as mentioned, the Security Council can defer 
iCC proceedings if acting under Chapter vii of the un Charter. the 
deferral is renewable every twelve months, but each instance is subject 
to a veto of a permanent member of the Security Council. As a result, 
peace negotiators and mediators cannot guarantee to negotiating par-
ties that the iCC will not become involved again.
 Second, the Statute allows the iCC Prosecutor to decide not to in-
vestigate or prosecute if this would not serve the “interests of justice.”14 
When interpreted broadly, one could argue that this gives the Prosecu-
tor discretion to refrain from proceedings if they threaten peace. but 
luis moreno-ocampo, the iCC’s first Prosecutor, has argued that an 
assessment of the interests of justice does not encompass the interests 
of peace. He has emphasized that his mandate is justice and that other 
institutions are responsible for peace.15
 third, a state can render an iCC case inadmissible by conducting 
genuine domestic proceedings, in accordance with the Court’s comple-
mentarity principle. Pursuant to this principle, the Court may exercise 
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its jurisdiction in a case only in the absence of genuine domestic pro-
ceedings, whether past or present.16 this avenue may be used to termi-
nate the iCC’s involvement in a case, but it cannot substitute iCC-style 
justice. in order to render a case inadmissible on grounds of comple-
mentarity, criminal proceedings are required. if the state, prioritizing 
the achievement of short-term negative peace, does not seek criminal 
justice in a specific case, the iCC can assume jurisdiction in that case.
 the avenues to terminate iCC proceedings in the interests of peace 
are also exclusive. only the Security Council can make the iCC defer 
proceedings. no organ or person can legally compel the Prosecutor to 
refrain from proceedings in the interests of justice. only the Court’s 
Prosecutor and judges can decide on complementarity. the power to 
decide on issues of justice and peace thus lies with international organs. 
for persons affected by iCC proceedings, but not recognized as victims 
of the crimes charged against a specific accused, there is no avenue to 
express their views, let alone decide, on the meaning of peace and jus-




the first referral in the Court’s history was made by the government of 
uganda in december 2003 and concerned its protracted conflict with 
the lord’s resistance Army (lrA). uganda explained that it referred 
the situation because
without international cooperation and assistance, it cannot 
succeed in arresting the members of the lrA leadership 
and others most responsible for the above mentioned crimes. 
furthermore, uganda is of the view that the scale and gravity 
of lrA crimes are such that they are a matter of concern to the 
international community as a whole. it is thus befitting both from 
a practical and moral viewpoint to entrust the investigation and 
prosecution of these crimes to the Prosecutor of the iCC.17
 on January 29, 2004, the Prosecutor and ugandan president yoweri 
museveni jointly announced the referral of “the situation concerning 
the lord’s resistance Army.”18 in light of ngos’ criticism that this 
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phrasing should not exclude the crimes allegedly committed by ugan-
da’s national army (uganda People’s defence forces, uPdf) from the 
Court’s investigations,19 the otP changed the referral’s name to “the 
situation in northern uganda.”
 the Court has issued arrest warrants against Joseph kony and four 
other lrA commanders, alleging them to bear individual criminal re-
sponsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes.20 At the time 
of writing, none of the arrest warrants has been executed.21
Sudan
on march 31, 2005, the un Security Council referred “the situation in 
darfur since 1 July 2002” to the iCC.22 Since the situation was referred 
to the Court in a resolution adopted under Chapter vii of the un 
Charter, the Court can exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed by 
Sudanese nationals on Sudanese territory even though Sudan is not 
a state party to the rome Statute. the Pre-trial Chamber has issued 
arrest warrants for the then–minister of humanitarian affairs Ahmad 
muhammad Harun, militia leader Ali muhammed Abd-al-rahman, 
also known as Ali kushayb, and, for the first time in the Court’s history, 
against an incumbent head of state, President omar al-bashir. All have 
been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.23
 the arrest warrants remain to be executed. even before the charges 
had been made  against him, Sudanese president omar al-bashir swore 
“thrice in the name of Almighty god . . . never [to] hand any Sudanese 
national to a foreign court.”24
 the Prosecutor has also brought cases against three members of 
darfuri rebel movements on three counts of war crimes committed dur-
ing an attack on the peacekeeping force of the African union (Au), the 
Au mission in Sudan (AmiS).25 they have appeared voluntarily before 
the Court.
the iCC as a Peacebuilder:  
An instrument to defeat the enemy?
if one were to classify the defeat of a warring party as peacebuilding, 
the iCC can be considered a “peacebuilder.” following this approach, 
the iCC Prosecutor has argued: “there is no tension between Peace 
and Justice in uganda: arrest the sought criminals today, and you will 
have Peace and Justice tomorrow.”26 Similarly focusing on the potential 
of international criminal justice to incapacitate spoilers, he has argued 
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with respect to darfur that “arresting and removing Harun today will 
contribute to breaking the criminal system established in darfur [and] 
will help peace, the political process and the deployment of peacekeep-
ers.”27 in other words, international criminal justice can contribute to 
peace by delegitimizing and incapacitating spoilers, as the nuremberg 
and tokyo tribunals have illustrated.
 However, this potential of international criminal justice to incapacitate 
also makes it a powerful instrument of warfare that intensifies rather 
than mitigates conflict.28 the nuremberg and tokyo tribunals dealt 
with enemies that had already been defeated; the iCC, with jurisdic-
tion over ongoing conflicts, provides parties with another battlefield on 
which to defeat their enemies. it is with this awareness of the iCC 
as another battleground that parties in darfur and uganda have co-
opted the “no peace without justice” ideology when justice could lead to 
peace on their terms by weakening their enemy. their opponents have 
rejected the Court precisely as a weapon used against them.
 take the ugandan referral of (only) the lrA to the Court. the ugan-
dan government calculated that the iCC could turn the lrA from an 
enemy of the ugandan government into an enemy of “the international 
community as a whole.”29 At the same time the referral could recharacter-
ize the ugandan government, the first government to refer a situation to 
the iCC, as a champion of international criminal justice. iCC supporters 
would no longer treat the lrA and the government as equal warmongers 
but would view museveni’s administration as a legitimate government 
fighting a criminal movement. linking the arrest of the lrA leader-
ship to the credibility of the iCC, european governments, staunch iCC 
supporters, would replace their criticism of uPdf abuses and of the gov-
ernment’s failure to ameliorate the humanitarian situation in the north, 
with renewed support for the uPdf operations against the lrA “crimi-
nals.”30 moreover, as the following statement of Amama mbabazi, who 
was ugandan minister of defense at the time, illustrates, the ugandan 
government hoped that the iCC, with its international reach, might do 
what the uPdf had been unable to do: arrest the lrA. While con-
flating the iCC and the international Criminal tribunal for the former 
yugoslavia and ignoring the fact that enforcement is the weakest chain in 
the iCC’s operations, he answered a parliamentary question:
How does iCC operate? . . . they have the office of the prosecutor; 
they carry out investigations and actually the international 
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community supports them. So, for this Serbian, for example, 
there is an international force, which is hunting for that person. 
So, should kony be indicted, and should he be indicted before 
we capture him, who will look for him in order to compel him to 
appear before this committee? it is not uganda; if they ask us we 
shall lend a hand, but actually it will be international forces.31
in addition to rallying international assistance for the arrest of the lrA 
leadership, the referral would, so the ugandan actors thought, convince 
the Sudanese government, wishing to be on the “good” side in the “war 
on terror” and under pressure on account of the conflict in darfur, to 
discontinue its military and logistical support of the lrA.32 in sum, 
concocted in the ministry of defense rather than Justice, the referral of 
the situation concerning the lrA to the iCC was part of a military and 
international reputation strategy.
 At the same time, the use of the iCC as an instrument of war is 
not without risks; it may boomerang. in the example of uganda, the 
iCC could equally prosecute state actors, for instance on charges of 
forced displacement, torture, and indiscriminate bombing. However, 
the ugandan government knew the iCC’s handicap of dependence on 
state cooperation in issues ranging from the issuance of visa for inves-
tigators to the arrest of the lrA leadership. by accusing state officials, 
the Prosecutor would risk the ugandan government’s cooperation in 
the case against the lrA.
 to date, many of the ugandan government’s calculations have proved 
to be correct. the iCC’s arrest warrants against the lrA leaders have 
helped the ugandan government convince the drC to allow the uPdf 
to pursue the lrA on Congolese territory. When the uPdf’s military 
operation failed and only led to further dispersion of the lrA and the 
death and displacement of hundreds of civilians, there was hardly any 
international criticism. indeed, the Security Council “welcome[d] the 
joint efforts . . . made [by states in the region] to address the security 
threat posed by lrA.”33 the ugandan government has also proved 
right, so far, in expecting that the Prosecutor would not go after co-
operative friends. the Prosecutor has not opened an investigation into 
alleged crimes by state actors, officially on the basis of (a dubious ap-
plication of ) gravity as a selection criterion.34
 in Sudan, the calculations have been reversed. the government of 
Sudan rejects the Court as a Western instrument for regime change, 
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and leaders of various rebel movements have embraced the iCC, 
grateful for “brother ocampo’s” legal attack on their enemy. the 
leaders of the Justice and equality movement ( Jem) have increased 
their military activity since the Prosecutor’s request for an arrest 
warrant against the Sudanese president in march 2009. referring to 
the Prosecutor’s advice to marginalize persons sought by the Court, 
the leader of one faction of the Sudan liberation movement (Slm) 
has refused to participate in peace talks, arguing that “war criminals” 
should not be negotiated with.35 for the rebel movements, terms 
such as “war criminal” have become, in mahmoud mamdani’s words, 
labels “to be stuck on your worst enemy, a perverse version of the 
nobel Prize, part of a rhetorical arsenal that helps you vilify your 
adversaries while ensuring impunity for your allies.”36 local leaders 
in camps for internally displaced persons have equally hinged their 
hopes on the iCC. “We need nAto, the eu and the iCC,” they 
argue, listing the iCC as one of the powers that could militarily 
intervene in order to execute arrest warrants. in their view, inter-
national criminal justice could be an instrument to achieve peace, 
namely by achieving regime change.37
 in the darfur situation the Prosecutor has in fact brought charges 
against more than one side of the conflict. yet, thus far, the charges 
against three members of rebel movements have not altered the positive 
attitude of rebel leaders toward the Court. the suspects are sought for 
acts that the major rebel leaders blame on a marginalized splinter group. 
like the proceedings against government officials, proceedings against 
members of splinter movements serve the interests of the leaders of the 
mainstream rebel movements. the suspects themselves do not fear the 
Court either—they have appeared voluntarily before the Court, believ-
ing that the Prosecutor had insufficient evidence against them. one of 
them, Abu garda, was proved right: the judges refused to confirm the 
charges against him. that decision came a week after the iCC’s Appeals 
Chamber had ordered the Pre-trial Chamber to reconsider its deci-
sion not to charge the Sudanese president with genocide.38 the contrast 
between, on the one hand, the Court’s pursuance of genocide charges 
against the President and, on the other hand, the Prosecutor’s praise 
for the cooperation extended by rebel leaders and the judges’ refusal to 
confirm the charges against one of them has in Sudan only reaffirmed 




the iCC as a Peacebuilder:  
A facilitator or an obstacle to Peace talks?
Court officials have pointed to the Juba talks to substantiate their claim 
that the iCC spurs peace.39 the talks between the ugandan govern-
ment and the lrA, under the auspices of the government of Southern 
Sudan, began a few months after the iCC had unsealed arrest warrants 
against the lrA leadership. these on-and-off negotiations between 
2006 and 2008 resulted in the most comprehensive set of agreements 
between the ugandan government and an lrA delegation in the two-
decade history of the conflict.
 When pointing to the Court’s success in spurring these talks, the 
officials frequently ignore that other factors were equally if not more 
important in bringing the lrA to the negotiating table. the govern-
ment of Sudan, which formerly had backed the lrA, had become less 
able and willing to continue doing so, not just because of the iCC’s 
involvement.40 the armies of Southern Sudan and uganda, in turn, 
had increased their military pressure on the lrA. these developments 
threatened the lrA’s long-term viability, thereby providing it with 
strong incentives to negotiate.
 moreover, rather than merely driving the lrA to the negotiating 
table, the iCC appeared to be an obstacle to the Juba talks insofar as 
its involvement made many states and international organizations that 
are supportive of the iCC reluctant to provide political and financial 
backing to the talks. they argued that their ratification or endorsement 
of the rome Statute implied that they could not support negotiations 
that concerned persons sought by the iCC.41 Whatever the outcome of 
the negotiations between the lrA and the ugandan government, these 
states and organizations were committed to backing the iCC, a party 
that was not even present at the talks.42 it was only when the security 
dividends of the talks became more tangible and the voice of the field 
offices, political advisers, and humanitarians gained the upper hand on 
the lawyers and human rights activists pushing the “no peace without 
justice” ideology at headquarters that donor countries and the un 
began to provide financial, logistical, and political support for the Juba 
talks.43 they adjusted their argument: if the iCC were circumvented 
by domestic trials, as ultimately envisaged in the Accountability and 
reconciliation Agreement between the lrA and the ugandan govern-
ment, “no peace without justice” would still have prevailed.
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 the strongest argument against the claim that the iCC promoted the 
peace talks in uganda is that lrA leader kony has to date refused to sign 
the final Peace Agreement. the separate parts of the agreement have 
been signed by the delegations of the lrA and the ugandan govern-
ment, but the lrA leadership itself never participated in the talks, partly 
out of fear of arrest and transfer to the Hague.44 more fundamentally, 
the iCC’s arrest warrants made it impossible for the lrA to achieve 
its desired outcome. from the outset, the lrA delegation had insisted 
that the iCC arrest warrants be “withdrawn,” but the rome Statute does 
not provide for simple withdrawal of the arrest warrants.45 the only 
avenue open to uganda for terminating the iCC’s case against the lrA 
leadership would be to challenge the admissibility of the case on the 
ground of complementarity—that is, a challenge based on uganda itself 
conducting criminal proceedings against the lrA. the 2008 Annexure 
to the 2007 Accountability and reconciliation Agreement therefore en-
visages a special division of the ugandan high court “to try individuals 
who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict” 
and a special unit to investigate and prosecute them.46 kony, however, 
referring to Charles taylor’s fate, the former liberian president who was 
promised asylum in nigeria and was nonetheless ultimately transferred 
to the Special Court for Sierra leone, continued to demand guarantees 
for his security and further clarifications on the relation between the 
peace agreement and the iCC arrest warrants before he would sign any 
agreement.47 A catch-22 situation emerged insofar as the ugandan gov-
ernment wished to make representations to the Security Council and 
iCC with a view to deferring the proceedings and challenging admis-
sibility only if the agreement was signed and kony surrendered, whereas 
kony would not sign “if the iCC indictments were not dropped.”48 
meanwhile, six years since the beginning of the negotiations, hopes for a 
peace agreement have been dashed.
 All told, in the larger context of shifting regional politics, the iCC 
arrest warrants have served as a “double-edged sword,”49 being, on the 
one hand, an additional incentive for talks but, on the other hand, an 
apparently insurmountable obstacle to the conclusion of an agreement.
 in darfur, too, the iCC’s involvement at first seemed to facilitate 
peace talks. during the Abuja negotiations, the mediation team of the 
African union readily took the agenda item “justice” off the table, ar-
guing that the un Security Council had delegated this issue to the 
iCC.50 the rebel movements that had insisted on “justice” needed little 
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convincing: they preferred the iCC to domestic proceedings, perceiving 
the iCC as a strong ally against their enemy. After seven rounds of 
negotiations during which the mediators presented the parties with a 
deadline to accept the darfur Peace Agreement (dPA), they referred 
to the iCC in order to pressure parties to sign.51 uS deputy secretary of 
state robert Zoellick, trying to address the movements’ concerns about 
the draft dPA and to pressure the government to accept amendments 
in light of these concerns, referred to the iCC (“if you don’t agree, i’ll 
see you in the Hague”) “to convey a sense of the stakes involved and 
the consequences.”52 but two of the most important rebel movements 
refused to sign. indeed, they became even more reluctant to engage in 
peace talks when the iCC charged their ultimate opponent, the Suda-
nese president. He, in turn, was given extra incentives by the iCC arrest 
warrant to do everything possible to stay in power.
 involvement of the iCC may thus spur peace talks by putting pressure 
on rebel movements, as in uganda, or by providing a reason to remove 
a breaking point from the agenda of peace talks, as in Sudan, but at the 
same time, the iCC’s involvement can become an obstacle to the suc-
cessful conclusion of such talks. first, whereas peace and reconciliation 
usually become possible once parties are convinced that they ultimately 
must live together again, international criminal justice can make them 
entrench in their positions, perceiving themselves as either legitimized 
or persecuted by an international court. Second, international donors 
have appeared reluctant to sponsor peace talks that concern persons 
sought by the iCC. third, fearing arrest, persons sought by the iCC 
may refuse to participate in the talks, and the delegations they send on 
their behalf may have insufficient authorization to negotiate by proxy. 
finally and perhaps most fundamentally, outsourcing issues to the iCC 
is not effective if disagreement remains. With respect to pressuring par-
ties to sign an agreement, as Alex de Waal and Julie flint have observed, 
“Pressure works if the party under pressure can agree with the end point. 
if that is life imprisonment, pressure only generates counter-pressure.”53 
in the absence of a total defeat, parties will sign an agreement only if the 
ultimate outcome is acceptable to them. “the Hague” as an outcome is 
usually unacceptable.
the iCC as a Substitute for Peace efforts
rather than spurring peace, the iCC’s involvement has sometimes 
replaced peace efforts. the position of darfuri rebel movements and 
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donors’ initial stance toward the Juba peace talks, both recounted earlier, 
are two examples. illustrative, too, are the un Security Council politics 
involved in the referral of the situation in darfur to the Court and a 
possible deferral of the iCC’s darfur proceedings.
 Whereas the Prosecutor has claimed that the referral means that the 
Council has decided that justice is a critical component to achieving 
peace in darfur,54 the referral, rather than being a tested instrument 
for peace, may have served the Council as an instrument of therapeutic 
governance. earlier condemnations, sanctions, and a peacekeeping mis-
sion had not been able to bring peace to Sudan. despite report after 
report warning of widespread and systematic commission of crimes and 
despite powerful nongovernmental organizations calling on Western 
governments to “save darfur” from “genocide,” ten years after rwanda, 
the Security Council seemed to be yet again a bystander. irrespective 
of what happened and would happen in darfur, with the referral to the 
iCC the Security Council could at least demonstrate its commitment to 
justice: “if not peace then justice.”55
 Soon after the referral, the first clashes between peace and justice 
appeared. the government of Sudan refused to accept a Chapter vii 
peacekeeping operation, among other reasons out of fear that the mis-
sion would enforce iCC arrest warrants. rebel movements became 
militarily more aggressive and reluctant to participate in peace talks. 
After the issuance of an arrest warrant against the Sudanese president, 
the government ousted thirteen international humanitarian organiza-
tions on allegations of cooperation with the iCC. for many human 
rights organizations, too, work has become more difficult, since they are 
suspected of handing over evidence to the Court.56
 Arguing that the iCC’s involvement threatened the chances for 
peace in darfur, some states and organizations, most vocally the Afri-
can union, the Arab league, and the organization of islamic States, 
called upon the Security Council to defer its proceedings. the Au ar-
gued that “the situation in darfur is too serious and complex an issue to 
be resolved without recourse to an harmonized approach to justice and 
peace, neither of which should be pursued at the expense of the other.”57 
the Au worried about the iCC Prosecutor acting against an incumbent 
president. When conforming to foreign policy etiquette by signing on to 
the rome Statute, Au members had not expected to endorse an “Am-
nesty international with legal powers.”58 more fundamentally, however, 
the Au was concerned with the iCC’s impact on peace. Whether the 
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potential escalation stemming from the iCC’s involvement affects trade, 
refugees, proliferation of armed groups and weapons, or the security of 
their peacekeepers in darfur, African states will bear the consequences 
of more violence in Sudan. Arrest warrants against members of the Su-
danese government destabilize the government of an already fragile and 
conflict-prone state and region.59
 However, the three Western permanent members of the Security 
Council have refused to defer proceedings. this is partially because 
Sudan has not taken the “meaningful steps”60 or implemented a “radi-
cal and immediate change”61 in its policies, which they had set as a 
condition for a deferral. but for the united kingdom, france, and some 
Western nonpermanent Security Council members, the reluctance to 
vote in favor of a deferral is also inspired by a “no peace without justice” 
ideology. After the hard-won Security Council’s referral of the situa-
tion in darfur to the Court, these states do not want to be now seen 
as weakening the Court’s position. Whereas the Council’s referral of 
the situation to the Court was presented as depoliticizing the conflict, 
the Court’s proponents argue that the Council’s deferral of the iCC 
proceedings would politicize the Court, even though both actions are 
provided for in the Statute. in the field, representatives of organizations 
with pro-iCC policies at headquarters complained: “At headquarters, 
iCC politics are ruling over darfur politics.” to some extent the focus 
on the creation and survival of the iCC as an institution has led, to 
paraphrase david kennedy, the work on building the Court to substi-
tute for the work on achieving the aims that the Court was supposed to 
pursue—justice and, perhaps, peace.62
 Court officials have argued that states and other international organs 
should prioritize compliance with iCC decisions. When accused of 
impeding peace negotiations, the Prosecutor claims that his mandate 
is justice, not peace,63 and that other organizations are responsible for 
peace.64 However, he has also argued that these other organizations 
must fulfill their responsibility within the framework of the rome Stat-
ute.65 in addition, the Prosecutor has questioned the wisdom of peace 
negotiations, arguing that persons sought by the iCC are unreliable.66 
Court officials thus argue that the iCC’s mandate is justice and that 
the mandate of peace belongs to others, but at the same time they in-
sist that others must implement the iCC’s orders and not intervene in 
the Court’s judicial mandate.67 States parties to the rome Statute may 
have agreed on this new normative framework by leaving the decision 
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not to intervene “in the interests of justice” entirely to the discretion of 
the Prosecutor, but it does raise fundamental questions of power and 
accountability. Who can be held politically accountable for a decision 
pursuant to which the Court will (continue to) pursue punitive justice 
even if this seems to postpone (negative) peace?
the iCC and domestic Accountability
on account of its principle of complementarity, the iCC at times spurs 
initiatives in favor of conducting domestic proceedings, which may help 
establish or reestablish the domestic rule of law and thereby contribute 
to (positive) peace. At the same time, the iCC may function as a court 
to which cases concerning conflict-related crimes are outsourced, limit-
ing the extent to which the country concerned appears able to uphold 
the rule of law itself. illustrations of the latter phenomenon are the 
ugandan referral and Au mediators’ taking the issue of accountability 
off the agenda of the Abuja peace talks once the iCC was involved. 
over time, however, both the ugandan government and the African 
union realized that the iCC’s involvement limited their leeway in ne-
gotiations. Since the only way to end the iCC’s involvement was to 
conduct domestic proceedings, the iCC’s involvement catalyzed initia-
tives to substitute another court for the iCC.
 in uganda, the iCC’s involvement resulted in a paradoxical situation 
in which it was in the rebel movement’s interests to insist on account-
ability instead of amnesty.68 for the lrA, domestic accountability was 
the only way that the existence of the iCC arrest warrants against its 
leadership could be terminated. Seemingly aware of the complementar-
ity principle, kony argued that “the iCC should leave uganda to handle 
the issue of accountability since uganda has a functional justice system 
with jails in luzira, lugore etc.”69 However, rather than merely requir-
ing the lifting of the iCC arrest warrants, the lrA delegation insisted 
that all sides to the conflict should be held accountable, including for 
crimes committed before the beginning of the Court’s jurisdiction, July 
1, 2002.70 in line with the demands of some civil society organizations, 
the lrA also demanded transitional justice mechanisms other than 
criminal proceedings, such as a national truth and reconciliation com-
mission and a compensation fund.71
 the Juba talks, in turn, spurred a broader debate in ugandan soci-
ety about transitional justice. Adopting concepts used by international 
advisers to the Juba talks, the ugandan government’s Justice law and 
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order Sector has created its own “transitional justice” working group. 
even though it remains to be seen to what extent the accountability 
agreements resulting from the Juba peace talks will be implemented 
now that kony has refused to sign the final Peace Agreement, the de-
bate on transitional justice as such is a radical break with uganda’s past.
 in Sudan, too, the issue of justice has returned to the mediators’ 
agenda. in the same communiqué in which the Au Peace and Security 
Council requested that the un Security Council defer the iCC pro-
ceedings against the Sudanese president, it “encourage[d] the Sudanese 
parties, with the support of the Joint Chief mediator, to ensure that 
issues of impunity, accountability and reconciliation and healing are 
appropriately addressed during the negotiations aimed at reaching a 
comprehensive peace agreement.”72 the communiqué also established 
a High-level Panel on darfur, which considered the dropping of ac-
countability from the Abuja talks “an error.”73 the Panel claimed that 
“external interventions will not, and cannot, of themselves, provide the 
answers to the range of difficult questions that Sudan faces.”74 mirror-
ing developments in uganda, the Au has come to consider the iCC’s 
involvement as an obstacle to peacemaking, has reconsidered its de-
cision to leave questions of justice to an international court, and has 
identified the principle of complementarity as a way to undo the iCC’s 
involvement. in doing so it has increased domestic and regional interest 
in criminal justice as an element of peacebuilding.75
Has the international Criminal Court been a peacebuilder in Africa? 
the ideology that is most often invoked as the Court’s raison d’être, 
“no peace without justice,” suggests that it should be. by giving teeth to 
international criminal law and by deterring crimes throughout Africa, 
the iCC may indeed contribute to building peace, but as with all 
criminal justice, it is difficult to establish whether the Court has indeed 
had these effects. With respect to the seven countries in Africa in which 
the Court has opened investigations, it is too early to tell whether the 
iCC has been a peacebuilder. but one can observe that in uganda and 
Sudan conflicts are still ongoing, despite the iCC’s involvement.
 Some critics argue that conflicts are ongoing because of the iCC. in 
uganda, the iCC’s arrest warrants may have been a reason, or the de-
cisive reason, for kony’s refusal to grasp the most promising chance 
for peace in northern uganda. in Sudan, the iCC’s charges against the 
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President have given him more incentives to cling to power. further-
more, the Prosecutor’s case against the President has given rebel move-
ments sufficient ammunition to refuse to talk peace with a government 
of “war criminals.” rather than an instrument of peacebuilding, the 
iCC, operating in ongoing conflicts, is used as an instrument of war, 
with which to delegitimize and incapacitate enemies, thereby intensify-
ing conflict. in theory, the Court, as an independent organization, could 
mete out justice on all sides. yet because the Court depends on others 
for cooperation, these others can use the Court as an instrument to 
pursue their strategic aims.
 to date, Court officials and Court supporters have used empirical and 
normative arguments to justify the “no peace without justice” ideology, 
constantly switching between consequentialist, deontological, and insti-
tutional justifications of criminal justice.76 When empirical evidence, no 
matter how small, seems to support the claim, Court officials have pre-
sented the iCC as an instrument for peace, relying on a consequentialist 
justification. When the empirical evidence suggests that the Court ob-
structs peace, they have presented justice as an aim in itself, irrespective 
of its impact on peace, adopting a deontological approach. “no peace 
without justice” is then still invoked, for normative reasons. According to 
this view, iCC-style justice is the aim; peace may be a welcome derivative, 
but justice shall not be sacrificed to peace.77 Alternatively, when justice 
seems to obstruct peace, iCC officials have put forward an institutional 
justification according to which the Court’s mandate is limited to justice 
and other institutions are responsible for peace.
 the problem with the deontological approach is that it is difficult 
to maintain that the sole purpose of the iCC is to punish crimes, ir-
respective of the consequences, even if these consequences undermine 
the very values that the law claims to protect, such as human life and 
physical integrity.78 the problem with the consequentialist approach 
is that, as eric blumenson writes, it presents the Prosecutor with the 
“unavoidable but extraordinarily difficult task . . . to make decisions that 
invoke such magnificent hopes and terrible costs with so little predictive 
information.”79 moreover, even if the Prosecutor had the information, 
how should he or she weigh consequences, for instance the short-term 
versus the long-term, the local versus the universal, the consequences 
for identified victims versus those for abstract potential victims? for 
instance, if it were established that impunity hampers the sustainability 
of peace (positive peace), should the Prosecutor then decide to start 
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or continue proceedings even if this were to foreclose an immediate 
cease-fire (negative peace)? Should the Prosecutor prioritize his or her 
decisions on the basis of consequences for the communities where con-
flict is ongoing or where crimes were committed, or on the basis of 
consequences for the international legal order?
 the institutional justification seems most convincing for the Court. 
in this view, the Court’s mandate is “justice” (iCC-style), and others are 
responsible for “peace.” Adopting this rationale, as they do, Court offi-
cials should stop presenting peace as the iCC’s raison d’être. moreover, 
this means that other organizations with a mandate to resolve conflict 
and promote peace should be allowed to fulfill their missions.
 this division of labor reveals, however, a key problem that tran-
scends the iCC. the “no peace without justice” ideology has spurred 
a justice bulwark, the iCC, but has created few institutional safe-
guards to promote peace if, in a concrete case, the two noble aims 
seem to clash. for the peace negotiator, justice is a powerful lever, 
but an “instrument” of peacebuilding over which it lacks control. 
the Security Council, in turn, can only defer iCC proceedings, and 
only for a maximum of one year at a time. moreover, members of 
the Security Council that are committed to the “no peace without 
justice” ideology are reluctant to vote in favor of deferrals. the Court’s 
proponents have successfully argued that such a deferral would be 
political interference in the judicial process of an independent court, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Statute provides for a deferral by the 
Security Council. for states wedded to the iCC ideology, supporting 
the seemingly clean, judicial iCC provides a safer moral high ground 
than supporting seemingly dirty, political peace deals. encouraged by 
iCC officials, the ideology has even led some states to argue that they 
cannot support peace talks involving persons sought by the iCC. is 
there any institution that still considers itself primarily responsible 
for peace? the iCC attempts to do justice in the fog of war. Persons 
in northern uganda were stunned to learn that the Court issued ar-
rest warrants against the lrA without providing the forces to execute 
the warrants and to protect ugandans from lrA retaliatory actions.80 
no international actor claims responsibility for the consequences of 
justice on the security situation. States committed to the iCC shield 
themselves behind the Court, implicitly arguing “if not peace, then 
justice.” or they argue that peace will not be sustainable in the long 
term if accompanied by impunity. meanwhile, those most directly 
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affected by the consequences of iCC prosecutions on a conflict have 
“the weakest institutional channel” for influencing decision making 
by the iCC Prosecutor, the Security Council, or other external actors, 
and no means to hold them accountable.81
 given this institutional imbalance, the iCC Prosecutor would be 
wise to take into account the interests of peace when exercising his or 
her discretion of whether or not to open an investigation or prosecution. 
He or she could do so by interpreting the interests of justice to in-
clude the interests of peace.82 moreover, while the Statute suggests that 
the Prosecutor must investigate and prosecute when there is sufficient 
evidence and cases appear admissible and in the interests of justice, the 
Prosecutor has acknowledged that he factors in other considerations, 
such as the expected cooperation by states, when deciding whether or 
not to open an investigation.83 including the potential impact on peace 
would be a worthwhile other factor.
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The Politics of Negotiating Peace in Sudan
S H A r At H  S r i n i vA S A n
m o s t  C o n t e m P o r A r y  A r m e d  C o n f l i C t s  i n  A f r i C A  e n d  w i t h 
negotiated settlements, and peace negotiations lay important founda-
tions for peacebuilding. yet peace negotiations straddle awkwardly the 
immediate desire to end violence and aspirations for forging a more 
lasting yet underdetermined “peace.” the latter imperative assumes 
greater prominence in connection with outsiders’ peacebuilding strate-
gies, aimed ostensibly at transforming war-torn societies, in the sup-
posed self-image of the outsiders, into strong and stable states as sites 
of peace, democracy, and prosperity. Peace negotiations thus prefigure 
ever-broader reformist agendas, and this leaves more at stake at the ne-
gotiating table. Consequently, negotiations now involve wider and more 
complex political contestations. external interveners and domestic ac-
tors, not limited to armed belligerents, all seek to shape the contours 
of what “peace” will mean through, or in spite of, the negotiating table.
 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) finalized in January 2005 
between the Sudan People’s liberation movement/Army (SPlm/A) and 
the government of Sudan provided a framework for national peacebuilding 
but also laid foundations for the secession of the republic of South Sudan 
six and a half years later, in July 2011. these two adversaries had fought 
a bitter war since 1983, which had claimed more than a million lives and 
displaced millions more civilians. this also followed Sudan’s first civil war, 
fought by southern separatists intermittently between 1955 and 1972. the 
so-called government of national unity, created by the CPA and compris-
ing both signatories, failed to make unity attractive to southern Sudanese. 
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the CPA’s promise of national democratic transformation and institutional 
reform, seen as key to peacebuilding in the country, also went mostly unre-
alized, and peacemakers’ hope that the CPA would help in the resolution 
of the darfur conflict—which escalated in 2003 while the exclusive bilateral 
negotiations for the CPA were under way—proved naively optimistic.
 rebellion in the western region of darfur, aimed at the central govern-
ment in khartoum as much as being born of local intergroup conflicts, 
showed that the CPA was not at all “comprehensive,” a bitter complaint 
expressed by various opposition groups across Sudan who had been 
excluded from the negotiations long before darfur’s crisis. mediation 
efforts focused on darfur between 2004 and 2011, first led by the Afri-
can union (Au) with strong support from the united States (uS), and 
then followed by various initiatives that culminated in the Qatar-hosted 
joint Au and united nations (un) meditation. these negotiations 
were at times rushed, and failed to be wholly inclusive. they were also 
undermined by the way in which the post-CPA political arrangements 
constrained political space for compromise.
 At the moment of South Sudan’s naissance as a sovereign state in July 
2011, violence escalated in the nuba mountains area of Southern kordo-
fan state, on the northern side of the new international border. thou-
sands of disaffected nuba fighters who formed part of the SPlm/A 
demanded a better peace deal for their region than the CPA had deliv-
ered. this conflict soon spread to the neighboring blue nile state. this 
was another ominous reminder that the binary simplification of Sudan’s 
wars into a north versus south, Arab versus African, muslim versus 
Christian conflict, while it helped facilitate the CPA, did not come close 
to bringing peace to the region. Sudan is thus an example of partially 
failed peacebuilding with the negotiations process as a key element that 
severely limited the subsequent possibilities for peace.
 At the heart of peacemakers’ strategy in mediating the CPA was a 
belief that only by first ending the “north-south” war and then includ-
ing provisions for national democratic transformation could Sudan’s 
multifaceted political crises be addressed. narrow, bilateral negotiations 
were not only expedient; they were considered the only way forward. 
yet this causal logic was interpreted differently and actively resisted by 
groups who were excluded from the talks. northern opposition groups 
and nascent rebel movements in darfur feared that a bilateral deal 
would only strengthen the khartoum government’s power, rather than 
facilitate political change, and sought to access negotiations to influence 
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the terms of constitutional and state reform. And they watched bitterly 
during these negotiations as control over power, wealth, security, and 
peace dividends accrued to the negotiating parties, who closely guarded 
their gains. this disenfranchisement of the opposition groups and rebel 
movements during the negotiations led to their further marginalization 
and disengagement in the post-agreement period, contributing to many 
opposition parties boycotting national elections in April 2010, which 
had been envisaged as central to the wider peacebuilding effort.
 during the CPA negotiations, many SPlm/A leaders who still pur-
sued a national liberation struggle, whether as an overriding objective 
or as a strategy for ensuring that southern objectives would be achieved, 
were also wary of a binary “north-south” solution. Well before the CPA 
was signed, the negotiations set in motion new political dynamics that 
would ultimately confound the peacebuilding and democratic trans-
formation objectives of Western peacemakers. instead of positive and 
sustainable political change, the uncertainties of the post-agreement 
period gave way to “stabilization” and conflict management in the for-
eign policy priorities of intervening states.
 negotiated peacemaking in Sudan could have been otherwise, and 
therefore it is important to understand how and why it took the particu-
lar course that it did. in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was nothing 
certain about peace in Sudan. the possible political outcomes were many 
and diverse, and of grave national significance. different peacemakers 
and diverse domestic actors all made distinct claims on the best way 
forward for the country, ranging from a narrow focus on violence in the 
south and southerners’ aspirations to an inclusive national constitutional 
reform process. much, then, depended on how those who prevailed in 
shaping the peacemaking process reduced these many futures to few, and 
then fewer still, focusing on a narrow and militaristic subset of Sudan’s 
political elite to be the builders of peace. Peacemakers endorsed political 
opportunity born of violence, and Sudan’s ongoing violent battles for 
peace became battles over the form and function of the institutions to 
deliver peace, with effects far beyond the negotiating table.
 this chapter insists that peace negotiations must be analyzed within 
their wider politics. What is required is an examination not only of politi-
cal actions at the negotiating table but also of the far-reaching political 
contestations through which the negotiating table is produced, repro-
duced, and reshaped. it is the institution of the negotiating table itself—
whose form and constitutive parameters frame the bargaining of what 
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“peace” might mean—that often becomes the primary object of political 
action. in the midst of a war, political actors with interests and choices 
construct negotiations that are unique, that could have been different, and 
that affect and are affected by the war as well as other political processes.
 Applying this approach in broad strokes to the case of Sudan reveals 
how dynamics of war and their negotiated settlement are becoming in-
terwoven with peacebuilding logics. the predictability of external inter-
vention, combined with the likelihood that this intervention will involve 
efforts to forge institutions of civil peace, shapes discursive and coercive 
actions of conflict groups. nonstate armed groups are often “asymmetri-
cally” weaker than their state adversaries, and they strategize war with 
not just victory but also political settlement, and thus third-party peace-
makers, in mind. the rise to prominence of power and wealth-sharing 
provisions as medium-term solutions has led many conflict groups to 
preempt such objectives in framing their political claims during war. 
Arguably this has served to increase numbers of armed insurgents strat-
egizing for political advantage.1 Similarly, nonarmed opposition groups 
seek to establish their legitimacy and credibility for being included in 
negotiation processes, often adopting consequentialist arguments that 
exclusion may threaten enduring peace. the leitmotif of war and vio-
lence during negotiating peace is reinforced rather than reduced.
 the chapter proceeds in two parts. the first part introduces a schema 
for investigating the politics of negotiated peace, arranged around con-
testations over the institution’s constitutive elements, that overcomes 
deficiencies in mainstream theorization of contemporary peacemaking. 
the second part examines recent experiences of peacemaking in Sudan, 
deploying this schema to account for the pathologies in external efforts to 
forge and foster peace, with implications for larger peacebuilding projects.
Analyzing Peace negotiations
in Africa, negotiated settlement is lauded as civil war’s new endgame. 
military victory and defeat are now far less common. on one account, 
settlements outnumbered victories by seventeen to four globally between 
2000 and 2005, and ten of these were in sub-Saharan Africa.2 Peacemak-
ing, these proponents tell us, is contributing to a more peaceful world.
 yet negotiations are not just civil war’s endgame by other means; 
they are atypical sites of domestic politics where violent conflict has 
often constrained traditional domestic political space and enfeebled po-
litical institutions. battles over what “peace” should mean are political 
199
the Pol i t ics  of  negotiat ing Peace in Sudan
contestations over the state, political authority, and society that are not 
limited to belligerents at the negotiating table.
 A tension within the priorities of peacemaking and peacebuilding 
manifests itself in how negotiations articulate with national and local 
politics in unforeseen ways, sometimes sowing the seeds for future 
violence.3 Although, in an era of liberal peacebuilding, negotiation 
agendas address wide-ranging societal issues,4 external peacemakers are 
frequently motivated by a short-term priority of ending armed hos-
tilities between belligerents, thereby rendering rights to participate as a 
product more of violence than citizenship. negotiations between only 
armed political elites exert a pull on, yet exclude, a wider range of actors 
contesting “peace” than the belligerents alone.
 notwithstanding that Western peacemakers are often loathe to ex-
pand peace negotiations to a wide set of actors, they nevertheless seek 
to utilize the process of negotiations to lay foundations for efforts to 
change, shape, and strengthen state institutions and foster democratic 
“transformation.” We should inquire into the effects that peacebuilding 
objectives have on a third-party peacemaker’s actions in intervening in 
and shaping peace negotiations. We must also analyze how the norma-
tive appeal to reformist peacebuilding goals (such as institution build-
ing, democratic elections, rule of law, and security sector reform) serves 
as a justificatory rationale for specific mediation choices. finally, the 
ways in which the objectives and logics of liberal peacemaking interven-
tions are resisted, appropriated, and reshaped by national local actors 
require investigation.
 the tensions and inconsistencies in how peacemakers pursue peace—
between those who use leverage and strategy to wrestle the belligerents 
and the material and military dynamics of war to an end, and those 
who seek to intervene and build a sustainable peace in the twilight of 
violence—reflect basic divisions in theories and praxis of liberal peace-
making. traditional “conflict management” approaches devise strategies 
for negotiations for striking rational bargains between armed adversar-
ies to end hostilities.5 A narrow instrumentalist logic dominates, and 
for some the content of peace settlements matters less than forestall-
ing a resumption of violence.6 yet rationalist conflict management and 
mediation thought is increasingly inflected with normative proposals 
for reconstructing legitimate democratic governance and liberal state 
institutions to secure peace.7 this shift reflects the increasing influence 
of the peacebuilding agenda on peacemaking thinking and practice.
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 broader “conflict resolution” and peacebuilding frameworks are de-
vised as something rightly to be “done” to transform violent societies. 
these frameworks are diverse,8 but they have in common a normative 
orientation toward achieving some or another substantive conception of 
“peace” that goes beyond mediated bargains between belligerents. Con-
flict management’s narrow focus on elite deals is criticized. they may help 
halt war, but, in roger mac ginty’s summation, they “minister to conflict 
manifestations rather than causes, reinforce rather than challenge inter-
group division, attend to armed groups but neglect less vocal but more 
vulnerable constituencies . . . in short, they deliver poor quality peace.”9
 Conflict resolution approaches more readily identify normative stan-
dards for “good” peace settlements. Peter Wallensteen notes “increasingly 
established norms” for the content of “internationally acceptable peace 
agreements,” including principles of democracy, human rights, criminal 
justice, reconciliation, and economic cooperation.10 this normative turn 
is mirrored in increased scholarly attention to the elements of jus post 
bellum, the neglected third pillar in just war theory, which corresponds 
with postconflict peacebuilding.11 How wars are justly ended bears upon 
the justness of going to war and how and to what extent war is fought, but 
these justificatory principles are being increasingly applied to legitimize 
when, how, and to what ends peacemakers should intervene.
 Peace negotiations are a messy battleground. Whether the building of 
“just” peace should begin during the mediation of negotiated settlements 
poses particular dilemmas. Should peacemakers, for example, sanction a 
permanent cease-fire and general amnesties—possibly closing off the op-
portunity for agreement on more significant political reforms—in order 
to immediately end hostilities and human suffering? Conversely, might 
insistence that a wider group of political actors—including civil society 
groups—take the time to negotiate a “thicker” peace, one more widely 
accepted and in line with “established norms,” come at the cost of pro-
longed war and more lives lost? furthermore, how do the belligerents 
and other local actors view their stakes and how do they seek to influence 
the content and implementation of peace? these contradictions and ten-
sions play out in local political dynamics, as political actors (armed and 
nonarmed) seek to pursue opportunities and secure advantages.
 despite significant differences, conflict management, conflict resolu-
tion, and just war theories are united by their focus on how to “best” 
contain and end war. there is a presumptive granting of virtue and 
legitimacy to peacemakers. An outsider-insider (mediator–conflicting 
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parties) approach is taken, and mediation assumes a functional and 
technical identity. the embedded nature of negotiated peacemaking 
within wider politics is subsumed within analysis of conditions and 
techniques for, and obstacles and risks to, interventions for resolving 
conflict. the fact of whether and why third-party states intervene in 
African conflicts is sometimes analyzed in terms of their interests,12 
for instance security, material gains, or domestic political pressures, but 
there is a paucity of analysis on how the interests, power, biases, and 
ideological proclivities of the actors who intervene for peace affect the 
kind of peace promoted and its wider effects. it is evident that mak-
ing peace is a “profoundly political endeavor,” yet it is mostly analyzed 
within a depoliticized, problem-solving modality.
 these deficiencies are more pronounced because of how peacebuild-
ing imperatives increasingly guide the objectives and actions of third-
party peacemakers. “Peace dividends” are combined with blueprints for 
constitutional and institutional reform to shape the positive peace that 
a negotiations process should be positioned to deliver. beginning with 
the particular form and function of the institution created to achieve a 
mediated settlement, the contours of “positive peace” can be influenced 
by third parties oriented toward their objectives, especially institutional 
and political reform and security arrangements. nonstate armed groups 
are supported with training and advice on preparing themselves to 
negotiate peace. expert “technical” consultations are commonplace in 
matters such as wealth- and power-sharing and security arrangements, 
dealing not only with interim issues such as demobilization, disarma-
ment, and reintegration of ex-combatants but also with issues such as 
electoral processes and institutions, decentralization, and judicial ar-
rangements. Postconflict planning and financing processes begin during 
the negotiations themselves, and peacebuilding institutions seek proto-
col agreements and implementation arrangements to meet their needs.
 Who defines the what questions—the “problem” of “war” and the 
“solution” of “peace”—generally and in any given case? How do cer-
tain actors’ definitions prevail over those of other actors, and with what 
political effects? if different contestations over what “war” and “peace” 
mean are closely tied to ideas of how to address the conflict, then the 
choices over the institutional form of negotiated peacemaking are cen-
tral to this political contestation. Peace is not a rational solution to the 
problem of war; rather, just as with war, it is a dynamic and contested 
process of social construction and action.
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 the institution for negotiations must therefore construct key elements 
of the war and the pathway to peace in ways that encourage a shift in 
the means of political action from violence to argumentative ideational 
politics. these “ideational” components include specifications for (1) how 
to (the scope of peacemaking, such as elite versus broad-based; rules 
of behavior in negotiations; organizational aspects, including sponsors, 
financing, mediator, location, international backing, experts, observers); 
(2) end a war through reaching political compromises (characterizing the po-
litical “conflict” that led to war with related possible solutions guided by 
ideas of “peace”: a “problem/solution” nexus captured in the agenda for 
talks); (3) between specific actors (who are or are not to be included, and 
how their identities are depicted); (4) who are resorting to violence (the 
political naming of violence and the framing of war); (5) to achieve political 
ends (the ascribing of political ideology or purpose to the warring parties).
 How these ideational components are specified significantly deter-
mines the territory of possible peace outcomes that negotiations might 
produce. the ideational components of the institution, taken together, 
also require sufficient logical coherence. for example, an expedient de-
sire to restrict the number of negotiating parties to the fewest possible 
requires framing the conflict in more reductionist—ideally binary—
terms. yet such reductionism, given its powerful effects, is subject to 
real-time domestic contestations, creating a dynamic interaction be-
tween the process of creating the institution and the ongoing politics of 
conflict. re-embedding analysis of mediation interventions within the 
politics to which they relate sheds a different light on them.
the Politics of negotiated Peace in Sudan
the two Sudans of 2012 are still battling for peace, between and within 
themselves. rather than giving all focus to how the negotiation of the 
CPA led to the independence of South Sudan, we should return to the 
period of the negotiations themselves and interrogate how the facilita-
tion of this particular peace outcome was achieved and with what wider 
effects in Sudanese politics. the CPA negotiations between 2001 and 
2004 were led by the intergovernmental Authority on development 
(igAd), a regional organization,13 with the heavy involvement of a 
“troika” consisting of the uS, the united kingdom (uk), and nor-
way. the CPA produced a singularly remarkable result, a peace process 
that despite many faltering moments remained intact and delivered for 
southern Sudanese full exercise of their rights to self-determination. 
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the agreement may be understood to be a tremendous success in this 
regard, but this would be as a success on its particular terms. Whether 
better or worse, peace outcomes in Sudan might have been otherwise, 
depending on the particular ways in which the prevailing institution 
to deliver peace was constituted. moreover, in achieving this particular 
success, the CPA and the igAd peace initiative also allowed a range of 
deleterious effects, especially in Sudan’s north.
 the igAd initiative, which began in 1993, was only one among many 
regional and international peacemaking efforts to resolve the civil war. from 
the mid-1980s Sudan was on a seesaw between the battle of bullets and that 
of words. major external peacemaking initiatives aside from the igAd en-
gagement included those led by former uS president Jimmy Carter in 1990, 
nigeria between 1992 and 1994, and egypt and libya between 1999 and 
2002. the rejuvenated igAd initiative between 2001 and 2004 prevailed 
over others and achieved far greater success for a range of reasons.
 despite a dominant rhetoric of neutrality and even passivity, third-party 
interveners in peace processes, whether mediators, facilitators, or observers, 
or more active (and coercive) peace enforcers, are influential interveners. 
in Sudan, most of the “peacemakers” involved in the igAd negotiations 
had been engaged in proxy wars with khartoum, were arming opposition 
groups, or had fractious diplomatic relations with Sudan. the type of peace 
they sought to make reflected their disposition toward the Sudanese state 
and aspirations for its future. the igAd negotiations also presented a 
“ripe” opportunity for Western interveners—especially the troika but also 
a range of Western states in the igAd international Partners forum—
seeking to advance their reformist political agenda in Sudan.
 the four igAd member states that sponsored the Sudan negotia-
tions—eritrea, ethiopia, kenya, and uganda—each had its own interests 
in its neighbor’s domestic politics and pursued ideas of peace in Sudan 
suited to its particular foreign policy. the declaration of Principles for 
negotiations that they prepared in 1993 reflected their preferences with its 
tilt toward the SPlm/A’s “new Sudan” aspiration of a secular democratic 
country and willingness to entertain southern independence.
 After the talks broke down in 1994, uganda, ethiopia, and eritrea 
increased military support to the SPlm/A and urged all opposition 
forces to unite under the national democratic Alliance (ndA) ban-
ner (the ndA included northern opposition groups marginalized after 
the national islamic front/national Congress Party [nif/nCP] took 
power in 1989; the SPlm/A joined and then led the ndA from the 
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mid-1990s). ethiopia took a particularly hard line against khartoum 
after the attempted assassination on egyptian president Hosni mubarak 
in Addis Ababa in 1995, but relations recovered after the ethio-eritrean 
war of 1998–2000. eritrea had become an earnest champion of the 
ndA and pursued confrontational strategies against khartoum in spite 
of the igAd negotiations, including arming and supporting the darfur 
rebellion. kenya, ultimately the key igAd peacemaker, was the most 
impartial of all, but it viewed Sudan’s wars, from its geographical van-
tage point and as host to many tens of thousands of southern Sudanese 
refugees, as being almost exclusively between south and north.
 Sudan’s wars were embedded within a vexed regional conflict com-
plex, and contending regional peacemakers were engaged in efforts far 
removed from neutral and dispassionate peacemaking. the egyptian-
libyan initiative between 1999 and 2002, in contrast with the igAd 
negotiations, did not include the option of southern self-determination 
as a basic principle, did not mention religion and state, and involved 
the diverse northern opposition parties within its scope of negotiations. 
for egypt, a reformed but united Sudan, with its islamist government 
moderated, was a key foreign policy objective.
 that the igAd initiative prevailed as the focal negotiations forum 
had much to do with the heavy diplomatic endorsement it received from 
Washington, which had its own partisan position regarding Sudan. the 
oft-repeated phrase on Capitol Hill was that there was “no moral equiva-
lence” between the SPlm/A and khartoum, which had been on the uS 
Congress’s list of states sponsoring terrorism since 1993. Washington was 
not a neutral arbiter, but the domestic moral concern for an end to south-
erners’ suffering motivated President george W. bush’s administration to 
engage khartoum on peacemaking with the offer of focusing on ending 
the “southern war” (pulling back from previous demands for national po-
litical transformation or regime change) and counterterrorism coopera-
tion, with the reward (albeit repeatedly postponed) of normalizing rela-
tions. yet a tension remained between a more realist conflict management 
objective of striking a deal, on the one hand, and a wider peacebuilding 
imperative, on the other. According to one senior uS diplomat, in 2003 
President bush linked democratization in Sudan, to be achieved through 
the peace process, with his wider middle east strategy.14
 in 2001 the uS-uk-norway troika began to seek an African-led 
peace initiative that they could significantly shape to include a broad 
transformative peacebuilding agenda. igAd’s Western backers agreed 
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that “negative peace” required a deal between the primary belligerents, 
but along the way they hoped a more comprehensive “positive” or “lib-
eral” peace deal could be urged that would include terms for multiparty 
democratic politics, security sector and judicial reform, and more equi-
table development. the igAd initiative, with kenya at the helm, was 
heavily dependent on its international backers for financial and techni-
cal support. this gave the international backers leverage to take a con-
siderably interventionist stance toward the conduct of the negotiations.
 Peacemakers, with their own interests in particular ideas of peace—
ranging from imperatives for efficacy to aspirations for political trans-
formation—thus also characterized the “problem/solution” nexus of 
the war in specific ways that played into domestic contestations over 
framing the war and the requirements of peace. descriptive frames that 
oversimplified the conflict or distorted Sudan’s sociopolitical makeup 
were not benign: they were active ingredients in the institutional prac-
tices of the negotiations that allowed for some possibilities of peace and 
foreclosed others. frames, as Christopher Cramer points out in his dis-
cussion of the category “civil war,” shape what is viewed and how what 
is viewed is interpreted.15 frames may be received, but they are actively 
reproduced and reshaped toward serving problem-solving policy action. 
As Stathis kalyvas notes, the “serious semantic contestation” over the 
term civil war is often part of the conflict.16 And the contestation takes 
on an altogether far more serious, and often violent, form when it is real, 
and between (often armed) domestic actors over a particular framing of 
a particular war that will determine political possibilities of peace.
 the dominant frame for understanding Sudan’s war in binary oppo-
sites was contested within Sudan and indeed lay at the heart of the con-
flict between the warring groups. Sudan’s successive central governments 
were at pains to insist that the war with the SPlm/A was depicted and 
quarantined as the “southern problem” only, yet the SPlm/A pursued 
a national liberation struggle that attracted other marginalized groups 
within Sudan in addition to southerners. by the time of the negotiations, 
the SPlm/A included tens of thousands of fighters from predominantly 
muslim groups in northern Sudan, and it had allied with other north-
ern opposition groups to launch fronts in the east of the country, using 
eritrea as a base. Although the latter was more a product of tactics and 
convenience, the many thousands of fighters from the nuba mountains, 
southern blue nile, and elsewhere in the north who joined the SPlm/A 
shared southerners’ grievances that Sudan’s political and economic elites 
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held power to their exclusion and treated them as second-class citizens. 
in sum, the war had long ceased being only a “southern war.”
 nevertheless, the binary simplification of the conflict aided an effi-
cacious approach to structuring the negotiations. igAd’s constellation 
of peacemakers brought to an end Sudan’s two-decades-long civil war, 
but this required the peace to be negotiated bilaterally and exclusively 
between khartoum and the SPlm/A, who were deemed to represent the 
“north” and the “south” respectively. As the institutional parameters for 
negotiating peace became more fixed, this reality gave way to institutional 
rigidities. the kenyan mediator for the negotiations, general lazaro 
Sumbeiywo, when pressed on the narrow bilateral nature of the negotia-
tions, stated: “i am interested in peace between north and south. that is 
my mandate, and i am sticking to it.”17 before negotiations even began, 
the institution’s ideational components had framed the political contest of 
wills that constituted the war, giving emphasis to some understandings of 
war and not others, and prefiguring the ideational possibilities of peace.
 domestic political actors, however, continued to challenge the in-
stitution’s design on peace. the SPlm/A had been given the identity 
of “southern rebels” pursuing southern objectives. the SPlm/A from 
its inception consistently protested that the problem was national in 
scope and rooted in central government policies that had merely af-
fected the south first and most egregiously. An influential part of the 
SPlm/A leadership, notably those close to its erstwhile leader John 
garang, maintained this national outlook throughout the negotiations, 
even when many within the SPlm/A were more parochially focused 
on southern independence. it is thus somewhat unsurprising that 
when the negotiations increasingly looked as though they would box 
the SPlm/A into a deal for the south alone, garang and his followers 
actively supported the nascent rebellion in darfur.
 the SPlm/A’s support for rebel groups in darfur accorded with ga-
rang’s national aspirations but also had immediate objectives, namely to 
put pressure on khartoum and the peacemakers while the negotiations, 
especially those on partly SPlm/A-held areas in northern Sudan (the 
nuba mountains, southern blue nile, and Abyei), were going nowhere. 
khartoum had refused attempts by peacemakers to address these areas 
in the igAd institution, arguing, for example in late 2002, that “igAd’s 
mandate is to handle the southern Sudan question only, and we are not 
accepting any attempt (to include other areas) even if igAd were to be 
dismantled altogether.”18 khartoum finally acquiesced to such negotia-
tions, but the SPlm/A failed to achieve its objectives for these areas and 
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indeed undermined local aspirations for peace. this tracks well with the 
SPlm/A’s success in laying symbolic claim to part of the darfur rebellion 
as part of its self-identification as a wider national political movement but 
its ultimate failure to unify different rebellions within a common cause and 
achieve a decisive national settlement, let alone military victory.
 negotiations that were structured around a north-south axis but that 
held out hope for wider political transformation across Sudan exacer-
bated, in the short term, political violence rooted in the country’s center-
periphery dynamics of inequality and marginalization. darfur’s rebellion 
was not “caused” by the exclusive peace negotiations, but it was certainly 
emboldened by them. for the leader of one faction of the darfur-based 
Sudan liberation movement/Army, Abdul Wahid al-nur, the watershed 
machakos Protocol of July 2002, which established the core elements of 
the CPA, was “not a solution. it put the country into a corner that the 
national Congress Party wanted. the SPlm was strong and they cor-
nered the SPlm into the south. . . . for me, machakos just divided the 
country, put our country in blocks, south and north, and just made things 
worse.”19 from late 2002 onward, as the situation escalated to all-out war 
in darfur, his movement was in close contact with garang’s SPlm/A.
 equally, as growing political instability and violence in the nuba 
mountains region of Southern kordofan throughout the post-agreement 
period foreboded, armed actors in this and other regions in Sudan’s 
north could not and would not disappear simply because of a domi-
nant historical narrative that framed a north-south peace that settled a 
north-south war. in turn, violence during the post-2005 period, notably 
in Abyei and the nuba mountains, prompted a reemphasis by external 
actors on security and stabilization priorities—above all, ensuring that 
the signatories to the CPA did not lapse back into direct military con-
frontation—that overshadowed peacebuilding efforts aimed at strength-
ening institutions of civil politics in Sudan’s north.
 How the “problem/solution” nexus was depicted was closely connected 
to the exclusivity of the negotiations and its effects. When the igAd ne-
gotiations prevailed over other competing peace initiatives and peacemak-
ers accepted defining Sudan’s war as a “north-south war” and the “southern 
problem” was elaborated as first and foremost the need to “end the violence 
and civilian suffering in the south,” then it was deemed sufficient to include 
only the primary belligerents depicted as representing “the north” and “the 
south” respectively, and to strike a deal between them that ended the war.
 despite the wider peacebuilding agenda being pursued by Western 
peacemakers, the expedient way forward in Sudan was not a broad 
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inclusive negotiation. this would, to summarize various Western diplo-
mats involved, “hopelessly complicate” the negotiations and jeopardize 
any agreement at all. the legitimacy of claims by various northern op-
position forces—whose national democratic Alliance had included the 
SPlm/A and had previously been championed by Western actors—to 
be included and heard in the negotiations was rejected. this policy de-
cision was buttressed by deploying a cause-effect idea that only when 
the “southern war” was stopped would national political reform that 
addressed wider grievances be possible.
 this causal logic proved fallacious. early exclusion laid the basis for 
enduring exclusion and disenfranchisement, and this ensured that the ad-
vantage granted to the khartoum government in focusing on the “south-
ern problem” persisted during the post-agreement period. Peacemakers 
repeatedly deferred inclusion of northern opposition parties in the nego-
tiations on the promise of subsequent inclusion in a constitutional review 
process and their right to freely contest scheduled democratic elections. 
However, the parties to the negotiations secured their preferential posi-
tion at the expense of those excluded. the CPA, running to over 250 
pages of detailed prescriptions for the political and security arrangements 
of the post-agreement period, largely predetermined the shape and struc-
ture of the interim national constitution and ensured the dominant role 
of the signatories to the agreement in any further reforms.
 the disaffection of the northern opposition parties with the consti-
tutional review process was followed by their frustration with how the 
ruling nCP managed the elections process, which led many parties to 
ultimately boycott the (delayed) national presidential elections in 2010. 
by 2011, when it was clear that the southerners wished to secede, a new 
opposition coalition in the north was again calling for an inclusive na-
tional constitutional review process. Worryingly, the wholesale failure to 
achieve meaningful political reform in Sudan’s north during the interim 
period laid foundations for a new war between a largely unreformed 
nCP in control of the “center” in khartoum and the north’s new “pe-
ripheries” of darfur, South kordofan, blue nile, and eastern Sudan.
 A narrow emphasis on resolving violence in southern Sudan within 
the CPA negotiations also necessitated depoliticizing violence else-
where, lest the negotiations appear manifestly ill-conceived and in need 
of reform that might jeopardize the chance of an imminent deal. When, 
in 2003 and early 2004, both the Sudan government and igAd and 
Western peacemakers were concerned that darfur might spoil the CPA 
negotiations, all benefited from downplaying the violence in darfur and 
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naming it “local,” “intertribal,” and “between farmers and pastoralists.” 
this obviated the need to address this violence within the igAd insti-
tution: the “southern war” remained distinct.
 in different ways and during different time periods, both of these 
actor groups actively supported such frames. in 2003, notwithstanding 
that the rebel movements had released political manifestos, khartoum 
mostly referred to the rebel groups as “bandits” with no political agenda, 
“armed criminal gangs,” “gangsters,” “highwaymen,” or “outlaws.” Also 
in 2003, uk government ministers referred to the tribal and historical 
nature of the conflict in darfur when fielding questions in parliament, 
notwithstanding the increasingly evident national political dimensions 
of the rebellion. When the uS State department spoke out on darfur 
for the first time in late 2003, it specifically noted that darfur was “not 
linked to the ongoing peace talks between the government of Sudan 
and the Sudan People’s liberation movement/Army in kenya.”20
 yet peacemakers and the khartoum government also knew of the 
SPlm/A’s involvement in supporting the rebels. this knowledge was un-
utterable, lest it make clear that violence in Sudan was deeply interlinked, 
and that the neat simplicity of igAd’s “north-south” negotiations was 
problematic. on one occasion, in mid-2003, the SPlm/A’s leader rev-
eled in the enabling and constraining features of the politics of naming 
violence. Accused by khartoum of supporting the darfur rebellion during 
a crisis in the negotiations, garang noted to a reporter that khartoum 
could not, on the one hand, describe the situation in darfur as armed 
plunder and, on the other hand, accuse the SPlm/A of being involved. 
khartoum, he added, “must first define the matter clearly” and understand 
its “political content.”21 but to do so, he well knew, would be to jeopar-
dize the whole basis of the igAd negotiations as aiming to solve Sudan’s 
“southern problem.” the SPlm/A’s involvement in the conflict in darfur 
proved useful leverage as it negotiated a more favorable deal for itself in the 
CPA. the war in darfur and the CPA negotiations were thus entwined in 
complex ways, and these political developments during the negotiation of 
the agreement cast a shadow over the post-agreement period.
many of the challenges that plagued postconflict peacebuilding efforts 
in Sudan after the CPA had their origins in how peace was negotiated in 
the first place. the achievement of southern self-determination and the 
independence of South Sudan was the CPA’s towering success; how-
ever, the process of arriving at this point also left open the possibility 
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that Sudan’s wars would, for the foreseeable future, be without end. this 
ensured that an array of new and equally vexing peacebuilding chal-
lenges would face Sudan and South Sudan despite the CPA process 
having in a formal sense neared finality.
 bloody front lines of the war prior to the CPA included those in the 
nuba mountains and blue nile regions of central Sudan, and these areas 
experienced renewed instability after the culmination of the CPA peace 
process failed to deliver secure and meaningful political change that 
addressed local grievances. northern opposition groups that were mar-
ginalized during the negotiations and dissatisfied with opportunities for 
political engagement in the post-agreement period remained fractious 
and continued to agitate for wholesale change in Sudan. the conflict 
in darfur, despite an agreement reached in doha, Qatar, between one 
of the rebel movements, the liberation and Justice movement, and the 
government of Sudan, in July 2011, appeared poised to worsen, given 
that the dominant national Congress Party now sought to reassert its 
claim to rule the new “north” Sudan in the wake of the secession of 
South Sudan. by early 2012, an alliance between the “SPlm-north” 
and the main darfur rebel movements had been formalized.
 meanwhile, the dominant SPlm/A, in near-exclusive control of the 
state in South Sudan, faced its own challenges from discontented armed 
and nonarmed political factions that seemingly had been waiting for the 
South’s secession before seeking to settle old scores. this was portentous 
of a new peacebuilding challenge to build inclusive and plural civil poli-
tics within the militarized and war-ravaged new state. it also remained 
to be seen whether these latent and manifest conflicts could be contained 
to those already developing within the two new sovereign states or, far 
more worryingly, whether dynamics had been established that might lead 
to a new interstate war. the unresolved dispute between the two states 
over the oil-producing region of Abyei, as well as disputes over oil export 
revenues and fees that led to South Sudan shutting down production and 
over the demarcation of the new international border, presented ample 
trigger points for such confrontation. finally, in April 2012, major military 
confrontation broke out between the two states, forcing the Au and un 
Security Council to scramble into “conflict management” mode once again.
 the particular course that negotiated peacemaking took in Sudan 
owed considerably to how the igAd institution was constituted to 
pursue a particular strategy for peace in the country. the manner in 
which the peace was devised in ways that sought to simplify and dis-
tort the underlying reality of the conflict to make it easier to achieve a 
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bargain, or to leave that complexity to be resolved sequentially in the 
post-agreement peacebuilding period, had dynamic consequences well 
before the agreement was reached. the negotiations, given the power 
they held over Sudan’s future political arrangements, became a target of 
political contestation within wider Sudanese politics. Such contestation 
left a legacy of renewed political struggle, disenfranchisement, and 
violent contestation that squarely undermined the ambitions of peace-
makers and peacebuilders for the post-agreement period.
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Peacebuilding in the  
Great Lakes Region of Africa
r e n é  l e m A r C H A n d
i n  n o  o t h e r  PA rt  o f  t h e  C o n t i n e n t  i s  t h e  m u lt i fA C e t e d  tA s k 
of peacebuilding facing more daunting challenges than in the great 
lakes region of Central Africa, an area comprising the eastern part of 
the democratic republic of the Congo (drC), rwanda, burundi, and 
uganda. nowhere else has the effort enlisted the participation of such a 
wide array of domestic and international actors, ranging from advocacy 
groups, local nongovernmental organizations (ngos), churches, inter-
national think tanks, regional organizations, special envoys, individual 
statesmen, the bretton Woods organizations, as well as the european 
union (eu) and united nations (un). no wonder the sheer multiplicity 
of interveners is often seen as part of the problem rather than the solution.
 As the centerpiece of peacebuilding operations in the drC, the 
united nations organization mission in the democratic republic of 
the Congo (monuC) carried the heaviest load. nowhere else has a un 
peacekeeping operation mobilized the energies of a larger number of ci-
vilian and military personnel (from 5,500 at its inception in 1999 to some 
20,000 by 2012), at greater cost for the international community (uS$1 
billion per annum), and with more ambivalent results. this is a com-
mentary on the scale and complexity of the crisis. it brings into focus the 
devastating impact of the two Congo wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003)—
the pivotal events in the Congo’s slide into chaos and a catastrophe for 
which there are no precedents anywhere on the continent.
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 there is, however, an instructive precedent for the un engagement, 
traceable to an earlier crisis when, in the years immediately following 
independence in 1960, Cold War pressures threatened to bring the new 
state to the edge of collapse. As the mineral-rich katanga province 
declared its independence from the central government, Stanleyville 
(now kisangani) became the bastion of a left-leaning breakaway fac-
tion headed by Antoine gizenga. What became known as the united 
nations operation in the Congo (onuC) effectively brought to 
an end the katanga secession, through the use of force, and laid the 
groundwork for a government of national unity headed by Cyrille 
Adoula.1 onuC, unlike its more recent avatar and though claiming 
approximately as many men on the ground (20,000) as monuC, was 
significantly more limited in terms of its goal (ending the katanga 
secession), its activities (political and military), and its duration (1960–
63), and, not surprisingly, it was considerably cheaper. monuC (later 
monuSCo),2 by contrast, covers a significantly larger area; it involves 
a plethora of auxiliary activities (such as disarmament and reinsertion 
of ex-combatants, civil and political affairs, refugee relocation, public 
health issues, and so forth) and claims a longer life-span. unlike what 
has all too often been the case with monuC/monuSCo, its prede-
cessor did not shun the use of force when diplomacy proved unavailing. 
there is evidently more than a change of acronym separating the two 
un interventions.
 the extension of conflict on a regional scale, drawing into its vortex 
an ever-increasing number of participants, with easy access to automatic 
weapons and mineral resources, helps explain its deadly impact on civil-
ian lives. According to the international rescue Committee (irC) the 
death toll in the drC between 1998 and 2008 was estimated at nearly 
5.4 million.3 Although the figure has since been revised downward, it is 
probably a fairly conservative estimate if one adds the human losses in 
rwanda and burundi since 1993.
 What peacebuilders are up against in the great lakes is a long-term, 
multifaceted, interlinked crisis. it is best described, in braudelian terms, 
as a longue durée phenomenon rooted in the historicity of domestic and 
interstate conflicts, a crisis made even more intractable by the obstacles 
inherent in the regional environment. there is no room in this context 
for quick-fix solutions; nor can the continuing significance of major 
historical events be ignored, any more than their tragic repercussions 
among the people of the region.
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 before turning to a discussion of the strategic shortcomings that 
have plagued peacebuilding efforts in the great lakes, something must 
be said of the contrasts and paradoxes inscribed in the geopolitics of 
former belgian Africa.
the regional environment: Contrasts and Paradoxes
the most obvious contrast is between the enormity of the area covered 
by the drC, the second largest state on the continent (950,000 square 
miles), and the lilliputian size of its neighbors to the east, rwanda and 
burundi, each approximately a hundred times smaller (10,000 square 
miles).4 no less striking are the disparities of mineral wealth. it is not for 
nothing that the early belgian colonizers, upon discovering the Congo’s 
huge deposits of copper, cobalt, diamonds, and gold, called it “a geologi-
cal scandal”—a situation in stark contrast with resource-poor rwanda 
and burundi, both heavily dependent on the export of tea and coffee 
cash crops. it is hardly a matter of coincidence, therefore, if much of the 
violence sweeping across the region is often referred to as a “resource 
war,” if the rewards held up to ex-combatants for returning to civilian 
life seem all too modest compared to the benefits reaped from diamond 
and gold smuggling, and if continued access to the Congo’s wealth is 
perceived by rwanda as a major goal of its regional foreign policy.
 the differences in the countries’ social landscapes are equally clear. 
the extreme diversity of communities and social systems found in 
the drC has relatively little in common with the more hierarchical, 
biethnic social patterns characteristic of rwanda and burundi, or in-
deed with the sharply divergent restructuring of their respective social 
systems brought about by recent upheavals. it is worth emphasizing 
that rwanda and burundi are not the only states inhabited by Hutu 
and tutsi. uganda, tanzania, and the drC claim sizable minorities 
of Hutu and tutsi elements, which together could number anywhere 
from 10 to 12 million; only in the drC, however, has the kinyarwanda-
speaking, or rwandophone, minority played a more decisive role in the 
country’s destiny.
 other paradoxes come to mind. Although the drC’s treasure trove 
translates into a uniquely promising potential for economic develop-
ment, 80 percent of its population lives in abject poverty. rwanda, in 
contrast, once described as among the poorest of the poor, shows one 
of the highest rates of economic growth on the continent (7 percent). 
more surprising still, the rwandan army, estimated to number around 
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75,000 personnel, has developed into the most formidable military 
machine in the region. rwanda has the capacity effectively to project 
its military force anywhere into eastern drC, as it has on several oc-
casions in the past. the key to the paradox lies in the magnitude of 
the financial aid provided by the international community in the years 
following the 1994 rwanda genocide, reaching the unprecedented level 
of over uS$500 million in 2004, as if to atone for its inaction during 
the genocide and redeem itself in the eyes of the victimized minority. 
the height of irony is that some of the most intractable issues faced by 
peacekeepers in the wake of the 1996 anti-mobutist insurgency, includ-
ing the repeated human rights violations committed by the rwandan 
army or its surrogates in the drC, could not have happened without 
the enormous amount of international financial aid channeled into the 
coffers of the rwandan regime.
 rwanda’s military capabilities have led to cost-free access to the drC’s 
mineral wealth, at which point rwanda’s military involvement in east-
ern Congo became self-financing. even more surprising in view of the 
overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to Paul kagame’s direct 
involvement in the crash of the rwandan president’s plane on April 6, 
1994—the precipitating factor behind the genocide—is the fact that this 
evidence has done little to diminish his prestigious aura in the eyes of his 
principal benefactors, the united kingdom and the united States. nor 
has his utter disdain for democracy dented his image as the man who 
brought the genocide to an end—never mind that he helped provoke it.5
the Historicity of Conflict
extreme brutality is the defining characteristic of the conflicts that have 
ravaged the region; their cumulative impact on the life of local commu-
nities has been little short of devastating. the savagery of the rwanda 
genocide, resulting in the deaths of over 600,000 people, mostly of tutsi 
origins, needs no elaboration. What is not always appreciated is that 
rwanda is not the only venue tainted by genocide. in a classic replay 
of victims turned killers, tens of thousands of Hutu refugees in eastern 
drC were massacred by units of the rwandan Patriotic Army (rPA) 
in 1996 and 1997, when search and destroy operations directed at the 
génocidaires morphed into a wholesale massacre of Hutu civilians.6 bu-
rundi, likewise, suffered a terrifying bloodletting—better described as 
genocide—in 1972, when, in response to a localized uprising, between 
200,000 and 300,000 Hutu civilians were killed in cold blood by the 
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tutsi-dominated army. nor did the litany of horrors, begun with the 
abortive, Hutu-sponsored coup of 1965, stop in 1972.7 After the election 
of melchior ndadaye, a Hutu, to the presidency in burundi in 1993, the 
tutsi-led army swiftly proceeded to reverse the verdict of the polls: his 
assassination unleashed an extremely bloody civil war, causing possibly 
as many victims among Hutu as among tutsi. not until 2005, following 
multiparty elections and the adoption of a power-sharing constitution, 
would the country experience a modicum of peace. but after the deci-
sion of most of the opposition parties to boycott the 2010 elections, thus 
giving the ruling party unfettered control of parliament and government, 
the future of burundi’s consociational democracy is anybody’s guess.
 How did such sustained, deliberate violence affect local communi-
ties? Although the answer is by no means self-evident, this question 
goes to the heart of the problems facing peacebuilders: how to come to 
grips with the multiplicity of local tragedies brought about by massive 
refugee flows, the looting of property, the theft of cattle, the expulsion 
of millions of internally displaced persons from their traditional home-
lands, uprooting of traditional authority figures, the spread of sexual 
abuse, the emergence of armed bands, and so forth. As had been noted 
time and again by outside observers, most notably Séverine Autesserre,8 
failure to take into account the critical importance of local issues goes a 
long way toward explaining the inability of peacebuilders to live up to 
their mandate.
 these local issues did not just happen; they are the consequences 
of broader conflicts. to be more precise, there is a circular connection 
between regional or interstate conflicts and their spin-off effects at the 
local level, so that bottom-up pressures feed into top-down confron-
tations and vice versa. to take the most obvious example: local-level 
grievances were certainly instrumental in mobilizing the Congolese 
masses against the mobutist state in 1996–97, but the collapse of the 
regime created the institutional void out of which a flurry of local mi-
litias emerged, and these in turn were quickly recycled on behalf of, 
or against, new regional enemies, again with disastrous consequences 
among rural communities.
 How local conflicts spilled over national boundaries to bring about 
wider confrontations is perhaps best illustrated by the role played by the 
banyamulenge9 in paving the way for mobutu’s demise. the projection 
of the Hutu-tutsi conflict into the Congo is indeed the key to un-
derstanding the circumstances that led to the collapse of the mobutist 
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state. though previous Hutu-tutsi frictions were not unheard of, it was 
not until 1994, after the rwanda genocide, that the “banyarwanda” label 
dissolved into full-blown Hutu-tutsi enmities. Almost overnight the 
lines were clearly drawn between the mobutu-backed Hutu refugee 
community and the pro-rwanda tutsi minority, the latter including 
both the long-established so-called banyamulenge (“the people of 
mulenge”) in South kivu, and the ethnic tutsi of north kivu. many 
were the Congolese tutsi who joined the rwandan Patriotic front 
(rPf) in the early 1990s, and their open display of sympathy for 
kagame’s rPf confirmed the suspicion of many Congolese that their 
loyalties were to rwanda. lingering distrust of the tutsi quickly turned 
into hatred as a million Hutu refugees from rwanda poured across the 
border into eastern Congo, soon followed by thousands of Hutu from 
burundi fleeing the avenging arm of the tutsi-dominated army. by 
mid-1996 the banyamulenge minority of South kivu had become the 
target of chronic violence; soon they were served notice that unless they 
returned to the land of their ancestors (rwanda) their lives would be 
in peril. it took little prodding for kagame to endorse the cause of the 
banyamulenge, and even less to harness their support in the destruction 
of the Hutu refugee camps. this, in a nutshell, is the background to 
what has been called Africa’s first world war.10
 in masterminding the anti-mobutist insurrection, under the guise 
of a disparate coalition of forces known as the Alliance of democratic 
forces for the liberation of Congo-Zaire (Afdl) under the nominal 
leadership of laurent kabila, with the rwandan army acting as the se-
nior partner, kagame was able to achieve three major strategic goals: 
rally the solid support of the banyamulenge minority, destroy the Hutu 
refugee camps strung along the border with rwanda and burundi and 
thereby eliminate a major security threat, and overthrow mobutu—no 
small feat when one considers the odds. not only was eastern Congo 
safe for rwanda, but so too was the ruling authority in kinshasa, or so 
it seemed in the heady days that followed the Afdl victory. by August 
1998, however, the fragile coalition stitched together by the Afdl leader 
was in a shambles. thus began the second Congo war, with rwanda 
backing the banyamulenge-dominated rally for Congolese democracy 
(rCd) and kabila throwing his weight behind an odd assortment of 
recycled mobutist soldiers, mai-mai warlords, and Hutu refugees.
 taking a closer look at kagame’s military prowess, the least that can 
be said is that it came at a heavy price for the Congolese people. His 
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alliance with the banyamulenge resulted in the more or less system-
atic removal of previous incumbents from the urban and provincial 
institutions of north and South kivu and their replacement by ban-
yamulenge elements, many of them unqualified to hold these positions. 
What came to be known in diplomatic language as the “closure” of the 
refugee camps was the signal for a massive manhunt of Hutu refugees 
throughout north and South kivu, and beyond. While causing an 
untold number of casualties among civilians, contrary to official state-
ments from kigali (approvingly relayed by uS embassy officials),11 the 
rwandan search and destroy operation failed utterly to wipe out the 
génocidaires—ex–Armed forces of rwanda (fAr) and interahamwe. 
in time the Hutu survivors would reemerge as the democratic libera-
tion forces of rwanda (fdlr), one of the most violent of the renegade 
factions spawned by the war. it is noteworthy that the anointment of 
laurent kabila as the new king of the Congo involved, among other 
quid pro quos, the promise to the kingmakers that he would do his 
utmost to block an impending un investigation into the killings of 
Hutu refugees, a task of which he acquitted himself with exemplary 
zeal. but the worst was yet to come. in August 1998, after realizing that 
the costs of his dependency on rwanda exceeded the benefits, kabila 
finally grasped the nettle; no sooner had he sent his tutsi advisers pack-
ing home than began a long and vicious civil strife.
 reflecting on “how to rebuild Africa,” Stephen ellis notes that “out-
siders tend to ignore the historical roots of today’s conflicts.”12 nowhere 
is this more evident than in the great lakes region, where the twists 
and turns of its tortured history are the key to an understanding of its 
present agonies.
 the history of the region helps explain why peacebuilding in rwanda 
and burundi operates within a radically different set of parameters 
from that of the Congo. rwanda is a prime example of a historically 
rooted trade-off between democracy and statebuilding. in contrast to 
the Congo, where threats to the peace are in large part a reflection of 
the extreme fragility of the state, the rwandan state is by far the stron-
gest of all states in the region, and the most oppressive. immediate and 
long-term threats to the peace have little to do with the fragility of the 
state apparatus; if there is such a thing as a clear and present danger 
to long-term stability, it stems from the stubborn unwillingness of the 
kagame government to meet the demands of the Hutu majority. ef-
fective repression rather than political participation is the key to peace 
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and stability. burundi, in contrast, exemplifies the reverse phenomenon, 
that is, a situation where peacebuilding depends to a large extent on 
the effective workings of a power-sharing arrangement that allows a 
modicum of political participation to all groups in society, not just Hutu 
and tutsi but the pygmoid twa (representing about 1 percent of the 
population). the key question is whether the burundi form of conso-
ciational government can survive the crisis of confidence engendered 
by the refusal of the major opposition parties to take part in the 2010 
elections, resulting in their virtual exclusion from the country’s political 
life. the current trend is toward the strengthening of the state under a 
one-party dominant system of government, which suggests an ominous 
parallel with rwanda.
 on an altogether different plane, what the historicity of the regional 
conflict underscores is the massive intrusion of external forces into the 
Congolese arena. no fewer than eight countries were at one time or an-
other involved in the Congo’s civil wars. besides having been the locus 
classicus of proxy wars by African states, the eastern drC has become a 
major sphere of rwandan influence, through direct or indirect interven-
tion. failure to take full measure of the rwandan connection has been 
a constant source of confusion and miscalculation for peacebuilders.
 vital as it is, the problem goes beyond the political dynamics of the 
regional context; it also involves a fair amount of confusion and inco-
herence among the many well-meaning do-gooders in their collective 
efforts to restore peace to the region.
Peacebuilding: A Surfeit of good intentions
that peacebuilders sometimes overcrowd the field and end up work-
ing at cross-purposes with each other is seldom taken into account by 
analysts; nonetheless, the phenomenon must be recognized for what 
it is—a thoroughly counterproductive state of affairs, frequently moti-
vated by internal rivalries and competition for access to domestic actors.
 the case of burundi is a prime example. in perhaps no other state 
have so many humanitarian ngos, international organizations, spe-
cial envoys, and think tanks been so heavily involved for so long in 
such a small space, and with more limited results.13 the reason for such 
modest achievements lies in part in the plethora of peacebuilders, each 
guided by a different reading of the nature of the conflict. the result, at 
best, has been immobilisme, and at worst a parallel diplomacy leading to 
further fragmentation of the political chessboard.
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 the point is persuasively argued by fabienne Hara, a close observer 
of the burundi scene in the years following the assassination of mel-
chior ndadaye in 1993: “the profusion of players in burundi, each with 
its own agenda and favored solution, has undermined the coherence of 
the international community’s response and led to competition among 
various burundian factions and ngos for recognition and support.”14 
more damning still is her indictment of the role of special envoys, and 
the struggle for influence among Western states:
the sheer number of special envoys reflects the diversity of their 
agendas and motivations, and tends to jeopardize the official 
claim that the international community wants peace, or at least 
the same peace, for the region. . . . Amid the various popularity 
contests between the nations of the region and the superpowers, 
the struggle for influence between france and the united States, 
and the geopolitical and economic interests of the countries in the 
region, all official mediators have been suspected of partiality.15
Hara goes on: “various attempts to impose drastic solutions, to hurl 
them forward with no consideration of political logic, and to claim ef-
fectiveness based on symbolic rather than concrete results have resulted 
in failures, slowly eroding the local populations’ faith in the interna-
tional community.”16
 Hara’s arguments have wider applicability in the region. the drC 
offers a number of examples where peacebuilders developed their own 
agendas and ended up pulling in different directions. High-level dis-
agreements among interveners have had particularly serious consequences 
throughout the region,17 but nowhere with more disastrous effects than 
in the drC. in 1996 and 1997 in the wake of the Afdl and rwandan 
attacks against the refugee camps, the media reported a humanitarian 
disaster of alarming proportions. much of the area in the vicinity of 
kisangani was swamped with tens of thousands of hapless Hutu refu-
gees fleeing westward. Howard french, an eyewitness to the scenes of 
apocalypse, described them as “people who had walked for seven weeks 
through some of the world’s most inhospitable territory, with killers in 
their midst and more killers on their trail.”18 despite the urgency of a 
swift humanitarian intervention, the international community proved 
utterly unable to reach a consensus on how to cope with the situation. 
Whereas the french and the european union favored a un-authorized 
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force to secure a humanitarian corridor, the uS and uk, all too eager to 
comply with the demands of their rwandan ally, categorically opposed 
any such move, thereby sealing the fate of hundreds of thousands of 
human beings.19
 one of the more persistent impediments to coordinated action among 
peacebuilders refers to their radically divergent views of rwanda’s role in 
fueling conflict in eastern Congo. not all interveners shared the sym-
pathy displayed by the uS and uk toward kigali, but most of the time 
the latter’s influence prevailed. thus, despite overwhelming evidence of 
kigali’s responsibility in providing military, logistical, and financial assis-
tance to its Congolese clients—ranging from the rCd in the late 1990s 
to laurent nkunda’s national Congress for the defense of the People 
(CndP)—there was little inclination on the part of monuC to rein in 
their moves, even when these constituted manifest threats to the peace, 
as happened in kisangani in 2002, in bukavu in 2004, and in much of 
masisi during nkunda’s antics from 2006 to 2009.20
 Pro- or anti-rwandan posturings, and pro- or anti-tutsi sentiment, 
are not the only elements that have informed the divergent perspectives 
of outside peacebuilders. A recurrent source of discord has been be-
tween those advocating military intervention on humanitarian grounds, 
and those favoring a more cautious approach, based on regional di-
plomacy or “talking through” problems. Whereas the latter has been 
characteristic of African mediators, appeals for military intervention, 
as one observer noted, have been typical of the attitude of the ngo 
community in moments of crisis.21 but the problem goes beyond such 
differences, and involves competing definitions of the roots of conflict 
and how best to deal with them, including disagreements over systemic 
versus proximate causes, whether to apportion responsibility of local 
or regional actors, whether the key issues are human rights violations 
or the denial of political participation, and the absence of democracy 
or presence of the wrong type of democracy (e.g., majoritarian versus 
power-sharing formulas). behind many of these conceptual divergences 
lies a conflict of priorities.
resetting Priorities
building peace can start from the ground up, so as to restore a modi-
cum of normality to communities whose lives have been torn asunder, 
or it can proceed from the top down, on the assumption that agree-
ment among leaders is a precondition for peace. the latter has been 
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the standard approach in much of the great lakes, with the disastrous 
results that Séverine Autesserre has so convincingly described.22
 Although these are not mutually exclusive, there is reason to believe 
that the unending series of setbacks met by peacebuilders is in large part 
a reflection of the low priority placed on resolving local issues. these 
cover a wide spectrum, ranging from chieftaincy disputes to wrangles 
over taxes or conflicting claims to landed property. land issues are in-
deed the most critical. food security and local livelihoods depend on 
access to land. As some observers have recently emphasized, “recent 
research has pointed to the direct links between access to land and 
food security in conflict environments: it is recognized that land access 
constitutes one of the more problematic and volatile facets of societal 
relations during and subsequent to armed conflict.”23
 this is where the massive population movements generated by eth-
nic confrontations carry a frightening potential for conflict. A classic 
example is the district of masisi in the drC, which has been and re-
mains to this day the focus of endless litigations over land rights, some 
going back to colonial days. in recent times, land has passed back and 
forth from one group of owners to another, from Hunde (the original 
owners) to Hutu and tutsi, from tutsi to Hutu, and now back to tutsi 
refugees returning from rwanda with their cows. behind these bewil-
dering changes of occupancy lie a number of historical watersheds: the 
arrival of tutsi refugees from the 1959–62 Hutu revolution in rwanda, 
the outpouring of Hutu refugees from the 1994 genocide, the expulsion 
of tutsi landowners in 1996 and their flight to rwanda, and now, follow-
ing the conclusion of the 2009 peace deal between kagame and kabila, 
which resulted in the removal of nkunda from the political scene,24 the 
border-crossing of some 60,000 tutsi along with their herds (derisively 
called “cows without borders”). this latest twist in the district’s com-
plicated and violent history casts an ominous shadow on the future of 
peace in north kivu.
 Whereas the masisi imbroglio shows how wider conflicts can perco-
late to the grassroots, the case of ituri is illustrative of the reverse phe-
nomenon: how a local dispute over land can suddenly burst into a regional 
conflagration out of all proportion to the triggering event. this is shown 
in admirable detail by thierry vircoulon and florence liégeois in their 
discussion of what they term un conflit ultra-local in the djugu district: in 
a matter of days, violence mutated into a “tribal war” between Hema and 
lendu, spreading to the whole of ituri and causing some 60,000 deaths 
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from 1999 to 2003.25 regardless of whether local issues stem from the top 
down or from the ground up, they develop a dynamic of their own and 
therefore need to be dealt with in these terms, as conflicts intrinsic to the 
communities from which they have arisen. this is where peacebuilding 
efforts have been most conspicuously wanting.
 Another misplaced priority has been the overemphasis on the do-
mestic roots of conflict at the expense of their transnational ramifica-
tions. Although the drC has been a privileged arena for proxy guer-
rilla movements,26 their sponsors have operated with almost complete 
impunity. their role as spoilers has generated relatively little concern 
from the international community. this is particularly true of uganda’s 
ceaseless meddling in the politics of ituri. but if any state has played and 
will continue to play a determining role in the fortunes of the drC at 
minimum cost to itself and probably with some benefits, it is rwanda. 
the “rwanda connection” has had a multiplier effect on many of the 
most violent confrontations recorded in the history of eastern drC. 
examples include the repeated incursions of the rwandan army into 
north and South kivu after the lusaka peace deal, the logistical and 
military assistance given by kagame to the Hema-dominated union of 
Congolese Patriots (uPC), the support extended to the two renegade 
tutsi officers of the Congolese armed forces, general laurent nkunda 
and Colonel Jules mutebutsi, during and after their military takeover of 
bukavu in June 2004,27 and more recently, the web of economic, financial, 
and political ties radiating from kigali to nkunda’s CndP. the extent 
of this network, disclosed by the un group of experts in late 2009,28 
was indeed instrumental in prompting kagame to disown his erstwhile 
client. but one cannot underestimate the proddings of the uS State de-
partment,29 the clinching factor behind the fragile kabila-kagame peace 
deal that led to their joint operations against the fdlr. if the interstate 
dimension of threats to the peace cannot be left out of the accounting, 
neither should the remedies be confined to the domestic scene.
 nor should the quest for short-term solutions mask the necessity of 
long-term strategies. the urgency of a change of perspective is nowhere 
more evident than in the alarming demographic explosion in rwanda 
and burundi. With a total population that has increased from 2 to 8 
million in half a century, neither state can sustain the extraordinary 
pressure on the land. And yet little is being done to defuse this time 
bomb and convey the gravity of the situation to policymakers. Just as 
imperative is the need for long-term economic planning. if economic 
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scarcity is one of the motivations behind the readiness of the young to 
join armed factions, it is also the main reason why so little success has 
been achieved in reinserting ex-combatants into civil society.
monuC on trial
inclined at first to vindicate monuC, recently a growing number of 
observers have voiced criticisms of its performance.30 Among its many 
shortcomings, its inability or unwillingness to protect human lives has 
been singled out as its greatest failing. this was made clear on a number 
of occasions, but at no time more dramatically than during the attack on 
bukavu in 2004, the mass slaughter in gatumba (burundi) in August of 
that year, and in kiwanja in november 2008. it was in that latter locality 
of north kivu, during nkunda’s advance toward goma, that monuC’s 
performance was at its most shameful: with a peacekeeping force only 
half a mile away, it did nothing to prevent the killing of 150 people by 
the CndP. in a blistering indictment, a Human rights Watch (HrW) 
report noted that although monuC had one of its largest field bases in 
kiwanja, with 120 peacekeepers, “it failed to keep the CndP from taking 
kiwanja and rutshuru on october 29 and failed to prevent the killings and 
other abuses by CndP and mai-mai combatants in early november.”31 it 
is noteworthy that the kiwanja tragedy occurred shortly after lieutenant-
general vicente diaz de villegas y Herreria handed in his resignation as 
monuC’s head of military operations, reportedly being taken aback by 
the organization’s “lack of a coherent strategy, lack of a mandate and lack 
of resources needed to get the peacekeeping job done.”32
 no less shocking has been the attitude of un peacekeepers during 
what one journalist described as a “four-day frenzy of rape” in luvungi 
from July 30 to August 2, 2010.33 Although dozens of monuC soldiers 
were stationed “just up the road,” nothing was done to stop the rapists, 
most of them identified as members of fdlr and mai-mai groups. At 
least 179 women were sexually abused. the un special representative to 
the un, roger A. meece, subsequently tried to explain the monuC’s 
appalling performance: “At the time there was one alleged rape and no 
reason to believe that this was happening on a mass scale as was later 
reported.”34 for his part the un under Secretary general for Peace-
keeping operations, Alain le roy, invoked the “limited resources” at 
the disposal of blue helmets: “the expectations on the blue helmets are 
often unrealistic given our limited resources. yes, some 18,000 peace-
keepers are deployed in the Congo, but there are more than 60 million 
225
Peacebui lding in the great  lakes  region of  Afr ica
people in an area the size of Western europe. if all peacekeepers were 
in eastern Congo alone, there would be just 18 peacekeepers per 10,000 
civilians.”35 though persuasive up to a point, the argument carries little 
weight in light of other limiting factors.
 According to its mandate under Chapter vii of the un Charter, 
monuC has the authority to use of force “to ensure the protection of ci-
vilians, including humanitarian personnel under imminent threat of physi-
cal violence,” but only rarely has it done so.36 though some have suggested 
the need for additional troops, the roots of monuC’s poor performance 
run deeper. it stems in large part from self-inflicted disabilities.37
 in a wide-ranging critique, thierry vircoulon points to a dual pro-
cess of “congolisation” and “bureaucratization” as key factors. monuC, 
he writes, “has been contaminated by the corruption and impunity in-
herent in its environment, while at the same time suffering from the 
characteristics of a heavy bureaucracy projected in a war zone.”38 many 
of the more distasteful traits, from sex scandals to trafficking in gold 
and diamonds and other forms of corruption, have gravely tarnished its 
image. A former deputy chief investigator with the un office of inter-
nal oversight Services in the Congo from 2005 to 2007 describes illegal 
deals between Pakistani peacekeepers and local militias: “We found cor-
roborative information that senior officers of the Pakistani contingent 
secretly returned seized weapons to two warlords in exchange for gold, 
and that the Pakistani peacekeepers tipped off two warlords about plans 
by the un peacekeeping force and the Congolese army to arrest them.” 
He concludes that monuC “cannot close its eyes and ears to evidence 
of misconduct. Such behavior undermines peacekeeping efforts every-
where.”39 Another critic confirms these accusations, pointing the finger 
at “the illegal buying of gold from the fdlr, the use of a un helicop-
ter to fly into the virunga national Park to exchange ammunition for 
ivory, trading un rations for gold, the purchase of drugs from rebels, 
and a general failure to support the disarmament of the group.”40 none 
of such damning evidence of wrongdoing ever surfaced in any of the 
official un reports.
 monuC’s preferred strategy of dealing with crises through “peace 
diplomacy” has spawned a flurry of auxiliary operational units, commit-
tees and subcommittees, regional conferences, and emissaries and spe-
cial envoys. out of this heavy institutional scaffolding has developed what 
vircoulon calls an “international action system” notable for its bureau-
cratic inertia: “Absent a unified command, a plurality of decision-making 
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centers has emerged, involving a mosaic of international bureaucrats, 
thousands of military and civilian personnel, consuming billions of dol-
lars, and mobilizing a world-wide net of activists, developers, diplomats, 
journalists and army men.”41 Although this cumbersome machinery 
helps explain monuC’s inability to respond quickly and efficiently 
to crisis, the contrast between the size of its presence on the ground 
and the modesty of its accomplishments is directly related to its image 
problem: for many Congolese, monuC is everywhere, except where it 
should be—at the front lines.
 Hardly more effective in dealing with ground-level emergencies, the 
creation of the un Peacebuilding Commission as a coordinating agency 
within the un bureaucracy has attracted scathing criticisms from out-
side observers: though well-meaning, this initiative proved sadly inad-
equate to deal with the complex political dimensions of post-conflict 
transitions.42 by downplaying or ignoring such crucial dimensions, the 
un has cast considerable discredit on itself while unwittingly ensuring 
that the crisis would become self-perpetuating.
the Congo crisis defies simple solutions. Contrary to the impression 
conveyed by monuC’s Public information division, peacebuilding 
cannot be reduced to a set of techniques or procedures. nor is it greatly 
improved by adding one more operational unit to an already top-heavy 
bureaucracy, or by invoking time and again the mantra of r2P (short-
hand for responsibility to Protect). it is a telling commentary on the 
practical limitations of the much-touted formula that its progenitor’s 
book-length disquisition on that theme appeared in print in 2008,43 
precisely when tens of thousands of civilians were forced out of their 
homes in the wake of the one of the most devastating outbursts of vio-
lence to rage across north kivu. in the language of the monuC they 
were the latest additions to a flow of internally displaced persons (idPs) 
that by 2009 had reached half a million in north kivu, and almost as 
many (419,000) in South kivu.
 idPs: the acronym is emblematic of many such aseptic renderings of 
human tragedies, which tend to obscure their magnitude and downplay 
their cruelty. the searing experience of displacement and dislocation, the 
destruction of homes and property, the fear and despair etched on people’s 
faces, their seemingly endless march to nowhere, such are the grim realities 
encapsulated in “idP.” there are many variations on this theme—such as 
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the use of the neutral term “closure” to refer to the systematic destruction 
of refugee camps in 1996–97, the indiscriminate shooting of civilians, their 
flight into the forest, and the ensuing manhunt. the result, invariably, is to 
conceal the unsettling realities of war in eastern Congo.
 if peacebuilding is to be more than a technical exercise, it is important 
to grasp the full dimensions of the appalling human wreckage attendant 
on the crisis: the horrific price paid in lives extinguished, properties 
destroyed, land alienated, social ties sundered. though often masked 
by the language of peacemaking, these are the human dramas that bear 
testimony to the lethal consequences of lack of attention to local issues. 
many are the fallout of wider conflicts; but more often than not they 
serve as the detonators that generate even more devastating confronta-
tions. festering hatreds feed into revanchist attitudes; past injuries are 
rarely forgotten, nor are collective wrongs easily forgiven. Countless 
examples could be cited of local disputes, largely ignored by peacemak-
ers, in time becoming the ignition points of more serious clashes. from 
ituri to minembwe, from masisi to rutshuru, there is ample evidence 
pointing to local conflicts becoming the vehicles of more extensive 
intergroup conflicts. Putting them in proper historical perspective is 
essential if meaningful solutions are to be found.44
 What the historicity of local and regional issues also demonstrates 
is the highly counterproductive role played by external actors in in-
tensifying or expanding conflict: by failing to control their domestic 
enemies, or by themselves becoming the critical vectors of violence in 
eastern Congo, uganda and rwanda must be seen as chief villains in 
the great lakes crisis. While the lord’s resistance Army (lrA)—
responsible for the continuing horrific mayhem in ituri, as well as in 
the Central African republic (CAr)—dramatically illustrates the spill-
over of uganda’s domestic problems into the drC, rwanda’s repeated 
interventions—ranging from armed aggression to the manipulation of 
proxies, with the Hutu génocidaires often used as a ploy in a carefully 
orchestrated game of bluff—shows just how close is the imbrication of 
domestic and international conflict arenas. that so little should have 
been done by peacebuilders to come to grips with this situation, directly 
or indirectly, diplomatically or otherwise, is little short of astonishing, 
unless one bears in mind the consistent tilt of key donors, notably uk 
and uS, on behalf of their privileged clients.
 if only because of its self-perpetuating nature, the crisis in the great 
lakes will remain at the top of the agenda of domestic and international 
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actors for years to come. At no other time has the need for developing 
an effective and sustained peace strategy been more pressing, but if the 
past is any index, the prospects for such a collective effort getting under 
way are not encouraging.
 in part because of the complexity of the issues that stand in the way 
of peace, in part because of what has been described as the lack of an 
effective approach to peacebuilding, there is no light at the end of the 
tunnel. but the more obvious reason lies in the absence of something 
resembling a functioning state system. only in rwanda has significant 
progress been made in this direction, but at the cost of democratic 
participation and widespread human rights violations. by denying the 
Hutu, representing 80 percent of the population, the right to control 
their political destinies, President kagame is sowing the seeds of future 
confrontations. Although burundi has dealt more constructively with 
ethnicity, through a power-sharing formula, there is an ominous con-
vergence between the two states in their shared distrust of opposition 
groups and their pitiless repression of dissidents. recent events in the 
drC indicate a similar trend, but without the benefit of a strengthen-
ing of the state.45 fifty years after independence the Congo resembles 
nothing so much as its mobutist clone, with this difference: that the 
level of devastation after years of civil strife is without precedent.
 thus the three states that make up most of the great lakes region are 
illustrative of the contradictions between statebuilding and democracy 
promotion, the two principal goals of peacemaking. the dilemma is pith-
ily captured by francis fukuyama: “before you can have democracy you 
must have a state, but to have a legitimate and therefore durable state 
you eventually must have democracy.”46 While the case of rwanda shows 
how the construction of a powerful state is likely to thwart democracy, the 
Congo exemplifies the opposite phenomenon, how multiparty elections 
run counter to the building of a strong state. burundi, unsurprisingly, 
doesn’t quite fit into either model: a democracy of sorts has been achieved 
through a power-sharing arrangement, but the pressure of the coercive 
state is far too strong to allow a full flowering of liberal democracy.
 As has been argued time and again, the reconstruction of the state is 
a precondition to peace, just as peace is a sine qua non for economic and 
social development, yet there is no indication that the critical first step 
toward that goal, that is, the creation of a reliable and efficient constabu-
lary, is being seriously considered. in the absence of a professional army, 
kabila’s strategy has been to recruit former rebels, thus paving the way for 
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further human rights abuses and defections. Similarly, the exigencies of 
creating a modicum of trust within the government have given rise to a 
clientelistic system that bears all the trademarks of the mobutist era. And 
just as under mobutu ethno-regional ties provided the glue that held the 
system together, so also under kabila, whose closest advisers are from his 
home province, katanga. this is hardly the most propitious scenario for 
peacebuilding. unlike what happened in the 1960s, however, when China 
was actively involved in supporting anti-mobutist insurgents, beijing has 
emerged as a key actor in promoting Congo’s economic rehabilitation and 
reconstruction.47 Although observers differ as to how to assess the costs 
and benefits of the “deal of the century,” between China and the Congo, 
it cannot be seen as an alternative to peacebuilding.
 How to create sustained, complementary partnerships among do-
mestic and international actors, how to set new priorities for channeling 
assistance, how to achieve better coordination and a more effective divi-
sion of labor among donors, and how to harness governmental capac-
ity to the exigencies of economic and social development—these are 
the fundamental tasks awaiting the new generations of peacebuilders. 
they’ve got their work cut out.
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forces for the liberation of burundi (fnl), a radical Hutu-dominated party.
231
Peacebui lding in the great  lakes  region of  Afr ica
28. united nations Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Re-established Pursuant to Resolution 1857.
29. Author interviews with uS officials and HrW members.
30. See, for example, lebor, Complicity with Evil, 216–19; matthias bassanisi, “keep-
ing an eye on Peacekeepers,” New York Times, may 23, 2008, A23; vircoulon, Réformer 
le “peace making” en République Démocratique du Congo. Among monuC critics linda 
Polman deserves pride of place for her withering criticisms of peace-keeping operations 
in the Congo and rwanda: see Crisis Caravan and We Did Nothing.
31. HrW, Killings in Kiwanja, 22.
32. Jeffrey gettleman and neil macfarquhar, “Congo rebels Advance; Protesters 
Hurl rocks at un Compound,” New York Times, october 28, 2008, A6.
33. Jeffrey gettelman, “4-day frenzy of rape in Congo reveals un troops’ Weak-
ness,” New York Times, october 4, 2010, 1.
34. Josh kron and Jeffrey gettelman, “un officials knew of rapes in Congo, mes-
sages Show,” New York Times, September 1, 2010, 6.
35. Alain le roy, “brutality in Congo: Who Can Stop it?,” in a letter to The New 
York Times editor, october 7, 2010.
36. one such occasion occurred in november 2006, after nkunda attacked the town 
of Sake in north kivu. “for the first time,” writes Jason Stearns, “un peacekeepers 
reacted forcefully against nkunda with attack helicopters and infantry, killing between 
200 and 400 insurgents.” Stearns, “laurent nkunda,” 252.
37. emily Paddon makes the convincing point that part of the challenge faced by 
the un in protecting civilian lives stems from the tension between that obligation and 
supporting or extending the authority of the state when the state is itself complicit in 
the violence against civilians. Personal communication to the author.
38. vircoulon, Réformer le “peace making,” 9.
39. matthias basanisi, “keeping an eye on Peacekeepers,” New York Times, may 23, 
2008, A23.
40. r. escobales, “un Peacekeepers ‘traded guns with rebels,’” Guardian Weekly, 
february 2, 2008, 6.
41. vircoulon, Réformer le “peace making,” 10.
42. See del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States. See also olonisakin and ikpe in 
this volume.
43. evans, Responsibility to Protect.
44. the historicity of intergroup conflicts is excellently brought out in roger kaser-
eka’s doctoral dissertation, “dynamiques locales et pressions extérieures dans la conflic-
tualité armée au nord-kivu: Cas des territoires de beni-lubero,” esp. chap. 4.
45. Sadly illustrative of this trend is the assassination of the human rights activist 
floribert Chebeya, head of the ngo La Voix des Sans Voix (voice of the voiceless), 
on June 1, 2010. despite official statements to the contrary, and gruesome attempts to 
camouflage the circumstances of his death, that he happened to be one of the most 
outspoken critics of the many abuses committed by the kabila government is the most 
obvious explanation for his murder. See “repression in the Congo,” Economist, June 12, 
2010, 54.
46. fukuyama, “Stateness first,” 88.
47. See marysse and geenen, “les contrats chinois en rdC.”
232
T w e l v e
Peacebuilding through  
Statebuilding in West Africa?
The Cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia
C o m f o r t  e r o
When conflict broke out in liberia on december 2, 1989, commentators 
did not forecast the subsequent instability, political crisis, and civil 
war that would consume neighboring Sierra leone in 1991 and Côte 
d’ivoire in 2002. the economic Community of West African States 
(eCoWAS) led the first regional peacekeeping mission to liberia in 
August 1990. it was later joined by the united nations (un) in efforts 
to end violent conflict and begin the complex process of rebuilding 
in all three neighboring countries. After two decades, regional and 
international actors in these West African countries have contributed 
to new trends and practices in the global peacebuilding enterprise.
 this chapter examines the wide-ranging international peacebuild-
ing initiatives that have spanned two West African countries, Sierra 
leone and liberia. by exploring a subcomponent of the peacebuilding 
experience in West Africa, namely statebuilding, the chapter considers 
the tensions, dilemmas, and successes at the heart of the peacebuild-
ing endeavor in both countries. Although commonalities exist in the 
cases of Sierra leone and liberia, they provide different insights into 
postconflict statebuilding. As i argue here, the process of statebuilding 
in West Africa provides a cautionary tale of the limitations of the global 
peacebuilding enterprise. international intervention was aggressive and 
robust in Sierra leone and liberia.1 At one level, intense partnerships 
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between national actors in Sierra leone and liberia and the interna-
tional donor community resulted in significant progress in rebuilding 
some aspects of the state in both countries. yet at another level, tensions 
between national, regional, and international actors often led to local 
elites either resisting or rethinking and reorienting external ideas and 
partnerships. the experience of statebuilding in both countries dem-
onstrates the limitations of external intervention, especially when there 
is a clash between national ideas and practices, and regional and global 
programs and strategies.
the State, Statebuilding, and Conflict in West Africa
Central to the peacebuilding enterprise is the attempt to establish con-
ditions that prevent the return to conflict. following the end of the 
Cold War, large-scale international efforts took place to help bring 
peace to countries emerging from conflict. key lessons learned from 
international peacebuilding efforts in the 1990s, of which liberia and 
Sierra leone were recipients, was that the quick-fix approach to end-
ing conflicts and holding national elections was insufficient to prevent 
the recurrence of conflicts. by the late 1990s and early 2000s, major 
discussions on improving the performance of the un and other multi-
lateral institutions for peacebuilding had evolved. it was agreed that if 
durable peace was to take hold in countries emerging from conflict, in-
ternational peacebuilding strategies required radical reorientation. this 
reorientation focused on a more “macro-level approach” that placed 
greater emphasis on constructing or strengthening the state and its in-
stitutions. it was a departure from the “micro-level approach” of earlier 
peacebuilding efforts, which focused on technical quick fixes and the 
supervision of elections. As dominik Zaum notes in chapter 2 of this 
volume, and as roland Paris and timothy Sisk have noted elsewhere, 
this macro-level statebuilding approach is not synonymous with peace-
building, nor is it an attempt to supplant peacebuilding. Statebuilding 
is a subcomponent of the peacebuilding enterprise,2 which is part of a 
“larger effort to create the conditions for a durable peace and human 
development in countries that are just emerging from war.”3
 Statebuilding is a complex project in the African context. Histori-
cally, African states were created to serve the political and economic 
interests of colonial forces. the survival of the colonial territories was 
reinforced through authoritarian governance, leading to the subjuga-
tion and exploitation of the population. Colonial authorities relied on 
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force and violence to protect their imperialist objectives. Colonialism 
also created alliances between local elites, co-opted to solidify colonial 
power and administration over territories. Consequently, the “state” was 
largely an alien construct, lacking the legitimacy to mobilize or extract 
cohesive groups from among the indigenous populations.
 independence in Africa did not bring a fundamental transformation 
in the structure of the state. instead, many states assumed characteristics 
of the colonial state—existing primarily to serve the interests of small 
but powerful elite groups. the state retained its forceful authoritarian 
character. like the colonial leaders they took over from, many of Africa’s 
independence leaders failed to establish legitimacy over their territories 
or extend formal control across their countries. new African leaders 
relied on the sovereignty that underpinned the international system for 
legitimacy and sought protection from their Cold War patrons, instead 
of seeking legitimacy from the societies they governed. When they 
required internal support, again, like their colonial predecessors, they 
established alliances, especially with local chiefs to control the country-
side, to collect revenue, and to win votes. to shore up its survival and 
its extractive role, the postindependent state controlled the production 
and distribution of national resources. the state became an instrument 
of accumulation and patronage, in which leaders built networks, often 
on ethnic (or regional lines) and bestowed rights and privileges, often 
economic, as a means to ensure its continued existence. Politics became 
a frequently violent struggle for access to the state and control of “the 
national cake.”4
 this violent struggle and competition for power has characterized 
politics in Sierra leone and liberia since their founding. State forma-
tion in Sierra leone and liberia has generally followed the previously 
described patterns. in the case of Sierra leone, founded in the eigh-
teenth century by british antislavery activists as a haven for freed slaves 
from britain and the new World, the peninsula later came under brit-
ish colonial rule from 1808 until it gained independence in 1961. in 1896, 
the british established a Protectorate to regulate the entire population 
in the upcountry interior, who lived under indigenous structures and 
institutions. rather than establish a unitary state structure, the colonial-
ist power established “a strong administrative distinction between the 
Colony (freetown and the Western Area) and the Protectorate (rep-
resented by three modern provinces).”5 britain operated a bifurcated 
system of governance in which freetown and the Western Area had its 
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own local government under the british legal system and where Creole 
settlers enjoyed extensive rights and privileges, while the Protectorate 
was established as “a sphere of indirect rule in which chiefs were central 
to the maintenance of law and order.”6 over time, the powers of the 
local chiefs, particularly over land and labor, including the allocation of 
mineral licenses in diamond areas, were strengthened. At the same time, 
rivalry intensified between the Creole region and the hinterland. this 
rivalry was later replaced by competition between two main ethnic and 
regional groups in the country—the temne and other northern-based 
ethnic groups, and the mende, predominantly in the south and east.
 When the newly independent state emerged, neither ethnoregional 
group, both of which had evolved into political parties—the northern-
based All People’s Congress (APC) and the southeastern-based Sierra 
leone People’s Party (SlPP)—was large enough to win elections. As 
a result, they developed alliances with other ethnic groups by buying 
favors from local chiefs or other local strongmen. gradually, local chiefs 
began to wield immense influence over local politics with considerable 
unchecked powers of abuse. like their colonial predecessors, the two 
dominant parties—the SlPP, which governed from 1961 to 1967, and 
the APC, which ruled for over twenty years (1968–92) following a mili-
tary coup—relied strongly on the support of chiefs to impose order on 
rural communities. this eventually led to resentment. indeed, a feature 
of Sierra leone’s civil war of march 1991 to January 2002 was the delib-
erate killing of chiefs or alienation from their communities. 
 the period of rule under the APC’s first leader, President Siaka Ste-
vens (1968–85) sowed the seeds for conflict. rather than build formal 
state institutions, he governed through a network of patronage and used 
state resources to compensate allies. His control of the informal sector 
enabled him to entrench his patronage to local elites, including chiefs, 
and lebanese commercial traders. Critical state institutions, such as the 
security sector, eroded and were unable to function because essential 
revenues were diverted. in 1985 when Stevens handed power over to 
Joseph momoh, who was then commander of the Sierra leone Armed 
forces (SlAf), the state was no longer able to control deep societal 
resentments and divisions. the ground was ripe for the revolution-
ary united front (ruf) rebel invasion in 1991, and a coup led by dis-
gruntled military elements who formed the national Provisional ruling 
Council in 1992. the years of war that followed reproduced the logic 
that had governed postindependence political life in Sierra leone. War 
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was essentially a violent competition and collusion for control of the 
country’s resources.7
 the case of liberia is unique, because the country lived under the 
protection of the united States for over a hundred years, though it 
was never colonized. nonetheless, liberia shared many hallmarks of 
postcolonial African states. like Sierra leone, it was founded as an 
entity to house freed slaves. in 1847, freed slaves from the uS, who had 
settled mainly in monrovia and along the coastal front, declared the new 
republic of liberia. Paradoxically, the settlers, commonly defined as 
Americo-liberians, were no different from their plantation slave mas-
ters, who had treated them with a brutish and domineering hand. ef-
forts to create a new republic did not bring the settler community closer 
to the indigenous population. State power remained largely centralized 
under the true Whig Party (tWP), the party of the Americo-liberian 
settler community that dominated the country for 133 years. under the 
tWP, liberia suffered from poor governance, injustice, and economic 
mismanagement. these factors created the basis for political and social 
dissension among the indigenous people in the 1970s.
 the overthrow of the Americo-liberian oligarchy by master Ser-
geant Samuel k. doe in April 1980, following the murder of the last true 
Whig leader, President William tolbert, unleashed a ferocious contest 
between Americo-liberian elites and political parties representing in-
digenous groups.8 yet the indigenous people were not a unified force, 
and when conflict broke out from 1989 to 1997, the fight for power was 
a contest not only between Americo-liberians and indigenous political 
groupings, but also between these indigenous political forces. the July 
1997 presidential election delivered only a temporary respite from the 
war. under the warlord-turned-president Charles taylor, whom some 
indigenous groups deemed as politically closer to Americo-liberians, 
the state was unable to resuscitate already crumbled state institutions. 
His government could not provide basic public services or essential in-
frastructure; national institutions were broken, and state functionaries 
who had been unpaid for years were left to fend for themselves. the 
country became a haven for international smugglers who collaborated 
with liberia’s desperate elites, which in turn helped to fuel and sustain 
liberia’s war and, with it, a warlord economy.9 but the collapse of the 
liberian state predates Charles taylor’s 1997–2003 presidency. indeed, 
his government was a microcosm of what existed prior to his assault on 
the doe government. When regional and international forces intervened 
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in August 2003, governance consisted of coercion by three brutal armed 
groups—the government of liberia’s forces and those of two rebel 
groups, liberians united for reconciliation and democracy (lurd) 
and the movement for democracy in liberia (model)—who divided 
the country into enclaves in the north (lurd), the center, including the 
capital (the government’s forces), and the south (model).
 thus in Sierra leone and liberia historical processes and political 
competition and fissures led to weak and fractured central governments. 
Another common thread was the interlocking nature of the conflicts in 
the region. the sociopolitical and cultural ties between the three coun-
tries that composed the mano river basin (Sierra leone, liberia, and 
guinea) largely determined the role each country played in the conflicts 
that emerged. long established cross-border affiliations and networks 
between state officials and dissent groups also greatly shaped the fight-
ing. At the same time, competition for regional influence by various 
eCoWAS member states (for example, nigeria versus Côte d’ivoire 
at the onset of the liberian crisis), sometimes with the involvement 
of other Africa actors (libya) or international actors (britain in Sierra 
leone, france in liberia (and Côte d’ivoire), and the uS in liberia), 
also exacerbated and influenced the character of conflict. in part because 
of the interlocking nature of the conflicts in liberia and Sierra leone 
observers called for a regional involvement, including peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. the regional body, eCoWAS, and the un focused on 
a political and security framework to stabilize regional civil wars as a 
foundation to the longer-term goal of sustaining peace in these two 
countries, as well as in the region.
the Success, limits, and  
Clash of ideas of Postconflict Statebuilding
Although regional and global peacebuilding strategies have increasingly 
focused efforts on constructing legitimate, effective state institutions, 
the record of these strategies has been mixed. Although some signifi-
cant successes have been registered, the degree of vested interests and 
resistance to change by political elites has exposed the dilemmas of the 
statebuilding enterprise in Sierra leone and liberia. further, as the 
cases show, the partnership and cooperation required to ensure an effec-
tive outcome have resulted in tensions between local national actors and 
their external partners. both groups often desired the same stated out-
comes, namely achieving national ownership and restoring sovereignty, 
238
Comfort ero
but clashed over priorities, practices, and policies to attain these ends. 
equally, the statebuilding strategy employed by external actors some-
times contradicted the views of national actors. but national actors were 
not a homogeneous group that articulated a common view; while they 
sought ownership, their interests and agendas varied and often clashed.
Sierra Leone: Consensus and Resistance to Statebuilding
in early 2009, Sierra leonean freelance journalist lansana gberie pub-
lished an article in which he remarked that his country had “passed a 
significant milestone.”10 the milestone was the successful completion, 
without un peacekeepers, of national elections, five years after the 
civil war had ended. the incumbent governing party, the SlPP, and its 
candidate, Solomon berewa, accepted defeat and handed power over to 
the rival APC and its leader, ernest koroma.11 in praising his country’s 
achievement, gberie singled out the role of the reformed national elec-
toral commission for the management of the elections, but left much 
of the praise to the army and police for securing a peaceful outcome.12 
Significantly, these security forces reversed a historical trend of interfer-
ing in national politics. this, gberie opined, was a “refreshing sign of 
maturation.” Credit, he argued, should also be given to the SlPP for its 
commitment to guaranteeing a democratic process and to the significant 
strides made to consolidate peace and rebuild basic state institutions.13
 this defining moment in Sierra leone’s consolidation of peace must 
be understood within the context of the five years of partnership and 
cooperation between the government and its donor partners. it was a 
partnership underpinned by intensive regional and international inter-
vention to restore peace to the country.
d e f i n i n g  t H e  P r i o r i t i e S  f o r  S tAt e b u i l d i n g
At the heart of this partnership was an immediate coalescing around 
the core fundamental reform issues that President Ahmad tejan kabbah 
had outlined in his speech at the opening of parliament on may 22, 1998, 
as critical to rebuilding the Sierra leonean state. the most salient re-
form issues included reform of the security sector, namely the army and 
police; regulation of the diamond sector to end illegal smuggling; decen-
tralization of government, including reestablishment of local councils 
and election of Paramount Chiefs; strengthening of the administration 
of justice; and maintenance of a sound macroeconomic framework.14 
donors such as the united kingdom’s department for international 
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development (dfid) and the european Commission (eC) supported 
this approach, which formed the basis of the government’s framework of 
action with various international partners. yet although there appeared 
to be a shared vision in implementing this action plan, there was still a 
glaring disjuncture between international rhetoric and the reality of in-
ternational engagement in Sierra leone. in 1998, the un’s presence and 
significant international financial support to help rebuild Sierra leone 
were largely missing. international involvement was mostly limited to 
the military intervention of the regional body, eCoWAS.
 it was not until the resumption of conflict in late 1998, culminating 
in the lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999, that any significant inter-
national effort was put in place to end the conflict. the major turning 
point came in may 2000 when ruf fighters took 500 un troops hos-
tage. this placed pressure on the un Security Council to strengthen the 
peacekeeping mission in the country, and on britain, the former colonial 
power, to intensify its engagement. between 1999 and 2001, the united 
nations mission in Sierra leone (unAmSil) was strengthened from 
6,000 (october 1999) to 11,100 (february 2000) to 13,000 (may 2000) 
and finally to 17,500 (march 2001) to expand the remit of the mission 
and enable it to play a more robust role throughout the country.15
 the british military took a hands-on-approach in restructuring the 
design, formation, and training of the Sierra leonean army, includ-
ing the organization of the ministry of defense. overall, considerable 
human and financial resources were expended by britain to reform 
the army. Police reform unfolded at a much slower pace, but by may 
2003 the british inspector-general had handed over leadership of the 
Sierra leone police to his national successor. reform of the intelligence 
agencies also formed an important part of the security reform agenda, 
with britain helping to establish a national security office. this sup-
ported government efforts to define a national security strategy. it also 
enhanced planning and coordination of national security among the key 
security agencies in the country.16
 regulating the diamond sector, addressing corruption, and strength-
ening local governance through decentralization were also critical to 
Sierra leone’s statebuilding strategy. these three areas were considered 
key components of the country’s peacebuilding strategy by the kabbah 
government. Aggressive campaigns against “blood diamonds” by local 
civil society groups such as the network movement for Justice and 
development, and by international groups such as Partnership Africa 
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Canada, global Witness, and Amnesty international, soon forced the 
uS and uk to give greater attention to the diamond sector. the uS and 
uk devised programs that guaranteed government regulation of dia-
mond fields and financial transparency in the management of revenue 
collection. they also improved working conditions of the large number 
of laborers involved in artisanal mining. regulation of the diamond sector 
was set within the wider campaign against Sierra leone’s historically in-
stitutionalized corruption at all levels of state. in 2000, britain supported 
the government’s initiative to set up an anticorruption commission.17
 there was a consensus among local and international actors that es-
tablishing security was a prerequisite for future peacebuilding activities. 
this “security first” approach helped stabilize the precarious situation in 
the country, although maintaining it was not always easy. for example, 
there were significant and near paralyzing tensions between the united 
kingdom and unAmSil in 2000 following the hostage crisis. the de-
cision of President kabbah to seek a Special Court for Sierra leone in 
response to the ruf’s violations of the lomé Peace Agreement caused 
further fissures between the uk (and the uS) and nigeria, as well as 
in the wider subregion, where it was felt that the pursuit of war crimes 
could undermine efforts to persuade the ruf to reengage in the peace 
process.18 Also, the restoration of the Paramount Chiefs and new local 
councils under the decentralization program caused disagreement be-
tween rural communities, the government, and its donor partner, dfid. 
the latter saw the restoration effort as critical to demonstrating the 
return of security to Sierra leone’s provinces, but it exacerbated local 
grievances, especially among the youth, who expressed resentment at the 
unrepresentative and unaccountable power the local chiefs wielded.19 but 
despite tensions about how to achieve security, there was common agree-
ment globally, regionally, and locally that security, including security sec-
tor reform, control of the diamond sector, and restoration of Paramount 
Chiefs, underpinned by a more robust un peacekeeping force, was vital 
to supporting future peacebuilding initiatives and statebuilding.
r e S i S tA n C e  t o  r e f o r m :  
t H e  P o l i t i C A l  r e A l i t i e S  o f  S tAt e b u i l d i n g
but consensus was difficult to reach on how to address the other state-
building priorities outlined by President kabbah in his speech to par-
liament. Statebuilding efforts soon foundered as tensions between the 
government and external actors emerged over contentious governance 
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issues like corruption, public finance management, and service delivery. 
resistance to reforming these politically sensitive areas revealed the 
limitations of donor influence and international engagement when key 
vested elite interests were threatened. for example, the slow implemen-
tation of a ten-year memorandum of understanding (mou) agreed to 
in 2002 by the governments of Sierra leone and the united kingdom 
(under the auspices of dfid)20 laid testimony to the difficulties of 
achieving commitment to address the issues of corruption and gover-
nance that President kabbah had stated were critical to rebuilding the 
Sierra leonean state. by 2005, the government appeared largely resis-
tant to change, causing donors to conclude that old habits would die 
hard, or were resurfacing again to shape postwar Sierra leone.21 the 
unity of purpose and harmony that was singled out to explain Sierra 
leone’s steady progress had dissipated. donors were left frustrated, 
with one former dfid official concluding that this state of affairs had 
largely shattered the myth that international partners, in particular the 
uk, had considerable influence over the government in shaping Sierra 
leone’s statebuilding agenda.22
 this reluctance to change was not surprising. gberie, who formed 
part of a team of two consultants assigned by dfid to review progress 
in implementing the mou, says that there was a lack of consultation 
with the government in designing the benchmarks underpinning the 
mou and little agreement on more politically sensitive issues relating 
to the uk’s call for the downsizing of military personnel within a year. 
this latter requirement caused alarm for a government that believed 
that a similar suggestion to immediately roll back the national army 
may have contributed to the may 1997 coup.23 the Sierra leonean gov-
ernment therefore lacked ownership of the governance dimension of 
the statebuilding reform agenda, even though it was premised on the 
objectives articulated by President kabbah in 1998. furthermore, the 
state was constrained in its ability to deliver on its proposed reform 
agenda.24 Critically, the progress of reform and change was hindered by 
the fact that postwar Sierra leone remained dominated by the same old 
political forces (despite their political party affiliation) that “reinforced 
their traditional power basis and manipulated the reform agenda.”25
t H e  u n  P e A C e b u i l d i n g  C o m m i S S i o n  i n  S i e r r A  l e o n e
for the united nations, placing Sierra leone under the purview of 
its newly established entity, the Peacebuilding Commission (PbC), 
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demonstrated that Sierra leone had reached a major milestone.26 in 
december 2005, unAmSil left the country, claiming that stabilization 
had been successful, and the work of the un shifted from peacekeep-
ing to peacebuilding. through the establishment of the united nations 
integrated office in Sierra leone (unioSil), the PbC was mandated 
to foster closer collaboration and consensus between local and interna-
tional efforts in addressing the more difficult political aspects of Sierra 
leone’s longer-term statebuilding agenda. However, a 2007 assessment 
by three international nongovernmental organizations (ingos)—Ac-
tion Aid, CAre, and CAfod—provided sobering reflections on the 
PbC. the report criticized the slow start and lack of political focus, 
analysis, and strategic direction of the PbC, as well as the lack of co-
herence and coordination between donors.27 the review further high-
lighted a perennial problem in international endeavors in statebuilding: 
the failure to appropriately link the uS$35 million in funding received 
from the Peacebuilding fund (Pbf) to the need to reach political con-
sensus with local actors on tackling challenges to peacebuilding. the 
Pbf financial support was granted prior to securing the political will of 
the government and, more worryingly, ahead of the 2007 elections. this 
gave the unfortunate impression that the funds were aimed at bolstering 
the fortunes of the incumbent SlPP party.28 this perception was made 
more real by the fact that the vice president and presidential contender, 
Solomon e. berewa, was cochair of the Pbf’s steering committee. An-
other concern was that the Peacebuilding Commission’s involvement 
in Sierra leone suffered from a lack of “an informed debate on the 
meaning and politics of post-conflict peacebuilding” that resulted in 
the commission’s adopting a technical approach at a time when securing 
the political commitment of the government was vital to consolidating 
peace in the country.29
 After the 2007 elections, a strategic framework premised on the 
original four priority areas of the previous government—youth empow-
erment and employment; democracy and good governance; justice and 
security; and capacity building—was developed by the government in 
collaboration with the un. in September 2008, unioSil departed 
from the country, leaving the PbC as the main un instrument in Si-
erra leone. its task of maintaining consensus and the commitment of 
Sierra leone to the objectives of postwar reconstruction could succeed 
only if these objectives remained politically acceptable to the govern-
ment. yet the fact that Sierra leone’s political landscape remains largely 
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unaltered should be cause for concern. the voting patterns that saw 
the APC winning, overwhelmingly, in the northern half of the country 
and the Western Area (including freetown), and the SlPP maintain-
ing its control of the southern and eastern provinces, reflect the old 
order. As un Secretary-general ban ki-moon observed, this exposed 
a deepening political schism and highlighted the increasing dominance 
of ethnicity and regionalism in the politics of Sierra leone, a fact that if 
not addressed “could have a negative impact on peace-consolidation ef-
forts in the country.”30 these examples highlight the tensions in Sierra 
leone between the external statebuilding agenda that encourages new 
ways of conducting politics and new political actors, and the national 
ownership agenda.31
Liberia: Securing Legitimate Elections and State Control
the liberian experience highlights that security is essential for state-
building.32 lessons from previous rounds of regional and international 
peacekeeping from 1989 to 1997 provided a stark reminder that security 
is a primary ingredient for guaranteeing longer-term peacebuilding. 
Consequently, in their second intervention in liberia beginning in 
August 2003, regional and international actors provided robust security 
coverage throughout the country. the mandate of the united nations 
mission in liberia (unmil) was designed to correct past mistakes 
that focused on elections, believing that this was sufficient to ensure sta-
bility.33 Similarly, eCoWAS as guarantor of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement of August 2003 that brought an end to liberia’s civil war 
played a more prominent political and security role with unmil in 
shaping the country’s postconflict environment. effective statebuilding 
in liberia required both security and a break with the predatory and 
warlord politics of the country’s past political history. former president 
Charles taylor’s removal from political power and his exile in August 
2003 following the unsealing of his indictment by the Special Court for 
Sierra leone for war crimes in June was a vital first step for liberians 
and its international partners to alter the basis for politics in the coun-
try.34 neutralizing other potential spoilers was the next critical step on 
the path to holding viable elections and constituting a legitimate state.
n e u t r A l i Z i n g  S P o i l e r S
for many liberians and international partners, namely eCoWAS, 
unmil, and the international Contact group on liberia,35 there was 
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consensus that external intervention should support efforts that con-
tribute to changing the political landscape of the country. inevitably 
this goal of creating a new postwar state faced resistance from a coalition 
that sought to cling to the status quo. this coalition of status quo forces 
was spread across the spectrum of liberia’s elite class, most notably the 
transitional government and business community. it brought under 
its umbrella all the leaders of the Americo-liberian settler hegemony 
as well as the top echelons of the three major armed factions (former 
members of government, lurd, and model forces) that had held 
the country in a stranglehold for a quarter of a century. their goal was 
to prevent the implementation of changes that would destroy their indi-
vidual careers or reveal the extent of their involvement in previous state 
predation and plunder.
 the coalition employed various tactics to derail the peace process 
and thereby prolong the life of the transitional government, in order 
to enable its members to loot the vestiges of an already bankrupt state. 
one such attempt was to forestall national elections in october 2005. 
to achieve this, the coalition sought to delay the signing into law of an 
electoral reform bill that would lay the procedural and operational foun-
dations for running elections. Another delaying tactic was to prevent 
completion of the disarmament and demobilization process, which was 
critical to securing the country ahead of national elections.36
 unmil attempted to build partnerships at various levels to break 
the power base of the coalition that did not want to change the status 
quo. the coalition was not a homogeneous entity, and international 
partners therefore encouraged splits. Another vital factor was that the 
CPA stipulated that members of the transitional government could not 
contest for political or elective positions in the postwar elections. this 
excluded the principal political leaders of the armed factions from par-
ticipating in the post-transition government.
 Against this powerful coalition resisting change was another constel-
lation of actors who desired reform. these people sought support from, 
and often aligned themselves with, liberia’s international partners, 
although the relationship was at times strained. the coalition brought 
together human rights activists, prodemocracy movements, different 
faith groups, and some national ngos, including women’s groups. it 
provided a domestic anchor in society that helped unmil and its in-
ternational partners navigate the difficult road to creating a new politi-
cal space to contest elections.
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f r e e  A n d  f A i r  e l e C t i o n S
the nationwide democratic elections provided for in the CPA took place 
on october 11, 2005, in a remarkably peaceful environment. twenty-two 
aspirants had registered as presidential candidates along with thirty reg-
istered political parties. the multiplicity of registered political parties 
exposed many of the deep-seated problems in the liberian political sys-
tem, in that many of the parties, beyond the established groups, were not 
national in character, but tended to represent regional or ethnic identities.
 ellen Johnson Sirleaf and her unity Party (uP) won the presidential 
elections in a second round run-off against george Weah and his Con-
gress for democratic Change (CdC). but postconflict politics were 
shaped and influenced by interactions between three major political 
forces that emerged during the elections: the “conservative/status quo 
forces,” the “nativist caucus,” and the “progressive nationalist move-
ment.”37 the conservative forces were made up of the remnants of the 
previously dominant Americo-liberian political class, represented by 
varney Sherman under the Coalition for the transformation of liberia 
(Cotol). Weah and his CdC embodied the aspirations of the nativ-
ists’ goal of indigenous rule. President Johnson Sirleaf ’s uP represented 
the progressive nationalist movement.
 the outcome of the elections reflected the historical resentment to-
ward the Americo-liberian hegemony and others associated with the 
dominant political class and the status quo. the voice of the dispossessed 
and disenchanted youth, who constituted a potent majority of liberia’s 
population and who overwhelmingly supported Weah, emerged as a 
force to challenge the status quo. yet Sirleaf ’s ultimate victory may be 
interpreted as a rejection of the ethnic jingoism that characterized the 
Weah camp. it was also a repudiation of attempts to entrench the his-
torical division of society along an indigenous versus Americo-liberia 
fault line. What emerged was a progressive nationalist movement that 
represented a rejection of a throwback to the past. Sirleaf ’s government 
wanted to forge an inward-oriented and focused pan-liberian force 
that encompassed social, political, and economic liberalism as a basis for 
policy, and to negotiate the terms of political and economic engagement 
with liberia’s international partners.
 yet the hope that warlords would not feature in the new postwar 
electoral climate was dashed. the race for seats at the national Assem-
bly ushered in factional leaders, some of whom were on the un’s sanc-
tion lists, including Jewel taylor, the wife of former president Charles 
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taylor, and other taylor allies such as militia leader Adolphus dolo and 
former warlord Prince Johnson, a self-proclaimed born-again Chris-
tian. it was, therefore, inevitable that uneasy relations would develop 
between the executive and the legislature and dominate liberia’s politi-
cal landscape. for the first time in liberia’s history, the ruling party did 
not dominate the legislature. yet while we must take caution not to 
overstate the emergence of a new democratic process, the success of the 
elections significantly altered the context in which the political process 
was evolving. it would also affect the nature of liberia’s peacebuilding 
agenda because the executive, led by a confident sovereign, would clash 
in the early years with a legislature that wanted to carve a prominent 
role for itself in determining the country’s progress. the administration 
of President Johnson Sirleaf outlined an extensive array of reform initia-
tives necessary to buttress the new democratic dispensation, premised 
on integration and nationalism, or “liberianization,” meaning ensuring 
liberia’s ownership of various processes. Her vision and accompanying 
policies would come to shape the postconflict peacebuilding process, 
including liberia’s relations with various international partners.
P o S t e l e C t i o n  S tAt e b u i l d i n g :  
r e d e f i n i n g  i n t e r n At i o n A l  A n d  l o C A l  r e l At i o n S H i P S
the immediate task of the new government after its inauguration on 
January 16, 2006, was to consolidate the country’s hard-won peace, 
embark on various reform initiatives, and put in place mechanisms to 
address long-term development and economic recovery. the role of 
eCoWAS, unmil, and other international partners was to complete 
the unfinished aspects of the CPA and provide the new government with 
the political space it needed for elaborating longer-term peacebuilding 
strategies. the international mantra of “partnership” and “ownership” 
was tested in the early months of the new democratic dispensation, as 
international actors were confronted with a confident head of a sovereign 
state, who, while pragmatically negotiating the terms of political and eco-
nomic engagement with liberia’s international partners, also displayed 
strong “nationalist” leanings. it became quickly apparent that President 
Johnson Sirleaf would vigorously seek to “liberianize” all donor inter-
ventions. for eCoWAS, unmil, the international Contact group on 
liberia and other external partners, it became immediately clear that the 
robust and rigorous style of diplomacy adopted by international partners 
during the transitional period would have to be tempered.
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 Soon after her election victory, Sirleaf and liberia’s regional and 
international partners (under the auspices of the international Con-
tact group) met to discuss an internal paper that set out what these 
partners considered as key priority areas. the document encouraged 
the new administration to open a dialogue with the people of liberia 
and the legislature in order to set clear priorities and benchmarks for 
action and change at national and local levels. it further advised that 
dialogue focus on priority policy and institutional reforms pivotal to 
the political stability and economic progress of liberia.38 Sirleaf did 
not find any of these identified priorities objectionable. the meeting, 
however, provided an opportunity for the president to articulate her 
goals and outline her priorities for rebuilding liberia. more critically, 
she emphasized the importance of liberians taking ownership of the 
destiny of the country, while collaborating with international partners. 
in the immediate months following her election, Sirleaf set out her re-
form and development agenda, and in march 2006 she announced the 
government’s 150-day action plan, which was jointly elaborated with 
the support of liberia’s donor partners. the plan had four interrelated 
parts: security, economic revitalization, rule of law and governance, and 
basic services and infrastructure. the government also established the 
liberia reconstruction and development Committee (chaired by the 
president) to coordinate external aid, and to oversee the 150-day ac-
tion plan, which later evolved into a set of government activities to 
be accomplished under an interim poverty reduction strategy.39 A key 
hangover, however, from the transitional period and a major gover-
nance problem for the Sirleaf government, was how to deal with the 
history of corruption and the hemorrhaging of state funds. Continued 
donor and international support, especially from the uS, the euro-
pean union, and international financial institutions, was contingent 
on proper financial management of state revenue and a strong anticor-
ruption program. Sirleaf ’s vision of ownership of liberia’s affairs and 
how she would ensure an outcome that was favorable to liberia was 
immediately tested.
 the implementation of the governance and economic manage-
ment Assistance Program (gemAP) tested donors’ commitment to 
partnership and ownership. gemAP was negotiated and signed under 
the transitional government in response to the troubling revelations of 
corruption concerning public officials at all levels.40 Although President 
Sirleaf was committed to the ideas behind gemAP, her party as well 
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as other liberian political parties perceived the program to be a highly 
intrusive form of international assistance that directly challenged libe-
ria’s sovereignty. the requirement to deploy international experts with 
cosignatory authority in the financial machinery of the liberian state 
was considered the epitome of intrusion.
 Pragmatically, however, Sirleaf encouraged gemAP, because she 
agreed with the core elements of its agenda, especially management of 
public finances. in accepting the recommendations of gemAP and the 
foreign experts, the president, in her inauguration speech, committed 
her administration to ensuring competency and integrity in managing 
the country’s resources but demanded that international partners pur-
sue an integrated capacity-building initiative “so as to render gemAP 
inapplicable in a reasonable period of time.”41 tensions were inevitable 
in implementing such a controversial and intrusive program. Although 
Sirleaf chaired the oversight gemAP economic governance Steer-
ing Committee (egSC) made up of donors and other international 
partners, its technical arm was still led by the uS government. A special 
retreat between the liberian government and its international partners 
was convened in April 2007, during which President Sirleaf raised con-
cern about the lack of teamwork, collegiality, and partnership that was 
supposed to underpin relations between the internationally recruited 
gemAP experts and the management of those gemAP-assisted 
government agencies. Another concern was that without a more robust 
plan of action for capacity development, the objectives of gemAP 
could not be sustained. A consensus was reached that liberia would 
begin to assume full control of gemAP processes.42
 the implementation of gemAP provides revealing insights into the 
mind-set of the new government, especially the president’s, over the 
issue of “ownership.” the flip side of the ownership debate was made 
visible in the implementation process. indeed, it was apparent to Presi-
dent Sirleaf that limited capacity in government ministries to deliver 
and meet the expectations of the country meant that much of what she 
wanted to achieve could not be done without international assistance. 
liberia’s partnership with the international community in the pursuit 
of peace could therefore be characterized as an “awkward relationship” 
in which liberians were proud of their independence but needed to 
reconcile that pride with the fact that they lacked the necessary capacity 
to rebuild their country.
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Statebuilding is an immensely complex and expensive endeavor that is 
dependent on an intense partnership between international, regional, 
and local actors but that contains a number of important tensions and 
contradictions. based on the two case studies presented in this chapter, 
we can draw out four observations. first, an often repeated phrase is 
that there is no “one size fits all” approach to statebuilding. rather, a 
key lesson is the need to think boldly about ways to tailor statebuilding 
approaches to individual postconflict situations. Second, the strategy of 
ensuring security first is a necessary step, but not sufficient for peace-
building. the region, the un, and the international donor community 
have made important contributions to helping Sierra leone and liberia 
achieve stability. However, while both countries have achieved increased 
security, the more deeply complex political tasks of statebuilding have 
proven to be problematic. in particular, it has been difficult to achieve 
transformation that leads to a fundamental change in the political 
landscape, although developments in liberia point to a realignment of 
political forces. overall, there is a tension between the transformative 
aspirations underlying the statebuilding enterprise and the demands for 
local ownership.
 third, where states are weak, fractured, and with limited functional 
capacity, external assistance is more likely to be highly interventionist 
and assertive, as witnessed in the early phase of international inter-
vention in Sierra leone and liberia. yet when a strong government 
emerges as in liberia, states will resist or seek to limit international 
attempts to determine or dictate the statebuilding agenda, especially on 
contentious issues where the sovereignty of a state is at stake. this once 
again highlights the problematic nature of the peacebuilding enterprise 
and the conflicting imperatives of transformative statebuilding and na-
tional “ownership.”
 finally, the long-term objective of helping to build legitimate and 
effective state institutions is contingent on creating processes and 
institutions such as coordinating bodies or policy forums that enable 
dialogue over contentious issues between government and external ac-
tors (and even among the latter). this does not mean that tensions 
between local, regional, and international actors can be overcome. 
indeed, as the examples in this chapter suggest, it may be impossible 
to resolve such tensions. However, processes like the economic gov-
ernance Steering Committee and the liberia reconstruction and de-
velopment Committee bring internal and external partners together in 
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liberia to discuss and debate priorities in statebuilding programs and 
may enable or encourage consensus building. the liberia case shows 
that coordination mechanisms between international actors and the 
national authority can be helpful in defining priority actions. further, 
the un’s approach of encouraging a shared vision of a peacebuilding 
framework is a useful strategy for consensus building on the way for-
ward to statebuilding, as seen in Sierra leone. this does not guarantee 
a convergence of ideas between national and external actors; indeed, 
the politics of postconflict peacebuilding remain hard to navigate. 
external actors often have limited reach in altering the underlying 
structures, patterns, and political dynamics that created violence and 
civil wars. nonetheless, the importance of peacebuilding processes over 
time should not be neglected. Although coordination mechanisms do 
not eliminate difficult relations between national and external actors, 
there are certain important ingredients, including reinforcing trust and 
respect, and encouraging a shared vision of the way forward, that are 
mutually beneficial.
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T h I R T e e N
Oil and Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta
A d e r o J u  o y e f u S i
it is true that some of the boys have taken to criminality, but 
there are no jobs, no schools for them; no water to drink, no 
electricity, and they see their parents as helpless. How many of 
their parents are lifting crude oil? How many of them get oil 
blocks? When did the nigerian national Petroleum Company 
(nnPC) become a prerogative of a certain section of the 
country, whereas the people who own it (that is the oil) are 
not involved in the administration of the place? the federal 
government should not treat the people as conquered people.
edwin kiagbodo Clark, “the niger delta Crisis,” Guardian 
(lagos), June 12, 2009
We are but products of government’s intransigence on the 
niger delta question, victims of the political class’ extreme lust 
for power and rabid ambition, children of necessity of the high-
handedness and violent suppression of the niger delta struggle 
by the Joint task force, fall-outs of mercenary elders who 
feed fat from the struggle of the niger delta people. . . . if the 
so-called militants are criminals, then all these parties are also 
criminals and therefore need their own amnesty.
A militant in the niger delta, and his representative, quoted in 
Guardian, June 12, 2009
the very reason for militancy is because of injustice. fiscal 
federalism is among the things that will silence our guns. A 
simple reversal to fiscal federalism will save you the trouble of 
another future ceremony where you are made to receive piles of 
worthless paper.
movement for the emancipation of the niger delta (mend), 
in a letter to nigeria’s president, This Day (lagos), June 6, 2009
254
Aderoju oyefusi
t h e  P r o d u C t i o n  o f  C r u d e  o i l  A n d  t h e  m A n A g e m e n t  o f  i t s  r e n t s 
have been recurring sources of conflict in nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa’s 
largest producer. the politics of oil led to an unsuccessful attempt at se-
cession by the ijaws, the largest ethnic group in the oil-producing niger 
delta, in 1966. it also contributed to an outbreak of civil war following 
the declaration of independence by the eastern region in 1967, and has 
since generated continuous unrest in nigeria. this has placed the coun-
try in a situation that can be characterized as between war and peace.1 
After two decades of a fragile postwar peace, an insurrection by military 
officers from the South-South region and the middle belt in April 1990 
led to a resurfacing of fundamental questions on resource management 
and statehood, and provided the occasion for fresh outbreaks of com-
munity and ethnic uprisings in the niger delta region.2 violent unrest 
in the region reached alarming levels after that. between may and June 
2009, in an outbreak of violence between government forces and mili-
tant groups, oil production plummeted to as low as 800,000 barrels per 
day (about 30 percent of normal output level) as foreign oil companies 
were forced to shift operations offshore.3
 following the 2009 round of violence, the government introduced 
and implemented an amnesty package for militants that included a 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (ddr) program. the 
peacebuilding program is unique in that it was primarily homegrown 
and managed by the nigerian government and people. though it suc-
ceeded in bringing some measure of peace to the niger delta region, 
many believe that the fundamental issues underlying the crisis remain 
largely unresolved, such as property rights to oil and an appropriate rev-
enue-sharing formula between the nigerian government and producing 
regions. this chapter discusses ten key issues and questions arising from 
oil resource management and peace efforts in the niger delta, and the 
challenges they raise for local and international peacebuilding. it argues 
that contracts for the extraction of natural resources ought to be based 
on a relationship of trust between governments, host communities, and 
extractive firms, but there are serious obstacles to this.4
economic Justice in oil ownership and rent-Sharing
A major factor underlying the niger delta crisis is the question of own-
ership or property rights to oil and the appropriate formula for sharing 
oil rents. before the outbreak of the 1967–70 nigerian civil war, com-
munities had property rights over land even though the british colonial 
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government’s mineral ordinance of 1914 (amended in 1925, 1950, and 1958) 
meant that it had vested ownership of all mineral resources in the country. 
the independence constitution provided for 50 percent of revenues from 
natural resources to be returned to the producing region on the basis of 
the derivation formula. However, just before the end of the civil war, in 
1969, the federal government introduced the Petroleum Act, which gave 
it total control of the oil industry and oil revenue. it also enacted the 
land use Act in 1978, which vested ownership of all land within a state 
to the governor. these steps were associated with a gradual reduction in 
the derivation formula to 45 percent in 1970, 20 percent in 1975, 2 percent 
in 1982, and 1.5 percent in 1984, before an increase to 3 percent in 1992.5
 the acquisition of absolute rights to oil by the central government 
undermined the establishment of appropriate institutional arrange-
ments to regulate oil exploration and production activities and safe-
guard host communities from the negative impact of oil activities on the 
environment from which communities derive their livelihood.6 As the 
international Crisis group notes, over five decades of oil activity has 
resulted in extremely high levels of air and water pollution, thousands 
of oil spills, and a notorious record of gas flaring.7
 Absolute central government ownership and control of oil resources 
has also led to the extreme dependence of the nigerian government on 
oil revenue. there is a marriage of interest between the state and the 
major multinational oil companies, such as Shell and Chevron, operat-
ing in the country. As a result, the administration of justice in cases of 
oil-related disputes has been biased in favor of Western companies, and 
the state has been excessively repressive toward host communities.8
 in addition, developmental initiatives by the federal government in 
the niger delta region, such as the establishment of the oil mineral 
Producing Areas development Commission (omPAdeC) in 1992, 
and the niger delta development Commission (nddC) in 2001, have 
followed a top-down approach. the federal government has starved 
the developmental agencies of funds, thereby incapacitating them. for 
example, the government and oil companies have habitually defaulted 
on their statutory financial commitments to the nddC. between 2001, 
when the agency was created, and december 2007, the total funds owed 
to the commission by the government had accumulated to a staggering 
300 billion naira.9
 in 1999, the derivation formula was increased from 3 to 13 percent. 
However, this has failed to pacify oil-producing communities, as it was 
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viewed as an inadequate response to over four decades of neglect. vir-
tually all the committees set up by the government since the return to 
civilian rule in 1999 to recommend lasting solutions to the niger delta 
crisis have suggested an increase in the derivation formula to at least 
25 percent. in particular, the technical Committee on the niger delta, 
set up in September 2008, suggested a framework in which the ad-
ditional funds should be invested in new infrastructure and sustainable 
development in the oil-producing region. it also suggested the need for 
greater involvement of host communities. in october 2009, the federal 
government muted the idea of transferring 10 percent of equity held 
in joint-venture contracts to oil-producing communities.10 However, it 
did not clarify exactly how this was to be done. Although the idea that 
economic issues are an important component of peacebuilding is widely 
accepted, the niger delta experience shows that in practice there are 
profound disagreements about this.
legally enforceable responsibilities of Stakeholders
the federal government of nigeria operates two contractual arrange-
ments with oil companies, a joint-venture contract and a production-
sharing contract. under the joint-venture arrangement, the nnPC, 
representing the government’s interests and multinational oil compa-
nies, set aside part of its oil earnings to finance development activities in 
host communities. one of the oil companies is appointed to operate the 
venture. i have argued elsewhere, however, that the reliance on oil com-
panies to operate community development programs has encouraged 
governments at all levels to abandon their statutory responsibilities.11 it 
has also allowed multinational firms to play a disproportionate role in 
community governance and service provision and increased the space 
for conflict between the latter and host communities.
 in 2005, a survey of eighteen communities in the niger delta re-
gion showed, for example, that 39 percent depended on oil companies 
for electricity, which was often rationed. the survey also revealed that 
the demand on companies for the provision of basic amenities fueled 
up to 40 percent of identified conflict episodes, and contests among 
communities, and between groups for benefits from companies, ignited 
another 36 percent.12 there is a need for a clearly defined concept of 
corporate “social responsibility” and the delineation of responsibilities 
of the government toward host communities in a legally enforceable 
resource extraction contract.
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external guarantees and involvement
the role of guarantees by external actors in preventing resource-related 
violence has been examined in the existing literature, but the focus is 
often on the use of external military deterrence to discourage potential 
insurgents.13 this is one-sided, and there is a need to examine how exter-
nal actors could compel governments to take action to prevent conflict.
 nigeria’s former president, Alhaji umaru yar’Adua, strongly sup-
ported the creation of an external force to guarantee stability in the 
gulf of guinea. this enthusiasm toward military deterrence was fol-
lowed up with military training and technical assistance by some for-
eign countries, such as the united States and britain.14 However, the 
same countries have not adequately pressured the nigerian government 
to address the causes of the niger delta crisis. there has also been no 
pressure from other countries within and outside sub-Saharan Africa, 
nor from international organizations such as the united nations (un) 
and the African union (Au).
 As many analysts have observed, nigeria did not walk into the niger 
delta crisis blindfolded. Apart from the Willinks Commission’s report 
of 1958, which first noted the possibility of an outbreak of rebellion in 
the region, nigeria has organized at least fifteen other conferences, sum-
mits, and forums to examine the crisis and provide recommendations 
for a solution.15 However, successive governments never implemented 
their core recommendations. in fact, official copies of some reports are 
said to have disappeared from government archives.16
 this lack of commitment on the part of the federal government to re-
solve the niger delta crisis was, therefore, at least partly responsible for 
the continued violence in the region. for example, the movement for the 
emancipation of the niger delta (mend)17 was formed some months 
after the failure of the national Political reform Conference of 2005 to 
satisfactorily address the niger delta question, and the perceived deliber-
ate assault against the ijaw people almost immediately thereafter. Simi-
larly, over a year of peace initiatives in the region were shattered by the 
government’s failure to publish or implement practical recommendations 
that had emanated from a technical committee it had set up in September 
2008 to study all previous reports and position papers on the niger delta 
crisis. in fact, in what appeared to be a confusing signal, government troops 
bombed one of mend’s camps in rivers state while the committee was 
still working, thereby triggering another round of violence.
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 multinational oil companies operating in the niger delta region 
have also contributed to the unrest and violence. oil companies have 
traditionally supported, and even instigated, violence against protest-
ers and communities. they have sometimes set communities, families, 
and individuals against each other, through the way in which they offer 
selective compensation or damages for land and developmental assis-
tance.18 more recently, however, oil companies have made some efforts 
to improve their practices. for example, in 2006, the Shell Petroleum 
development Company introduced a new approach (the global mem-
oranda of understanding) aimed at improving the way it engages with 
communities, by allowing clusters of communities to determine what 
projects are carried out under the joint-venture arrangement.19 Some oil 
companies have also begun to advocate for greater participation of host 
communities in exploration activities through ownership of oil assets as 
a way of preventing attacks.20
 the actions of foreign oil companies are therefore critical to peace-
building in the niger delta, as the conflict cannot be viewed as separate 
from international processes. yet regional and international actors have 
not exerted strong political pressure on the nigerian government. the 
argument here is that strong political pressure by regional and inter-
national actors would be helpful, but the presence of strategic mineral 
resources and so many competing interests have made this unlikely.
Political marginalization and Power-Sharing
there has been continuous agitation by many of the ethnoregional groups 
in nigeria for a “true” federal political structure where each region has 
significant autonomy and control over its destiny. Among the grievances 
expressed by the niger delta people is the claim of political marginaliza-
tion. until 2007, no ijaw or any other person from the niger delta region 
occupied the country’s highest political offices, which were dominated by 
persons from the northern, western, and eastern regions. With the out-
break of violence in the niger delta region in 2004, President olusegun 
obasanjo, a yoruba from the West, made a political arrangement within 
the ruling People’s democratic Party (PdP) whereby an ijaw was to run 
as vice president in the 2007 election. With the victory of the PdP in the 
elections, goodluck ebere Jonathan became the first person from the 
niger delta to assume political office at that level of government.
 this raised the prospects of peacebuilding in the niger delta, as the 
new president, Alhaji umaru yar’Adua, extensively relied on his vice 
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president to reach out to militants in the region and facilitate discus-
sions on how to resolve the lingering crisis. but early efforts by the vice 
president to avert the disasters that occurred during the military action 
against the ijaws in may 2009 were rebuffed by the president, who was 
reported to have denied his vice president audience for three days. the 
apparent “inability” of the vice president to avert or minimize the large-
scale assault or to convince the federal government to take action to 
minimize civilian casualties or provide relief for victims demonstrated 
that power and political office sharing are not necessarily synonymous. 
this prompted some groups, such as mend and the Warri ijaw Peace 
monitoring group, to ask for his resignation. many felt his office had, 
in any case, been reduced to that of a “house boy,” and there was nothing 
the niger delta region stood to benefit from his appointment.21
 in november 2009, President yar’Adua was rushed abroad for medi-
cal treatment. on february 9, 2010, the national Assembly adopted a 
motion empowering the vice president to assume the office of presi-
dent in an acting capacity. on becoming acting president, goodluck 
Jonathan took some steps to assert or consolidate his authority. the first 
was replacing the national security adviser. the second was the dissolu-
tion of President yar’Adua’s cabinet. the new cabinet reflects a major 
change in the allocation of ministries among the various ethnic groups 
in the country. two of these changes (the appointment of deziani 
Allison-madueke, an ijaw, as the new minister of petroleum resources, 
and the elevation of Peter godsday orubebe, another ijaw, to that of 
substantive minister of niger delta) are particularly important for the 
niger delta crisis. following the death of yar’Adua on may 5, 2010, 
Jonathan was made president and commander in chief of the armed 
forces of the federal republic of nigeria. He was reelected president 
in 2011 for a term of four years. However, militants in the niger delta 
have shown that they do not desire a Jonathan presidency as an end 
in itself. they say that violence in the region will not abate unless the 
president addresses the issue of economic justice. the above develop-
ments suggest that power and political office sharing must remain an 
integral part of peacebuilding efforts where ethnic divisions run deep, 
but that economic justice remains central.
“democracy,” electoral violence, and Peacebuilding
in may 1999, nigeria experienced a transition to civilian leadership after 
sixteen years of brutal military rule. this transition reshaped the nature 
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of the niger delta crisis. oil availability raised the stakes associated 
with winning political office, since attaining the latter meant almost 
unhindered control of this flow of wealth.
 between 1999 and 2007, the oil city of Warri, in delta state, as well as 
parts of rivers state, including the state capital, Port Harcourt (regarded 
as nigeria’s oil capital), suffered violent conflicts. two groups—tom At-
eke’s niger delta vigilante (ndv) and Alhaji mujahid Asari-dokubo’s 
niger delta People’s volunteer force (ndPvf)—fought over control of 
oil-bunkering routes and control of tribal chieftaincy titles in communities 
with access to patronage from government and oil companies.22 Highly 
placed federal government officials from the ruling People’s democratic 
Party are reported to have provided logistical support and political protec-
tion to Ateke to help counter the influence of the opposition All nigeria 
People’s Party (AnPP) during the 2003 state and federal elections. in 
exchange, they would receive free rein to carry out profitable bunkering 
activities.23 former rivers state governor Peter odili is alleged to have pro-
vided financial backing to assist Asari-dokubo in securing the presidency 
of the ijaw youth Council. Asari-dokubo is reported to have subsequently 
used this position to exploit divisions between the ijaws in different states, 
and to recruit youths to help ensure odili’s reelection in 2003.24
 these events show that while democracy and elections can contrib-
ute to peace by providing opportunities for representation, they can also 
trigger violent expression of grievances and competition, especially in 
environments with weak institutional arrangements and weak rule of 
law. Some niger deltans believe that one of the underlying factors in 
the crisis in the region is the fact that elections tend to be flawed.25 the 
manipulation of frustrated youths by political leaders has been identified 
as another important factor.26 the international community’s role of 
observing elections fails to adequately address electoral malpractices.27
Peace negotiations
the issue of who should preside over negotiations to resolve the niger 
delta crisis has been controversial. former President yar’Adua con-
sistently rejected the suggestion that a non-nigerian lead a mediation 
process, and largely relied on his vice president, goodluck Jonathan, to 
reach out to militants. the ijaws and most militant groups considered 
this as “an attempt to saddle the vice President with the sole respon-
sibility of solving ‘his peoples’ problem, so that he can be charged with 
responsibility for failure.”28
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 in 2008 there was disagreement over who should chair a proposed 
niger delta summit. many within and outside the region had sug-
gested an experienced and well-respected African figure, like former 
un Secretary-general kofi Annan of ghana or Archbishop desmond 
tutu of South Africa, both nobel Peace laureates. the federal govern-
ment, however, opted for ibrahim gambari, a seasoned diplomat of 
northern affiliation who had served under previous military regimes 
and as a former ambassador to the un. the federal government ar-
gued that the niger delta crisis was a domestic problem and nigerians 
were best qualified to solve it, but many niger deltans believed that the 
choice of gambari represented the pursuit of sectional interests and a 
hidden government agenda.29 following the threat by the federation 
of ijaw youths not to participate, the idea of a summit was eventually 
jettisoned. in the wake of the military onslaught against ijaw commu-
nities in may–June 2009, the nigerian bar Association called for the 
establishment of a truth commission composed of “neutral persons,” 
and headed by a distinguished international figure, to mediate between 
government and militants, but this call was ignored.
 Apart from the controversy over who should facilitate peace nego-
tiations, activists in the niger delta have repeatedly complained that 
national negotiations between the nigerian government and “represen-
tatives” of the niger delta have always been closed, and have involved 
delegates appointed by the federal and state governments, most of which 
are believed to lack public credibility in the delta.30 these meetings are 
viewed as avenues for government to buy the loyalty of participants. 
delta militants have also requested that “resource control negotiations” 
between the government and representatives of each of the niger delta 
ethnic groups take place in any of the major cities in the niger delta 
rather than in Abuja.31
 nigeria’s experience suggests it may be difficult to achieve consensus 
between all groups in relation to the choice of a mediator between par-
ties to a conflict. mediation by international figures or agencies may be 
resisted by some parties for political reasons.
lack of Coordination within the niger delta
efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement have also been complicated by 
the lack of unity among different groups in the niger delta. there are 
many armed groups in the region, with the government officially iden-
tifying sixteen in 2003. Although most groups collaborate in some areas, 
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the issues of hierarchy and representation remain sources of disharmony. 
the loose formation among militant groups and the considerable lati-
tude they exercise in choosing what kinds of operations they carry out 
have encouraged various acts of criminality, such as kidnapping for ran-
som and other forms of violent extortions. this has made peacebuilding 
efforts by government and other stakeholders more difficult, since they 
cannot readily identify a command structure to negotiate with. many 
groups, such as the ijaw youth Council, the ijaw youth leadership 
forum, the South-South governors forum, the delta State elders, 
leaders, and Stakeholders forum, the Conference of ethnic nationali-
ties of the niger delta, the ijaw, isoko, and itsekiri leaders forum, the 
niger delta ethnic nationalities, and the niger delta Peace and de-
velopment forum, attempt to mediate, and many more seek relevance, 
thereby complicating any peace process. there is a problem of cohesive-
ness within the militant groups. for example, during the implementation 
of the amnesty program introduced by the federal government in August 
2009, some members of different groups publicly embraced the amnesty 
even when their organizations either had not stated their position or had 
publicly rejected the offer.
 divisions between militant groups are replicated among the various 
ethnic groups in the niger delta. frequent squabbles over positions 
and rents have encouraged both the government and oil companies to 
employ divide-and-rule tactics in the delta.32 for example, the violence 
in the city of Warri, delta state, between 1997 and 2003, involving the 
ijaws and itsekiris, and later the urhobos, illustrates how rent-seeking 
contests brought very lucrative benefits to the leaders of ethnic militias.33
 As a result of ethnic rivalry and a lack of coordination, militancy in 
the niger delta has come to be viewed as an ijaw struggle, and there 
have been efforts by other groups to discredit the agitations. for ex-
ample, during the 2009 face-off between the ijaws, the federal govern-
ment, and oil companies, an itsekiri community publicly applauded the 
efforts of a multinational oil company, Chevron, which had written a 
memorandum of understanding with them. Some other non-ijaw com-
munities praised government troops for “helping to maintain order and 
peace” in their communities, and called for continuous occupation.34
 there has been some measure of cooperation lately, especially with re-
quests for greater control of oil resources by host communities and states, 
but the issue of fractionalization between and among ethnic groups in 
the niger delta remains a significant impediment to peacebuilding.
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disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and Amnesty
At different times in the conflict, the nigerian government has granted 
amnesty to militants in the niger delta. more than four decades ago, 
the government granted amnesty to some ijaw youths who had taken 
up arms against the state and proclaimed a “niger delta republic.”35
 the obasanjo government also granted amnesty to Asari-dokubo 
and Ateke, leaders of two prominent militant groups, in october 2004, 
following their agreement to lay down their arms. the agreement, 
which included an arms-for-cash deal, was aimed at disarming Asari-
dokubo’s ndPvf, Ateke’s ndv, and their affiliated cult and youth-
group members. it also provided for the reintegration of these groups 
into society, and the creation of jobs for youth.36
 these efforts failed to bring lasting peace to the region. despite the 
much-talked-about plan to create jobs for youth, there were no spe-
cific and concrete proposals to accomplish it. the 2004 disarmament 
process also failed to collect all the arms. reports indicated that very 
old weapons were traded for financial rewards, while newer and more 
sophisticated weapons were retained by militants.37
 the federal government granted another amnesty to militants in the 
niger delta, subject to each militant signing a “renunciation of mili-
tancy” form within sixty days of August 6, 2009, when the amnesty was 
to take effect. the government also announced the creation of twenty-
seven rehabilitation and reintegration centers across the region, and a 
budget of 50 billion naira for the implementation of the amnesty pack-
age, including the rehabilitation and reintegration of militants (gov-
ernment officials later claimed that the amount actually earmarked for 
the program was just over 10 billion naira, not 50 billion).38 under the 
program, militants were to receive a monthly income of 20,000 naira, 
in addition to a daily allowance of 1,500 naira for meals, as a form of 
reintegration assistance, but there were no payments for arms returned 
by militants. Approximately 10,000 militants spread across sixty camps 
in the region were expected to benefit.
 the attorney general and the minister of justice considered the gov-
ernment’s initiative “the boldest step taken in the history of nigeria to-
wards tackling the niger delta question,” but the amnesty package did 
not find universal acceptance among nigerians, niger deltans, or even 
militants. nobel literature laureate Wole Soyinka described the gesture 
as a “cynical use of rhetoric to douse an epic conflagration.”39 Soyinka 
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and others believed that the amnesty package would fail because the 
government had not committed itself to addressing the causes of unrest 
in the delta, such as inadequate compensation for environmental dam-
ages, failure to develop the region, denial of the right to oil control, and 
government repression. Some viewed the requirement for militants to 
fill out renunciation forms as laughable, and others believed that the 
amnesty package was a scheme to round up militants in the region.40
 most militants were not positively disposed toward the amnesty 
plan, especially at the initial stages. for example, Asari-dokubo be-
lieved that it was the nigerian government that needed amnesty, and 
he attempted to bring the government to court for criminalizing him 
by including his name on the list of persons to be granted amnesty.41 
mend spokesperson Jomo gbomo consistently reminded the gov-
ernment that his group did not ask for amnesty, because its members 
were not criminals. He described mend as “a movement challenging 
the current status of the nation,” whose members do not need amnesty 
but an armistice, meaning an “enabling environment that allows a ces-
sation of hostility by all parties and facilitate[s] meaningful dialogue 
on the niger delta debacle.”42
 other militants had earlier expressed doubt over the sincerity of gov-
ernment, citing the cases of Soboma Jackree, Asari-dokubo, and Henry 
okah, who were arrested by the government while they were in the pro-
cess of negotiating peace or after the granting of amnesty. in exchange 
for their participation in the amnesty deal, the militants requested that 
the government guarantee their safety, expunge their names from all 
criminal records in order to facilitate their rehabilitation to normal life, 
and shield them against prosecution by future governments.43
 Although the government tried to persuade militants to embrace its 
“magnanimity” in offering amnesty to all militants, it also employed 
subtle threats. for example, senior security officials warned unrepentant 
militants to be prepared for “anything” after the government’s sixty-day 
ultimatum.44 nevertheless, militants continued to destroy oil facilities. 
on July 9, 2009, the government decided to release Henry okah, the 
alleged leader of mend, who had been incarcerated since 2008 and 
whose release had been one of the conditions demanded by mend. 
on July 14, mend unilaterally declared a sixty-day cease-fire two days 
after attacking the Atlas Cove Jetty, an oil facility in lagos state, killing 
five workers in the process.45 on August 3, 2009, militants articulated 
their conditions for implementing disarmament, demobilization, and 
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reintegration. they demanded 300,000 naira for each Ak-47 and two 
magazines of ammunition surrendered.46 they also requested that the 
government construct a three-bedroom apartment “of relatively good 
comfort” for each of their members in places of their own choice within 
the niger delta, the cost of which would be paid back by each of the 
beneficiaries over a ten-year period.47 they promised to hand over seven 
oil wells within the first week of the federal government’s agreeing to 
these terms, and to end all hostilities.48 the federal government did not 
make any official response to these demands.
 on August 6, 2009, when the amnesty took effect, there were reports 
that some purported militants embraced the government’s package and 
handed in their arms. “boyloaf,” one of the mend commanders in 
charge of the bayelsa axis, met with President yar’Adua in the federal 
Capital territory in Abuja, and accepted amnesty.49 At the same time, 
the nigerian police raided Asari-dokubo’s arms depot, carting away 
arms and ammunition.50 the sixty-day period for militants to accept 
the government’s amnesty ended on a note of seeming victory when, a 
few hours before the expiration of the deadline, in a televised, carnival-
like program, government ekpemupolo, also known as tompolo, who 
had been declared wanted by the government “dead or alive” after the 
destruction of Camp 5 in delta state in may 2009, embraced the gov-
ernment’s amnesty.51
 the amnesty board was disbanded on october 18, 2009, but post-
amnesty efforts to secure peace continued, as there was an alleged meet-
ing between President yar’Adua and a mend negotiating team that 
included Wole Soyinka and a former chief of general staff from the 
niger delta. A post-amnesty committee was also established.
 in July 2010 the federal government began the rehabilitation and 
reintegration aspect of the peacebuilding program. this involved expos-
ing ex-militants to nonviolence transformational training and counsel-
ing in a camp setting in obubra, Cross river State. the training was 
facilitated by the foundation for ethnic Harmony in nigeria (feHn) 
and involved American instructors from emory university in Atlanta, 
georgia.52 this was to be followed up with skills-acquisition training 
and formal education. in 2010, the ministry of the niger delta began 
construction of nine skill acquisition centers across the country, which 
were to complement existing facilities such as the Petroleum train-
ing institute and Scotchville in Warri, delta State, Pendaxia in lagos 
State, Peugeot Automobile in kaduna, and the national institute for 
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freshwater fisheries research in new bussa, niger State.53 the gov-
ernment also revealed plans to sponsor at least 13,000 ex-militants to 
various tertiary institutions both in nigeria and abroad using the plat-
form provided by the ministry of the niger delta.54
 the actual deployment of ex-militants to training centers began in 
August 2010. in march 2011, the Presidential Amnesty office sent twenty 
former militants, including one female, to South Africa for aviation 
training as pilots.55 one of the ex-militants who embraced the amnesty 
program and underwent nonviolent education and skills acquisition, 
Abraham ingobere, was elected into the bayelsa State House of As-
sembly in the 2011 election. According to ingobere, this demonstrates 
that ex-militants can have a part in the political administration of the 
country.56 in June 2011, thirty-six niger delta youths were sponsored to 
israel for training in agriculture.57
 the apparent commitment of the federal government to the post-
amnesty and peacebuilding program has not gone unnoticed. there are 
reports, for example, that the united nations may adopt the nigerian 
ddr/peacebuilding model in other conflict areas, if it proves to be suc-
cessful.58 other militants who had earlier expressed doubts as to the 
sincerity of government and workability of the program have since been 
encouraged to turn in their arms. in June 2010, about one hundred ex-
militants stormed Abuja in fourteen buses, demanding to be included 
in the federal government Amnesty Programme.59
 throughout the process, the government continued to issue warn-
ings saying it would not condone “any act of sabotage whether from 
the ex-militants and beneficiaries of the post-amnesty scheme or stake-
holders under whatever guise” and that it has a robust plan to move the 
nigerian youths to “greater heights.”60 in october 2010, the govern-
ment instigated the arrest of Henry okah in South Africa and insti-
tuted charges of treason against him for bomb explosions around the 
“eagle Square” in Abuja for which mend claimed responsibility. in 
a solidarity visit to Abuja to commiserate with the president and the 
nation over the incident, a group of ex-militant leaders (including many 
former commanders of mend) attempted to impress upon the nation 
that the militant phase of the niger delta struggle was over and that 
mend as a movement died with their embrace of the federal govern-
ment amnesty.61 in response to a federal government directive, the Joint 
task force ( Jtf) in the niger delta launched a major offensive on the 
hideouts of regrouped militants in bayelsa, delta, and rivers State in 
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november 2010 during which it captured fourteen militants and recov-
ered various arms and ammunitions. it also attempted to capture John 
togo, leader of the niger delta liberation force, a newly formed mili-
tant group.62 these efforts led to the destruction of over forty houses 
in Ayakoromo and other communities in burutu local government 
Area of delta State, the killing of over sixty civilians and displacement 
of over a thousand persons in december 2010.63 in may 2011, there were 
reports that John togo and his niger delta liberation force (ndlf) 
had declared an end to militancy, which according to the spokesman of 
the group, was born out of a desire to avert further killing of civilians 
in rural communities in the niger delta. However, many believed the 
group was only seeking a way out. there are also unconfirmed reports 
that John togo had been severely injured in a military assault by the 
Jtf and had died of the wounds.64
 notwithstanding these developments, the ddr and peacebuilding 
program have not been without flaws. for example, in an interview 
with Al-Jazeera, Henry okah said that the peace process could unravel 
because of the government’s focus on buying off important militants 
rather than addressing the fundamental issues behind the crisis.65 these 
claims are corroborated by accusations by some ex-militants that the 
government is applying double standards in dealing with those who 
have embraced amnesty, and is focusing only on the “big boys.” mend 
had earlier accused the federal government of “enticing every militant 
camp with one billion naira to support the amnesty plan.”66 John togo 
attributed his renewed offensive to “the refusal of the federal govern-
ment to dialogue with the real freedom fighters” and the practice of 
“lobbying some handful of disgruntled elements with money and oil 
contracts.”67 in edo state there were protests by ex-militants complain-
ing of neglect. there have also been cases of armed robbery involv-
ing alleged ex-militants.68 mend considers the five-day to two-week 
training in nonviolence as laughable and has asked rhetorically why 
the American prison system is “over-burdened with about 2.3 million 
inmates” if it is that easy to transform people by a two-week training.69 
A threat by the group to bomb the eagle square in Abuja, the proposed 
venue for the 2011 independence anniversary celebration, made the gov-
ernment cancel the entire arrangement. in february 2012, the group 
attacked and destroyed the trunk line of the nigerian Agip oil Com-
pany (nAoC) in coastal brass, bayelsa State, and threatened to cut off 
the country’s oil production and to attack South African companies 
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operating in the country over what it described as the “interference” of 
its president, Jacob Zuma, in “the legitimate fight for justice in the niger 
delta.” it also accused President goodluck Jonathan of “squander[ing] 
public funds on tribalistic sycophants and thugs calling themselves ex-
militants,” rather than addressing the “serious issues facing the nation 
and its citizens.”70 the system of paying ex-militants their allowances 
through their former commanders also created problems. there were 
complaints that some ex-commanders failed to remit payments to ex-
militants over long periods. Such accusations may have contributed to 
the assassination of some former commanders, such as Sagboma george 
in August 2010 and ebi Albert in June 2011.71
 the ddr program has also proved to be expensive. ex-militants are 
paid 65,000 naira monthly as part of the reintegration program.72 this 
is similar to the income they are reported to have earned as militants.73 
by comparison, the current minimum wage in nigeria was raised in 
July 2011 to 18,000, up from 7,500 naira. given the country’s high youth 
unemployment, it is not surprising that the ddr program became a 
honey pot. by January 2011, the government became concerned about a 
“bloated figure” of ex-militants by the Presidential Amnesty Commit-
tee headed by the ex-minister of the interior, general godwin Abbe.74 
by october 2009, the deadline for militants to turn in their arms, the 
committee had registered and documented up to 20,192 “repentant 
niger delta militants,” more than double the initial estimate. by may 
2010, there were an additional 2,971 ex-militants from more than eleven 
different “militant groups” seeking inclusion and documentation in the 
post-amnesty program.75 the government has had to buy the support 
and loyalty of key militant leaders with huge amounts of money, oil-
related contracts, and other benefits.76 these developments show that a 
ddr program involves heavy financial costs.
between Justice and Peace
the niger delta crisis offers insights into the much-debated issue of a 
possible trade-off between justice and peace in postconflict peacebuild-
ing. there have been calls at various times and by various persons and 
organizations for the government to take “strong” action against the per-
petrators of violence in the region. for instance, Human rights Watch 
(HrW) expressed concern that the granting of amnesty to individuals 
responsible for serious human rights abuses will contribute to the culture 
of impunity and jeopardize the prospects for peace in the region.77
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 there have been similar condemnations by international agencies 
investigating the may–June 2009 onslaught against ijaw communi-
ties. for example, the Conference of ethnic nationalities of the niger 
delta threatened to drag the federal government into the court of the 
economic Community of West African States (eCoWAS) over the 
onslaught, while the federation of ijaw Women (fiW) petitioned the 
un Human rights Commission against the blockage of waterways 
across the niger delta in the ijaw areas of delta state during and after 
the attacks, describing it as a “wicked attempt to eliminate the ijaw race 
through starvation and sickness.”78 the allegations are corroborated by 
Amnesty international, which accused the federal government of dis-
placing innocent people and denying them health care.79
 mend also called on the united nations to investigate alleged 
extrajudicial killings and rape by troops of the Joint task force during 
the military confrontation. it also called on the international Court 
of Justice (iCJ) to try former president obasanjo for alleged crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing against the ijaw people.80 the 
nigerian government has so far ignored the allegations and threats of 
legal action.
 the federal government’s dilemma over what to do with the docu-
ments discovered in Camp 5, one of the camps operated by mend, 
in may 2009, aptly demonstrates the complexity of pursuing both 
justice and peace in the niger delta. the documents were said to con-
tain a list of “militants’ sponsors,” minutes of meetings held between 
militants and politicians, details of attacks on oil facilities and who 
was responsible, including insiders within the oil companies, details of 
bunkering money paid to prominent people, names and addresses of 
foreign contacts, documents of arms purchases and names of nigerian 
middlemen, and a plan by militants to acquire “sophisticated military 
hardware, including armored cars and jets” as well as “gun-ships, bombs, 
and rocket-launchers from an east european company.”81 the discov-
ery of the documents confirmed what many believe to be the intricate 
relationship between political violence and oil theft, and caused a stir 
in government circles.82 Although some people, including some serving 
senators, asked for the publication of the documents and the trial of 
those implicated, the federal government felt that this could create a 
security backlash and complicate the ongoing peace efforts.83 Some of-
ficials also expressed concerns that public knowledge of the revelations 




the cost of the crisis in the niger delta is astonishing. between 2006 and 
2008 alone, the country is said to have lost uS$61.6 billion due to attacks 
on its oil installations as well as oil theft, and another uS$3 billion lost to 
oil bunkering within the first seven months of 2008.84 violence between 
militants and government troops also cut down the nation’s oil produc-
tion.85 in addition, at least one thousand people are reported to have been 
killed in conflicts involving militants and security forces between 2006 
and 2008, with up to three hundred hostages taken.86 there is other unac-
counted human misery connected to the violence, such as rape, physical 
assault, loss of property, and disruption of socioeconomic activities. the 
death toll in the may–June 2009 violence has not yet been officially deter-
mined, but there are indications it may be well over a thousand.87
 the conflict has sparked huge spending on security and defense by 
both the nigerian government and oil companies. for example, the na-
tion’s budgetary allocation to defense in 2008 was a staggering 445 bil-
lion naira, while multinational oil companies are reported to have jointly 
spent about uS$3.7 billion on security in 2007 alone.88 According to the 
chairman of the technical Committee on the niger delta, the nation has 
never spent so much on military hardware and security and related as-
pects, not even during the civil war. the director-general of the national 
institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, located in kuru, Jos, noted that 
the state’s management of the niger delta struggle has largely militarized 
the region, turning it into “a huge garrisoned command” and making it 
“the most large-scale and prolonged military operation” the country has 
experienced.89 oil is still being produced at gunpoint all over the delta.
 rather than addressing the issues underlying the niger delta crisis, 
oil companies and governments at various levels have paid militants 
to keep their constituents under control and to guarantee the safety 
of companies’ operations and staffs.90 this has predictably promoted 
distrust, divisions, and violent rent-seeking contests between groups. it 
has contributed to the criminalization of the niger delta crisis.91
the most striking element of the peacebuilding efforts in the niger 
delta is its primarily homegrown nature involving many sections of 
nigerian society, including civil society groups, labor unions, women’s 
organizations, the nigerian bar Association, and religious leaders.92 yet 
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international actors have also had an impact on the crisis in the niger 
delta, including the ambiguous involvement of multinational oil com-
panies operating in the region.
 there is broad agreement on explanations for conflict in the niger 
delta. the national question and the division of resources have remained 
unresolved since 1966, when the first republic was violently brought to 
an end by the military. Addressing these issues would involve the cre-
ation of an equitable federal structure and the promotion of economic 
justice. even the most outspoken critics of militancy and criminality 
in the niger delta region agree that there are underlying grievances 
that the federal government must address. there is also considerable 
agreement that the report of the technical Committee on the niger 
delta (tCnd) addresses some of these challenges and provides the 
government with practical steps that could help resolve the crisis.93
 there is a paradox in that international private oil companies are 
involved and also have interests in the niger delta region. many of the 
activists and militants in the region wanted international actors to be 
directly involved in peace discussions and negotiations, and petitions 
were sent to international and regional organizations such as the united 
nations and eCoWAS. Although some Western countries are worried 
about the effect of the niger delta crisis on oil prices and have at times 
pressured the nigerian government to take steps to avert a major crisis, 
there has been no deliberate international engagement to bring lasting 
peace to the niger delta.94 there have been only smaller-scale efforts, 
such as in 2004 when the uS government allegedly pressured President 
obasanjo into negotiating with Asari-dokubo and his ndPvf, and at 
times when uS courts have entertained litigations by nigerians against 
multinational oil companies operating in the delta.
 there is much at stake in the niger delta, for local, national, and 
international actors. President goodluck Jonathan has made the resolu-
tion of the niger delta crisis and the problems of the power (energy) 
sector the focus of his administration. but the reality is that peacebuild-
ing is not straightforward given the complexity of the conflict, the high 
stakes involved, and the fluid boundaries between opposing sides.
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f O U R T e e N
Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration in Southern Africa
Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique
g W i n yAy i  A .  d Z i n e S A
u n i t e d  n A t i o n s  ( u n )  P e A C e k e e P i n g  f o r C e s  s u P e r v i s e d 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (ddr) of former com-
batants in namibia, Angola, and mozambique. in all three southern 
African countries, ddr aimed at creating sustainable, secure, and peace-
ful frameworks of transition. in namibia, the united nations transition 
Assistance group (untAg) successfully executed its disarmament and 
demobilization mandate. in Angola, disarmament and demobilization, 
monitored by four un peace missions—three incarnations of the united 
nations Angola verification mission (unAvem), and the united na-
tions observer mission in Angola (monuA)—foundered, leaving no 
room for reintegration. the united nations operation in mozambique 
(unomoZ) departed without completing its disarmament mandate. 
focusing on the interplay between local, regional, and international actors 
in the crafting and implementation of ddr, this chapter examines the 
factors that led to the different outcomes in these three countries.1
namibia
namibia demonstrates that synchrony between local, regional, and 
international stakeholders neutralizes the challenges to effective imple-
mentation of ddr. following protracted colonial occupation, libera-
tion politics, and prolonged involvement by the league of nations and 
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the united nations, the new york Accords of december 22, 1988, fa-
cilitated the implementation of namibia’s independence in line with 
un Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and the establishment of 
untAg.2 the accords, mediated by the united States, were signed by 
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. in 1989–90, untAg—one of the first 
multidimensional un peace operations—successfully supervised na-
mibia’s transition to independence. Critically, untAg had a specific 
mandate to disarm and demobilize the country’s armed groups, as part 
of the overall strategy to create secure conditions for namibia’s transi-
tion to independence.
 the mission, with the cooperation of South Africa and the South 
West Africa People’s organization (SWAPo), was required to follow 
a clearly crafted plan for disarming and demobilizing the following: 
SWAPo’s military wing, the People’s liberation Army of namibia 
(PlAn), and indigenous forces established by colonial South Africa 
to fight against PlAn alongside the South African defense force 
(SAdf), such as the South West Africa territorial force (SWAtf), 
citizen and commando forces, and the counterinsurgency unit koevoet 
(“Crowbar”), which terrorized namibians.3 untAg was also tasked 
with supervising the SAdf’s withdrawal from namibia. As the time-
specific untAg did not have a mandate to assist with the long-term 
and important reintegration of the demobilized combatants, this was 
left to the devices of the independence government. therefore, na-
mibia’s ddr was not an integrated process, as it experienced a gap 
between disarmament/demobilization and reintegration. there were no 
steps to ensure continuity through untAg’s postwithdrawal synergy 
with relevant local bodies.
 despite its well-stated disarmament and demobilization schedule, 
untAg experienced an inauspicious complicated start, partly because 
of the bureaucratic nature of the un’s institutional framework. the im-
plementation of resolution 435 and effective deployment of untAg 
were delayed by the Security Council’s powerful Western countries, 
which clamored for downscaling the mission’s budget and its disarma-
ment and demobilization military component. Although the tripartite 
new york Accords had been signed on december 22, 1988, the un 
Security Council did not approve untAg’s budget of uS$416 million 
until february 1989.
 the delay in untAg’s full deployment meant the mission was not 
ready to monitor the movement of armed groups and their confinement 
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to bases on April 1, 1989, when the cease-fire was to come into effect. 
on this day, South African forces clashed with PlAn combatants who 
had crossed the border from Angola into northern namibia. untAg 
later confirmed PlAn’s explanation that it had been engaged in estab-
lishing military bases inside namibia that would be monitored by the 
un mission, only to be ambushed by South African forces. However, 
at the time, South African forces, authorized by the Special represen-
tative of the Secretary-general (SrSg), martti Ahtisaari, to deploy 
and enforce the cease-fire, engaged in a major onslaught against the 
outnumbered and less well equipped SWAPo combatants, in which 
more than 375 PlAn combatants were killed.4 the clash reflected the 
sensitive security atmosphere that had been created by mutual distrust 
and suspicion between the parties. An urgent joint commission meet-
ing at mount etjo, involving the external parties—the united States, 
russia, Cuba, and Angola—calmed the potentially explosive situation, 
which threatened the untAg mission through a possible resumption 
of war, and secured the parties’ recommitment to the peace process.5 
the ultimate consensus among local, regional, and international actors 
for promoting namibia’s independence process at the end of the Cold 
War was important.
 in addition to resolving the cease-fire violations, external actors—in-
cluding the Contact group,6 which comprised the united States, the 
united kingdom, West germany, Canada, and france—supported 
the namibian peace process. untAg was well funded. the frontline 
States—Angola, mozambique, tanzania, and Zambia—also gave con-
structive and important support to the independence plan, particularly 
to the mediation and confidence-building activity between the South 
Africans and SWAPo in the aftermath of the clash between their forces.
 untAg’s operational and logistic capacity was expeditiously boosted 
to enable it to establish a firm nationwide strategic presence and au-
thority over and above South Africa and SWAPo to credibly carry out 
its clear disarmament and demobilization mandate. the parties’ crucial 
commitment to namibia’s independence process and amenability to 
untAg pressure facilitated significant disarmament and demobili-
zation. this mitigated widespread skepticism about whether the in-
country and global affairs were indeed effectively transformational.
 untAg had a strong institutional framework. its military component 
reached a maximum strength of 4,493, consisting of 300 military monitors 
and observers, three infantry battalions, and logistics units. this made 
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it credible and increased the chances of its success. the peace operation 
deployed one military observer for every six fighters, enabling effective 
monitoring of disarmament and demobilization.7 untAg subsequently 
demobilized SWAtf and the citizen commando forces. the arms, mili-
tary equipment, and ammunition collected from these units were depos-
ited in “double-locked” drill halls guarded by untAg infantry.8
 the un, determined to ensure effective disarmament, exerted pres-
sure on the South African administrators, which led to the demobili-
zation of 1,600 ex-koevoet members that South Africa had tactically 
“infiltrated” into the South West African Police (SWAPol),9 under 
untAg supervision by october 30, 1989. their arms were retrieved 
and sent to Windhoek.10 this effectively brought the menacing unit 
under untAg’s control and eased the transition process. the remain-
ing 1,500-strong “merlyn force” was withdrawn after certification of 
the independence elections on november 21, 1989, completing the with-
drawal of the SAdf and its concomitant military equipment. most of 
the heavy weapons that were collected during the disarmament process 
were transported to South Africa by the SAdf under untAg obser-
vation.11 in essence, untAg engaged in limited weapons collection 
and disposal programs in namibia.
 the disarmament of PlAn was implemented in Angola. PlAn 
troops who were in namibia after April 1, 1989, were assembled at 
designated camps before being escorted under untAg supervision to 
assembly points north of the 16th parallel in Angola. despite a slow 
start, more than 5,000 combatants were ultimately confined to bases in 
Angola12 where their disarmament and demobilization was supervised 
by a small team of thirty-one military monitors known as untAg A 
(Angola).13 difficulties such as the absence of accurate information on 
PlAn’s force posture did not derail the process, and by the end of 
november 1989 many PlAn combatants had been disarmed and de-
mobilized, and the assembly camps had been closed.
 the success of the disarmament and demobilization was undermined 
by the namibian independence government’s failure to proactively plan 
and implement comprehensive reintegration programs. Since namibia 
had no army at independence, one of the priorities of the new govern-
ment was the establishment of an integrated namibian defense force 
(ndf). Against a backdrop of mistrust and suspicion, establishment 
of the ndf was informed by the political imperatives of using the 
new military as a vehicle in the nation-building project while ensuring 
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stability and consolidation of state power.14 together, the ndf and 
the transformed namibian police absorbed between 8,000 and 10,000 
combatants, offering them and their dependents some stability.15 How-
ever, this accounted for only a fraction of the more than 50,000 total 
demobilized. Preoccupied with the swift formation of the ndf, na-
mibia’s government embarked on stopgap reintegration measures for 
the additional former combatants. this created a time bomb that would 
explode, close to a decade after the war had ended, in nationwide pro-
tests by ex-combatants disaffected by their poor socioeconomic status.
 in terms of reintegration, ex-SWAtf members were better placed 
than their ex-PlAn counterparts, as they continued to receive salaries 
from South Africa after their discharge, until namibia’s independence. 
this was designed to facilitate their reintegration into civilian life, and to 
retain their loyalty to the SAdf in case namibia’s transition to indepen-
dence collapsed.16 in 1991–92, South Africa implemented a compensation 
scheme consisting of “a once-off payment of 12,000 namibian dollars 
(uS$2,600) to former Koevoet and SWAtf forces as a gratuity to tide 
them over until they found employment.”17 their prior achievement of 
the standard education criteria required for entry into SWAtf also gave 
them good standing for civilian employment and reintegration.
 the same cannot be said of former PlAn combatants, whose em-
ployment prospects were restricted by their lack of formal qualifica-
tions. the majority, unable to be absorbed into limited public sector 
employment, remained part of the mainstream unemployed population 
years into independence. this was at a time when the transition to 
independence was accompanied by a neocolonial economic structure 
and a small private sector that was not immediately restructured to 
facilitate economic growth and job creation. the country recorded a 
small growth of real gross domestic product (gdP), of 0.2 percent, in 
1990, which was 23 percent lower than in 1980.18 low mineral prices, 
overexploitation of fishing resources, prolonged drought, and financial 
mismanagement were some of the factors behind the depressed eco-
nomic performance. the government also did not develop the potential 
of the informal sector to meet the reintegration goals of creating jobs 
and alleviating poverty among unattached former combatants.
 former PlAn combatants were each paid a small, onetime gratuity 
of 1,400 rand in 1991. this followed demonstrations by former combat-
ants in Windhoek who demanded compensation for their liberation 
war efforts. the plan was that this gratuity would be complemented by 
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the succeeding two-year (1991–92) development brigade (later devel-
opment brigade Corporation) training program, which was designed 
to impart practical agricultural and construction skills for sustainable 
postgraduation income-generation to the unemployed ex-combatants. 
However, this did not quite work out as planned.
 the development brigade was strategically placed under the min-
istry of lands, resettlement, and rehabilitation, as land reform was to 
be central to its success. However, namibia’s slow and cumbersome land 
resettlement program resulted in the perpetuation of skewed landown-
ership patterns. Access to land was problematic, in particular for former 
combatants who were not treated as a specific preferential target group 
under the snail-paced national land reform program. other institutional 
and operational problems, including a lack of funding, a lack of tech-
nical expertise and qualified personnel, as well as inappropriate train-
ing, resulted in the development brigade program failing to acquire 
self-sufficiency and being unable to wean the trainees into productive 
employment or viable projects. bilateral donors such as the Swedish 
international development Cooperation Agency (SidA) and later the 
european Community withdrew sponsorship on the basis of negative 
evaluation reports on the performance and viability of the development 
brigade. the dependency syndrome among brigade members, who be-
lieved that the government had to indefinitely guarantee their welfare 
and employment, aggravated the situation. the development brigade 
project also confined former combatants together and reinforced their 
separateness, thereby undermining their reintegration into society.
 namibia’s initiatives failed to facilitate the reintegration and guaran-
tee the postwar human security of former combatants. this presented 
a potential threat to national stability and security, as demonstrated by 
the public disruption and rioting by unsuccessfully reintegrated and ne-
glected former combatants in the mid-1990s. in order to avert full-scale 
instability, the government reactively institutionalized the “Peace Proj-
ect,” aimed at affirmative job placements, mainly in the public service, 
for about 11,950 unemployed and registered former combatants. A larger 
civil service was the price that the namibian government had to pay for 
the earlier botched reintegration. instead of mollifying the disgruntled 
and riotous former combatants in the short term with monetary payoffs, 
the Peace Project enhanced prospects for the long-term reintegration of 
its beneficiaries, and for some time did manage to prevent new security 
threats posed by former combatants. in a significant step, namibian 
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president Hifikepunye Pohamba, within a year of taking office, estab-
lished a stand-alone ministry of War veteran Affairs in october 2006 
to take care of war veteran matters.19
 in addition to the absence of a generalized comprehensive reintegra-
tion strategy, namibia illustrates the potential harm of failing to ad-
dress the concerns of particular groups, such as women, the disabled, 
and psychologically distressed former combatants. Although about 10 
percent of the former combatants suffered from physical and psycho-
logical disabilities, governmental rehabilitation programs were limited. 
the evangelical lutheran Church in namibia (elCin) ran a reha-
bilitation center at nakaye in ovamboland for the wartime injured and 
mentally stressed PlAn veterans who required specialized treatment 
and training. it was the only such rehabilitation center. operating on 
a shoestring budget, the rehabilitation center could accommodate only 
180 former combatants under “unacceptable” living conditions with 
inappropriate training programs.20 not surprisingly, within a year, in 
July 1990, the number of interns had plummeted to 71. However, these 
individuals could not secure employment, and the rehabilitation center 
could not profitably use their skills.
 the government later took charge of most rehabilitation activities, 
including the elCin center, which opened its doors to the broader 
disabled population. Significantly, the namibian government made a 
policy shift—from institutional rehabilitation of people with disabilities, 
to “community-based rehabilitation” involving provision of assistance to 
the disabled as part of the mainstream society into which they were 
supposed to reintegrate.21 this aimed at facilitating grassroots-oriented 
rehabilitation and raising the awareness of the community about the 
struggles involved in dealing with disability. the community-based ap-
proach, however, did not single out disabled former combatants as a 
special target group, making it difficult to evaluate the impact of this 
approach on their rehabilitation.
 further targeted assistance for disabled former combatants was put 
in place in 1998. this came in response to pronounced protests by ex-
fighters for jobs and welfare assistance. in June 1998 the government 
cobbled together a temporary program for unemployed veterans with 
severe disabilities that entitled them to receive a monthly allowance of 
350 namibian dollars for twelve months. A monthly allowance of 500 
namibian dollars per disabled ex-combatant was subsequently formally 
administered by the ministry of Health and Social Services. Similar 
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allowances were also granted to older former combatants who could not 
be absorbed under the government’s ex-fighter employment programs. 
the former combatants, however, claimed that the allowance was not 
substantial enough to cater for their basic needs.
 there were also no specific reintegration programs for female ex-
combatants who faced the challenge of readjusting to traditional and 
feminized civilian life. the patriarchal society of postconflict namibia 
was disinclined to accommodate difference or promote equality in the 
treatment of female former fighters, politically or socioeconomically. 
female former fighters had to swiftly lose their military identity, slip 
into “gender-appropriate civilian attire, and were sent to refugee rather 
than demobilisation camps, where they received no benefits, retraining 
or psychological counselling to assist them in their reintegration.”22 the 
reintegration process essentially relegated most female former freedom 
fighters to official oblivion against the backdrop of a conservative soci-
ety.23 ex-PlAn single mothers faced greater difficulties in sustaining 
themselves and their children in the absence of dedicated support ini-
tiatives.24 it is thus not surprising that female former combatants were 
active participants in postindependence protests calling for government 
assistance. for instance, a list compiled by the jobless former combat-
ants who demonstrated at okahao in 1998 indicated that there were 
115 women, 65 men, and 7 children gathered at the northern town.25 
Although the “Peace Project” absorbed female ex-fighters, some com-
plained of being allocated arduous jobs such as road work. despite these 
difficulties in the reintegration of ex-combatants, local, regional, and 
international actors had collaborated to ensure that disarmament and 
demobilization was reasonably successful.
Angola
Angola illustrates how local, regional, and international actors can 
collude to undermine the potential for ddr to contribute to durable 
peace. failed attempts at ddr twice contributed to the resumption 
of armed conflict between the military factions of the movement for 
the liberation of Angola (mPlA) and national union for the total 
liberation of Angola (unitA). ddr was first undertaken between 
1991 and 1992 as part of the larger peacekeeping initiative monitored 
by the un’s second verification mission in the country. unAvem ii 
was established in accordance with the bilateral bicesse Agreement of 
may 31, 1991, between the mPlA and unitA, with a mandate to end 
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Angola’s sixteen-year civil war. the comprehensive agreement was an 
outcome of Portuguese mediation observed by the united States and 
Soviet union. it provided for, among other things, a cease-fire, canton-
ment, disarmament, and demobilization of about 200,000 soldiers from 
the opposing forces, alongside the formation of new unified armed force 
of 50,000 and a neutral police force, within an inflexible time frame.26 
Joint political and military commissions—made up of mPlA and 
unitA members and observers from Portugal, the united States, and 
the Soviet union27—were established to ensure the parties’ compliance 
with the bicesse Agreement.
 the unAvem ii–supervised disarmament and demobilization 
process was undermined by questionable confidence in, and political 
commitment to, the process—particularly on the part of unitA—as 
well as by the mission’s poorly designed mandate and the international 
community’s failure to allocate it a substantial budget. unAvem ii, 
with an inadequate mandate to verify implementation of the bicesse 
Agreement by the mPlA and unitA, was essentially an adjunct to 
the Angolan disarmament and demobilization process.28 the un de-
liberately aimed at establishing a resource-stringent “small and manage-
able” mission and accepted a minimal and passive monitoring role.29 
using the analogy of a sporting contest to describe the excessive power 
of the mPlA and unitA in the arrangement, former unAvem ii 
chief military observer major-general michael nyambuya noted that 
“the parties were the players and referees themselves.”30 this made the 
disarmament and demobilization process susceptible to manipulation 
by either party in the absence of effective external supervision.
 unAvem ii, and by extension its supervision of the disarma-
ment and demobilization process, was inadequately funded and poorly 
equipped. notwithstanding that unAvem ii was established two 
years later than untAg, and for deployment in a more complicated 
context, it was allocated uS$132.2 million compared with untAg’s 
uS$416 million. this shortage of funds was aggravated by the consid-
erable insecurity and mistrust between the long-term warring parties. 
both the mPlA and unitA bypassed the disarmament process and 
maintained contingency fighting capabilities.31 unAvem ii military 
observers lacked verification equipment like sensor mechanisms to au-
thenticate the parties’ caching of arms.32
 the lack of an appropriate security infrastructure meant that the 
storage and control of weapons that had been collected from the armies 
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was ineffective. the recommended “double key” system, whereby one 
key to a depository building remains in the custody of local hands and 
the other in un hands, was not feasible in Angola, as tents and grass 
huts used as safe houses could not be padlocked.33 unAvem ii, with 
only 350 military observers, was understaffed, and cases abounded of 
five-person unAvem teams monitoring about 30,000 troops each.34 
that untAg deployed one military observer for every six soldiers is an 
illuminating contrast. typical financial limitations and hardships were 
a powerful disincentive for combatants to disarm and demobilize, and 
many deserted the poorly secured cantonment areas. these inadequa-
cies combined to foster the disappearance of arms. in the run-up to 
the 1992 election, only 65 percent of mPlA and 26 percent of unitA 
troops had been demobilized, while only 8,000 had been integrated 
into the Angolan Armed forces.35 the mPlA also reputedly and clan-
destinely mobilized a crack paramilitary unit of demobilized soldiers, 
whose strength ranged from 1,500 to 10,000 “ninjas.”
 the loopholes in the disarmament and demobilization process al-
lowed the opposing armies to retain or return to combat readiness and eas-
ily resume fighting in the aftermath of unitA’s rejection of the election 
outcome.36 even without a limited mandate, it is hard to conceive that 
unAvem ii could have put ddr back on track when unitA was 
not committed to the peace process and desired to fight on. the result 
was the destructive war of october 1992 to late 1994, which caused at 
least 300,000 human deaths (3 percent of the population), as conserva-
tively estimated by Human rights Watch.37
 Similar obstacles to unAvem ii’s ddr were replayed under the 
subsequent unAvem iii–led peace process. the latter multidimen-
sional mission, established on the basis of the comprehensive lusaka 
Protocol of november 20, 1994, was given responsibility for the “overall 
supervision, control and verification” of the cease-fire, as well as for the 
disarmament and demobilization process.38 unAvem iii’s comprehen-
sive and clear mandate was not underpinned by a commensurate budget, 
personnel, or logistics, with predictable results. former unAvem iii 
chief military observer Philip Sibanda noted that the Security Council 
authorized a military component of half the requested 15,000 troops, 
a situation that was compounded by the provision of a few fixed-wing 
and rotary aircraft, in a country with transport infrastructure devastated 
by prolonged war.39 unitA largely continued its trend of circumvent-
ing ddr. it maintained its elite fighting force while about 12,000 of 
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its almost 68,000 personnel who had registered for ddr systemati-
cally deserted, leaving only about 55,000 in the camps, including 7,000 
underaged soldiers.40 in addition, then–un Secretary-general boutros 
boutros-ghali reported that the military equipment surrendered by 
unitA had mainly been of mediocre quality.41
 in Angola, in contrast to the facilitative regional consensus for 
untAg’s success, certain governments and nationals of neighboring 
states abetted unitA’s sanction-busting activities through lucrative 
“diamonds for military-aid” arrangements.42 this ensured unitA fire-
power, thus undermining ddr and prolonging the conflict. in return 
for diamonds and cash, Zaire’s president, mobutu Sese Seko, allowed 
unitA to use his country (now the democratic republic of the Congo 
[drC]) as a base for stockpiling weapons, in addition to providing the 
movement with Zairian end-user certificates, thereby facilitating uni-
tA’s procurement of weapons.43 burkina faso allowed its territory to be 
used as a transit point for military hardware procured by unitA from 
eastern europe. Congo-brazzaville was a major “sanctions-busting 
hub” for unitA between may and September 1997, and in one incident 
facilitated the purchase by unitA of 10,000 military uniforms. indi-
vidual South African nationals also aided unitA’s military equipment 
procurement from other countries outside South Africa. togolese presi-
dent gnassingbé eyadema reportedly became unitA’s chief provider 
following mobutu’s ouster in 1997, with togo and unitA allegedly 
cultivating a lucrative arrangement under which togo retained a share 
of the military equipment that was imported for unitA. the collusion 
of these regional states and individual gunrunners in sanctions-busting 
galvanized unitA’s military capacity and spoiled Angola’s chances for 
stable peace.
 the un’s smaller observation mission in Angola, monuA, whose 
military component comprised 2,650 personnel, replaced unAvem iii 
on June 30, 1997. unitA exploited monuA’s ineffective surveillance, 
coupled with an abortive sanctions regime, and invested returns from 
illicit diamond trading into a substantial remilitarization program.44 
regional and international countries were complicit in unitA’s 
sanctions-busting and arms-purchasing. it continued its illegal trade in 
“blood diamonds” with europe through the drC, Congo-brazzaville, 
and other conduits such as South Africa, namibia, rwanda, and Zam-
bia, earning about uS$420 million annually, which it could invest in 
arms.45 diamond revenue was invested in the purchase of weapons 
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from a range of suppliers, including Albania and bulgaria, with unitA 
using most of the above-mentioned countries as transit zones. the An-
golan government, for its part, used revenues from oil, mining conces-
sions, and bank loans to obtain military equipment. monuA’s failure 
to complete Angola’s on-and-off ddr ended in remobilization and 
forced conscription by both sides, followed by the return to war.46 this 
effectively dealt the lusaka peace process a death blow and was the 
epitaph of the series of failed un-led ddr attempts. following the 
mPlA forces’ military defeat of unitA in 2002, the government lent 
primacy to a largely domestically managed ddr of the vanquished.
mozambique
the general Peace Agreement (gPA) for mozambique of october 4, 
1992, signed in rome between the ruling liberation front of mozam-
bique (frelimo) and the opposing mozambican national resistance 
(renamo), ended mozambique’s seventeen-year civil war. the gPA 
was the culmination of mediation by a host of regional and international 
actors: the Catholic Church of mozambique, Sant’ egidio Community 
(a Catholic lay organization associated with the vatican), African states 
including botswana, malawi, South Africa, kenya, and Zimbabwe, as 
well as Western countries, namely italy, the united States, the united 
kingdom, and Portugal. the italian government supported the negotia-
tions logistically. rome also contributed about uS$35 million, between 
1990 and 1994, to help fund renamo’s continuing commitment to the 
peace process and its transformation into a political party.47
 the mediation process had been aided by “the radically changed 
peaceful conditions in Southern Africa, especially in neighboring South 
Africa, a country that had previously stoked the wars in the region and 
in mozambique.”48 this came at the end of the Cold War and apartheid 
in South Africa. on the basis of the gPA, the un Security Council, 
through resolution 797 (december 16, 1992), established a mission in 
mozambique, unomoZ, whose military tasks included monitoring 
and verification of the cease-fire, ddr of the parties, withdrawal of 
foreign forces (malawian and Zimbabwean contingents) from mozam-
bican territory, and disbanding of private and irregular armed groups. 
the mission was ten times larger than unAvem ii, as the Security 
Council authorized 7,000 peacekeepers and allocated a budget of 
uS$500 million.49 A cease-fire commission, chaired by unomoZ and 
also comprising representatives from the frelimo government, renamo, 
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Portugal, italy, france, the united kingdom, and the united States, was 
responsible for disarmament and demobilization in approved troop-
assembly areas.50
 the last foreign forces departed from mozambique on June 9, 1993, 
almost seven months past the agreed-upon deadline, but disarmament 
was complicated by the lack of reliable data on the number of troops 
and weapons on both sides. estimates of the number of weapons im-
ported into the country during the civil war range from 500,000 to 
6 million.51 the frelimo government also allegedly distributed 1 mil-
lion Ak-47 rifles to civilian defense units in the 1980s.52 by december 
1995, only a modest number of the total weapons had been collected 
by the unomoZ-chaired cease-fire commission.53 most of the sur-
rendered arms were of poor quality, as both sides retained their high-
quality weapons. to aggravate matters, unomoZ initially gave in 
to politically motivated demands by the government to abandon the 
original plan of sending weapons collected from assembly areas to re-
gional depots pending their destruction.54 fragile security in the as-
sembly points later resulted in the parties agreeing to transfer weapons 
to the unomoZ-guarded depots. Although there are no accurate 
statistics, a large proportion of the 190,000 weapons collected and not 
destroyed during the un operation recirculated locally and regionally.55 
this inflated the estimated millions of uncontrolled firearms that were 
not collected by unomoZ, with serious implications for national and 
regional security. furthermore, from being initially identified as a pre-
requisite to holding elections, the “disarmament train . . . was allowed 
to derail” as elections took precedence.56 unomoZ departed soon 
after the october 1994 elections, without completing the verification of 
disarmament carried out at assembly points. the parties had also made 
it impossible for the mission to carry out its disarmament mandate out-
side the assembly areas.
 recognizing the security threats posed by the proliferation of illicit 
arms after the departure of unomoZ, mozambique’s security forces, 
at times in partnership with neighboring governments, conducted weap-
ons control exercises.57 the governments of mozambique and South Af-
rica—erstwhile enemies for over a decade—significantly demonstrated the 
political and operational will to cooperate in dealing with the security 
threat posed by redundant weapons. in a series of significant joint seek-
and-destroy missions code-named operations rachel, between 1995 
and 2001, South African and mozambican police forces used various 
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incentives and other methods—including cash rewards and modest 
buyback programs—to persuade local communities to pinpoint known 
arms caches throughout mozambique.58 other supplies, even sweets, 
were also used to reward the increased number of women and especially 
children informers. the confidence nurtured between the police forces 
and local communities, together with the substantial numbers of re-
covered weapons, demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the unomoZ 
disarmament exercise, which had resulted only in a continued and 
abundant presence of illicit arms.
 mozambique’s demobilization and reintegration process, which was 
managed by unomoZ during the transition to the october 1994 elec-
tions, was not immune to the potential of collapse. demobilization was 
delayed as the government and renamo respectively withheld 5,000 
and 2,000 troops as “insurance.”59 in the assembly areas, at one point, 
the extent of the mutiny by former combatants, due to poor conditions 
and uncertainties with the lengthy process, threatened the entire peace 
process.60 the revolts included blocking main roads, with combatants 
demanding swift demobilization. notwithstanding the delays, about 
93,000 soldiers were eventually demobilized between 1992 and 1996.61
 the general Peace Agreement emphasized the need for reinte-
gration support for former combatants to guard against immediate 
post-agreement threats to peace posed by unsuccessfully reinstated 
fighters. However, the agreement lacked a specific implementation 
strategy, which resulted in a limited focus on long-term reintegration 
and created a gap between the latter and disarmament and demobili-
zation. Whereas unomoZ had been tasked with disarmament and 
demobilization, the country office of the united nations develop-
ment Programme (undP), the un agency mandated with sustainable 
human development, managed the reintegration support scheme. this 
scheme, a two-year cash compensation program financed by donors 
through a uS$35.5 million un trust fund, was the major component 
of the subsequent reintegration strategy and succeeded in “paying and 
scattering” the demobilized soldiers.62 the quick-fix cash compensa-
tion scheme was not supplemented effectively by other mechanisms 
and did not guarantee the human security of the demobilized, who had 
difficulty with long-term employment-related reintegration. mozam-
bique’s war-torn formal economy was unable to absorb the majority 
of former combatants who also had low levels of education. it is esti-
mated that about half of the former combatants took up unprofitable, 
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small-scale agriculture.63 mozambique’s average gdP growth after the 
conflict was impressive: 6.7 percent from 1993 to 1997, 10 percent from 
1997 to 1999, and 7.7 percent from 2003 to 2007.64 However, this growth 
did not address structural economic inequalities and largely failed to 
benefit the informal economy.65 As a result, the reintegration of former 
combatants suffered.
 two ex-combatant associations were later established to represent 
the interests of their members, and since then former combatants have 
expressed their discontent on a number of occasions.66 even though one 
of these groups, the mozambican demobilized Soldiers Association 
(Amodeg), insisted that members engage in peaceful protests, vio-
lent demonstrations were common in Zambezia and Sofala provinces. 
in 1996, former combatants engaged in sporadic riots against unem-
ployment and in favor of war pensions. in 1997, a undP study revealed 
that 29 percent of demobilized combatants considered themselves not 
reintegrated, while 5 percent feared they would never be integrated due 
to war trauma.67 by April 1999, only 5,000 of the subsequently regis-
tered 22,000 renamo former combatants were eligible for pensions.68 
due to ineffective ddr, some former high-ranking combatants have 
since been involved in criminal enterprises such as illicit arms trading, 
contract assassinations, money laundering, and drug trafficking. other 
associated violent crimes have included raping women at gunpoint and 
burglary by armed thieves.69
 in contradiction to this frequent portrayal of ex-combatants, however, 
the case of mozambique also shows how some war veterans may serve 
as advocates against violence and as agents for change. in 1997, fre-
limo and renamo ex-soldiers joined to establish ProPAZ (for Peace), 
whose volunteers, working in six provinces of the country, helped local 
communities solve conflicts without using violence.
 targeted assistance for special groups such as women and the disabled 
was largely absent in mozambique. female ex-combatants constituted 
a mere 1.48 percent of the total recognized demobilization caste, and 
expressed sentiments of being used for political purposes and being 
neglected during the transition and postconflict periods.70 the low 
numbers of female ex-combatants who formally demobilized can be 
explained by a narrow definition of “combatant” that did not formally 
recognize the different roles and participation of women in the war.71 
As in namibia, against a conservative and patriarchal backdrop, female 
former freedom fighters in mozambique were expected to “simply return 
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to their fields and get cultivating” in accordance with the “proper role 
of women.”72 female ex-combatants have told stories of “renegotiation 
of roles, responsibilities and issues surrounding access to and control of 
household resources. marital relations have been under strain and some 
marriages have not survived. there has been an increase in domestic vio-
lence and women have been exposed to infection by Stds and perhaps 
Hiv/AidS, considering the risk factor involved with the use of astrin-
gents in the vagina.”73 Sally baden quotes a researcher who “witnessed 
many women losing their independence within their homes, their liveli-
hoods; some women [became] even more burdened with work as they 
were abandoned by their war-husbands and, even more tragically, some 
women became victims of violence within their own homes, long after 
the fighting had stopped.”74 At the same time, protests, such as road-
blocks, by disabled ex-combatants housed in assembly areas manned by 
unomoZ, showed the lack of attention toward their special needs.75
 local institutions assisted with contextualized psychosocial sup-
port, healing, and reconciliation. in addition to policies, strategies, and 
programs implemented by the government and local and international 
nongovernmental organizations,76 traditional healing and reconciliation 
practices were used to facilitate the reintegration of combatants, espe-
cially young soldiers, into their communities.77 A study of the life out-
comes of thirty-nine male former child combatants conducted between 
1988 and 2004 found that “the majority of this group . . . have emerged 
from violent childhoods to become trusted and productive adult mem-
bers of their communities and nation.”78 the children’s recovery was 
attributed to a “combination of rehabilitation programs, community sen-
sitization campaigns, community projects, and traditional ceremonies.”79 
Community-based strategies such as ritual cleansing and appeasement 
or “treatment” ceremonies, through which a person’s identity as a demo-
bilized soldier dissolved,80 were irreplaceable rites of passage. Some of 
these reintegration ceremonies also included a civic education compo-
nent meant to assist former combatants adjust to civilian livelihoods.
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is a political endeavor, 
yet it is critical for peacebuilding. favorable outcomes depend as much 
on local and regional politics and initiatives as on international grand 
plans. At the local level, there can be no substitute for the parties’ un-
questionable political will and commitment to ddr. in namibia, the 
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parties were willing to implement and support the ddr process, whereas 
in Angola the protagonists were not. for their part, the mozambican 
parties subverted the process by exploiting the loopholes occasioned by 
the un operation’s preoccupation with holding the country’s october 
1994 postwar elections regardless of progress in disarmament.
 international actors and neighboring states either facilitate or im-
pede ddr through the demonstration of constructive commitment 
and support or willful violation of their obligations. the international 
community and particularly the un Security Council’s powerful West-
ern countries were more prepared to financially underwrite un opera-
tions in namibia and mozambique with a significant positive impact 
on ddr, especially in the case of the former. Angola’s neighboring 
states and international gunrunners poured arms and ammunition into 
unitA’s hands, helping the rebel movement effectively skirt its ddr 
obligations. in mozambique’s case, the postwar government and its 
post-apartheid South Africa counterpart engaged in collaborative post-
unomoZ weapons collection exercises to rid mozambique of some 
of its superfluous arms and ammunition.
 Although ddr may be the flip side of the logically strategic es-
tablishment of the unitary and legitimate national defense forces that 
are crucial for postconflict peace- and statebuilding, it should not be 
crafted as an afterthought, because effective ddr guarantees the 
human security of superfluous fighters. it is essential that stakeholders 
constructively coordinate the resolution of tensions that may threaten 
the process. Any institution trying to design contextually relevant ddr 
programs without doing harm in postconflict situations should consider 
the specific needs of the demobilized combatants according to age, sex, 
and physical condition. local institutions can certainly be harnessed to 
assist with the macro-management of ddr as the case of mozambique 
shows. this is important for the long-term success of ddr, given the 
usually time-specific external engagement with the process.
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f I f T e e N
Peacebuilding without a State
The Somali Experience
C H r i S t o P H e r  C l A P H A m
t h e  s o m A l i  s tAt e  h A s  b e e n  C o m P r e h e n s i v e ly  d e s t r o y e d .  t h i s 
is no temporary breakdown of public institutions, such as occurred in 
uganda in the dying days of the tito okello regime before yoweri mu-
seveni’s national liberation movement took power in January 1986. it 
is not a collapse of public order, such as that from which the former bel-
gian Congo had to be rescued by a united nations (un) intervention 
shortly after independence in June 1960. Somalia cannot even properly 
be characterized as a “failed state”: there is simply no state that could 
be said to have failed. the nonexistence of the state goes well beyond 
the absence of anything that could be described as a government, since 
mohamed Siad barre fled from mogadishu in his last operational tank 
in January 1991. the elements out of which a state must be constructed 
are equally nonexistent. the shells of the burnt-out ministry buildings 
of what used to constitute the Somali government contain no bureau-
crats, nor is there any cadre of qualified people, waiting in the wings, 
who could be organized into any new machinery of government. there 
is no tax collection system. there is no army or police force. Such gov-
ernment-like functions that continue to be performed are accomplished 
outside any hierarchical structure of order, and are organized through 
local-level clan structures, through the networks of Somali islam, or by 
businessmen operating outside either the constraints or the protection 
that the state provides. the mobile telephone system, catering to an 
essential need of one of the world’s most garrulous peoples, works far 
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more efficiently without a state than in almost any other part of the 
world where it works with one.
 the condition of statelessness poses challenges at many levels. for 
the people who manage the international system, it poses an affront to 
what that system ought to be: it is taken for granted that this system is 
composed of states, which form the essential building blocks of global 
public order, and an area of inhabited territory that lacks such a structure 
is not just anomalous but permits the existence of “pirates” or “terror-
ists” who operate outside the bounds of acceptable behavior. for Somali 
people, though the state’s absence (given some of its activities when it 
did exist) is not an entirely unmixed curse, the lack of public order leads 
to massive numbers of deaths (not only directly through conflict, but 
indirectly through the absence of effective distribution networks, medi-
cal facilities, and other services), imposes restrictions on movement, and 
prevents any form of “development” that might eventually provide the 
foundation for a better life.
 for the purposes of this volume, the absence of a state in Soma-
lia poses a particularly stark challenge to the idea of “peacebuilding,” 
and to the processes through which peace might plausibly be built. 
Peacebuilding, as devon Curtis makes clear in the introduction of this 
volume, involves setting priorities and “establishing legitimate institu-
tional hierarchies at the level of the state.” throughout the literature, it 
is broadly assumed that peacebuilding is about forming a state in which 
the conflicting parties have a share, and which in turn can then furnish 
the essential infrastructural basis for continued peace, notably in terms 
of order and development. even much of the literature on Somalia, 
indeed, starts from the premise that the first step on the road back to 
peace must be to reestablish the Somali state—in a form characterized 
by all the desiderata of the “good governance” agenda beloved of aid 
agencies—because there is simply no conception of how “peace” can 
exist without one.1 if, as is all too clearly the case, this premise cannot 
be met, then the desired outcome that the state is intended to achieve 
cannot be provided either.
 What happens, therefore, when there is no state, and precious little 
chance of forming one? this chapter starts by examining the tangled 
relations between Somalis and the states that have been imposed on 
them, which provide the essential background to the sources of state-
lessness and the problems of peacebuilding through statebuilding. it 
then looks at some of the attempts that have been made to build peace 
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in Somalia: the bringing together of different factions and the negotia-
tion of some settlement in which they could all share—an enterprise 
that has invariably collapsed, not least because it assumed the existence 
of a state or the possibility of creating one. the chapter next examines 
two further kinds of peacebuilding, on the one hand in Somaliland (and 
to some degree Puntland) by building a partial state on the basis of local 
institutions, on the other hand through the union of islamic Courts 
(uiC), which briefly attained power in mogadishu and beyond in the 
second half of 2006. much of this, inevitably, is a distinctively Somali 
story, and given the peculiarities—breakdown not only of the Somali 
state but much more basically of Somali society as a whole—it cannot 
be assumed that there are “lessons” from Somalia that may be applied to 
the rest of Africa and beyond. the Somali case does nonetheless have 
resonances that may be of broader interest.
Somalis and the State
over very large areas of Africa, the “state” was a colonial invention, 
imposed on peoples who had survived for countless generations without 
one. rarely, however, was the mismatch between indigenous cultures 
and colonial statehood so blatant as in the Somali case. this mismatch 
was made all the more stark by the very homogeneity of the Somali 
people.2 external observers have often been surprised that a territory 
having the apparent advantages that most of its colonially created 
equivalents lack—common nationhood, language, religion, culture, and 
lifestyle—should prove quite unable to sustain a common structure of 
government. A paradox this may be, but not a contradiction. the very 
fact that Somalis had so much in common meant that there was no need 
for the colonial state, as there often was elsewhere, to bring together and 
mediate between the disparate peoples encompassed within the newly 
created boundaries. Somalis had their own mechanisms for managing 
the often fractious relationships between themselves, to which the co-
lonial state was generally an irrelevance, and at worst positively damag-
ing. these mechanisms, moreover, were profoundly antithetical to the 
hierarchies of statehood. nineteenth-century traveler richard burton’s 
famed comment on the Somalis—“each man his own sultan”3—per-
fectly expressed the rejection of this obligation to obey that underlies 
the institutions of governance. Where individuals did gain authority, 
this was derived from their wisdom, piety, or ability to articulate some 
project of broad appeal, and was personal to themselves. What passed 
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for the colonial state in british-ruled Somaliland involved little more 
than the supervision, with the lightest of touches, of existing conflict-
management mechanisms, while in italian Somalia, colonial statehood 
remained almost entirely alien to the indigenous population.
 the first republic, which derived from the independence of the 
former british and italian Somalilands and their union on July 1, 1960, 
and was overthrown by the military coup of october 1969, perfectly 
illustrated this mismatch. democratic to the point of anarchy, it rested 
on chaotic coalitions of clan factions for which the principal nationalist 
party, the Somali youth league, provided a forum for squabbles over 
patronage, rather than an ideology or an organization. the one element 
that could be used to foment a sense of national unity, the claim for the 
“reunification” with Somalia of Somalis who had been incorporated by 
colonialism into the neighboring territories of kenya, ethiopia, and the 
french Somali Coast (djibouti), ensured bad relations with its neigh-
bors and with other African states for which the colonial borders were 
sacrosanct. it also led to the decision to form, with Soviet assistance, an 
army that might be used to reclaim these territories, but that actually 
posed the greatest danger to those who had created it.
 the 1969 coup, ushering in the regime of mohamed Siad barre, 
which was to rule Somalia for the next twenty-two years, tested the 
idea of Somali statehood to destruction, by seeking to impose a level 
of central control that Somali society was entirely unable to sustain. in 
essence, Siad sought to create a hierarchical structure, backed by the So-
viet union in exchange for key military facilities in a strategically sensi-
tive area. He sought to legitimize these structures through the project 
of Somali unification. the formal abolition of the clan system and the 
establishment of a marxist-leninist vanguard party were never more 
than window-dressing: in practice, the government was run, as everyone 
recognized, by an alliance of the three clans—marehan, ogaden, and 
dulbahante—with which Siad was most closely associated. the raison 
d’être of this entire enterprise collapsed as early as 1977–78, when So-
mali forces overran the Somali-inhabited area of southeastern ethiopia, 
the Soviet union switched sides to the ethiopians, and the Somali army 
was driven out by an ethiopian and Cuban force, with heavy Soviet 
backing.4 the next thirteen years witnessed the long drawn-out death 
throes of the Somali state, as Siad sought to hang on by means of oppor-
tunistic international and domestic clan alliances, in the course of which 
any coherent Somali army gave way to the clan militias that paved the 
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way for subsequent “warlords.” A particularly vicious incident in this 
descent into anarchy, the systematic bombing of the northern capital 
of Hargeisa in mid-1988, which resulted in an estimated 40,000 deaths, 
destroyed whatever legitimacy the state may still have possessed in the 
northern part of the country. When Siad eventually fled in January 1991, 
this led not to the takeover of government by an organized guerrilla 
force (as happened in uganda in 1986, and in ethiopia in may 1991), 
but rather to the destruction of government and the partition of the 
national territory, mogadishu included, between the fiefdoms of dif-
ferent factions. Although at one level a well-organized opposition was 
not needed to overthrow the collapsing Siad regime (in sharp contrast, 
notably, to the herculean effort required to oust the derg in ethiopia), 
more fundamentally both government and guerrillas were victims of the 
fissiparous nature of Somali society.
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding
the first and most familiar external involvement in Somalia, opera-
tion restore Hope, launched by the united States with un backing 
and participation late in 1988, was not a statebuilding or peacebuilding 
exercise at all. A disastrous attempt at post–Cold War “humanitarian 
intervention,” it sought to guarantee the safe delivery of humanitarian 
relief, but without tackling the underlying conditions that had created 
the need for the relief in the first place.5 the entire operation lacked a 
plausible political agenda, and the uS and un forces found themselves 
sucked into domestic political conflicts between those Somali factions 
that benefited from their presence and those that lost out. Whether a 
properly resourced, long-term intervention, with an agenda explicitly 
geared to rebuilding the Somali state, could have succeeded therefore 
remains an open question, though i remain extremely skeptical. A very 
high level of political skill, and a deep familiarity with Somali norms and 
practices, would have been needed in order to prevent the statebuilders 
and peacebuilders from becoming embroiled in the conflicts of a deeply 
factionalized society, and there is nothing in the experience of external 
intervention in other failed or fractured states to suggest that it could 
have worked in Somalia. there is a very high likelihood that “statebuild-
ing” would merely have taken the form of a one-size-fits-all model de-
rived from Western norms, and would rapidly have degenerated into a 
personal autocracy sustained by external military and financial patronage, 
replicating the characteristics of Somali states that had failed in the past. 
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even that, however, could scarcely have been worse than the outcome 
that actually ensued, when faction leaders (often described as “warlords”) 
were able to garner the prestige derived from having seen off the united 
States and its allies, together with considerable quantities of cash and 
weapons, and entrench themselves far more effectively than before.
 it is scarcely necessary to recount the long and dismal history of at-
tempts at externally brokered Somali “peace settlements” from the time 
of the un withdrawal in early 1995 onward, since these all shared essen-
tially the same structural difficulties, which in turn fatally undermined 
the objectives that they were intended to achieve. three such difficulties 
were particularly damaging. first, there was the question of whom to 
negotiate with. the attempt to re-create a Somali state, in a situation 
in which the imposition of a framework of public order by prolonged 
and expensive external military force was not a viable option, entailed 
brokering some kind of deal with existing faction leaders, since they 
alone controlled the force that would be needed to make the deal stick, 
or that could conversely be used to destroy it. this strengthened faction 
leaders as a whole, since they thus became the recognized interlocutors 
between Somali society and the outside world, even when they enjoyed 
little legitimacy within the sections of Somali society that they claimed 
to represent. At the same time, it led to further factionalism, since the 
way for subordinates to gain external recognition was to present them-
selves as independent operators, who would thus need to be bought off 
by the external brokers. one result of this was to destroy whatever lever-
age might otherwise have been possessed by local mediators, commonly 
described as “elders,” through whom the endless squabbles between dif-
ferent clans and factions had previously been patched up. in much of 
Somalia, and especially in the towns and their immediate hinterlands, 
“elders” in this sense no longer exist, their authority having been fatally 
undermined by lawless and heavily armed young men with varying al-
legiances to different faction bosses.
 Second, there was the question of what to negotiate about. Since there 
was no state, there was no prize, control of which would have provided 
a tempting inducement to faction leaders to agree among themselves, 
and moderate their behavior in order to help maintain an instrument 
of governance that they could all use. there was no scenario equivalent 
to the negotiations between the national Party government and the 
African national Congress in South Africa between 1990 and 1994, 
or between outgoing colonial regimes and their would-be nationalist 
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successors during African decolonization. there were no ministries, 
no buildings and staff and organizational structures that would confer 
some kind of power on the politicians who controlled them. there were 
only the empty shells of destroyed former government buildings, and 
the empty titles of minister of this or that which could be bandied about 
in the negotiation process. nor was there any shared “idea of the state”: 
any set of common attitudes and beliefs about how a Somali state would 
work, or what it would do, that might create an ideology of statehood 
sufficient to temper the divisions or moderate the demands of the poli-
ticians who would have to form it. the only inducement on offer was 
therefore external payoffs of one kind or another that would provide 
specific incentives to individual politicians to participate in particular 
settlements, but that could not be used to develop a common agenda 
for a workable structure of government. Signatures on dotted lines, in 
the comfortable hotels in other countries of the region in which the 
negotiations took place, could not be made to stick in the form of real 
political settlements on the ground in shattered Somalia.6 many in-
ducements were in any event zero-sum: plums that were offered to one 
faction leader could not go to another, and an adverse allocation would 
be accepted only until a shift in bargaining power enabled a leader to 
challenge it. outbreaks of vicious fighting on the ground were often 
orchestrated to strengthen one faction against another at critical points 
in the negotiations: the “peacebuilding” process itself fomented conflict.
 third, there were problems deriving from Somalia’s place in a fractured 
region—and, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, in a fractured 
world. Central to the regional dilemma was ethiopia. As the dominant 
state in the region, with a large Somali population in its own territory and 
a long and indefensible border with Somalia, ethiopia had a legitimate 
interest in any settlement, and an incentive to moderate conflicts that 
would inevitably spill over its own frontier. At the same time, the 
antipathy between highland ethiopians and Somalis runs long and 
deep: between highlander and lowlander, agriculturalist and pastoralist, 
Christian and muslim, hierarchical statist society and egalitarian 
stateless society. Any ethiopian involvement thus stirred more than the 
usual Somali resentment at external intervention. Correspondingly, any 
settlement that excluded ethiopian interests, or those Somali factions 
best disposed toward accommodation with Addis Ababa, would arouse 
ethiopian efforts at destabilization, for which the means of manipulation 
through clan factions were always available, while any settlement that 
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broadly met with ethiopian approval would likewise seem illegitimate 
in the eyes of many Somalis. beginning in 1998, these problems were 
compounded by the war between ethiopia and eritrea; and especially 
after eritrea’s defeat in 2000, the regime in Asmara sought to encourage 
a “second front” in southeastern ethiopia, to relieve the pressure in the 
north. this activity was entirely opportunistic: state power in eritrea, 
as in ethiopia, lies with Christian highlanders, and the threat posed by 
militant islam to the regime in Asmara was more intense than that for 
its southern neighbor, all the more so since inept eritrean diplomacy 
aroused the hostility also of muslim regional states. And if this was not 
enough, the global “war on terror” revived uS interest in Somalia, as a 
threatening ungoverned space in which islamist militants could thrive, 
and from which indeed attacks on the uS embassies in nairobi and 
dar-es-Salaam, and on the uSS Cole in Aden, appeared to derive. like 
ethiopia, which rapidly signed up as a uS regional ally and enforcer, the 
united States had an interest in “stability” in Somalia, and in the creation 
of an effective Somali state; but in practice, as the result of a general 
suspicion of islam as a basis for governance, and a particular concern 
to liquidate Al-Qaida militants using Somali territory, its impact was 
almost entirely counterproductive.7 in short, external engagement in 
Somalia not only completely failed to create the state-based structures 
of public order that outsiders viewed as the essential precondition for 
“peace,” but also—by introducing new prizes for faction leaders and 
tying internal divisions to external agendas—intensified the existing 
levels of conflict.
Alternative Approaches
At this point it is helpful to look at two very different approaches that 
have been used to create structures of order on a largely indigenous basis, 
in different parts of Somalia, and that—in dramatically different ways—
provide some insight into alternative ways of managing Somali conflicts.
The Somaliland Experiment
the first of these is the establishment in 1991 of the breakaway re-
public of Somaliland, encompassing the formerly british-ruled area 
of the united Somali republic formed in 1960. Somaliland has now 
maintained an effective but unrecognized independence for two de-
cades, and has (for all its problems) achieved a level of peace, order, 
and participatory government markedly greater than in former italian 
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Somalia to the south. the formal basis for the Somaliland regime lies 
straightforwardly in the model of postcolonial statehood. its boundaries 
are those of the former british colony; its legal claim to separate statehood 
lies in the five-day existence of an independent Somaliland in June 1960, 
and the assertion that the union with Somalia then voluntarily entered 
into can likewise be voluntarily rescinded; and whenever opportunity 
offers, the regime emphasizes its “britishness,” in order to advertise its 
difference from its ex-italian counterpart.8 in practice, however, this is 
no standard postcolonial state. the institutional legacy of british colo-
nialism has been virtually obliterated, and nothing remains of the forms 
of rule—administration, military, taxation system—that elsewhere en-
sured continuity between colonial and independent statehood.
 instead, the Somaliland state rests on complex processes of interclan 
bargaining. Central to its creation is the fact that one group of clans, the 
isaaq, accounts for a dominant share of its population; it is also centrally 
placed within Somaliland, and very few isaaq live in the other Somali-
inhabited territories. Somaliland was thus of necessity an isaaq-dominated 
state. the isaaq had been particularly opposed to the Siad barre regime, 
in which they had little part, and from which—most obviously in the 
bombing of Hargeisa—they had badly suffered. despite divisions both 
between and within the different isaaq clans, in respect of which the 
isaaq differ little from other Somalis, and the need to reach some ac-
commodation with non-isaaq clans within the territory (notably the 
issa and gadabursi from the dir clan family in the west of the terri-
tory, and the dulbahante and Warsangeli from the darod in the east), 
Somaliland thus possessed a core population with a commitment to its 
“own” state, and a history of alienation from the former Somalia. it was 
also able to draw on some political continuity through the Somali na-
tional movement, the dominant political party of the 1950s and 1960s, 
which provided a framework through which to facilitate the process of 
political reconciliation. its aged leader, mohamed Haji ibrahim egal, 
became the first president of newly independent Somaliland.9
 A second key factor was the process by which the new state was es-
tablished, as the culmination in may 1991 of the “grand Conference of 
the northern Peoples,” or in local terms a Guurti, at which representa-
tives of all the northern clans met and argued over the course of several 
weeks about the best way forward for the peoples of the region following 
the collapse of the government in mogadishu. this provided a legiti-
mate basis for the historic decision to assert the region’s independence, 
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founded in indigenous custom and allowing for deals to be made and 
compromises to be reached that would ensure some place in the new 
state for all of its constituent peoples. Again, this should not obscure 
the levels of factionalism, breaking out on occasion into violence, that 
have continued to affect Somaliland politics. the dulbahante and 
Warsangeli, in particular, have clan territories that overlap across the 
former colonial frontier into the area of ex-italian Somalia that comes 
under the sway of the quasi-autonomous “Puntland” administration. 
Prominent individuals in each of these clans may classify themselves 
as Puntlanders at one moment, and Somalilanders at another, as the 
power of the rival regimes in the border areas, and the inducements 
on offer from each side, shift one way or the other. in the west, the 
issa especially are heavily involved in the government of djibouti, and 
have a substantial population in the Somali region of ethiopia, again 
allowing them to play off different options. even within the “core” isaaq 
constituency, clan and subclan rivalries remain, and the Habr yunis clan 
in particular have often been at odds with the government in Hargeisa. 
this, however, is part of the normal cut-and-thrust of Somali politics, 
which is never “stable,” in the sense of the regular processes of authori-
tative management associated with “government” in statist systems of 
rule. “Authority” in Somali society is inherently volatile; any settlement 
is necessarily temporary, and may be disowned or need to be negotiated 
as the situation changes; violence is never far beneath the surface, and is 
indeed a normal accompaniment to the process of bargaining; the elders’ 
task of managing conflict is never done. However troubling to outsiders, 
this is how the Somali system works, and any process of “peacebuilding” 
can never plausibly do more than provide for the mechanisms through 
which inherent conflicts can in some way be mediated.
 A third and paradoxical element in the comparative success of the 
Somaliland experiment is the ambiguous engagement of the inter-
national community. the avowed aim of the Somaliland government 
is to achieve full recognition as a sovereign state, with a place in the 
united nations and the African union, that can engage with other 
international actors, not least with potential investors and aid donors, 
on the same basis as other states throughout the world. it is indeed 
bizarre that Somalia continues to be recognized globally as a state, 
even though it has not for two decades had a government capable of 
exercising even minimal control over most of its notional territory, 
whereas Somaliland is formally recognized by not a single other state 
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or international institution, even though it has managed for a similar 
period to govern most of its own territory with at least a modicum of 
peace and participation. the unfulfilled quest for recognition places 
the Somaliland authorities under constraints analogous to those fac-
ing southeastern european states seeking admission to the european 
union: they are obliged—subject to other pressures that they also must 
take into account—to behave in a way that is in line with their overall 
goal. Whether Somaliland would retain a broadly consensual political 
structure should this quest be achieved, and should the greatly increased 
aid funds generated by recognition become available to its government, 
must remain very much open to question.
The Islamist Experience
the second and more distinctive experiment in building peace by creat-
ing new structures of authority is the regime established in mogadishu 
by the union of islamic Courts in early 2006, and rapidly extended to 
much of the rest of Somalia in the latter part of that year, before its 
collapse in the face of ethiopian invasion (supported by the united 
States) in late december. despite this collapse, the islamist forces have 
since regrouped, and present a significant and increasing threat to the 
transitional federal government, which is formally recognized by most 
of the international community but which has been quite unable to im-
pose its authority over much of the national territory, and particularly 
mogadishu. Any plausible future structure of governance, at least in 
southern Somalia, is far more likely to derive from the islamists than 
from any other source.
 there can be little doubt that the union of islamic Courts was, at 
base, a genuine indigenous initiative, seeking to harness the unifying 
values of islam in order to bring peace to people who had suffered badly 
from the lack of it. during the long period after 1991 when no state ex-
isted, institutions based in islam had spontaneously formed in order to 
meet the critical needs of the population. the most prominent among 
these were the courts, created for the most part within the territories of 
particular clans or subclans, and meting out justice with popular consent 
on the basis of sharia. to these were added schools and medical services, 
as well as other social services, that could draw on the charitable pre-
cepts of islam and provide some substitute for the collapsed institutions 
of the state. Another and particularly important way in which islam 
substituted for state failure was the provision of banking and money 
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transfer systems, notably Al-barakaat, through which funds from the 
diaspora could be channeled, with remarkable speed and efficiency, to 
needy recipients inside the country.
 from early 2006 these initiatives coalesced into a single organization, 
the uiC, which drove out the principal “warlords” struggling to con-
trol mogadishu and almost instantly created a level of peace within the 
shattered city that had not been seen for over fifteen years. Checkpoints 
between the territories of different subclans (or just armed gangs) were 
dismantled, and public order was restored. People were able to travel 
peaceably around the city and beyond, in a way that had previously been 
impossible. there was, to be sure, a price to be paid: islamic justice was 
swift and often brutal, and the edicts of the new rulers rested on a purist 
and intolerant form of islam that was at odds with the easygoing faith 
of most Somali muslims; attempts were even made to prohibit watch-
ing the 2006 football World Cup on satellite television—an odd move, 
since both iran and Saudi Arabia were playing. the benefits of the uiC 
were nonetheless enormous, and the area under its control rapidly ex-
panded as the factional militias that had previously carved up Somalia 
between them melted away before it. it became possible—in the most 
optimistic scenario—to envisage a united and peaceful Somalia, under 
strict but broadly consensual islamist control.
 this vision was most obviously aborted by ethiopian intervention, 
launched by a disciplined and well-equipped army to which the large 
but ragtag forces assembled by the uiC could offer no effective resis-
tance. behind this, of course, lay the challenge that an islamist gov-
ernment in Somalia posed to both regional and global hegemons. the 
regime in Addis Ababa had watched with growing alarm as the islamist 
bandwagon rolled, apparently unstoppably, toward its own frontier, re-
viving along the way the irredentist project of uniting all Somalis under 
a common flag. the Somaliland regime was even more directly threat-
ened. militarily, the best option open to the ethiopians was to seek to 
stop the uiC within Somalia, before it crossed the frontier and created 
further mayhem within ethiopian territory. Although the initiative 
undoubtedly lay with the ethiopian government, it was able to gain 
the support, both military (notably through satellite intelligence) and 
diplomatic, of the united States, to which an overtly islamist regime 
in a strategically sensitive part of the post-9/11 world was unthinkable. 
in the event, the task proved much easier than either the ethiopians or 
the Americans could have expected. the uiC forces melted away; the 
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ethiopian army went on to occupy mogadishu; and fleeing islamists 
were pursued through the mangrove swamps of southwestern Somalia. 
the old warlords were back, now under obvious and much resented 
ethiopian protection, and peacebuilding returned to square one.
 behind this debacle, however, lay deeper problems in peacebuilding 
through islam in Somalia that need to be more fully explored. to start, the 
contradictions of external engagement with Somali peacebuilding on the 
part of broadly Western-oriented agencies were precisely replicated on 
the islamist side. the engagement of the uiC with the global movement 
for islamic renewal, and notably with Wahhabi elements based in Saudi 
Arabia, affected the balance of power within the uiC, and strength-
ened those factions associated with a more “purist” or “fundamentalist” 
conception of islam, which was at odds with the popular islam of most 
Somalis.10 this weakened the union’s legitimacy with its popular base—
a weakening that could only have intensified as its initial allure wore off 
and normal factional politics resumed—increased divisions within the 
union itself, and led to the articulation of agendas that could only ring 
alarm bells, both regionally and globally. it led to an incursion of foreign 
islamists, for whom Somalia became the latest frontline in a global proj-
ect, in a way that also reduced indigenous legitimacy and increased ex-
ternal distrust. the uiC even received a contingent of eritrean military 
advisers, with whose bewilderment one can only sympathize: nothing 
could be further from the ruthlessly disciplined eritrean People’s libera-
tion front than the chaos they encountered in Somalia.
 the uiC likewise exemplifies a recurring pattern in Somalia politics, 
illustrated by the jihad of Sayyid mohamed Abdalla Hassan in the early 
twentieth century, or the Somali youth league in the 1950s. in each 
case, a single leader or small group, drawn from a particular clan base, 
generates a charismatic project with an appeal extending well beyond 
the original core. As further supporters join in, the movement develops 
a momentum of its own, normal clan divisions are suspended, and even 
skeptics are obliged to take part, lest they be left high and dry by the 
defection of their own followers. As its scope increases, however, so the 
movement’s coherence diminishes, until a sharp check to its ambitions 
leads it to fall apart into its constituent sections, and “normal” politics 
resumes. the core of the uiC lay in the Ayr subclan of the Habr gidir 
clan, and even if it had not been abruptly stopped by ethiopian armed 
forces, it is virtually inevitable that its limitations would have been re-
vealed in some other way.
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is there a future for Somali Peacebuilding?
in a volume on peacebuilding in Africa, Somalia lies at the bottom of 
the pile. in all of the other cases considered, there is at least some frame-
work within which a settlement of conflicts can be attempted, and in 
several of them the essential elements of a postconflict settlement are 
in place, and the challenge lies in tackling issues such as demobiliza-
tion, security sector reform, economic reconstruction, and institution 
building, in order to prevent a backslide into war. Somalia, in contrast, 
remains mired in ongoing conflict. the fractious nature of Somali so-
ciety itself, the chronic instability of the regional environment, and the 
insertion of the region into global conflict agendas conspire to prevent 
the emergence of any plausible framework for peace. the engagement 
of external actors, even those seeking to stabilize Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa as a whole, has almost invariably intensified conflict rather 
than moderated it.
 there are nonetheless two pointers to how a measure of peace might 
be promoted in Somalia, no matter how difficult these may be to imple-
ment in practice. the first is that peacebuilding has to precede state-
building, not the other way round. A viable state can only be the outcome 
of a successful process of reconciliation: it can never be the means by 
which public order is restored. the resistance to hierarchy inherent in 
Somali society as a whole, the lack of effective instruments of control 
at the disposal of a revived Somali state, and the inevitable collapse of 
such a state into a squabble for benefits among its constituent factions 
all underline the futility of the “peacebuilding through statebuilding” 
approach that is often the key to success elsewhere.
 the second pointer is that, precisely because of its stateless, fractious, 
and often violent nature, Somali society has over time developed its 
own mechanisms for conflict management that—no matter how time-
consuming, uncertain, and often exasperating (to outsiders) these may 
be—nonetheless provide the only plausible way forward. the key to the 
success of such mechanisms is their insulation from external engage-
ment, the effect of which is to destabilize the delicate and ever-changing 
relationships between domestic actors. in a globalized world, in which 
Somalis themselves are among the most globalized of peoples, this is 
an extremely difficult task. it must involve at the minimum the forcible 
suppression of means by which Somalis—with piracy as the most obvi-
ous example—destabilize the rest of the world, and a recognition that 
the pursuit of agendas such as radical islam can have only highly adverse 
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consequences for domestic well-being. Paradoxically, these two ways in 
which the Somali imbroglio is seen to threaten external interests may 
well be at odds with one another: the most effective way to suppress 
piracy would be through the imposition of an islamic state capable of 
imposing domestic order, at the cost of arousing international hostil-
ity. but within the limits that the outside world can tolerate, the only 
practicable solution is to let Somalis build their own peace, in their own 
way, themselves.
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